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TO STEF TIJS 

FOREWORD 
This book is dedicated to Stef Tijs, professor of Operations Research 
at the Mathematical Institute of the Catholic University of Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands. Many reasons are at the root of this book. The most com-
pelling one is probably the fact that each of the authors received his/ 
her introduction to game theory from Stef Tijs. His enthousiastic way of 
teaching was so convincing for them that they started research in game 
theory (or a related topic). His important role in their research pro-
grams can best be explained by numbers. For 9 of the 12 authors, Stef 
Tijs was advisor of their M.S.D. thesis. For 10 of them he was/is advisor 
of their Ph.D. thesis as well. Game theoretical research in the Nether-
lands can be compared with a star with spurs. The inner star is Stef Tijs. 
The spurs are his students, fed with his ideas as a base for their own 
research. 
A second main reason for the dedication of this book to Stef Tijs is due 
to his leading role in the development of game theory in· the Netherlands. 
Game theory in the Netherlands started with the Ph.D. thesis of Stef Tijs 
in 1975, "Semi infinite and infinite matrix games and bimatrix games". 
From that moment on he started building a game theory school. Step by 
step each subfield of game theory was covered by one of his students. 
On a national as well as on an international scale he took care of the 
establishment of the vital scientific contacts. Once a year he organizes 
an International Game Theory Day. Many famous game theoreticians visited 
Nijmegen; among them Shapley, Selten, Maschler, Schmeidler, Raghavan, 
Parthasarathy and Filar. To keep the Dutch game theoreticians in touch 
with each other, he organizes a seminar on game theory 4 to 6 times a 
year. At these seminars young researchers have the opportunity to speak 
about their current work. 
Concerning Stef's own scientific contributions to the development of 
game theory : since 1976 he has published more than 60 outstanding papers 
in international journals. 
Summarizing, it may be said, without overstatement, that game theory 
in the Netherlands owes its present state to Stef Tijs and it is this fact 
that tre authors wish to memorize and emphasize with this book. The fact 
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that the appearance of this book coincides with Stef's 50-th birthday, 
August 31, 1987, is no coincidence at all. 
For the technical realization of this book we are indebted to the 
Rijksuniversiteit Limburg, particularly to the Economic Department for 
granting us secretarial facilities. 
Yolanda Paulissen typed the manuscript and took care of the layout. 
She had a difficult task since she worked under considerable time pressure. 
Yolanda, however, performed her job so extremely well, that this book had 
never become what it is without her persistent devotion and excellent 
typewriting. 
Finally we wish to express our gratitude to the Centre for Mathematics 
and Computer Science at Amsterdam for publishing this book. 
Hans Peters 
Koos Vrieze 
Rijksuniversiteit Limburg 
August, 1987. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This book consists of surveys in game theory. Each author was asked 
to provide a survey on his/her specific topic within the field of game 
theory (or related topics), eventually supplemented with recent own re-
sults. Thus this book serves two goals. On the one hand, on a large 
number of topics, the reader has the opportunity to get a review of the 
state of the art of that topic. On the other hand, since recent develop-
ments are mentioned and since on several places proof methods are indica-
ted, the reader may become familiar with the present way of thinking in 
game theory. 
Game theory is a mathematical theory which deals with decision situa-
tions in which several persons with diverging preferences are involved. 
The foundation of game theory was laid by John von Neumann in 1928 
("Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele", 1928, Math. Annalen 100, pp.295-
320). However the theory received widespread attention only after the 
publication of the fundamental book of Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
("Theory of Games and Economic Behavior",1944, John Wiley & Sons, New 
York). Nowadays it is understood that game theory is able to provide in-
dispensable tools for mathematical models and notions of many disciplines 
like economy, the social sciences, the political sciences and sociobiology. 
Traditionally, game theory has been divided into two classes : coope-
rative games and non-cooperative games. This division can also be traced 
in this book. Chapters I through V are concerned with non-cooperative 
game theory, while the chapters VII through XII deal with cooperative game 
theory. The remaining two chapters (VI and XIII) contribute to the rela-
ted topics. 
Chapter VI is based on the observation that the same mathematical 
structure is underlying many problems in decision making under uncertainty 
and in game theory. It is argued that many theorems can be interchanged 
for these two fields merely by interchanging "state of nature" and "player". 
In chapter XIII some social choice problems are treated. In the 
theory of social choice the strategic aspects of game theory is partially 
vanished. Individual preferences over the alternatives, among which a 
group of individuals has to decide, lead to decision procedures which de-
vii 
termine the collective choice of preference. The emphasis is laid on the 
"impossibility" of procedures which, at first sight, are socially defen-
dable and have appreciable properties. 
In non-cooperative game theory no binding agreements between the 
players are allo>11ed. Then solutions of such games have to be self-enfor-
cing in the sense that, once it is agreed upon, nobody has an incentive to 
deviate. This point of departure leads to the Nash-equilibrium as solution 
concept for non-cooperative games, i.e. a strategy combination with the 
property that no player can gain by unilaterally deviating from it. Even 
games with a finite number of pure strategies for the players may have 
several or an infinite number of equilibrium points. Hence, in the lite-
rature, several refinements of the Nash-equilibrium are proposed. In 
chapter I the most important ones are introduced in an intuitive way for 
games in extensive form. Also the relation with the associated normal 
form game are explained. Chapter II focusses on games in normal form. 
For the two player case the set of equilibria are analysed in detail. 
Several refinement concepts are considered and interrelated. Chapter III 
presents a survey on two player games with incomplete information. As 
well the zero-stm case as the nonzero-sum case are treated. Many problems 
remain open in this field. A recent International Conference on Game 
Theory (Columbus, Ohio, June 18-24, 1987) showed that this field may re-
joice in a wide interest at the moment. 
Chapters IV and V deal with stochastic games. A stochastic game is a dy-
namic system, where at discrete time epoques the players have to make a 
decision, resulting in immediate rewards and in a Markovian stochastic 
movement of the system. In chapter IV a survey on zero-sum stochastic 
games is given. Three criteria are considered discounted -, average -
and total reward stochastic games. In chapter V nonzero-sum stochastic 
games are treated. 
In cooperative game theory binding agreements between the players 
play the crucial role. This is reflected by the way cooperative games are 
defined, namely in characteristic function form, i.e. for each possible 
coalition (subset of players) a real number is given, being the worth of 
the coalition. In games with transferable utility (chapters VII through 
XI) the question is, how to divide the worth of the grand coalition. 
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Since the before mentioned book of Von Neumann and Morgenstern, several 
solution concepts are proposed. In chapter VII the probably most impor-
tant one is analysed in detail : the core, i.e. the set of efficient di-
visions which are individual rational and group rational. In chapter VIII 
the T-vector and her properties are considered. This solution concept is 
introduced by Tijs (S.H. Tijs, 1987, "An axiomatization of the T-value", 
Math. Social Sciences 13). It appears to have several nice properties, 
making it suitable for application in many economic situations. 
In chapter IX the subclass of superadditive games are dealt with. For 
these games formation of coalitions makes sense, as the worth of the union 
of two disjoint coalitions of players is at least as large as the sum of 
the worth's of the separable coalitions. 
In the chapters X and XI the theory of cooperative games is applied to 
multiperson combinatorial optimization problems. The worth of coalitions 
results by solving certain combined combinatorial problems. In chapter X 
for seven classic combinatorial problems the multiperson version is formu-
lated. It is shown, for instance, that for five of them the core is non-
empty. In chapter XI linear optimization games are considered. Special 
attention is p~id to problems with discrete action spaces. An attempt is 
made to unify the existing methods. 
Finally, chapter XII is concerned with bargaining theory, which belongs 
to the theory of cooperative games without side-payment. 
In games without side-payment a set of feasible outcomes is given together 
with a status quo point, being the outcome if the players do not succeed 
in agreeing on some feasible outcome. 
A survey is presented with respect to the nonsymmetric Nash bargaining 
solutions with emphasis on different axiomatic characterizations and the 
economic meanings of these axioms. 
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CHAPTER I 
EQUILIBRIA IN NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES 
by Eric van Damme 
ABSTRACT 
This paper surveys the main equilibrium concepts that have been propo-
sed for (strictly) noncooperative games, i.e. games without communication 
in which no binding agreements nor commitments can be made. The most im-
portant properties of these concepts are presented and illustrated by means 
of simple examples. Emphasis is on concepts that are especially relevant 
for extensive form games. 
The author should like to thank Stef Tijs for introducing him to Game 
Theory and for his encouragement at critical stages of the development. 
This paper owes a considerable intellectual debt to work of Harsanyi and 
Selten and Kohlberg and Mertens. Financial support from the Deutsche For-
schungsgemeinschaft through the Sonderforschungsbereich 303 is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Game Theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models of con-
flict and cooperation between rational individuals. It is a normative 
theory of which the aim can be described as 'We wish to find the mathema-
tically complete principles which define "rational behavior" for the par-
ticipants in a social economy and to derive from them the general charac-
teristics of that behavior' (Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947,p.31)). 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern insist that the principles ought to be perfect-
ly general, but that we may be satisfied if we can find solutions only in 
special cases. (After more than 40 years it must be admitted that solu-
tions have been found only in very special cases (such as 2-person zero-
sum games and games with perfect information) and that even in these cases 
the proposed solutions have not been universally accepted) . A solution is 
defined as a set of rules which tell each player how to behave in every 
situation that may conceivably arise and Von Neumann and Morgenstern advo-
cate the indirect method to find such a solution (or theory) . This method 
consists in 'imagining that we have a satisfactory theory of a certain de-
sired type, trying to picture the consequences of this imaginary intellec-
tual situation and then in drawing conclusions from this as to what the 
hypothetical theory must be like in detail. If this process is applied 
successfully it may narrow down the possibilities for the hypothetical 
theory of the type in question to such an extent that only one possibili-
ty is left, - i.e. that the theory is determined' (Von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1947,p.147)). Let us assume that this indirect method is success-
full and that it has produced a unique, absolutely convincing, solution 
for a certain game. If this theory is common knowledge, then each player 
knows the rule recommended to each opponent, and a player will play accor-
ding to the theory only if his recommended strategy maximizes his payoff 
when played against the strategies of the others. Hence, in game theore-
tic terminology, a self-confirming theory must prescribe a Nash equilibrium. 
Nash's (1951) equilibrium concept is the most fundamental and most im-
portant one in Game Theory. It is relevant for (strictly) noncooperative 
games, i.e. games in which there are no possibilities for communication, 
correlation or (pre-)commitment except for the ones that are explicitly 
allowed by the rules of the game. It should be stressed that a noncoope-
rative game does not prohibit cooperation, it just requires that all possi-
bilities for cooperation be explicitly modelled. It will be clear that, 
therefore, a noncooperative model may have to be very detailed and it may 
be more convenient to omit, for example, possibilities for communication 
from the game and to build them into the solution concept instead (in this 
case one obtains Aumann's (1972) concept of correlated equilibria) One 
may even wish to build commitment possibilities into the solution concept 
(one then enters the realm of cooperative game theory). However, it should 
always be possible to return to fully noncooperative modelling and to jus-
tify the solution concept by means of Nash equilibria of the underlying 
game. In this paper, attention will be confined to strictly noncooperative 
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games, hence, to Nash equilibria. 
A noncooperative game can be represented either in extensive form 
(which describes the actual evolution of the play in every detail) or in 
normal form (in which attention is just on outcomes). Both models are 
formally introduced in section 2 and in the sections 2 and 6. We discuss 
the issue of whether these 2 representations are equivalent. (The main 
problem is whether the normal form, which condenses all de~ision making 
before the actual play, involves self-commitment or not). In section 3 we 
try to clarify some confusion concerning the concept of Nash equilibria. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern's indirect argument discussed above establishes 
only that being a Nash equilibrium is necessary for being a rational solu-
tion of a noncooperative game, it does not establish sufficiency and in-
deed not all Nash equilibria are satisfactory. Specifically, not all Nash 
equilibria are self-enforcing, i.e. not all equilibria have the property 
that, when recommended, no player has an incentive to deviate. In the 
sections 4 and 5, the drawbacks of the Nash concepts are discussed, we try 
to identify which criteria self-enforcing equilibria should satisfy and in-
troduce some more refinedequilibriumconcepts based on such criteria. 
Finally, in section 6 it is discussed whether a meaningful equilibrium con-
cept for extensive form games can be based on the normal form. 
2. NONCOOPERATIVE GAME MODELS 
A noncooperative game can be represented in extensive form, in normal 
form or in agent normal form. This section provides the formal definition 
of these forms as well as of the basic concepts associated with them. We 
open with the extensive form, which is the most detailed model and which 
closely follows the actual evolution of the play, i.e. this model exactly 
specifies 'who moves when', 'who knows what' and 'what are the consequen-
ces of which'. Throughout, attention is confined to finite games. If the 
discussion appears too terse, the reader may turn to Selten (1976) or Van 
Damme (1983) for a more leisurely presentation. 
An n-person extensive form game is a sixtuple r (K,h,P,p,U,C) of 
which the constituents are as follows : 
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(i) K is a finite directed tree with a distinguished vertex (the origin). 
The interpretation is that the game starts at the origin and moves 
from vertex to vertex until an endpoint is reached. The nonterminal 
vertices are decision points, a decision determines an edge of the 
tree, henca, a vertex where the game continues. We write x < y if 
vertex y comes after x in the tree and Ex denotes the set of edges 
originating at x, i.e. if e E Ex then e connects x toy where y 
comes immediately after x. 
(ii) h is the payoff function, it specifies for each player i and each end-
point z the payoff hi(z) that i receives when z is reached. (No 
payoffs are cashed during the game) . 
(iii) P is the player labelling, i.e. P labels each decision point with 
the player who has to move at this point. We write Pi for the points 
where player i has to move, hence P. = {x;P(x) = i}. Some points 
l. 
may be labeled with O, the interpretation being that in this case a 
chance move (move of nature) is performed. 
(iv) p specifies the probabilities of the chance moves, hence, px is a 
probability distribution on Ex for every x E P0 . 
(v) u = cu 1 , .•. ,Un) where ui is a partition of Pi into information sets 
of player i. The interpretation is that, if x E Pi is reached by 
the play, then player i only knows that the element u E Ui that con-
tains x is reached. Each partition Ui must satisfy the following con-
dition: IfuEU. andx,yEu, then\E \ \E \and-,(x<y). In 
l. x y 
words, nodes at the same information sets have the same number of 
edges (see (vi)) and each play intersects each information set at 
most once. 
(vi) c = (Cu)u specifies for each information set u (u E UiUi) the choices 
available at u. Formally, Cu is a partition of U xE u Ex such that for 
each c E Cu and each x E u, the choice c contains exactly 1 alterna-
tive from Ex The interpretation is that, if player i takes the 
choice c at u and if the play actually is at x E u, then the play 
moves to the node after c n E . 
x 
As an illustration, consider the game of Fig. la. Player 1 has to move 
at the origin where he has to choose between A and B. (Note that the ori-
4 
gin always constitutes a singleton information set). If 1 chooses B, the 
game terminates with 1 receiving 2 and player 2 getting 4. If 1 chooses 
A, he has to choose again, this time between L and R. Player 2 has to 
move after player 1 has chosen for the second time and, as indicated by 
the dotted line connecting the decision points of player 2, this player 
does not know whether 1 has chosen L or R, hence, the 2 decision points of 
player 2 constitute an information set. Player 2 has 2 choices, 1 and r, 
where 1 corresponds to the left branches that originate in 2's decision 
points. The game terminates after player 2 has moved. Each endpoint de-
termines a pair of payoffs with the understanding that the first number 
always is the payoff to player 1. 
3, 1 
0,0 0,0 Cl ,6 1 r 
I ' /r \ 1 ~\ r I 2 AL 3,1 0,0 0,0 Cl, 6 AR 
L BL 2,4 2,4 
BR 2,4 2,4 
Fig. la Fig. lb 
Next, let us turn to the question of how to play an extensive form 
game, i.e. to the concept of strategy. A belzavior strategy oi of player i 
specifies a probability distribution on Cu for every information set u of 
this player. If Oi actually specifies a choice (i.e. a degenerate distri-
bution) for each u E Ui, then oi is called a pure strategy. A mixed stra-
tegy .. s a probability distribution over the (finite) set of pure strate-
gies. Note that mixed strategies correspond to prior randomization where-
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as behavior strategies involve only local randomization. Clearly, every 
mixed strategy induces a behavior strategy, but the converse need not hold 
since a mixed strategy allows correlation between actions at different in-
formation sets. If the game has perfect recall so that every information 
set always discloses what one has known or done in the past, then there is 
no need for such correlation and in this case the restriction to behavior 
strategies is justified (Kuhn (1953), Formally f is said to have perfect 
recall if for any i, all information sets u,v E Ui and all choices c E Cu 
if some point in v comes after c (i.e. after some edge in c) then all points 
in v come after c). Throughout, attention will be confined to games with 
perfect recall. 
A strategy corribination a is an n-tuple of strategies, one for each 
player. When each player has chosen his strategy (and decides to stick 
to it), then an outside observer can determine the outcome of the game. 
Specifically, each strategy combination 0 uniquely determines a probabili-
ty distributionJP(0) over the endpoints of the tree, which will be called 
the outcome of 0. Player i's expected payoff resulting from 0 is the ex-
pectation of hi with respect to JP(0), hence Hi (0) = l:zhi (z) JP(z I 0). Two 
strategies 0i and 0i' will be said to be equivalent (resp.payoff equivalent) 
ifJP(0\0'.) =JP(0\0'.') for all 0 (resp. H.(0\0'.) = H.(0\0'.') for all 0 and 
l l J l J l 
j) where 0\0i is short hand notation for (0 1 , ... ,0i_ 1 ,0i,0i+l'"""'0n). In 
Fig. la the strategies BL and BR are equivalent. The strategy combination 
0 is said to be (payoff) equivalent to 0 1 if 0i is (payoff) equivalent to 
0'. for all i. 
l 
We now turn to games in normal (or strategic) form. An n-person nor-
mal form game is a 2n-tuple (s 1 , ... ,Sn,H 1 , ... ,Hn) where Si is a finite, 
nonempty set (of pure strategies of player i) and Hi : s ~JR is this 
player's payoff function (S = XiSi) with the interpretation that players 
choose their strategies simultaneously and independently. Such a game can 
be viewed as a special kind of extensive game, but the above discussion 
makes it clear that we can also associate a normal form game to each game 
f that is originally given in extensive form (just let Si be player i's 
pure strategies in f). Fig. lb displays the normal form of Fig. la with 
the usual convention that player 1 chooses a row. This example already 
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shows that usually the normal form contains a lot of redundancy, for 
example, payoff equivalent strategies just appear as duplications. The 
game that results after all such duplications have been removed will be 
called the semi reduced normal form. If one also eliminates pure strate-
gies that are duplications of a mixture of other pure strategies, the redu-
ced noY'TT/al form results. 
If one replaces an extensive game by its normal form, one condenses all 
decision making into stage without actually limiting the freedom of 
action that a player has, so one may argue (as in Von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1947,p.85) that the 2 representations are fully equivalent. How-
ever, note that the normal form assumes that there is full coordination 
between choices of the same player at different information sets and this 
need not be the case in the extensive form. For example, a player may be 
a corporation which has, at different information sets, different agents 
(all with the corporation's payoff function) acting on behalf of it. If 
the agents receive coordinated instructions, the normal form is appropriate, 
but if they act independently, they should be treated as seperate, active 
players. In this case, not the normal form is relevant, but rather the 
agent noY'TT/al form, i.e. the normal form game< c ,H > where u E U.u. and 
u u u l l 
H = H if u EU. 
u i l (see Selten (1976)). Hence, before normalizing a game, 
one should first determine which agents are active and which are dummies. 
One may argue (philosophically) that 'person i at information set u' is 
always different from 'person i at information set v' if u ¥ v so that the 
agent normal form is always appropriate and this brings us to the second 
problem associated with the equivalence asserted above : The normal form 
seems to imply immediate commitment, since as soon as one has chosen a 
strategy one has to stick to it whereas deviations are possible during an 
extensive game. This author does not consider this issue problematic for, 
if one would deviate from one's strategy in the extensive game, one would 
forsee this at the beginning of the game and also deviate in the normal 
form. Hence, we will take the point of view that normal form strategies 
are relevant (at least for players which are single individuals) , but 
we will return to the issue in section 6. Let us conclude by remarking 
that for games with incomplete information, this view is in agreement with 
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that of Harsanyi (1968) : In an incomplete information game, different 
types of the same player act fully independent so that the agent normal 
form is appropriate and not the normal form. 
3. NASH EQUILIBRIA 
Let f be a game in which player i's payoff function is Hi. The stra-
tegy a• is said to be a best reply against a if 
.i. 
H. (cr\o~ l 
J. J. 
max Hi(O\Oj_'l. 
0~ I 
J. 
a' is a best reply against a if the above equality holds for all i. If a 
is a best reply against itself, then a is called a Nash equilibrium. 
Hence, a is a Nash equilibrium iff no player can gain by deviating unila-
terally from a. Note that the Nash concept excludes reactions from j to 
deviations from i. This is without loss of generality since all such 
possible reactions are already captured by the rules of our (noncooperati-
ve) game. Also note that, if r is an extensive game with perfect recall, 
then 0 is a Nash equilibrium of f in behavior strategies if and only if 0 
is payoff equivalent to a mixed strategy equilibrium of the normal form 
of f. Nash (1950) has shown that any (finite) game has a Nash equilibrium. 
Also the structure of the set of equilibria has been investigated in some 
detail (see e.g. Jansen (1981) for the 2-person case). For later referen-
ce, we collect some properties in Proposition 1. (We say that property P 
holds for generic extensive games if, for any n-person extensive structure 
(K,.,P,p,U,C), the set of payoff functions h EJRnz for which P fails to 
hold is contained in a closed set with Lebesgue measure zero (Z denotes the 
endpoints of K)). 
Proposition 
(i) (Nash (1950)). Every game has a Nash equilibrium. 
(ii) (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)). The set of Nash equilibria consists 
of finitely many connected components. 
(iii) (Kreps and Wilson (1982)). Generic extensive form games have fini-
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tely many Nash equilibrium outcomes so that all equilibria in the 
same component yield the same outcome. 
(iv) (Harsanyi (1973a)). Generic normal form games have an odd number of 
equilibria which vary differentiably with the payoffs of the game. 
This proposition may be illustrated by means of the game of Fig. 1. 
Let 0 <a< 2 and S = 1. Then there are 2 components, viz {(AL,l)} and 
{(o1 ,o2 J} where o 1 is any mixture of BL and BR and o 2 chooses 1 with pro-
bability at most 2/3. The first component yields the outcome (3,1), the 
second yields (2,4). (Note that this game already shows that 'finite' 
cannot be replaced by 'odd' in Proposition l(iii)). As the normal form 
from Fig. lb is nongeneric, (iv) does not apply. However, the subgame 
starting at the second decision node of player yields a generic normal 
form and this has Nash equilibria (L,l), (R,r) and (o 1 ,o2 ) where o 1 chooses 
both L and R with probability 1/2 and o 2 chooses 1 with probability 
a(3+a)- 1 , hence, the equilibria indeed vary differentiably with a. 
In the Introduction we already justified the Nash concept and explained 
why this concept is fundamental to noncooperative game theory. However, 
this (indirect) justification does not imply that unaided players will ne-
cessarily choose equilibrium strategies, nor have we specified an equili-
briating (learning) process by means of which they could reach equilibrium. 
Hence, Nash equilibria may be irrelevant from a positive point of view and 
it is not clear why one should actually play a Nash equilibrium. Of course, 
if a game has a single Nash equilibrium, if this is strict (i.e. each 
player will loose by deviating) and if one expects the opponents to play 
the equilibrium, then one should also play one's equilibrium strategy, 
but why should one expect the others to play the equilibrium ? Following 
0chelling (1960) one can argue that in this case only the equilibrium is 
a focal point which serves to coordinate expectations. (This should espe-
cially be the case if all players are familiar with the argument from the 
Introduction). 
However, even in this case, the Nash concept has been challenged in 
Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984). Consider Fig. 2a which has a unique 
equilibrium at (R 1 ,R2 ). Bernheim and Pearce argue that one should not ne-
cessarily expect this equilibrium to be played as players might analyse 
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the game with inconsistent beliefs (player 1 (2) might firmly believe that 
2 (1) is going to play L2 (L 1) in which case the outcome will be (L 1 ,M2 ); 
more generally, all outcomes are 'rationalizable' in this game). Of course, 
one must ask where such inconsistent prior beliefs might come from given 
that players have common information about the game. In fact, Aumann (1987) 
strongly argues in favor of common priors and Bernheim (1986) has shown 
that common priors do indeed lead to Nash outcomes rather than just ratio-
nalizable outcomes. 
12 M2 R2 
5,0 0,5 0,3 11 R1 11 R1 
0,5 5,0 0,3 12 B,8 0,6 12 1,-1 -1,0 
3,0 3,0 1, 1 R2 6,0 6,6 R2 0,2 0,0 
Fig. 2a Fig. 2b Fig. 2c 
Schelling's focal point argument looses much of its force when there are 
multiple equilibria as in Fig. 2b. In thJs game, there are 2 strict pure 
equilibria, viz (L 1 ,L2 ) and (R 1 ,R2 ) and the former Pareto dominates the 
latter so that one might say that (L 1 ,L2 ) is more focal. On the other 
hand, Ri is a much safer strategy as it guarantees a payoff of 6 no matter 
which action the opponent chooses. So should one be surprised if players 
fail to coordinate their choices and the outcome turns out to be (L 1 ,R2 ) ? 
To this point one can respond by saying that Nash equilibrium is best vie-
wed as a 'presolution concept' rather than as a solution concept, since 
being a Nash equilibrium is only a necessary condition, not a sufficient 
condition for being the rational solution of a game. Hence, as soon as 
game theorists have found out which of the above 2 arguments is more pro-
minent, they will be able to ascribe a unique solution to the game of 
Fig. 2b and Schelling's argument again applies. Consequently, it seems 
important to have an equilibrium selection theory. One such theory has 
been developed in Harsanyi and Selten (1987), but lack of space prevents 
a discussion here. 
To guarantee existence of equilibria it is essential that one allows 
randomization and equilibria in mixed strategies have always given rise 
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to puzzlement and misunderstanding. After all, the idea of basing impor-
tant decisions on a toss of a coin is hard to accept. Furthermore, such 
equilibria seem difficult to interpret as randomization is not necessary 
for one's own purposes but rather to keep others from deviating. Hence, 
on the face of it, mixed strategy equilibria seem unstable as a player al-
ways has alternative (pure) best replies available. These issues can be 
illustrated by means of the game of Fig. 2c. This game has ((2/3,1/3), 
(1/2,1/2)) as its unique equilibrium, i.e. player 1 chooses his first stra-
tegy with probability 2/3, player 2 randomizes equally. The equilibrium 
payoff is zero to both players, but the equilibrium strategies do not gua-
rantee this payoff (one might get less if the other deviates). Hence, 
equilibrium strategies need not have maximin properties, and Aumann and 
Maschler (1972), therefore, suggest that player i might prefer to play Ri. 
However, (R 1,R2) is not an equilibrium so that player 2 will deviate if 
he expects 1 to follow the Aumann/Maschler suggestion. Also note that, 
in equilibrium, a player does not play for himself but against his oppo-
nent : player i randomizes to make j (j f i) indifferent. The latter is 
made even clearer if one changes player 1 payoff s but leaves the best re-
ply structure unchanged, i.e. L1 (resp. R1) remains a best reply against 
L2 (resp, R2). Then player l's equilibrium strategy remains constant, 
but 2's equilibrium strategy varies, hence, for a fixed best reply struc-
ture, a player's equilibrium strategy depends only on his opponent's pay-
offs, which all seems quite paradoxical. 
Harsanyi (1973a) has argued that these paradoxes and seeming instabi-
lities are caused by the fact that our model is too much idealized, i.e. 
it fails to incorporate the actual uncertainty that each player has about 
his opponents' payoffs, and that the difficulties disappear in a fully 
specified model. To illustrate Harsanyi's approach, consider Fig. 2c but 
now assume that player i does not know j's payoff associated to (R1 ,R2), 
each player knows his own payoff, however. (For simplicity we assume 
that only the payoff to (R 1 ,R2) is uncertain). Specifically, suppose that 
i considers j's payoff (if j € {1,2}) associated to (R 1 ,R2) to be a 
random variable £Xj where Xj has a nonatomic distribution Fj and £ is 
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• 
close to zero (X 1 and X 2 are assumed independent) . As player 1 does not 
know the realization of x2 , he does not know whether player 2 will play 
L2 or R2 . Let g be the probability player 1 assigns to 2 playing L2 . 
Then 1 will play L 1 for all realizations x 1 of x1 with x 1 ~ (2g-1)/(1-g)s. 
Note that 2 is ~ndifferent with probability 0 so that his best response 
is almost always unique and pure. Consequently, player 2 will assign a 
probability p = F 1 ((2g-1)/(1-g)s) to the event that 1 plays L 1 and this 
player will play L2 for any realization x 2 with x 2 ~ (3p-2)/(1-p)s, hence, 
the ex ante probability that 2 plays L2 is F 2 ((3p-2)/(1-p)S). Clearly, 
to have an equilibrium in this game, the beliefs of the players should be 
consistent, i.e. 
g F 2 ((3p-2)/(1-p)s) and p Fl ((2g-1)/(1-g)S). 
These equations have a solution (Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem) and as s 
tends to zero, all solutions converge to the mixed equilibrium of the 
game of Fig. 2c. Hence, the mixed equilibrium of the original game can be 
viewed as the beliefs associated with the pure equilibrium of the more de-
tailed model in which the incomplete information is taken into account. 
Harsanyi (1973a) has shown that this interpretation holds for all mi-
xed equilibria of generic normal form games so that the above mentioned 
instabilities are indeed seeming instabilities.(It should be remarked that 
this issue has not been completely settled for extensive games, and that, 
if one accepts Harsanyi's interpretation, it is not clear whether a normal 
form game is equivalent to its reduced normal form). 
Above we argued that only Nash equilibria can be self-enforcing, but we 
did not discuss whether all equilibria have this property, i.e. whether 
for any Nash equilibrium, players will always follow the recommendation to 
play this equilibrium. The answer to this second question is negative as 
the Nash concept suffers from at least 3 drawbacks : 
(i) Nash equilibria need not be sequentially rational, i.e. in extensive 
form games, they may prescribe suboptimal behavior at unreached in-
formation sets (so that a player will deviate when such a set is un-
expectedly reached) , 
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(ii) Nash equilibria need not be robust with respect to perturbations in 
the data of the game (so that players may deviate as soon as they 
entertain the slightest doubt about these data), and 
(iii) Nash equilibria are not 'independent of irrelevant alternatives', 
i.e. they need not persist when unreasonable (e.g. dominated) ac-
tions are eliminated from the game. 
In the next sections we will study these issues more deeply and discuss 
some more refined equilibrium concepts that have been introduced to over-
come these drawbacks. 
4. EQUILIBRIA IN EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES 
The following simple example may demonstrate that Nash equilibria need 
not be sequentially rational. 
(3, 1) (0,0) 
'"" (2,2) 
Fig. 3 
If player 2's decision node is reached, player 2 will choose L2 , hence, 
backwards induction suggest that the solution of this game should be (R 1,L2 ). 
This indeed is a Nash equilibrium, however, there is a second equilibrium, 
viz (L 1 ,R2). In the latter equilibrium, 2 threatens that he will choose 
R2 if he is reached and it is an equilibrium only since 2's decision point 
is not reached so that 2 does not have to execute his threat. Of course, 
a rational player 1 should foresee that 2's threat is empty and that 2 
will choose L2 if he is actually reached. Hence, (L 1 ,R2J is not self-en-
forcing as player 1 has an incentive to deviate. 
The above argument generalizes to all games with perfect information 
(i.e. games in which all information sets are singletons) and it leads to 
the conclusion that only equilibria that can be found by dynamic program-
ming \baakwards induation) are self-enforcing. Note that for generic per-
fect information games no player is ever indifferent between 2 choices so 
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that almost always we obtain a unique solution. Several comments are in 
order concerning this solution 
(i) In experiments one finds that empty threats are carried out and that 
the game theoretic solution has nearly no predictive power (see e.g. 
Guth et.al. (1982), Guth and Tietz (1987)). 
(ii) Fig. 3 can be interpreted as a game in which first an entrant 
(player 1) decides about whether to enter a certain market or not 
and next the existing monopolist decides about whether or not he 
should fight this entry (R2 = fight entry) . Suppose the same mono-
polist plays this game in n towns (n finite) against n different 
players such that player k is informed about the outcome in any town 
1 with 1 < k. Intuition suggests that the monopolist will fight en-
try early on in the game to build a reputation for being tough, but 
backwards induction shows that this strategy is incredible : player 
2 should give in (choose L2 ) in all towns. This phenomenon is 
known as the chain store paradox and was first described in Selten 
( 1978) . 
(iii) Backwards induction meets with philosophical problems. Namely, the 
induction process assumes that, given any point in the tree, from 
then on all players will play 'rationally' whereas the point itself 
might have been reached only as the consequence of 'irrational' be-
havior. Hence experience may refute the rationality assumption. To 
be specific, in the above chain store game the 'rational' solution 
tells player 2 always to choose L2 . Now suppose you are player 1 in 
town 25 and you observed that 2 choose R2 on all 24 previous occa-
tions. Do you still decide to choose R1 ? (See Selten (1978) and 
Binmore (1985) for more on this issue). 
(iv) Adding a little bit of imperfect information prevents the backwards 
induction to operate and this may in fact change the solution com-
pletely. For example, suppose that in the chain store game, there 
is a small probability that 2 actually prefers R2 to L2 . Then, 
after fought entry, entrants will consider it more likely that the 
monopolist actually likes to fight and in this case the above dis-
cussed intuitive (agressive) strategy becomes credible. In fact, 
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no matter how small the ex ante probability is that the monopolist likes 
to fight, the intuitive strategy becomes the unique solution as long as 
the number of towns is sufficiently large (see Kreps and Wilson (1982b)). 
Despite the philosophical problem discussed above, game theorists have 
accepted the backwards induction principle and issue (iv) has motivated 
them to try to extend it to games with imperfect information. Selten 
(1965) proposed the concept of subgame perfect equilibria, i.e. of Nash 
equilibria that induce an equilibrium in every subgame. In Fig. 5 only 
(R 1 ,L2 ) is subgame perfect as there is a subgame starting with the move 
of player 2. In Fig. la, if a< 0, then (L,l) is the unique equilibrium 
of the subgame, so that only (AL,l) is subgame perfect. (In this case, 
(BL,r) is an imperfect equilibrium. Formally, if x is a decision point 
in an extensive game f then the restriction fx of f to Kx (i.e. to the 
subtree starting of x) is a subgame if for every information set u of r 
either u c K or u n K 
x x 
The strategy combination O is said to be a 
subgame perfect equilibriwn if o (i.e. the restriction of o to r ) is a 
x x 
Nash equilibrium of fx for every subgame fx. An equilibrium is said to 
be subgame consistent (Selten (1973)) if it prescribes the same equili-
brium in any 2 subgames r and r that differ only in the history about 
x y 
how x (resp. y) is reached. (Note that subgame consistency generalizes 
the idea of Markov strategies). Proposition 1 (i) implies that, if ox is 
an equilibrium of the subgame rx, then ox can be extended to an equili-
brium of r (just replace rx by its equilibrium value and take an equili-
brium of the truncated game) . The following Proposition is a trivial con-
sequence of this observation. 
Proposition 2 
(i) Every game has a subgame perfect equilibrium, in fact, it has even 
a subgame consistent equilibrium. 
(ii) Generic extensive games with perfect information have a unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium. 
The concept of subgame perfectness has found many applications in eco-
nomics, but space restrictions prevent a discussion at this point. (An 
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application which has come to play a prominent role in economic theory is 
Rubinstein (1982), for some other applications, see Van Damme (1987)). 
Unfortunately, the subgame perfectness concept is not satisfactory from a 
theoretical point of view. Namely, suppose Fig. 3 is changed so that R1 
is duplicated, i.e. player 1 chooses simultaneously between L1 ,R1 and Ri, 
player 2 does not get to hear whether R1 or Ri was chosen, but the payoffs 
after Rl are identical to those after R1 • This duplication does not chan-
ge the strategic situation, but the new game has no proper subgames, so 
that in particular the equilibrium (L 1 ,R2 ) is subgame perfect. To elimi-
nate such drawbacks, Selten (1976) proposed the concept of perfect equili-
bria. This concept is based on the 'tPerribling hand' pPinciple, i.e. it is 
assumed that each player makes mistakes with an infinitesemal probability 
so that each choice will occur with small positive probability which makes 
every information set ,reachable and thereby eliminates empty threats and 
nonoptimal behavior. Formally, to be a pePfect equilibPiwn it is required 
that at each information set each player's action is optimal not only 
against the equilibrium actions of the others but also against small per-
turbations thereof (hence a perfect equilibrium of the extensive form is 
just a perfect equilibrium of the agent normal form (see section 5)). 
In the modified game of Fig. 3, if player 1 chooses R1 and Ri with po-
sitive (mistake) probability, then 2 has only L2 as a best reply so that 
only the equilibria with payoff (3,1) are perfect. 
Note that the perfectness concept establishes sequential rationality 
by requiring robustness. Such robustness may be difficult to verify, 
however, and this motivated Kreps and Wilson (1982a) to introduce the 
slightly modified concept of sequential equilibria. The idea underlying 
this concept is that at every information set a player will construct be-
liefs about in which point of the set he actually is and optimize, given 
these beliefs, against the opponents' strategies. Kreps/Wilson require 
that these beliefs be common and common knowledge and that they be consis-
tent with the equilibrium strategies, which they formalize by insisting 
that beliefs can be explained by means of small deviations from the equi-
librium. Formally, a system of beliefs assigns to each nonterminal node x 
a nonnegative number µ(x) such that a probability distribution results 
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over each information set. By Bayes' rule, an interior behavior strategy 
combination o (i.e. each choice occurs with strictly positive probability) 
induces a unique system of beliefs µ (0) given by µ (x I O) = JP (x I 0) / JP (u I O) 
for x E u. More generally, µ is said to be consistent with o if (O,µ) = 
lill\(Ok,µ (Ok)) fer some sequence (Ok)k of interior strategy combinations. 
For each information set u, the 
tributionJPµ(O) on the terminal 
u 
er i's expected payoff with 
assessment (O,µ) induces a probability dis-
nodes of the tree and H~ (0) denotes play-
i u 
respect to this distribution ( JPµ (0) is obtained 
u 
by first drawing ~ point in u according to µ and then playing the game as 
described by o). Finally, o is said to be a sequential equilibrium if 
there exists a system of beliefs µ that is consistent with O such that O is 
a Nash equilibrium of the agent normal form game in which agent u of player 
i has payoff function Hµ . iu 
It is not difficult to show that a sequential equilibrium is subgame 
perfect. The converse is not true, as in the modification of Fig. 3 dis-
cussed above, no matter which beliefs player 2 has, he will always choose 
L2 so that all sequential equilibria yield payoff (3,1). It is also not 
difficult to prove that every perfect equilibrium is sequential, but again 
the converse does not hold. Consider Fig. la with a= 6 = 0. In this game 
(BR,r) is a sequential equilibrium that is not perfect. (Note that (R,r) 
is an equilibrium of the subgame). Namely, if player 1 mistakenly chooses 
A and L with a positive probability, then 1 is strictly better than r so 
that perfectness requires 2 to choose 1, but, consequently, only (AL,l) is 
a perfect equilibrium. It is easily checked that, in this example, the 
difference occurs only for a nullset of payoffs and Kreps and Wilson have 
shown that this holds generally. Formally, we have. 
Proposition 3 
(Selten (1976), Kreps and Wilson (1982a)). 
(i) Every game has a perfect equilibrium. 
(ii) Every perfect equilibrium is sequential and every sequential equili-
brium is subgame perfect. 
(iii) Generically, almost all sequential equilibria are perfect and the set 
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of sequential equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of perfect 
equilibrium outcomes. 
Unfortunately, since the concept of sequential equilibria virtually 
does not restrict the beliefs at unreached information sets, it allows 
incredible beliefs which in turn may sustain 'unreasonable' equilibria. 
To illustrate this claim, consider Fig. la with a< 0, S > 0, such that 
(AL,l) is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Now, change the game 
such that the 2 decision points of player 1 are condensed into 1 so that 
1 chooses between AL, AR and B simultaneously and such that player 2 is 
not reached when 1 chooses B. If player 1 is a single player and not a 
team, one can argue that this modification does not change the strategic 
situation, however, it does change the set of sequential equilibria. In 
the modified game, (B,l) is a sequential (even perfect) equilibrium as 
player 2 can justify playing 1 by believing that 1 has chosen AR in case 
he is unexpectedly reached. However, these beliefs are nonsensical 
if a < O, then AR is dominated by both AL and B so that 2 believes that 
has chosen his worst action ! If 2 is reached, it only makes sense to 
believe that 1 has chosen AL and (AL,l) is the unique sensible equilibrium. 
Note that this Fo'l'WaPds Induation argument is based on a dominance rela-
tionship that is present only in the normal form, hence, concepts as se-
quential and perfect equilibria, which are based on the agent normal form, 
fail to incorporate it. This suggests to use the normal form to construct 
formal criteria which 'reasonable' beliefs should satisfy. In the sections 
5 and 6 we will investigate whether this approach is feasible, however, let 
us remark that in the literature also much effort has been devoted to con-
structing intuitive, ad hoe, criteria to eliminate unreasonable sequential 
equilibria for specific classes of games. For a survey of the latter, we 
refer to Cho and Kreps (1987) and Van Damme (1987, Ch.10). 
To conclude this section, we will show that the main results obtained 
depend crucially on the restriction to finite games. Let r be the (infi-
nite) game in which first chance chooses a E {0,2} (both possibilities with 
probability 1/2), next player 1 (knowing a) chooses x E [0,2] and finally 
player 2 (knowing both a and x) chooses y E [0,2]. The payoffs are 
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a 
Hl (x,y) (x-a) (y-a) a H2 (x,y) ( 1-x)y. 
Note that player 2's payoff does not depend on a and that, in a subgame 
perfect equilibrium, this player chooses y = 2 (resp. y = 0) for x < 1 
(resp. x > 1). Consequently, if a= 0, player can guarantee himself 
slightly less than 2 by choosing x slightly less than 1 and it follows 
that player 1 does not have a best response unless player 2 chooses y = 2 
if a= 0 and x = 1. Hence, the subgame a = 0 has a unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium in which player 1 chooses x and 2 responds with y = 2, 
We see that, in infinite games, not every equilibrium of a subgame can be 
extended to an overall equilibrium : if a = 0 and x = then y = 0 is also 
optimal for player 2, but this action is not part of an equilibrium of the 
game with a = O. By a similar reasoning one sees that the subgame a = 2 
has a unique equilibrium in which 1 chooses x = and 2 responds with 
y = 0. Hence, to keep 1 in equilibrium, player 2 has to base his decision 
at x = 1 upon whether a = 0 or a = 2 even though this information is fully 
irrelevant for player 2's own decision problem. Consequently, this game 
does not have a subgame consistent equilibrium and Proposition 2 (i) is 
not valid for infinite games. (Hellwig and Leininger (1987) have shown 
that perfect information games with compact action spaces always have a 
subgame perfect equilibrium as long as payoffs are continuous). Next, 
change the game so that player 2 is not informed about the outcome of the 
chance move. Then, in a sequential equilibrium (there are no proper sub-
games now) player 2 will still choose y = 2 (resp, y = 0) for x < 1 (resp. 
x > 1), however, as this player cannot condition on a, player does not 
have a best response in at least one of the cases so that no sequential 
equilibrium exists, hence Proposition 3 (i) is not valid for infinite ga-
mes. It should be remarked that Nash equilibria do exist in the modified 
game. Namely, if E ;;; 1/3, then the strategy pair 
rl-E if a = 0 L' if x ;;; 1-E Ll+E y(x) ~l+E-x)/E if x <: l+E if a = 2 otherwise x 
is a Nash equilibrium. Note that player 2's response is suboptimal in the 
intervals (1-E,1) and (1,l+E) but that player 1 chooses to avoid these 
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intervals. (For general existence theorems for Nash equilibria in infinite 
games, we refer to Tijs (1981), 
5. EQUILIBRIA IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 
As we are mainly interested in extensive games, attention will be con-
fined in this section to those normal form concepts that have also proved 
relevant for games in extensive form. In this section, we restrict our-
selves to definitions and normal form properties; the connections to the 
extensive form will be discussed in section 6. 
Perhaps the most natural and intuitive idea in game theory is iterati-
ve elimination of dominated (and/or payoff equivalent) strategies and to 
regard as unreasonable those equilibria that do not survive such a reduc-
tion of the game. Formally, a strategy O'. is said to be dominated by O'.' 
l l 
if H. (o\o~) ~H. (0\0 1 ') for all a with at least 1 inequality being strict. 
l l l l 
Unfortunately, the outcome of the process may depend on the order of eli-
mination and there need not exist an equilibrium that survives all possi-
ble elimination orders. This may be illustrated by the 3-person game in 
which player i (i = 1,2) has the pure strategies L.,M. and R., in which 
l l l 
player 3 chooses between L3 and R3 and in which the payoff functions are 
given by 
Hl (Ll ,L3) 2 Hl (Rl) 1 I 
H2 (R2 ,R3) 2 H2(L2) 1 I 
H3(Ml,L2,L3) H3 (Ml ,R2 ,L3) = H3 (Ll ,M2 ,R3) H3 (Rl ,M2 ,R3) 1 . , 
H. (0) = 0 otherwise. 
l 
(When we write H1 (L 1 ,L3 ) = 2, this means that the payoff is independent 
of 2's strategy). The elimination order M1 ,L3 ,L2 ,M2 ,L 1 leaves only 
(R 1 ,R2 ,R3 ) with payoffs (2,1,0), while the order M2 ,R3 ,R 1 ,M 1 ,R2 leads to 
(L 1 ,L2 ,L3 ) with payoffs (1,2,0), hence different orders yield different 
unique outcomes. Note, however, that player 3's payoff is 0 in both out-
comes and it is not difficult to see that the 2 outcomes lie in the same 
connected component of equilibria (cf. Proposition 1). Proposition 6 shows 
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that this is not a coincidence as there exists a component that remains 
for all possible elimination orders (i.e. for all elimination orders there 
always remains an equilibrium from this component) . 
Next, let us turn to perfect equilibria. Again the idea is that there 
are small trembles in the equilibrium strategies so that each player should 
choose a best response against slight perturbations of the equilibrium. 
(It should be remarked that such perturbations arise naturally if one 
accepts Harsanyi's argument (section 3) that players are always somewhat 
uncertain about their opponents' payoffs (see Van Damme (1983, Ch.5))). 
Formally, a mixed strategy equilibrium a is said to be a perfect equili-
brium if there exists a sequence {ok}k of completely mixed (i.e. interior, 
each pure strategy occurs with positive probability) strategy combinations 
such that a is a best reply against Ok for all k. From the definition it 
is clear that a perfect equilibrium strategy is undominated; the converse 
only holds in the 2-person case as shown in Van Damme (1983). To prove 
existence of perfect equilibria, an alternative characterization is useful. 
For E = (E 1 , ... ,En) with Ei > 0 (all i) and Ta completely mixed strategy 
combination, define the perturbed game f(E,T) as the game in which each 
player i when he intends to play Oi actually plays (1-Ei)Oi + EiTi. 
Selten (1976) has shown that a is a perfect equilibrium if and only if a 
k k 
is a limit point of equilibria of a sequence f(E ,T ) of perturbed games 
as Ek tends to zero. Since each perturbed game is an ordinary normal form 
game with payoffs close to those of r, since the Nash correspondence is 
upper hemi-continuous and since the set of mixed strategies is compact, it 
follows that any normal form game has a perfect equilibrium. Hence, 
Proposition 4 
(Selten (1976), Van Damme (1983)). 
Every normal form game has a perfect equilibrium. Perfect equilibria are 
undominated and in 2-person normal form games, every undominated equili-
brium is perfect. 
A perfect equilibrium need not survive iterated elimination of domi-
nated strategies as the game of Fig. lb with a < 0 and S > 0 demonstrates. 
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AR is strictly dominated and in the reduced game r is weakly dominated so 
that only (AL,l) remains. However, also (BL,r) is perfect in Fig. lb : if 
player 2 believes that the mistake AR is more likely than the mistake AL, 
then indeed it is optimal to play r. (Also cf. the discussion on plausi-
ble beliefs in section 4; to verify perfectness of (BL,r) one may also use 
Proposition 5: the equilibrium is undominated for a~ 6 and B > 0). Note 
that this example also shows that a perfect equilibrium need not remain 
perfect after strictly dominated strategies have been eliminated. 
Myerson (1978) has argued that the above beliefs about mistakes are un-
reasonable. His argument is that, since AR is dominated by AL (we continue 
to assume a < 0, B > 0), the mistake AR is more costly so that players will 
try much harder to prevent this mistake and that, therefore, it should be 
considered much less likely that this mistake actually occurs. (Van Damme 
(1983, Ch.5) has shown that this assumption can only be partially justi-
fied by means of the payoff uncertainty argument of section 3). The con-
cept of proper equilibria formalizes this idea. For £ > O, an interior 
strategy combination cr is said to be an £-proper equilibrium if it satis-
fies 
for all players i and all pure strategies si,si· In words: if si yields 
less than si, then the mistake si occurs with a probability that is at 
most£ times the probability of the mistake si· A strategy combination a 
is a proper equilibriwn if it is a limit point of £-proper equilibria as 
£ tends to zero. Myerson (1978) has shown that every normal form game has 
a proper equilibrium and clearly every such equilibrium is perfect. Un-
fortunately, also proper equilibria need not survive when dominated stra-
tegies are eliminated. Take Fig. lb with 0 <a< 2 and B > O. Then ite-
rated elimination still yields (AL,l), but now also (BL,r) is a proper 
equilibrium. Namely, if a> 0, then AR is a better response against r 
than AL is, so that, when player 2 intends to play r, properness leads 
this player to believe that AR is more likely, but then indeed the choice 
r is justified. This example also shows that a proper equilibrium need 
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not remain proper after a strictly dominated strategy (in this case AR) 
has been eliminated. Furthermore, a proper equilibrium need not remain 
proper when available mixed strategies are explicitly introduced as pure 
ones. Let M be the mixture 1/2 AL + 1/2 BL and add M as a pure strategy 
of player 1 in Fig. lb. If a< 1, then M dominates AR so that, according 
to properness, M should be considered much more likely. However, then 
player 2 should choose 1 as 1 yields more against M than r does, hence, 
in the modified game only (AL,1) is proper. Consequently, 2 normal form 
games with the same reduced normal form need not have the same sets of 
proper equilibria. That there need be no relation at all between proper-
ness and iterated elimination is once more demonstrated by Fig. 4a : 
Iterated elimination leads to (L 1 ,L2 ) but this equilibrium is not proper. 
If 1 intends to play L 1 , then R2 is a better response than M2 , hence, 
player 1 should consider R2 more likely, but then he should play R1 . 
unique proper equilibrium is ( (3/4,1/4) ,L 2 )). 
(The 
2,2 1,0 0, 1 4,4 4,0 0,2 
2,2 0,3 1 ,O 0,0 0,4 1,2 
Fig. 4a Fig. 4b 
While in the previous discussion, we emphasized the drawbacks of the pro-
perness concept, it should be remarked that an important positive property 
will be discussed in section 6 (Proposition 8). Proposition 5 summarizes 
the above. 
Proposition 5 
(Myerson (1978), Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)). 
Every normal form game has a proper equilibrium. Every proper equilibrium 
is perfect, but the converse does not hold. A proper equilibrium need not 
survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies and when elimination 
leads to a unique equilibrium, then this need not be proper, although it 
is perfect. Two games with the same reduced normal form need not have the 
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same sets of proper equilibria. 
The above discussion naturally suggests to try to remedy the drawbacks 
of properness by requiring a 'reasonable' equilibrium to be stable against 
all perturbations in strategies. Following Okada (1981) call an equili-
brium a strictly perfect if for any interior strategy combination T the 
perturbed game f(E,T) has an equilibrium close to a for E close to zero. 
Unfortunately, self-enforcing equilibria need not be strictly perfect and 
strictly perfect equilibria need not exist. In Fig. 4a, if T2 ru (0,1,0) 
then f(E,T) only has (L 1 ,L2 ) as an equilibrium while the unique equili-
brium is (R 1 ,L2 ) if T2 ru (0,0,1) so that no equilibrium is strictly per-
fect. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) have suggested to apply the strict per-
fectness criterion to sets of equilibria rather than to singletons, and 
they call a set E a stable set of equilibria if it is a minimal set with 
the property that for eAch T the game f(E,T) has an equilibrium close to 
E for sufficiently small E. (Minimality is needed since otherwise the set 
of all equilibria would trivially satisfy the condition) . Kohlberg and 
Mertens show that stable sets always exist, that they contain only perfect 
equilibria and that there exist stable sets that lie completely within one 
component (hence, it makes sense to speak of stable components and stable 
outcomes, cf. Proposition 1). In Fig. 4a, any perturbed game either has 
an equilibrium close to (L 1 ,L 2 ) or close to ((1/3,2/3),L2 ) so that the 
unique stable set contains exactly these 2 points (i.e. the extreme points 
of the set of all equilibria). Consequently, a stable set need not con-
tain a proper equilibrium. It is, however, conjectured that a stable com-
ponent (i.e. a component that contains a stable set) always contains a 
proper equilibrium. Stable sets relate nicely to iterated elimination of 
dominated strategies as it can be shown that a stable set contains a stable 
set of any game obtained by elimination of a dominated strategy. In this 
statement, 'contains' cannot be replaced by 'is' as Fig. 4a demonstrates 
R2 is dominated and in the reduced game only {(L 1 ,L 2 )} is stable, hence, 
((1/3,2/3),L2 l vanishes but this is needed in the original game for per-
turbed games f(E,T) with T ru (0,0,1). Furthermore, it can be shown that 
a stable set E contains a stable set of any game obtained by deletion of 
a pure strategy that is not a best reply against any element in E. We 
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will return to this important property (which is called Fo:r>Ward Induction 
in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) in section 6). A drawback of stability 
may be illustrated by means of Fig. 4b : Stable sets may vanish when in-
ferior strategies are eliminated from the game. A strategy is said to be 
inferior if it is a best reply only against a strict subset of strategies 
where also some other strategy is a best reply, and Harsanyi (1978) has 
argued that such strategies should be eliminated. In Fig. 4b, the strate-
gy R2 is inferior (it is a best reply only against (1/2,1/2)) when R2 is 
eliminated, R1 is strictly dominated so that only (L 1 ,L2 J remains. In the 
original game, however, there are completely mixed equilibria in which 
player 2 chooses R2 with probability 4/5 and player 1 randomizes (1/2,1/2) 
and any such equilibrium is strictly perfect, hence, is stable as a single-
ton set. (Note that this game has an even number of stable components). 
The following Proposition summarizes the main properties of stable 
equilibria. 
Proposition 6 
(Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)). 
Every normal form has a stable set of equilibria and even a stable compo-
nent. A stable set contains only perfect equilibria. In generic normal 
form games, every equilibrium as a singleton is stable. A stable set con-
tains a stable set of any game obtained by deletion of a strategy that is 
dominated or that is not a best reply against the set, however, stable 
sets may vanish if inferior strategies are eliminated. 
To conclude this section, let us consider another set valued solution 
concept, that of persistent equilibria introduced in Kalai and Samet (1984). 
If r is a normal form game, then C = (c 1 , •.• ,Cn) is said to be a retract 
if Ci is a nonempty, closed, convex set of strategies for each player i. 
A retract C is essential if there exists a neighborhood U of C (in the 
set of mixed strategy combinations) such that for any a E U there exists 
a best reply against a that is in c. A persistent retraat is defined as a 
minimal essential retract and a persistent equilibrium is a Nash equili-
briusm that belongs to a persistent retract. To illustrate this concept, 
consider Fig. 5. In Fig. Sa (Battle of the Sexes) the 2 strict equilibria 
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(L 1 ,L2 l and (R 1 ,R2 ) are persistent. This game also admits a completely 
mixed equilibrium but the only essential retract that contains this equi-
librium is the set of all mixed strategy combinations and this is not mi-
nimal (it contains { (L 1 ,L2 )}) so that the mixed equilibrium is not per-
sistent. Hence, contrary to stability, requiring persistency may elimina-
te completely mixed equilibria. In Fig. Sb (matching pennies) there are 
no 'corner' equilibria that 'threaten' the completely mixed equilibriqrn 
and in this case the set of all strategies is a persistent retract, so 
that the mixed equilibrium is persistent. Fig. Sa already illustrates 
that the concept of persistency may not be appropriate for single shot 
games which are played without any possibilities for coordination as in 
this case only the mixed equilibrium is focal. Persistent equilibria 
can perhaps be best interpreted as stationary states when the game is 
played repeatedly but each time with different players who only have 
statistical information about the past. However, also this interpretation 
meets with difficulties as there exist examples (available from the author 
upon request) in which evolutionarily stable strategies (Maynard Smith 
(1982)) fail to be persistent. 
L2 R2 L2 R2 
Ll 3,1 0,0 Ll 4,-4 -4,4 
Rl 0,0 1,3 Rl -4,4 4,-4 
Fig. Sa Fig. Sb 
It can be shown that persistent equilibria exist, but they need not 
be perfect. The latter may be shown by replacing (0,0) in Fig. 3 with the 
matching pennies game from Fig. Sb and constructing the associated normal 
form. In this game, only the set of all strategies is essential, so that 
all equilibria (including the imperfect one in which 2 threatens to play 
matching pennies) are persistent. Kalai and Samet, however, have also 
shown that there always exists an equilibrium that is both proper and per-
sistent and by adapting their arguments one can even show that there 
exists a persistent retract that contains a stable set. Finally, Theorem 
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4 in Kalai and Samet (1984) implies that a persistent retract contains a 
persistent retract of any game obtained by deletion of a dominated strate-
gy. The following Proposition summarizes these properties. 
Proposition 7 
(Kalai and Samet (1984)). 
Every normal form has a persistent retract that contains a proper equili-
brium as well as a persistent retract that contains a stable set. However, 
a persistent equilibrium need not be perfect, nor need a stable set con-
tain a persistent equilibrium. A persistent retract contains a persistent 
retract of any game obtained by deletion of a dominated strategy. 
6. EXTENSIVE FORM OR NORMAL FORM ? 
In section 4 it has been shown that the extensive form concepts of se-
quential and perfect equilibria are unsatisfactory because they fail to 
incorporate dominance relationships that are present in the normal form. 
Now, the reason that these concepts were defined by means of the agent 
normal form is that Kreps/Wilson and Selten had the impression that back-
wards induction cannot be captured in the normal form. In this section, 
we will first show that this impression is not completely correct, although 
indeed some information is lost in the normalisation process. Next, it 
will be investigated whether a 'sensible' extensive form solution concept 
can be based on the normal form. 
In section 4 we have seen that generic extensive games with perfect 
information have a unique sequential equilibrium. Since the roll back 
procedure from the extensive form can be mimiced in the normal form (first 
eliminate only those strategies that prescribe a suboptimal choice at ter-
minal decision points, etc.), there exists an elimination order that re-
duces the normal form to its unique sequential equilibrium payoff. Propo-
sitions 1 and 6 guarantee that this payoff always remains and it can be 
shown that full reduction always (i.e. no matter the elimination order 
used) leaves just this payoff. Hence, it might seem that, at least for 
these simple games, knowledge of the normal form suffices. However, itera-
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ted elimination is only guaranteed to yield the correct payoff, by picking 
the wrong order one may retain strategies that are not even equivalent to 
the unique sequential equilibrium (although they are in the same component 
by Proposition 1). For example, in Fig. 6, the unique sequential equili-
brium is (L 1r,R2), but if a< 2, then elimination starting with R1r leaves 
only L2 for player 2 and L2 is not equivalent to R2 . Furthermore, if a 
game is not fully generic, iterated elimination may even produce the wrong 
outcome : If a = 2 in Fig. 6, one may retain (R11,L2) and this yields the 
wrong payoff. Hence, it seems that, even for perfect information games, 
extensive form analysis might be preferable. 
0,0 1,3 
I r 2,2 2,2 
a, 1 ~ R2 Fig. 6 2,2 2 2,2 2,2 a,1 0,0 
Ll Rl a,1 1,3 
This example already shows that one cannot expect normal form analysis 
to yield the exact sequential equilibrium strategies : In the normal form 
one does not have to care about own mistakes, so that L11 and L1r appear 
as duplications, even though only L1r is sequentially rational. Hence, 
the best one can hope for is to obtain normal form strategies that are 
equivalent to a sequential equilibrium. Fig. 6 also shows that such stra-
tegies are not obtained by requiring normal form perfectness : If a< 2, 
then (L 11,L2) is perfect in the normal form, but L2 is not equivalent to 
R2 . In this example, all normal form perfect equilibria still yield the 
sequential equilibrium outcome (2,2), but it is easy to construct examples 
in which even this property fails. Let (cx,S) = (-1,1) in Fig. 1. Then 
(AL,l) is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the extensive form, 
but (BL,r) is an undominated, hence, perfect equilibrium of the normal 
form and this yields an entirely different outcome. Note that to sustain 
(BL,r) in the normal form, player 2 must consider the mistake AR to be 
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more likely than the mistake AL and these beliefs are clearly nonsensical 
from the extensive game point of view (as L dominates Rat player l's 
second information set) , yet such beliefs are not excluded by normal form 
perfectness. These beliefs are excluded by the properness concept and in-
deed, for a< O, the unique sequential equilibrium of Fig. la is the unique 
proper equilibrium of Fig. lb. Furthermore, in Fig. 6, properness requires 
player 2 to choose R2 so that also in this example each proper equilibrium 
is equivalent to the sequential equilibrium. More generally, it can be 
shown that the restrictions that normal form properness imposes on mistakes 
imply sequentially rational behavior at all information sets in the exten-
sive form except at those that a player prevents by his own actions. For-
mally 
~roposition 8 
(Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), Van Damme (1984)). 
If CT is a proper equilibrium of the normal form, then CT is equivalent to a 
sequential equilibrium of the extensive form so that, in particular, lP(CT) 
is a sequential equilibrium outcome. 
Note that, as Proposition 8 is confined to equivalence classes of strate-
gies, the 'normal form' can be replaced by the 'semi reduced normal form' 
in this statement. However, the result no longer holds for proper equili-
bria of the reduced normal form (cf. Proposition 5, also see Kohlberg and 
Mertens (1986)). Furthermore, for nongeneric games, 'sequential' cannot 
be replaced by perfect (Van Damme (1984)). In general, not all sequential 
equilibria correspond to normal form proper equilibria. Consider the mo-
dification of Fig. la in which player 1 chooses between AL, AR and B si-
multaneously, player 2 not being reached if 1 chooses B, and let (a,S) = 
(-1,1). This does not change the normal form so that again only (AL,l) is 
proper, however, (B,l) is perfect in the extensive form. Hence, Proposi-
tion 8 points to the possibility of using properness as a criterion for 
eliminating 'unreasonable' sequential equilibria. Clearly, this criterion 
is allowed only when the normal form is indeed appropriate, i.e. when each 
player is a single individual (cf. section 2) and this excludes games with 
incomplete information (Van Damme (1987,Ch.10) shows that for such games, 
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properness involves unjustified comparisons of utility between different 
types of the same player). However, as properness fails to incorporate 
the forward induction logic (see Proposition 5) , this criterion is bound 
to be unsuccessfull. Again consider Fig. 1 but now let (a,$) = (1,1). 
Then iterated elimination reduces the normal form to (AL,l) and we argued 
that only this equilibrium is sensible, yet also (BL,r) is proper in the 
normal form. 
Several comments are in order concerning Forwards Induction : 
(i) Applying forwards induction is justified only if normal form analy-
sis is indeed appropriate, i.e. if there is a central player coordi-
nating the agents. For example, in Fig. 1 with a = 1 and $ > 0, if 
the agents of player 1 are completely independent, then the agent 
normal form is relevant and the equilibrium (BR,r) is self-enfor-
cing since a deviation of the first agent of player 1 does not ne-
cessarily trigger a deviation of the second agent. This again brings 
us to the issue of whether the normal form representation assumes 
self-commitment. Suppose a = 1 and $ is large so that (a,$) risk 
dominates (3,1) (Harsanyi and Selten (1987)) implying that, where on-
ly the subgame to be played, the equilibrium (R,r) would most like-
ly result. In this case, if player 1 actually reaches his second 
decision point, will he continue with the plan AL or will he reop-
timize (hence, act as a seperate agent) and decide to choose R after 
all ? (Note that as soon as, the second decision point is reached, 
B is no longer available and R is not dominated). Hence, it is not 
completely clear that forward induction is justified not even in the 
case·where each player is a single individual. 
(ii) Forward Induction is not completely captured by iterated elimination 
of dominated strategies, since, by replacing a terminal node by a 
subgame with a unique equilibrium having this value, one can destroy 
all dominance relationships. For example, if one replaces (0,0) in 
Fig. 3 by matching pennies (Fig. Sb), then the normal form does not 
have dominated pure strategies. Applying this same trick also shows 
that forward induction is not captured by the combination of persis-
tency and properness : In Fig. la, let (a,$) = (1,1) and replace 
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the endpoint after (AR,l) by matching pennies. Then forwards induc-
tion still yields (AL,l) as the solution (if 2 is reached, he should 
conclude 1 has chosen AL since AR, followed by optimal play in mat-
ching pennies, is dominated by B), but in the normal form, the unique 
retract is the set of all strategies, so that the outcome (2,4) is 
both persistent and proper. It seems that the formal criterion of 
iterated elimination of non best replies best captures the intuitive 
idea of forward induction (see Van Damme (1987, Ch.10) for a justi-
fication of this criterion) . 
(iii) Adding a little bit of incomplete information may completely destroy 
the forward induction argument (just as it does with backwards in-
duction). Consider Fig. la, but assume that (a,SJ is either (1,1) 
with probability 1-S or (4,1) with small, but positive probability s 
and that only player 1 knows which case prevails. In the modified 
game, player 2 is justified in choosing r for he might think that 
a = 4 and that player 1 has chosen AR, hence, the forward induction 
logic does not apply. Specifically, in the modified game a strict 
equilibrium results when player 1 chooses B (resp. AR) if a = 1 
(resp. a = 4) and player 2 chooses r (strict means that each player 
looses by deviating), hence, with very high probability we obtain 
the outcome (2,4) that was not viable in the complete information 
case (see Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine (1987) for an extension of 
this argument). 
(iv) Forward induction is incompatible with subgame consistency (see 
Abreu and Pearce (1984)). Let fi be the game in which player i 
(i = 1,2) chooses between the 'easy way out' with payoff (2,2) or 
playing the battle of the sexes game of Fig. Sa; if player j (j i i) 
has to move, he knows that i has not taken the easy way out. Conse-
quently, when j moves, he should conclude that i will play his favo-
rite equilibrium in Fig. Sa (otherwise i would have taken the easy 
way out), so that forward induction yields (3,1) (resp. (1,3)) as 
the outcome of f 1 (resp, f 2). Now, let f be the game in which first 
a coin is tossed to determine which player has the easy way out, 
both players being informed about the chance move. Iterated elimi-
nation of dominated strategies in the normal form of r yields a 
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unique solution : The player who has the easy way out does not use 
this option but rather he plays battle of the sexes and receives 
his most preferred equilibrium. Clearly, this equilibrium is not 
subgame consistent (as this condition requires that the same equi-
librium played in rl and f2). 
The above discussion leaves us only with stability as a normal form 
criterion to select 'reasonable' sequential equilibria in the extensive 
form. Indeed, stability seems to capture forwards induction (Proposition 
6), but, unfortunately, a stable set of the normal form need not contain 
a sequential equilibrium of the extensive game. Fig. 4a can be viewed as 
the normal form of the extensive game in which player 2 first chooses be-
tween L2 or to play the subgame with strategies L1 ,M1,M2 and R2 . The 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium in this extensive game requires player 
1 to choose (3/4,1/4) (this is the proper equilibrium of the normal form) 
and we have already seen that this does not belong to the stable set. In 
this example, the stable set yields the correct outcome (2,2) but one can 
construct examples (see Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)) in which even this 
property fails. However, such examples involve stable sets that are not 
contained in one component and one can show (J.F. Mertens, private commu-
nication) that stable components of normal forms associated with generic 
extensive games always contain a proper equilibrium. Combining this re-
sult with the Propositions 1, 6 and 8 we see that, at least for generic 
extensive games, stability might constitute a criterion to eliminate 'un-
reasonable' sequential equilibrium outcomes. We write 'might' as it has 
not yet been completely cleared whether the forward induction argument is 
acceptable and whether stability indeed eliminates all unreasonable out-
comes (cf. Fig. 4b). Furthermore, it should be remarked that stability 
only deals with outcomes not with strategies in the extensive form, and 
this is the price we pay for using a normal form concept : We cannot tell 
what the player should do off the equilibrium path (unless we select a 
proper equilibrium from the stable component). Finally, it should be re-
marked that, for nongeneric games, stable sets might be too large. Let 
a = 2 in Fig. 6 and replace (0,0) by a decision of player 2 between (0,0) 
and (3,-1). Then, when applying backwards induction, one never has indif-
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ference to the payoff (2,2),however,it is easily seen that the stable set 
contains the outcome (R 1 ,L2 ) and this yields the wrong payoff. 
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CHAPTER II 
EQUILIBRIUM POINTS OF BIMATRIX GAMES 
by Mathijs Jansen 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of two-person non-cooperative games is concerned with the 
behavior of two individuals (players) dealing with a conflict situation 
where binding agreements are impossible. One of the purposes of the 
theory is to prescribe a unique solution to the problem of how these in-
dividuals should behave in such a situation. Since binding agreements 
are impossible, one property of a solution to a non-cooperative game is 
that neither player has the incentive to unilaterally deviate from that 
solution. Therefore the study of two-person non-cooperative games is 
based on the equilibrium point concept (Nash (1950)). An equilibrium 
point of a game is a pair of strategies, one for each player, whereby 
no player can gain by deviating. Unfortunately, the equilibrium point 
concept has several disadvantages, because in general equilibria are not 
unique, interchangeable, or Pareto optimal. So the problem arisis which 
equilibrium point should be chosen as the solution of a game when it has 
more than one equilibrium point. In the literature, we come across seve-
ral ways to handle this problem. 
1. One shrinks (refines) the equilibrium point set by imposing an extra 
condition. 
2. One tries to find a (numerical) procedure for selecting a particular 
equilibrium point which can serve as the solution of the game. 
3. One tries to formulate a list of attractive properties so that each 
game has exactly one equilibrium point satisfying all the properties. 
In this paper we are concerned with the first area of research. Further-
more we will restrict our attention to bimatrix games, a type of non-
cooperative game where the two players have a finite number of pure stra-
tegies. Section 2 begins with the definition of a bimatrix game and an 
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equilibrium point. The two examples in this section form the introduction 
to section 3 in which we investigate, for a bimatrix game, the structure 
of the set of equilibria. Section 4, 5, 6 and 7 will deal with several 
refinements of the equilibrium point concept, restricted to the two-person 
case. 
This paper only includes proofs in the case of a new result or proof tech-
nique. 
Notation. The elements of the basis of unit vectors of lRm are denoted by 
e 1 , .. .,em. For a finite set S, I S I is the number of elements of S. The 
convex hull of a set S c]Rm is denoted by conv(S). If C clRm is a convex 
set, then we write ext(C), dim(C) and relint(C) for the set of extreme 
points of C, the dimension of (the affine hull of) C and the relative in-
terior of C, respectively. Finally, 
Sm · = { p E lRm ; p ;;;; 0 and L: i: 1 pi 1 }. 
2. BIMATRIX GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM POINTS 
We start with the formal definition of a bimatrix game. 
Let A and B two mxn -matrices. The two-person game where the players 1 
and 2 choose, independently of each other, a p E Sm and a q E Sn, respec-
tively and subsequently receive the payoff 
PAq=L:m L:n i=1 j=1 piaijqj 
and 
m n 
pBq = L:i=l L:j=l pibijqj' respectively 
is called the mxn - bimatrix game corresponding to the ordered pair of 
matrices. This game is denoted by (A,B). 
With this game we can model a conflict situation in which two individuals 
are involved. The first individual can choose one of m alternatives num-
bered 1,2, .. ,m, while the second one can choose one of n alternatives num-
bered 1,2, .. ,n. If player 1 chooses the pure strategy i E {1,2, .•• ,m} and 
player 2 chooses the pure strategy j E {1,2, ..• n}, 
a .. and b .. , respectively. For a vector p E Sm (q 
l.J l.J 
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they receive the reward 
E Sn) p. (q.) can be 
l. J 
seen as the probability of choosing i (j) and pAq (pBq) can be interpreted 
as the expected reward for player 1 (2) corresponding to the (mixed) stra-
tegies p and q. 
As described before, the study of two-person noncooperative games is based 
on pairs of strategies from which no player can gain by deviating unila-
terally. Hence we focus our attention to equilibrium points, where a pair 
(p,q) E Sm x Sn of strategies is called an equilibriwn point of the mxn-
bimatrix game (A,B) if p is a best reply to q : 
pAq max pAq 
p 
and q is a best reply to p 
pBq = max pBq. 
q 
The set of equilibrium points of the bimatrix game (A,B) is denoted by 
E(A,B). 
So (p,q) E E(A,B) if and only if (p,q) E B1(q) x B2 (p), 
where B1(q) (B2 (p)) is the set of all best replies to q (p), or, in other 
words, if and only if (p,q) is a fixed point of the mapping that assigns 
to a pair (p,q) E Sm x Sn the set B1(q) x B2 (p). By applying the "fixed 
point theorem" of Kakutani to this mapping, Nash (1950) proved that for 
all bimatrix games the set of equilibria is nonempty. 
In order to get an impression of the shape of the set of equilibria, we 
make a picture of this set for two examples of 2X3-bimatrix games. To 
that purpose the strategy set s2 is identified with a line segment. Each 
point of this line segment corresponds in an obvious way with a strategy 
of player 1. For instance, each endpoint of the segment corresponds with 
one of the strategies e 1 = (1,0) or e 2 = (0,1). Analogously, the strate-
gy set s3 is identified with an equilateral triangle. In this way any 
strategy pair in s2 x s3 can be identified with a point in the following 
diagram 
I 
I 
, 
I 
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Example 2.1 
For the 2X3-bimatrix game (A,B), where 
and 
the equilibrium point set is connected and composed of four convex pieces 
s1,s2,s3 and s4 
Example 2.2 
For the 2X3-bimatrix game (A,B), where 
and 
the equilibrium point set consists of two disjunct convex pieces s 1 and 
s2 : 
The sets defined in the following equivalence play an important role in 
section 3 of this paper. 
Lerruna 2.1 A strategy pair (p,q) is an equilibrium point of the bimatrix 
game (A,B) if and only if 
C(p) c M(A;q) and C(q) c M(p;B), 
where C(p) := {i; p. > O} LS the carrier 
]_ 
of p, C(q) is the carrier of q, 
M(A;q) := {i; e.Aq= max ekAq} is the set of pure best replies to q and 
M(p;B) is the ]_ k replies set of pure best to p. 
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Finally, we note that for a bimatrix game (A,B) and strategies p of 
player 1 and q of player 2 
B1 (q) conv{ei; i E M(A;q)} 
and 
3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM POINT SET 
A bimatrix game modelling a situation where the interests of the 
players are strictly opposed is of the form (A,-A). Such a game is 
usually called a matrix game and denoted by A. In 1928, Von Neumann pro-
ved in his famous minimax theorem that each matrix game A has a value 
val(A) := max min pAq = min max pAq 
p q q p 
and that the optimal strategy spaces of player 
o1 (A) := {p; pAq ;;:;val(A), for all q} 
and of player 2 
o2 (A) := {q; pAq ~val(A), for all p} 
are nonempty. 
It is well known that E(A,-A) = o1(A) x o2(A) and that Oi(A) is a convex 
polytope for i E {1,2}. 
The elements of the set ext(Oi(A)), called extPeme optimal strategies of 
player i E {1,2}, were characterized by Shapley and Snow (1950). 
Bohnenblust, Karlin and Shapley (1950) and Gale and Sherman (1950) esta-
blished a relationship between the dimensions of the sets of optimal stra-
tegies. 
Furthermore the same authors completely answered the question which pairs 
of convex polytopes can serve as the sets of optimal strategies for some 
matrix game. 
Several authors such as Vorob'ev (1958), Kuhn (1961), Millham (1972, 1974), 
Winkels (1979) and Jansen (1981a) generalized (some of) these results to 
the class of bimatrix games. 
In this section we have collected most of the results of these writers con-
cerning the structure of the set of equilibria of a bimatrix game. 
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3.t Maximal Nash subsets 
Some important concepts are gathered in the following 
Definition 3.2 
Two equilibrium points (p,q) and (p',q') of a bimatrix game (A,B) are 
interchangeable (cf. Nash (1951)) if (p,q') and (p',q) are also equilibria 
of (A,B). A set of equilibria is a maximal Nash su:bset for the game (A,B) 
if it is a maximal set with the property that all its elements are inter-
changeable. 
Note that the maximal Nash subsets for the bimatrix game introduced in 
example 2.1 are s1,s2,s3 and s4 • For the bimatrix game introduced in 
example 2.2 these sets are s1 and s2 • 
The term maximal Nash subset was introduced by Heuer and Millham (1976). 
Nash, who already considered such sets in 1951, called them su:bsolutions. 
Winkels (1979) used the term Nash component. These authors showed that a 
maximal Nash subset for an mxn-bimatrix game is a closed and convex 
subset of Sm x Sn. In Jansen (1981a) and Winkels (1979) it appeared that 
a maximal Nash subset is in fact the Cartesian product of two convex po-
lytopes : 
Lerrvna 3 .1 Let S be a maximal Nash subset for the mxn - bimatrix game 
0 0 
(A,B). If (p' q) E relint(S), then 
0 0 
s K(q) x L(p), 
0, 
E Sm; 
0 
where K( q) := {p (p,q) E E(A,B)} and 
0 {q E Sn; 0 L( p ) := (p ,q) E E(A,B)} are convex polytopes. 
The examples in section 2 suggest that the equilibrium point set of a bi-
matrix game is the finite union of connected components or even the finite 
union of convex components, where 
Definition 3.2 A connected (convex) component of the equilibrium point 
set is a maximal connected (convex) subset of the set of equilibria. 
In Jansen (1981a) it was shown that every pair of equilibrium points from 
a convex subset of the set of equilibria of a bimatrix game is inter-
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changeable. As a consequence we have 
Theorem 3.1 (Cf. Jansen (1981a)). Let C be a convex subset of the set of 
equilibrium points of a bimatrix game. Then C is a convex component if and 
only if C is a maximal Nash subset. 
If (p,q) is an equilibrium point of a bimatrix game (A,B), {(p,q)} is a 
convex subset of E(A,B). Hence we can find, applying Zorn's lemma, a con-
vex component of E(A,B) containing (p,q). Consequently, in view of theo-
rem 3.1, every equilibrium point of the game (A,B) is contained in a ma-
ximal Nash subset and E(A,B) is the union of such subsets. 
Before we show that the number of maximal Nash subsets for a bimatrix 
game is finite, we need the following lemma. 
Lemma 3.2 (Cf. Jansen (1981a)). Let S be a maximal Nash subset for the 
0 0 
bimatrix game (A,B) and let (p,q) E relint(S). Then (p,q) ES if and 
0 0 0 0 
only if C(p) c C(p), C(q) c C(q) 1 M(A;q) ~ M(A;q) and M(p;B) ~ M(p;B). 
0 0 
This result implies that a maximal Nash subset S with (p,q) E relint(S) 
0 0 0 0 
is completely determined by the quartet (C(p), M(A;q), C(q), M(p ;B)). 
Since there is only a finite number of such quartets, we have a proof of 
Theorem 3.2 (Cf. Jansen (1981a), Winkels (1979)). The set of equilibrium 
points of a bimatrix game is a (not necessarily disjunct) union of a fi-
nite number of maximal Nash subsets. 
As we see in the first example of section 2, for two different maximal 
Nash subsets s1 and s2 the set s1 n s2 may be non-empty. Heuer and 
Millham (1979) proved that in that case s1 n s2 is a (proper) face of the 
convex polytopes S and T. 
As a consequence of theorem 3.2 each connected component C of the equili-
brium point set of a bimatrix game (A,B) is of the form 
C = s1 U s2 U ••• U Sn' 
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where s 1,s2 , ••. ,sn are maximal Nash subsets for (A,B). So every bimatrix 
game has a finite number of connected components. This result was also 
obtained by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). In their paper the same authors 
introduced the bimatrix game (A,B), where 
H 
0 ~1] li -1 j] A := 0 -1 and B ·= 0 0 -2 -1 
For this game E(A,B) = s 1 U s 2 U ••• U s 6 is a connected component for 
which Sin Si+ 1 f 0 for i 1,2, .•• ,5 and s 1 n s 6 f 0. 
In 1974, Millham derived, for a special case, dimension relations for ma-
ximal Nash subsets for bimatrix games. His results were extended by 
Jansen (1981a). In the description of the dimension of (the affine hull 
of) a maximal Nash subset S for a bimatrix game (A,B) an important role is 
played by the matrices 
A(S) := [a ] ij i E M(A;q),j E C(q) and B(S) := [bij ]i E C(p) ,j E M(p;B) 
where (p,q) E relint(S). By lemma 3.2 these so-called S-submatrices of A 
and B, respectively do not depend on the choice of the point 
(p,q) E relint(S). 
Theorem 3.3 Let S be a maximal Nash subset for the bimatrix game (A,B) 
with A> 0 and B > 0 and let (p,q) E relint(S). Then 
dimension L(p) =I C(q) I - rank A(S) 
and 
dimension K(q) I C(p) I - rank B(S). 
3.2 Extreme equilibria 
In view of theorem 3.2, the set of equilibrium points of a bimatrix 
game can be found if the extreme points of the maximal Nash subsets are 
known. These so-called extreme equilibrium points can be characterized 
by means of certain square submatrices of the payoff matrices : 
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Theorem 3.4 (Cf. Vorob'ev (1958), Kuhn (1961), Jansen (1981a)). 
If (p,q) is an extreme equilibrium point of the mxn-bimatrix game (A,B) 
and y := I C(q) I , then there exists a yxy- submatrix K of A such that 
(renumber, if necessary, the rows and columns of A in such a way that K is 
in the upper left corner of A) 
(1) the (y+l)x(y+l) -matrix K :=[-~ ~] is nonsingular, 
- ~ -1 y . . (2) q. - (det K) L:. l K.. if J E C(q) and J ]_= 1-J 
(K .. is the cofactor of the element k .. ) , 
1-J 1-J 
(3) pAq = det K I det K. 
An analogous statement can be formulated w.r.t. the connection of the vec-
tor p and the number pBq with a certain square submatrix of B. 
The extreme equilibrium points of an mxn-bimatrix game (A,B) can also 
be found by calculating the extreme points of two polyhedral sets associa-
ted with that game. In order to introduce these sets, we note that Mills 
(1960) and Mangasarian and Stone (1964) proved that a pair (p,q) of stra-
tegies is an equilibrium point of the game (A,B) if and only if there 
exist scalars a and S such that 
for all i E JN 
m eiAq ;;;: a, 
pBe. ;;;: 13' J for all j E JNn 
and 
p(A + B)q = a + S. 
This result led to the definition of the convex polyhedral sets 
PB := { (p' S) E Sm x 1R; pBe. ;;;: 13' for all j E JN } J n 
QA := { (q ,a) E Sn x 1R; eiAq ;;;: a, for all i E JN } . m 
The same authors observed that all the equilibrium points of a bimatrix 
game (A,B) can be found by solving the qu.adratic programming problem 
maximize p(A + B)q - a - B 
(p,B,q,a) 
such that (p,B,q,a) E PB x QA. 
In Jansen (1981a) a proof can be found of the following 
Lemma 3.3 Let (A,B) be a bimatrix game and let (p,B,q,a) E PB x QA. 
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Then (p,q) is an extreme equilibrium point of the game (A,B) if and only 
if 
(p,f3) E ext PB' 
(q,a.) E ext QA' 
a. = pAq and S = pBq. 
Based on these results, Winkels (1979) has developped a method to find 
the whole set of equilibrium points of a bimatrix game. 
Firstly the extreme points of the polyhedral sets PB and QA associated with 
the game (A,B) must be determined, for example with the help of the algo-
rithm of Balinsky • 
. 11 22 11 22 Then the extreme points (p ,S ),(p ,S ), ... of PB and (q ,a. ),(q ,a.), ••• 
of QA are conveniently arranged in the following tableau : 
1 j q •• q ... 
1 j 
a. •• a. ••• 
1 f3 1 . p 
. 
. 
. 
i f3i k .. p .. iJ . .. 
. . 
. 
. 
The left (upper) block of this tableau contains as rows (columns) the ex-
treme points of PB (QA). If one defines 
otherwise, 
then the matrix K in the lower right block contains all the necessary in-
formation about the extreme equilibrium points, because for an element 
i i j j i j (p ,f3 ,q ,a. ) E PB x QA' kij = 1 if and only if (p ,q ) is an extreme 
equilibrium point. 
Finally, Winkels describes an efficient method how on the basis of the 
matrix K all maximal Nash subsets for the game can be constructed. 
Consider the bimatrix game (A,B) as described in the second example of 
section 2. For this game the associated polyhedral sets are 
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QA {(q,a) E s3x 1R • 
' 
q1 + 2q2 + 2q3 ;-;; a} 
and 
PB { (p,13) E s2x 1R. 
' 
2p1 ;-;; 13, 2p2 ;-;; 13}. 
Since 
and 
the corresponding tableau is 
1 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
1 2 2 
1 0 2 1 0 0 
1 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 
0 1 2 0 1 1 
From this tableau we conclude that the extreme equilibrium points are 
1 1 1 1 (e1,e1)' (ez,e),Ce2,e2),((2'2),e2) and ((2•2),e3), 
while 
E(A,B) 
with 
{(e1,e1)} 
1 1 
conv{(2 ,2 ),e2} x conv{e2 ,e3}. 
4. REFINEMENTS OF THE EQUILIBRIUM POINT CONCEPT 
In the first section we have given several reasons to refine the equi-
librium point concept as introduced by Nash. The last 15 years several 
refinements of this concept have been proposed in the literature. In the 
following we will distinguish three kinds of refinements. These will be 
investigated successively in the sections 5, 6 and 7. 
(1) In section 5, we will deal with equilibrium points that are stable 
(in a sense to be defined later on) against small perturbations of 
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the strategy spaces of the game. In this field an important role is 
played by (strictly) perfect equilibria. 
(2) In section 6, the best reply sets are central. We are interested in 
equilibrium points for which the best reply sets satisfy some stabi-
lity condition(s). We deal with (quasi-)strong, regular, robust and 
persistent equilibria. 
(3) Finally, in section 7, we pay attention to equilibria that are stable 
against slight perturbations of the payoff(matrice)s of the game. 
We come accross essential and (strongly) stable equilibria. 
5. (STRICTLY) PERFECT EQUILIBRIA 
In 1975, Selten assumes that each player with a small probability makes 
a mistake, that is whenever he chooses some (pure) strategy in fact some 
close by completely mixed strategy is played. Therefore Selten is inte-
rested in equilibrium points for which each player's equilibrium strategy 
is not only a best reply against the equilibrium strategy of his opponent, 
but also against some slight perturbation of this strategy. In order to 
investigate such "perfect equilibria", Selten models the idea of making 
mistakes via a perturbed game, i.e. a game in which the players' strate-
gies are restricted to simplices with faces parallel to the faces of the 
original simplex. 
Definition 5.1 For an mxn-bimatrix game (A,B) and a mistake veator 
E ElRmxn (that is : E > O, Li:l Ei < and Lj:l Em+j < 1), the E-pertux>bed 
game is the game where each strategy p [q] of player [2] is replaced by 
the convex combination 
m p(E) := (1 - Li=l Ei)p + (E 1,E2 , ••• ,Em) 
[q(E) :"' (l- l:j:1 &m+j)q + (Em+1 '·" ,Em+n)] 
of the strategy p [q] and the completely mixed strategy 
(E1,E2·····Em) [T := __ n___ _ 
Lj=1 Em+j 
(E 1, ••• ,E+)]. m+ m n CJ:=-----
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This results in a payoff p(s)Aq(s) for player 1 and p(s)Bq(s) for player 2. 
In the s-perturbation of an mxn-bimatrix game (A,B) both players only 
choose completely mixed strategies, since the probability of choosing row 
i (column j) is at least E. (s .). Hence the strategy space of player 1 
1 m+J 
is 
{p E Sm; p. ~E. for all i ElN }, 
1 1 m 
whereas 
{q E Sn; q. ~ E . for all j ElN} 
1 m+J n 
is the strategy space of player 2. 
Definition 5.2 Let (A,B) be an mxn-bimatrix game. An equilibrium point 
(p,q) is called perfect if there exists a sequence {s(k)}k E JN of mistake 
vectors converging to 0 and a sequence{(p(k),q(k))}k ElN of elements of 
Sm x Sn converging to (p,q) such that, for each k ElN, (p(k),q(k)) is an 
equilibrium point of the s(k)-disturbed game. 
Selten (1975) obtained the following characterization of perfect equilibria. 
Theorem 5.1 An equilibrium point (p,q) of an mxn-bimatrix game (A,B) is 
perfect if and only if there exists a sequence {(p(k),q(k))}k ElN in 
Sm x Sn converging to (p,q) such that, for all k EJN, 
(1) p(k) and q(k) are completely mixed 
(2) p is a best reply against q(k) and q is a best reply against p(k). 
In order to prove that every bimatrix game has at least one perfect equi-
librium point, we show that there corresponds with the s-perturbed game of 
an mxn-bimatrix game (A,B) an mxn-bimatrix game (A(s),B(s)) such that 
(p,q) E E(A(s),B(s)) if and only if (p(s),q(s)) (as defined in definition 
5.1) is an equilibrium point of the s-perturbed game (Cf. Van Damme (1983), 
theorem 2.4.3). 
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Take 
A(e) 
where for i ElNm and j ElNn 
a .. (e) := e.(e)Ae.(e). 
l.J l. J 
m Then, if we use the notation A := Ei=1 ei and µ 
p(e)Aq(e) [(1-A)p + Acr]A[(1-µ)q + µ-r] 
(1-A)(1-µ)pAq + A(1-µ)crAq + µ(1-A)pA< + AµcrA< 
L .p. [(1-A)(1-µ)e.Ae. + A(1-µ)crAe. + µ(1-A)e.AT +AµcrAT]q. 
i.,J l. l. J J l. J 
L .p.[e.(e)Ae.(e)]q. = L .p.a .. (e)q. = pA(e)q. 
l. ,J l. l. J J l. ,J l. l.J J 
This implies that 
p(e)Aq(e) ~ p(e)Aq(e), for all p E Sm 
if and only if 
pA(e)q ~ pA(e)q, for all p E Sm. 
A similar result can be derived for the matrix B(e) defined analogously. 
This completes our proof. 
Since the e-perturbed game of a bimatrix game (A,B) is equivalent with a 
bimatrix game (close to (A,B)), each e-perturbed game possesses at least 
one equilibrium point. In view of the compactness of the strategy spaces, 
each sequence of equilibrium points as mentioned in definition 5.2 has a 
limit point. Since such a limit point is an equilibrium point, we have a 
proof of 
TheoPem 5.2 (Selten (1975)). Every bimatrix game has at least one per-
fect equilibrium point. 
With the help of theorem 5.1 it is easy to see that a perfect equilibrium 
point is undominated, where 
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Definition 5.3 An equilibrium point (p,q) of an mxn-bimatrix game (A,B) 
is undominated if for all p E Sm and q E Sn 
pA ~ pA implies pA = pA 
and 
Bq ~ Bq implies Bq Bq. 
By using the theory of matrix games, Van Damme (1983) established the 
following characterization. 
Theorem 5.3 An equilibrium point of a bimatrix game is perfect if and 
only if it is undominated. 
Tijs (1985) obtained the same result by using geometrical arguments. He 
further shows that the set of perfect equilibria of a bimatrix game is a 
(not necessarily disjunct) union of a finite number of convex polytopes. 
For both games in the examples 2.1 and 2.2 the set of perfect equilibria 
coincides with the maximal Nash subset s1• This is an easy consequence of 
the fact that for both games e 1 is the only undominated strategy for 
player 1. 
Unfortunately the perfectness concept does not eliminate all unreasonable 
equilibria. Myerson (1978) showed that adding strictly dominated strate-
gies may enlarge the set of perfect equilibria. For that reason he in-
troduced so-called proper equilibria. We will not discuss this equilibrium 
point concept in this paper. Furthermore, by restricting to perfect equi-
librium points, one may eliminate equilibria with attractive payoffs. For 
the game (A,B), where 
A ,. [: :] and B := ~l-21 02] 
(e 1,e 1) is a perfect equilibrium point yielding both players a lower 
payoff than the imperfect equilibrium point (e2 ,e2). 
For these reasons Okada (1981) proposed to study equilibria which are not 
only stable against some mistakes made by a player, but against all mis-
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takes. Formally 
Definition 5.4 An equilibrium point (p,q) of the mxn-bimatrix game (A,B) 
is called strictly perfect if for any mistake vector E there exists an 
equilibrium point (p(E),q(E)) of the E-disturbed game corresponding to (A,B) 
such that lim (p(E),q(E)) = (p,q). 
dO 
The bimatrix game (A,B) (Van Damme (1983)), where 
0 :J l-·,1 and B ·= 0 :J 0 
shows that there exist games without strictly perfect equilibria. 
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) however, proved that all bimatrix games possess 
at least one strictly perfect set of equilibria, where 
Definition 5.5 A closed set C of equilibria of an mxn-bimatrix game (A,B) 
is strictly perfect if for any open set V containing C there exists a 
neighbourhood U of 0 EIB.mxn such that, for all mistake vectors EE U, the 
£-disturbed game corresponding to (A,B) has an equilibrium point in V. 
One easily shows that a strictly perfect set contains a perfect equilibrium 
point. Furthermore, if C is a strictly perfect set and (p,q) E C is imper-
fact, then in view of the closedness of the set of perfect equilibria, there 
exists a neighbourhood W of (p,q) such that 
(1) all equilibrium points in Ware imperfect 
(2) C\W is a strictly perfect set. 
This implies that a strictly perfect set not properly contained in another 
one, contains only perfect equilibria. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) called 
such minimal strictly perfect sets stable sets and showed that every bi-
matrix game has at least one stable set and that such sets possess several 
attractive properties. 
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6. BEST REPLY STABLE EQUILIBRIA 
In this section we deal with equilibria which are not only a fixed 
point of the best-reply-multifunction (p,q)-> B1(q) x B2 (p) mentioned in 
section 2 but with equilibria for which the best-reply-multifunction sa-
tisfies some extra condition. Successively, we pay attention to (quasi-)-
strong equilibria, regular equilibria, robust equilibria and persistent 
equilibria. 
6.1. Strong and quasi-strong equilibria 
In 1973, Harsanyi introduced equilibria for which every player's 
equilibrium strategy is the only best reply to the strategy of his oppo-
nent. 
Definition 6.1 An equilibrium point (p,q) of a bimatrix game (A,B) is 
called strong if I B1 (q) I = I B2 (p) I = 1. 
Since 
lemma 
( 1) 
(2) 
where 
B1(q) = conv{ei; i E M(A;q)} and B2 (p) = conv{ej; j E M(p;B)}, 
2.1 implies that an equilibrium point (p,q) is strong if and only if 
p and q are pure strategies (that is : I C(p) I =I C(q) I = 1) 
(p,q) is a quasi-strong equilibrium point, 
Definition 6.2 An equilibrium (p,q) of a bimatrix game (A,B) is called 
quasi-strong if 
C(p) = M(A;q) and C(q) M(p;B). 
Such equilibria with the property that no player has a pure best reply 
other than the pure strategies belonging to the carrier of his equilibrium 
strategy, were also introduced by Harsanyi in his papers of 1973. The 
author (1981b,c) further investigated such equilibria and paid special 
attention to equilibrium points that are quasi-strong and isolated, where 
an equilibrium point (p,q) of a bimatrix game (A,B) is called isolated if 
there exists a neighbourhood V of (p,q) such that 
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E(A,B) n V = {(p,q)} 
or, equivalently, if {(p,q)} is a maximal Nash subset for that game. 
With the help of theorem 3.3 one obtains the following characterization. 
Lerrona 6.1 Let (p,q) be a quasi-strong equilibrium point of a bimatrix 
game (A,B) with A > 0 and B > 0. 
I C(p) I I C(q) [ and the matrices 
Then (p,q) is isolated if and only if 
[a .. ]. 
1-J ]_ E C(p), j E C(q) and 
[b .. ]. c c ( ) . c 1-J ]_ " p ' J c. C(q) are nonsingular. 
From the foregoing characterization of strong equilibria it will be clear 
that the set of strong equilibria of a game may be empty. It is still an 
open problem if all bimatrix games possess a quasi-strong equilibrium 
point. For a bimatrix game with a quasi-strong equilibrium point the 
following result was obtained (cf. Jansen (1981b)). 
Theorem 6.1 If (p,q) is a quasi-strong equilibrium point of a bimatrix 
game (A,B) and (p,q) ES, where Sis a maximal Nash subset for (A,B), then 
(p,q) E relint(S). 
In view of theorem 3.2 this implies that a quasi-strong bimatrix game, 
that is a game for which all equilibria are quasi-strong, has a finite 
number of equilibrium points. As a consequence of the following result of 
Meister (1984) a quasi-strong bimatrix game has in fact an odd number of 
equilibrium points. 
Theorem 6.2 A bimatrix game with a finite number of equilibrium points 
has an odd number of quasi-strong ones. 
This theorem also implies that a game with a finite number of equilibria 
possesses a quasi-strong equilibrium point (Cf. corollary 7.9 in Jansen 
(1981b)). An other result concerning the existence of quasi-strong equi-
libria was obtained by Jansen (1981b). 
Theorem 6.3 A bimatrix game with a convex set of equilibria (a Nash sol-
vable game) has at least one quasi-strong equilibrium point. 
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For a bimatrix game with (p,q) as its unique equilibrium point theorem 
6.3 and lelllllla 6.1 imply that 
(1) (p,q) is a quasi-strong equilibrium point 
(2) I C(p) I =I C(q) I 
So we have a proof of one part of the following result of Kreps (1974). 
Theorem 6.4 Let (p,q) E Sm x Sn be given. Then there exists an mxn-
bimatrix game (A,B) with (p,q) as its unique equilibrium point if and only 
if I C(p) I = I C(q) I . 
To finish this section, we consider a type of bimatrix game for which 
quasi-strongness appears in a natural way. 
If an mxn-bimatrix game (A,B) is completely mixed, that is C(p) = lNm and 
C(q) = lNn' for all (p,q) E E(A,B), then obviously all equilibria are 
quasi-strong. Hence, it follows from theorem 6.1 that a completely mixed 
bimatrix game has only a finite number of equilibrium points. It is also 
easy to see that, in the completely mixed case, the set of equilibrium 
points is convex. Using these two facts the first statement of the follow-
ing result of Raghavan (1970) and Heuer (1975) has been proved. 
Theorem 6.5 Let (A,B) be a completely mixed bimatrix game. Then 
(1) (A,B) has a unique equilibrium point, 
(2) the matrices A and Bare square, 
(3) if A> 0 and B > 0, the matrices A and B are nonsingular. 
6.2. Regular equilibria 
In the literature several authors (Cf. Harsanyi (1973b), Van Damme 
(1983), Jansen (1987)) have introduced a regularity concept for equilibrium 
points. We will start with the definition given by the author. After 
that this definition will be compared with those given by Harsanyi and 
Van Damme. 
As a first step we will associate with an mxn-bimatrix game a smooth map 
f : JRm+n ~JRm+n for which there exists a one-to-one correspondence between 
the equilibrium points of that game and the so-called feasible solutions 
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of the equation f(z) = 0. In order to define this map we will first show 
how the problem of finding an equilibrium point of an mxn-bimatrix game 
(A,B) can be formulated as the (linear oorrrplementarity) problem LCP(A,B) 
find, for the matrix M ·= lr O -AJ, 
-Bt 0 
, a vector 
z = (x,y) E JRm x JRn such that 
z ?; 0 
w := Mz + 1 ?; 0 
m+n 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) < w,z > 0 (where< w,z >denotes the inner product of wand z). 
A vector z satisfying (1) and (2) is called feasible and a feasible vector 
satisfying also (3) is called a solution of the linear complementarity 
problem LCP(A,B) (Cf. Luthi (1976)). 
In the following lemma it is shown that there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the equilibria of the game (A,B) and the nonzero solutions 
of LCP(A,B). 
Lemma 6.2 Let (A,B) be an mxn-bimatrix game with A> 0 and B > O. 
(a) If (p,q) E E(A,B), then (p/pBq, q/pAq) is a solution of LCP(A,B). 
(b) If (x,y) E JRm x JRn is a nonzero solution of LCP (A,B), then x f 0, 
III n y f 0 and (x/l:i=l xi, y/l:j=l yj) E E(A,B). 
Hence, in order to find the equilibria of the mxn-biII1atrix gaIIle (A,B), we 
have to find all vectors x EJRIII and y EJRn satisfying 
riAy 
:;; 1 and x. ?; 0 for all i E JN ]_ III (feasibility) xBe. :i 1 and y. ~ 0 for all j E JN J J n 
2:. IIl 1 x. (1-e.Ay) n y. ( 1-xBe.) = 0 (oorrrplementarity). + L 1 i= ]_ ]_ J= J J 
So if we define the map f : JRIII x JRn ...., 1RII1+n by rk ( 1-ekAy) if 1 :;; k :;; m 
fk(x,y) := 
yk-III ( 1-xBek_III) if II1+1 :;; k :;; II1+n 
our probleIII is to find feasible vectors x and y with l:IIl+n k=1 fk(x,y) 0 or, 
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equivalently, f (x,y) = O. 
So we have reduced the problem of finding the equilibrium points of an 
mxn-bimatrix game to the determination of the nonzero feasible 
solutions of the equation f(x,y) = 0, where f : lRm x lRn -+lRm+n is an in-
finitely often differentiable mapping associated with the game in question. 
Let 
m+n m+n Jf(x,y) = [a.f.(x,y)]. 1 J. __ 1 J l. i= ' 
the Jacobian off evaluated at (x,y). Since one can expect that an equi-
librium point will have nice properties if f is locally invertible at the 
solution (x,y) corresponding to that equilibrium point, i.e. if Jf(x,y) is 
nonsingular, we introduced (Jansen (1987)) 
Definition 6.3 An equilibrium point (p,q) of a bimatrix game (A,B) is 
called regular if the Jacobian Jf(x,y) is nonsingular, where (x,y) is the 
solution of the equation f (x,y) = 0 corresponding to (p,q) and where f is 
the mapping associated with (A,B). 
Also Harsanyi (1973b), in order to introduce regular equilibria, associa-
tf's with a given game a certain smooth mapping g : lRk -+ lRk (k E :JN depen-
ding on the game) and considers nonnegative solutions of the equation 
g(z) = 0. Van Damme (1983) slightly modified Harsanyi's definition. 
The approach of Harsanyi and Van Damme however has as a drawback that not 
every nonnegative solution of the equation g(z) = 0 is an equilibrium point 
and not every equilibrium point leads to a solution of the equation. 
In view of Corollary 3.4.2 of Van Damme (1983) and the next theorem, our 
concept of regularity is equivalent to the one introduced by Harsanyi and 
Van Damme. 
Theorem 6.5 (Jansen (1987)). An equilibrium point of a bimatrix game is 
regular if and only if it is isolated and quasi-strong. 
By applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the map 
F : lRZmn x lRm x lRn -+ lRm+n defined by 
{ "k(1-.. Ay) if 1 ;;; k ;;; m 
Fk(A,B,x,y) 
yk ( 1-xBek ) if m+1 ;;; k ;;; 
-m -m 
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m+n 
* * * * one can show that in the neighbourhood of a point (A ,B ,p ,q ), where 
* * * * (p ,q) is a regular equilibrium point of the bimatrix game (A ,B ), the 
set {(A,B,p,q); (p,q) E E(A,B)} is a smooth curve through the point 
* * * * (A ,B ,p ,q ) • 
Theoroem 6.6 (Cf. theorem 2;5.5 of Van Daunne (1983)). * * Let (p ,q ) be a 
* * regular equilibrium point of a bimatrix game (A ,B ). Then there exist 
* * * * neighbourhoods U of (A ,B ) and V of (p ,q ) such that 
(1) I E(A,B) n v I = 1, for all (A,B) E u 
(2) the mapping cr : U-+ V defined by {cr(A,B)} 
tiable. 
E(A,B) n V is differen-
To finish this section we consider roeguZaro bimatrix games, i.e. games for 
which all equilibria are regular. In view of theorem 6.5 a bimatrix game 
is regular if and only if it is quasi-strong. 
Furthermore, theorem 6.2 implies that a regular game has an odd number of 
equilibria (Cf. Harsanyi (1973b)). Since a non-degenerate (in the sense 
of Lemke and Howson (1964)) bimatrix game is regular and the class of non-
degenerate mxn-bimatrix games is a dense subset of the set of all mxn-
bimatrix games,we have partially proved 
Theoroem 6.? The set of regular mxn-bimatrix games is an open and dense 
subset of the set of all mxn-bimatrix games. 
Proof. Let (A,B) be a regular mxn-bimatrix game and let (p,q) E E(A,B). 
Then, in view of theorem 6.6, there exist neighbourhoods U of (A,B) and V 
of (p,q) such that 
I E(A',B') n v I= 1, for all (A',B') EU. 
Since the number of equilibrium points of the game (A,B) is finite, one 
can choose the neighbourhood U of (A,B) and an £ > 0 in such a way that 
for any game (A',B) EU 
I E(A',B') n B (p,q) I= 1, 
£ 
for all (p,q) E E(A,B). 
In view of the upper semicontinuity of the multifunction E (assigning to 
an mxn-bimatrix game its set of equilibrium points), 
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E(A I ,BI) c u 
(p,q) E E(A,B) 
B£(p,q), for all (A',B') EU. 
So I E(A,B) I= I E(A' ,B') I , for all (A',B') EU. 
With the help of lemma 2.1 it can be shown that U can be choosen in such 
a way that all equilibrium points of any game (A',B') in U are quasi-strong. 
Hence, all games in the set U are regular which completes the proof. D 
In fact we have shown in the proof of the foregoing theorem that the set 
{(A,B) is a regular game with E(A,B) = k} 
is open for all k E1N. Consequently the set of all regular mxn-bimatrix 
games is, as a finite union of open sets, disconnected and the number of 
equilibrium points is locally constant on the set of regular games. 
Finally, we note that Harsanyi (1973) proved that almost all bimatrix 
games are regular by showing that the class of mxn-bimatrix games with an 
irregular equilib·rium point has Lebesgue measure zero (where the class of 
all mxn-games is identified withJR2mn). 
6.3. Robust equilibria 
From theorem 5.1 it appears that for a perfect equilibrium point (p,q) 
the equilibrium strategy p (q) is a best reply to some (completely mixed) 
strategies close to q (p). Based on the idea that for a reasonable equi-
librium point the equilibrium strategy of a player remains a best reply if 
the other player changes his equilibrium strategy slightly but arbitrarily, 
Okada (1983) introduced robust equilibria. To be more precise 
Definition 6.4 An equilibrium point (p,q) of an mxn-bimatrix game (A,B) 
is robust if there exist neighbourhoods U of p and V of q such that 
p E B1(q), 
q E B2 (p), 
for all q E V 
for all p E U. 
Okada characterized the robust equilibria as follows. 
59 
TheoPem 6.8 An equilibrium point (p,q) of a bimatrix game (A,B) is robust 
if and only if the following conditions are fullfilled : 
( 1) e.A ekA if i,k E C(p)' l. 
(2) Be. Bek if j,k E C(q), J 
(3) if i E C(p) and k E M(A;q)\C(p), then 
a .. 
= akj' for· all j E C(q) l.J 
r/. C(q)' a .. ;::: ak.' for all j l.J 
- J (4) if j E C(q) and k E M(p;B)\C(q), then 
b .. bik' for all i E C(p) l.J 
b .. ;::: bik' for all i r/. C(p). l.J 
The theorem implies that a quasi-strong equilibrium point (p,q) is robust 
if and only if all pure strategies e. with i E C(p) are equivalent for l. 
player 1 and if all pure strategies e. with j E C(q) are equivalent for 
J 
player 2. Furthermore a strong equilibrium is robust. 
If for a robust equilibrium point (p,q) of a game (A,B) and mistake vector 
e: e:k J pi - ~ if i E C(p) 
e: 
kr/. C(p) I C(p) I 
p. := l. l e:i if i r/. C(p) 
and qe: is defined in a similar way, then, fore: small enough, (pe:,qe:) is 
an equilibrium point of the e:-perturbed game of (A,B). So we have proved 
the following 
TheoPem 6.9 A robust equilibrium point is strictly perfect. 
Example 6.1 
u 
2 g] [l 2 i] If A := 2 and B := 2 , then (p,q) 1 0 
is a robust equilibrium point, 1 1 where p q = <2,2,0). 
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6.4 Persistent equilibria 
In 1984, Kalai and Samet generalized the robustness concept by streng-
thening the pointwise stability of equilibria to a notion of neighbourhood 
stability. 
For an mxn-bimatrix game (A,B}, they call a set PxQ, where Pc Sm and 
Qc Sn are nonempty, closed, convex sets, an essential Nash retract for 
(A,B) if there exist neighbourhoods U of P and V of Q such that 
( 1) for any q E v, a p E p can be found with p E B1 (q) 
(2) for any p E u, a q E Q can be found with q E B2(p). 
With the help of Zorn's lemma, Kalai and Samet show that every bimatrix 
game has a minimal- essential Nash retract. They are interested in equi-
librium points contained in such retracts. 
Definition 6.5 An equilibrium point LS called persistent if it belongs 
to some minimal essential Nash retract. 
Since for a robust equilibrium point (p,q),{p} x {q} is a minimal essen-
tial Nash retract, a robust equilibrium point is persistent. Moreov<?.r 
we have 
Theorem 6.10 Every bimatrix game has a persistent equilibrium point. 
Proof. Let PxQ be a minimal essential Nash retract and let po E P. 
1 1 0 By (2) we can find a q E Q such that q E B2 (p ). In view of (1) there 
exists a p 1 E P with p 1 E B1(q 1). By continuing this process, we can 
f . d O 1 · d 1 2 . . h 11 k E Ln sequences p ,p , ... in Pan q ,q , ... in Q wit for a JN 
k k-1 k k q E B2 (p ) and p E B1(q ). 
* Since P and Qare compact, both sequences have a limit point, say p and 
* * * q , respectively. Then (p ,q ) E PxQ is an equilibrium point. D 
Furthermore Kalai and Samet prove that every bimatrix game possesses a 
perfect and persistent equilibrium point. 
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7. ESSENTIAL AND STRONGLY STABLE EQUILIBRIA 
In this section we deal with equilibrium points that are stable 
against slight perturbations of the payoffs. 
Wu Wen-tsun and Jiang Jia-he (1962) called an equilibrium point of a bi-
matrix game essential if, ro.ughly speaking, all games in a neighbourhood 
of the game in question have an equilibrium point close to it. To be more 
precise 
Definition 7.1 An equilibrium point (p,q) of a bimatrix game (A,B) is 
essential if there exists, with every neighbourhood V of (p,q) a neigh-
bourhood U of (A,B) such that 
E(A' ,B') n V f r/J, for all (A' ,B') E U. 
Kojima, Okada and Shindoh (1985) strenghtened this stability concept by 
introducing equilibrium point8 that change continuously and uniquely against 
slight perturbations of the payoffmatrices of the players. 
Definition 7.2 An equilibrium point (p,q) of a bimatrix game (A,B) is 
strongly stable if there exist neighbourhoods U of (A,B) and V of (p,q) 
such that 
c 1) I E (A' B') n v I 
(2) the mapping a 
tinuous. 
1, for all (A' ,B') EU, and 
U-> V defined by {cr(A' ,B')} = E(A' ,B') n Vis con-
Obviously, a strongly stable equilibrium point is isolated and essential. 
That the concept of essentiallity is related with that of quasi-strongness 
follows from 
Theorem 7.1 An essential equilibrium point of a bimatrix game is an 
element of some quasi-strong maximal Nash subset for that game (a maximal 
Nash subset is quasi-strong if all equilibrium points in the relative in-
terior of the set are quasi-strong). 
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Proof. Let (p,q) be an essential equilibrium point of the bimatrix game 
(A,B). Now we can proceed as in the proof of the theorems 5.2 and 7.2 
~1 ~2 . in Jansen (1981b) to construct a sequence p ,p , ... converging top such 
that 
( 1) 
for k large enough 
~k (p ,q) E: E(A,B) 
C(pk) = M(A;q). 
~1 ~2 Also a sequence q , q 
(2) 
way 
(3) 
(4) 
that for 
~k (p ,q ) 
c(qk) 
k large enough 
E E(A,B) 
= M(p;B). 
converging to q can be constructed in such a 
Since the number of maximal Nash subsets for (A,B) is finite, we may 
suppose, without loss of generality, that there exists a maximal Nash sub-
set S for (A,B) such that 
~k ~k (p ,q), (p,q ) E: S, fork large enough. 
0 0 
Since Sis closed, also (p,q) ES. If (p,q) E relint(S), then in view of 
(2) and lemma 3.2, fork large enough, 
0 ....... k 0 0 
M(A;q) c: M(A;q) = C(p ) c C(p) c: M(A;q). 
0 0 0 Q 
Hence C(p) M(A;q) and similarly C(q) = M(p;B). 
So Sis a quasi-strong maximal Nash subset containing (p,q). D 
As a consequence of this theorem, an isolated and essential equilibrium 
point is quasi-strong. Hence a strongly stable equilibrium point is re-
gular. Since theorem 6.6 implies that a regular equilibrium point is strong-
ly stable we have the following result (Cf. Jansen (1987)). 
Theorem 7.2 An equilibrium point of a bimatrix game is strongly stable 
if and only if it is isolated and quasi-strong. 
Because this result implies that an isolated and quasi-strong equilibrium 
point is essential, we have a new proof of 
Theorem ?.3 (Cf. theorem 7.5, Jansen (1981b)). An isolated equilibrium 
point of a bimatrix game is essential if and only if it is quasi-strong. 
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The following result was also obtained by Jansen (1981b). For a different 
proof see theorem 3.4.5 of Van Damme (1983). 
Theorem ?.4 An essential and quasi-strong equilibrium point of a bimatrix 
game is isolated. 
Corollary ?.1 If (p,q) is an essential equilibrium point of a bimatrix 
game, then 
(1) (p,q) is an isolated (and quasi-strong) equilibrium point, or 
(2) (p,q) is an element of the relative boundary of some quasi-strong 
maximal Nash subset for that game. 
As a consequence of this corollary the class of all essential mxn-bimatrix 
games - a game is essential if all its equilibria are essential - coincides 
with the class of all regular mxn-bimatrix games. 
Since there are bimatrix games without an essential equilibrium point 
- take for A and B the nxn-matrix (n E: JN\{ 1}) with all coefficients equal 
to one - Jiang Jia-he (1964) investigated the essentiallity of the connec-
ted components of thP. equilibrium point set. He calls a closed set K of 
the equilibrium point set of a bimatrix game (A,B) essential if for any 
open set V containing K there exists a neighbourhood U of (A,B) such that 
E(A' ,B') n V f 0, for all (A' ,B') E: U. 
Obviously any closed set containing an essential equilibrium point is 
essential. 
He obtained the following result also proved by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). 
Theorem ?.5 For every bimatrix game the equilibrium point set has at 
least one essential connected component. 
Since for an essential component consisting of one point only, that point 
must be an essential equilibrium point, the following is immediate 
Corollary ?.2 (Cf. Wu Wen-tsun, Jiang Jia-he (1962), Jansen (1981b), 
Meister (1984)). A bimatrix game with only a finite number of equilibrium 
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points has at least one essential equilibrium point. 
Suppose that K is an essential closed set of equilibria of the bimatrix 
game (A,B). Let for a mistake vectors close to O, (A(s),B(s)) be the 
bimatrix game eqJivalent with the s-perturbed game. Since K is essential 
and since (A(s) ,B(s)) is close· to (A,B), the game (A(s) ,B(s)) has an equi-
librium point (p,q) close to K. So the equilibrium point (p(s),q(s)) of 
the s-disturbed game induced by (p,q) (see definition 5.1) will also be 
close to K. This implies that an essential closed set is strictly perfect. 
Furthermore, our considerations at the end of section 5 imply 
Theorem ?.6 Each essential connected component of the set of equilibria 
of a bimatrix game contains a stable set (and hence a perfect equilibrium 
point). 
In a comparable way Van Damme (1983) proved the following result which im-
plies that stability against perturbations in the payoff's implies stabi-
lity against perturbations in strategies. 
Theorem ?.? An essential equilibrium point of a bimatrix game is strictly 
perfect. 
Analogously to the proof of theorem 7.1 the following result can be ob-
tained. 
Theorem ?.8 An isolated and essential maximal Nash subset contains at 
least one quasi-strong equilibrium point. 
In combination with theorem 7.5 this result implies 
Corollary ?.3 A bimatrix game for which all maximal Nash subsets are 
pairwise disjunct has at least one quasi-strong equilibrium point. 
This corollary generalizes theorem 6.3 and corollary 7.9 in Jansen (1981b). 
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Finally, we give for bimatrix games an overview of the relations between 
the refinements of the equilibrium concept mentioned in this paper. 
l. robust (Okada 1983) I 
strong 
(Harsanyi 1973) 
regular 
(Harsanyi 1973 
Van Damme 1983 
Jansen 1987) 
\ Van Damme 
\ 
\ 
Okada \ 
(1983)~ 
isolated 
quasi-strong 
\ 
persistent 
(Kalai, Samet 1984 
\ 0~~~~4) 
\ ~\ 
\\ 
\\ 
~ 
strictly perfect 
(Okada 1981) 
~rfect 
I (Selten 1975) 
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( 198 7) 
essential 
pure 
quasi-strong 
(Harsanyi 1973) 
strongly stable 
(Kojima, Okada, 
Shindoh 1985) 
(Wu Wen-tsun, 
Jiang Jia-he 1962) 
/.n Damme (1983) 
<-- __ ,-,_·-... -.. -} 
Van Damme 
(1983) 
undominated 
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CHAPTER I I I 
GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
by Peter Bonn 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
In game theory a lot of attention is paid to games with complete in-
formation. These are games in which all participants (= players) have 
full information about the various actions the players can take, the ac-
tual "payoffs" (to all players) generated by a choice of action by each 
player, and the precise information available to the other players. 
However, real life situations are different. Think about competing 
firms which often lack information about the other's financial means, 
capacity of production, costs of labour etc. Information also plays a 
crucial role in disarmament negotiations. Both sides don't know the 
exact quantity (how many) and quality (what types) of their opponent's 
armoury. Moreover, the exact state of information of the other side is 
unknown. As we like to study real life situations by game theoretical 
means the above argument emphasizes the importance of a general theory 
about games with incomplete information. 
Harsanyi (1967-1968) developed a model on which most of the study on 
incomplete information is based. His "Bayesian analysis for games with 
incomplete information" was only recently formalized by Mertens and 
Zamir (1985). Results not using this approach can be found e.g. in 
Megiddo (1980). 
For studying the role of "learning" and "threats" in an incomplete 
information environment, repeated games (= multistage games) seem an 
appropriate framework. Here, the players have to make a decision several 
times which leaves room to statistical inferences and "threat-behaviour". 
Very important work was done by Aumann and Maschler (1966-1968) who laid 
the foundation to further research in this area. 
In section 2 we try to give an impression of the results and problems in 
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the study of these so-called repeated games with incomplete information. 
Throughout this section we assume that 
(1) only two players are involved in the game, player 1 and player 2. 
(2) the same game is being played repeatedly. 
Under these assumptions we present a general model which covers various 
cases of incomplete information in repeated games. 
First we discuss the situation in which incomplete information is on 
the part of one player only (lack of information on one side) and where 
the players are in conflict, i.e. the gains of player 1 are equal to the 
losses of player 2 and vice versa (the zero-sum case). In this survey, 
some basic techniques and ideas in the study on incomplete information are 
illustrated. Subsequently it is shown that some of the results for lack 
of information on one side can not be generalized for a natural extension 
the zero-sum case with lack of information on both sides. These results 
together with extensions can be found in the works of Aumann and Maschler 
(1966-1968), Mertens and Zamir (1971-1972,1976,1980), Kohlberg (1975), 
Sorin (1980) and others. After that, the attention is directed to the non 
zero-sum case. Here only the case with lack of information on one side 
has been studied. Although many of the basic ideas used in the zero-sum 
case can be helpful in this case too, the results look quite different. 
New phenomena arise and pose new difficulties. In this part we closely 
follow Hart (1985). 
In a somewhat different context section 3 describes a first attempt 
to evaluate and compare various information types. A different kind of 
information may lead to a different behaviour. How does a change in the 
state of information affect the payoffs ? The study is restricted to re-
latively simple one shot games, in which the players has to decide only 
once. This section subscribes to works of Levine and Ponssard (1977) and 
Borm (1987). 
2. REPEATED GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
In this section we concentrate on an aspect of information evaluation 
which involves questions like 
How can I get the maximal profit out of my information 
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What information do I reveal by taking a certain action 
Can my information be helpful to force a desired outcome 
In this context terms like "learning process", "exchange of information", 
"threats" and "punishments" come in. 
A general model for repeated games with incomplete information is 
presented in 2.1. It is argued that most of the games studied so far fit 
into this model. 2.2 discusses the zero-sum case, 2.3 the non zero-sum 
case. 
2. 1 The model 
The classes of repeated games we study are given by the following 
(i) Two players, player 1 and player 2. 
(ii) A finite set M1 of choices for player and a finite set M2 of choi-
ces for player 2. M1 := {1, ••• ,m1}, M2 := {1, ••• ,m2}. 
(iii)A finite set K of stage games. To each k EK there corresponds a pair 
of m1 x m2- matrices (Ak,Bk). 
k k k I I [A .. ]. E M • E M_ B = [B .. ]. E . E M ' K = r 
l.J i 1 ,J -L' l.J i M1 ,J 2 
We often identify K with {1, ... ,r}}. 
(iv) A probability vector p = (p 1, ... ,pr) E /:.r ·= {p E 11/ [ i:k:l Pk 1, 
Pk ;;; 0 for k E { 1 , .•• , r}}. 
Without loss of generality we assume p E /:.+ := {p E !:. I Pk> for k E {1, .. ,d}. 
r 2 r 
(v) Two partitions of K, K1 for player 1 and K for player 2 
K1 1 1 (r1 r) {K (1), .•. ,K (r 1)} E JN' r1 ~ 
K2 {K2 (1), ... ,K2 (r2)} (r2 E JN' r2 ~ r) 
(vi) An element x of K is chosen according to the probability vector p. 
(vii) Before stage 1 player i (i 
{1, ... ,r.} with x E Ki(l.). 
l. l. 
over K is made accordingly, 
E {1,2}) is informed about the 1. E 
l. . 
A subjective probability vector pi(l.) 
l. 
i.e. 
-1 ( l: . p.) . 
j(Ki(l.) J 
l. 
0 else 
(viii) At each stage m = 1,2, ... player chooses an element im E M1 and 
player 2 chooses an element jm E M2 . This is done simultaneously, 
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i.e. without either player knowing what the other did. Player 1 and 
player 2 get the payoffs A. . and B. . respectively, but they don't 
1m3m 1mJm 
observe these payoffs. 
(ix) After each stage m 1,2, .•. player i (i E {1,2}) receives a signal 
as a function of x and the choices made in stage m. In this way we define 
signalfunc~ions A1 and A2 : 
Ai: K1 x M1 x M2 ~Li (i E {1,2}) 
where 1 1 and 12 are the signalsets of player 1 and player 2, respectively. 
(x) Both players have perfect recall (i.e. they don't forget what they 
are told in the previous stages). 
(xi) All of (i) - (x) is common knowledge to both players. Especially, 
1 2 1 player 2 knows K ,K ,p (.),A 1, .•• 
Games based on (i) - (xi) are called finite if the number of stages is fi-
nite, infinite otherwise. Finite games will be denoted by G (p) with n 
n 
being the number of stages, infinite games by G00 (p). Note that by varying 
the partitions in (v) and the signalfunctions in (ix) the model can cover 
several types of games with incomplete information. 
Following Harsanyi, these games with incomplete information can be 
equivalently viewed as games with complete but imperfect information. 
Here .the uncertainty players have is not about the rules of the game (e.g. 
payoffs) but only about the moves previously made (by the players or by 
chance). This is accomplished by adding an extra stage m = 0, at which 
"nature" chooses x E K according to the probability vector p. 
Next we describe the strategy sets of the players in G (p), 
n 
00}. A pure strategy cr of player 1 in G (p) is a collection 
n 
fo} E {l }'where for all m E {1, ••. ,n} 
mm , ••• ,n 
cr :=Kl x 
m 
n E {1,2, .•• , 
1 i.e. for every partition element K1 , 1 E {1, ••• ,r1}, and every history of 
actions h EH, cr determines an action i E M1 for stagen. For n = 00 m m m m 
this description is not entirely correct. Formally, we have to define a 
pure strategy cr in G00 (p) as a sequence {crm} m EJN such that etc. However, 
to shorten our descriptions we leave out this distinction from now on. 
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A mixed strategy is, as usual, a probability distribution over the set of 
pure strategies. However, since G (p), n E {1, •.. , 00 }, is a game with per-
n 
feet recall, we can restrict ourselves to behavior strategies (for n ElN 
cf. Kuhn (1953), for n = 00 cf. Aumann (1964)). If behavior strategies 
are used the players make independent randomizations at each move. For-
mally, a behavior strategy a of player 1 in Gn(p) is a collection 
{am}m E {l, ... ,n}' where for all m E {1, ... ,n} 
CT : Kl XH ->lo 
m m m1 
Analogously strategies T for player 2 are defined by replacing a by T, 
1 2 K by K , M1 by M2 and m1 by m2 . 
So far we have only defined sequences of payoffs (cf (viii)). For 
evaluating games with incomplete information we will concentrate on the 
expected average of such sequences. Therefore, we look at the expectation 
Of N 0 -- J_ 'O' n X 13 1 ~ L.. A. . and := 
n · n m=1 imJm n n 
n x l:m=l Bi j . These expectations depend 
mm 
on the probability vector p and the strategies o and T which are used : 
2 yn(p,a,T) := lE Sn and p,cr,T 
1 y (p,CT,T) :=lE an, 
n p,CT,T 
It may be noted that the above description is appropriate in the version 
with complete but imperfect information. In the incomplete information 
version it would be more consistent to look at r 1- and r 2-vectors of 
average payoffs. Once x is chosen, the partition elements of K1 and K2 
to which x belongs are determined. At that instant the payoffs for other 
"types" (this terminology is due to Harsanyi) are not important anymore. 
Hence we look at 
1 1 1 
w (p,CT,T) = (w (p,O,T;1), .. ,w (p,CT,T;r1)) 
n n n 
2 
and wn(p,CT,T) 2 (w (p,O,T;1), .. , 
n 
2 
wn(p,a,T;r2)) 
with 1 
1 n A.x. ) (1 {1, •.. ,r 1}) wn(p,CT,T,l) := lE 1 (- l: E p (1) ,O,T n m=l l.mJm 
2 
:=JEZ (J_ ~ B.x. ) (1 {1, ..• ,r2}). and wn(p,CT,T,l) p ( 1) , a, T n m= 1 imJm E 
However, for most of our aims both descriptions turn out to be equivalent 
and can be used interchangeable. 
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2.2 The zero-sum case 
This paragraph deals with games based on (i)-(xi) in which all stage 
. k k k k games are zero-sum games, i.e. (A ,B ) = (A ,-A) for all k EK. We will 
restrict our attention to two fundamental and relatively simple classes : 
standard inform~tion with lack of information on one side and on both si-
des, respectively. This is done because even in these cases things get 
complicated and were not fully understood for a long time. Besides, basic 
ideas and methods can be better understood here. We briefly survey the 
most important results and illustrate them by giving an example. 
Other types of games with incomplete information can be fitted into 
the model of 2.1 too, like a generalisation of the standard information 
case by means of information matrices. The interested reader is referred 
to the works of Kohlberg and Zamir (1974) and Mertens and Zamir (1977). 
Repeated sequential games with incomplete information, in which the 
players do not move simultaneously but sequentially (i.e. player 1 moves 
first, his action is told to player 2, player 2 makes his move), don't 
seem to fit into the model. However, by adjusting the strategies and sig-
nalfunctions a sequential game can be viewed as a special kind of a simul-
taneous game. The results found for simultaneous games also hold for se-
quential games but can be strength2ned considerably. For a more detailed 
description we refer to Ponssard and Zamir (1973), Ponssard (1975) and 
Sorin (1980). 
2.2.1 Standard information : lack of information on one side 
We consider games G (p), n E {1, ... ,00 } and p E 6, with 
1 n 2 r 
K = {{1},{2}, ... ,{r}} and K = {{1, ... ,r}}. Hence r 1 = r,r2 1. To 
fit the model we assume that K1(1) = {l} for all 1 E {1, .•• ,r}. Then 
p1(1) = 1 for all 1 E {1, ... ,r} and p2(1) = p. 
What this means is that player 1 exactly knows what game is being played 
repeatedly, whereas player 2 only knows the probability pk of the game 
(AK,BK) being played. This is what is called lack of information on one 
side. Furthermore we assume the following 
1 1 = 12 = M1 x M2 and 
A1({1},i.j) = (i,j), A2 ({1, ••• ,r},i,j) (i,j) (1 E {1, •.. ,r}, i E M1 , 
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j E M2). This is called standard information. After each stage the 
actions taken in that stage are announced to both players. 
Because [ K2 [ = 1 we may consider a behavior strategy T of player 2 as 
a collection {T } E { } where for all m 
m m 1 , ••• ,n 
rn-1 
'rn : (M1 x M2) ~ 6rn2 
Because [ K 1 (1) [ = 1 for all 1 E { 1, ... ,r 1} a behavior strategy o of player 
1 can be described by an r-vector (o 1 , ... ,or) with uk being a collection 
{ok} E {1 }' k E {1, ... ,r}, where for all rn rn m , ••• ,n 
a~ : (M1 x M2)rn-1 -> 
Further we define for each k E {1, ••• ,n}, m E {1, .•. ,n} and i E M1 
a := (orn1, ••• ,ornr) and ok(i) := (ok) .. 
rn m mi 
on 
Since for the zero-sum case a 
n 
1 n x y (p,O,T) := JE (- L _1 A. · ) n p,o,T n rn- irnJm 
- 6 for all n EJN we can concentrate 
n 
the expected n-stage average payoff to player 1 if a and T are used. 
Note that for finite games G (p) we have a finite number of pure strategies. 
n a r-1 .a 
For player 1 this number is equal to rn1, for player 2 to m2 with 
n-1 j 
a= r. Zj=O (rn 1.rn2) . This can be seen by counting the information sets 
in the version with complete but imperfect information. So, using the 
minimax criteriurn, we may consider the (minimax) value vn(p) of Gn(p) de-
fined by 
min max y (p,o,T) = rnax rnin yn(p,o,T). 
T a n a T 
It appears that v is a concave function on 6 r' n i.e. 
vn(µp 1 2 1 2 + (1-µ)p) ;;; µvn(p) + (1-µ) vn(p ) for allµ E [0,1] and 
1 2 E 6 p p 
r 
The main result for finite games is the (forward) recursive formula 
for v (p) given in theorem 1. This formula was first derived by Aumann 
n 
and Maschler (1966-1968) and formally proved in Mertens and Zarnir (1971-
1972). Recently an alternative proof was provided by Armbruster (1983, 
cf Sorin (1986)). 
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Theorem 1. For all p E ~ and n E {0,1,2, ••• } we have r 
vn+1(p) 
where 
;~ 1 Pk cr~(i) (i E M1) 
such that p~ (i) = _1 (i) Pk. a~ (i) 
(J 
( 1) 
(i E M, k E K) 
Note that if player 1 uses strategy cr1 (for stage 1), cr 1(i) denotes the 
total probability of i E {1, ••• ,m1} being chosen in stage 1. Theorem 1 
reveals some important characteristics of games with incomplete informa-
tion. By the minimax criterium an optimal strategy a for player 1 in 
G (p) has to guarantee v (p) even if player 2 knows this strategy. n n 
Knowing a and the "real" actions of player 1 in the previous stages too, 
player 2 is able to deduce a sequence of posterior probability vectors 1 2 1 p ,p , ••• on K by using Bayes'law. (p := p). It is easily verified 
that this sequence of random variables {pm} } form a martingale, m E {1, ••• ,n i.e. 
( m J 1 m-1 Ea,T p p , ... ,p ) m-1 p for all m E {1, ••• ,n}. 
Consequently E pm = p. In some sense these posterior probability a, T 
vectors measure the information which is revealed to player 2. To be 
exact, Ea (pm+l - pm J pm) measures the amount of information being re-
vealed m in stage m by playing a in that stage. Using the sequence m {pm} E {l } it is also seen that m , ••• ,n 
1 n y (p,a,T) = - I 1 a (a ,T ) n n m= lll m m 
if a (a ,T ) denotes the expected payoff at stage m according to pm. III m m 
Now we are able to give an interpretation of theorem 1. The first 
term in equation (1) represents the payoff to player 1 in the first stage 
of G 1(p), the second term his payoff in the remaining n stages. It is n+ 
seen that this last payof f depends heavily on the strategy chosen in the 
first stage and the information revealed there. This interaction makes 
it impossible to analyze the situation backwards. In this way we can not 
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use a tool which has proved to be very hulpful in the treatment of stochas-
tic games. 
A consequence of theorem 1 is that v (p) for each p E 6 is decreasing n r 
in n. Intuitively this result is clear because in a game with more stages 
player 2 has more opportunity to learn and to profit from this learning. 
Theorem 2 and 3 deal with two approaches for repeated games with in-
complete information having a large number of stages : "limit of value" and 
"value of limit". "Limit of value" means that we consider the value of a 
finite n-stage game and let n tend to infinity. "Value of limit" means 
that we in G00 (p) define a value using some kind of limiting average of the 
payoffs. However, for games with standard information and lack of informa-
tion on one side both approaches turn out to be equivalent. 
Before starting theorem 2 about "limit of value" we have to define 
the following. Let 6(p) be the matrix game determined by the matrix 
r k A(p) := Ik=l pkA Then 6(p) corresponds to the game in which player 
ignores his information (i.e. Ok o for all k E {1, ... ,r} and 
m m 
m E {1, ... ,n} and consequently pm p for all m). We therefore call 6(p) 
the non-revealing game corresponding to Gn(p), n E {1,2, ..• ,00}, and denote 
its value by u(p). Note that u is continuous on 6r 
It follows that vn(p) ~ Cav u(p) for all p E 6r and n EJN, where Cav u de-
notes the least concave function that is greater or equal to u on 6r' and 
with minor abuse of notation Cav u(p) denotes its value at p. In this way 
we come to the conclusion that there is a function v : 6 ~JR such that 
(a) vn ~ v (n ~ 00), uniformly 
(b) v continuous and concave 
(c) v(p) ~ Cav u(p) for all p E 6r. 
Aumann and Maschler (1966-1968) proved that v 
r 
Cav u. 
Theorem 2. (i) lim vn(p) Cav u(p) (p E 6 ) r 
n~oo 
(ii) There is a N EJR, N > 0 such that for all p E 6 
N r 
0 ~ v (p) - Cav u(p) ~ 
n l/n 
Their proof is based on a relation between the profit that is made by 
playing in a revealing way and the amount of information that is thus 
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being revealed. 
Zamir (1971-1972) proved that O(J_) is the best uniform upper bound for 
vn - Cav u by giving an example Vn in which u = Cav u and v (p) ~ p(l-p) 
n Vn 
for all n ElN and p E ~r· Here a link can be laid to the 
Central Limit Theorem. If n = Cav u player has to ignore his informa-
tion. This leads to playing the same mixed strategy at each stage. 
Consequently there will be n random variation in the average payoff. 
According to the Central Limit Theorem this variation will be of the order 
1 The example of Zamir can now be thought of as an example in which 
Vn 
player 1 can take advantage of this natural variation by slightly devia-
ting from the "optimal" mixed strategy. However, it is interesting to 
note that such kind of advantageous behavior is not always possible even 
if u = Cav u. An interesting point was made by Mertens and Zamir (1976) 
who showed that in the example of Zamir the normal distribution explicit-
ly comes in : the limit of Vn • v (p) is the standard normal density func-
n 
tion evaluated at its p-quantile. 
Now we come to the "value of limit" approach. 
(1967) pointed out that the expectation of lim 
n 
1 
exist. In this way an obvious candidate n-+OO 
Aumann and Maschler 
~ n A~ . may fail to 
m=l l.mJm 
for a payoff function in G00(p) is ruled out. To overcome this difficulty 
we define the value of G00 (p) directly without first defining payoffs. 
Definition. G00(p) is said to have a value v00 (p) if for all E > 0 there 
are strategies OE of player 1 and TE of player 2 and an integer NE EJN 
such that 
(i) y (p,O ,T) ~ voo(p) - E \Jn ~ N E' VT n E 
(ii) y (p,O,T ) :;;; voo (p) n E + E 'v'n ~ NE VO• 
This definition implies that player (player 2) can get the lim inf 
(lim sup) of the expected n-stage average payoff to player 1 as close to 
v00 (p) as he wishes. Therefore we shall use the following terminology 
aE(TE) E-guarantees v00 (p) in G00 (p), or, aE(TE) is E-optimal. 
The following theorem which is due to Aumann and Maschler (1966-1968) 
states that "value of limit" and "limit of value" coincide (cf. theorem 2). 
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Theorem 3. For all p E 6r we have 
v00 (p) = Cav u(p). 
An intuitive approach to the proof of theorem 3 is given by Aumann (1981, 
23-24) and is shortly recited below because it reflects the characteris-
tic way of reasoning in games with incomplete information. 
In a zero-sum situation information can not hurt you, so v00 has to be 
concave. Next we have that v00 ~ u because player 1 can choose to ignore 
his information. So it follows that v ~ Cav u on 6 . 
oo r 
To "prove" the opposite inequality, note that player 1 (by definition) has 
a strategy GE which E-guarantees v00 • Therefore he may as well announce 
this strategy (and use it). Given GE player 2 is able to deduce a sequen-
ce of posterior probabilities {pm}m E JN which are random variables depen-
ding on the pure actions chosen by player 1 in the various stages. This 
sequence is a martingale. Furthermore, because this sequence of probabi-
lities is conditioned on more and more information there is a random va-
riable q such that pm·? q (m ~ 00 ) with probability 1. This means that af-
ter a finite number of stages player 1 has revealed about all the informa-
tion he is ever going to reveal. From that stage on he has to play (al-
most) nonrevealing and the posterior probabilities will be close to q. 
Therefore, player 1 on average can not do better than IB u(q). Using 
Jensen's inequality and the fact that IB q = p (E pm= p for all m and 
pm~ q a.s.) we have 
v00 (p) :0 IB u(q) :0 IB Cav u(q) :0 Cav u(IB q) = Cav u(p). 
However, all the reasoning above is just imaginary. Player 2 can not 
really assume that player 1 is using any particular strategy at all and 
therefore will not be computing posterior probabilities after all. He 
has to find an E-optimal strategy TE in a totally different way. Two such 
strategies were provided by Aumann and Maschler (1966-1968). However, the 
first one is of little practical use because it makes use of the optimal 
strategies Tn for all finite games Gn(p), and these are not computed that 
easily. In this sense the second one was more applicable, being construc-
ted with the aid of Blackwell's theorem about repeated games with vector 
payoffs, and therefore called a Blackwell strategy (cf. Blackwell (1956)). 
In proposition 5 this strategy is described. For the sake of completeness 
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in proposition 4 we give ans-optimal strategy for player 1. It may be 
noted that both strategies have stronger properties than just s-optimality. 
Proposition 4. Let p E 6r and a as below. Then we have 
y (p,y,T) ~ Cav u(p) Vn ElN VT. 
n 
For a determine (Caratheodory) : 
1 r p1, •.. ,Pr E 1R and q , .•. ,q E 6r such that 
(a) Cav u(p) 
(b) r p = l:k=1 
(c) Pk ~ 0 
a Use in every 
with probability 
r 
= l:k=1 
K 
Pk u(q ) 
K 
Pk q 
(k E { 1 , ..• , r}) , r l:k=1 p = k 
stage strategy sk, which is 
qk 
Pk· ~x~, k E {1, ••. ,r}. 
PX 
k 
an optimal strategy in 6(q ), 
Note that in playing a player 1 once performs a lottery, in the beginning, 
and play stationary from then on. 
Proposition 5. Let p E 6r and T as below. Then we have 
For each s > 0 there is an integer N E JN such that 
s 
y n(p,cr,T) $ Cav u(p) + s Vn ~ N vcr. 
s 
For T determine (Cav u concave and continuous) 
11 E 1Rr such that 
(a) Cav u(p) n . P 
(b) Cav u(q) $ 11 . q for all q E 6 . 
r 
Let S := {z EJRr [ zk $ llk for each k E {1, •.• ,r}} and define xn E1Rr as 
the average vector payoff to player after stage n-1 (n E {2,3, ... }). 
Note that xn E V : = { z E 1R [ zk $ max{ [ Aij [ ; i E M1 ,j E M2 , 1 EK}}. 
Let yn be such that d(xn,yn) = min d(x ,y) (Euclideau metric d)y exists 
y ES n n 
because s n v f ~). 
Further, if xn i S we define ln E 6r by 
k E {1, •• .,r}. 
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Let t:P be an optimal strategy for player 2 in t.(ln) 
T In stage n, play 
arbitrary if n 1 or x E S 
{en n else 
2.2.2 Standard information : lack of information on both sides 
We consider games G (p) of 2.1 with 
n 
K1 1 1 2 2 2 {K (1), .. .,K (r)} and K = {K (1),. • .,K (v)} for r and v such that 
IK1(s) I v for all s E { 1,. . .,r} 
I K2 ( t) I r for all t E {1,. • .,v} (Hence f . v = r) • 
Consequently, K can be arranged in a r x v - matrix of games such that the 
elements of K1 form the rows and those of K2 the columns. Accordingly, 
we may provide the stage games with a double labeling: As,t (s E {1, ••. ,r}, 
tE{1,. • .,v}). 
Above assumptions imply that we are in the consistent case as defined 
by Aumann and Maschler (1967). It is therefore allowed to restrict our 
attention to the so-called "independent case" because any game meeting the 
consistency requirement, is equivalent to a game meeting the independency 
requirement by adjusting the probability vector p and the stage matrices 
Ak, k E { 1 , ••• , r} • 
For the independent case we assume the probability of the (s,t)-element 
of K, s E {1, ••• ,f} and t E {1, ••• ,v}, to be Tis • Tit' where TI= (TI 1 ,. •• ,Tir) 
and 'TI = (n1, ••• ,nv) are two probability vectors : TIE t.r, TI' E t.v. 
As a motivation for the term "independent case" we can say that player 1's 
conditional probability on the "types" of player 2 is independent of his 
own "type" (similarly for player 2). 
To emphasize that we assume the independent case we will use the notation 
G (TI,TI) instead of G (p). 
n n 
Furthermore we assume that \ 1,\2 , t 1 and t 2 are like in 2.2.1, i.e. 
such that the players have standard information. It may be noted that 
games with standard information and lack of information on one side can be 
fitted into the model too: let r =rand v = 1, the independency require-
ment is fulfilled trivially. 
A behavior strategy cr of player 1 in G (TI,n) can be described by a n 
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1 r s 
r-vector (o ' ••. ,o ) where 0 is a collection {08 } { } with 
mm E 1, .•. ,n 
s (M1 x M )m-1 0 m 2 
For m E { 1 , ... ,n} 
' 
1 r 
0 ·= (o , ... ,o ) 
m m m 
-+ /'i 
m1 
s E {1, ..• ,n 
and ox(i) := 
m 
s E {1, ••• ,r}. 
and i E {1, •.. ,m1} we define 
k (o ) .. 
mi 
Analogous definitions can be given for a behavior strategy T for player 2. 
Again we concentrate on 
y (TI,n,o,T) :=JE TI' C I: n A2: ) 
n TI, ,O,T n m=1 ]_ mjm 
and 
v (TI ,n) := min max y (TI,n,o,T) max min y (TI,n,o,T). 
n n n T 0 0 T 
For finite games G (TI,n), the results are very similar to those found 
n 
for the case with lack of information on one side. The proofs given there 
can be generalized almost directly. These results can be found in Mertens 
and Zamir (1971-1972) and are summarized in theorem 6. 
Theorem 6. For all n EJN, TIE /'if and TIE /'i\J we have 
(i) vn(.,n) is a concave function on /'ir 
v (TI,.) is a convex function on /'i 
n \J 
(a function v is convex iff -v is concave) 
(ii) the recursive formula 
v (TI ,n) 1 { z r I:\) s As,t t (n-1). m1 m2 01 (i). - max min TI TI 01 + L:i=1 L:.1 n n s=1 t=1 s t T 1 J= 01 '1 
; 1 (j) v (TI2(i) ,TI' 2(j)} 
n 
where 
01 (i) := zs:1 Tis. o~(i) I: \) TI .. / (j) (i E M1' j E M2) t=1 t 1 
and 
TI2(i) E f'ir, TI' 2 (j)Ef'i such that for each s E {1, ••. ,r} and 
t E {1, ••• ,v} 
01 (i) 
\) 
OS (. ) ~TI 2 (J') 
. TI s. 1 ]_ ' t 
Again we see the reliance on posterior probability vectors. For example, 
if we assume that player 1 knows the exact strategy of player 2 in the 
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first stage, he can after stage 1 compute the conditional probability of 
player 2 being of "type" t E {1, .•• ,v}, because he also gets informed 
about action j 1 of player 2. The two sequences {Tim}m E {l, .•• ,n} and 
{rrm} are martingales. 
m E {1, ... ,n} 
The more interesting part in games with lack of information on both 
sides is about infinite games. Here, in contrast to games with lack of 
information on one side, "value of limit" and "limit of value" are not 
equivalent. Before stating this result formally we introduce the follow-
ing. The non-revealing game 6(TI,TI) corresponding to G (TI,TI), n 
n E {1,2, ... ,00 } is defined to be the matrix game determined by the matrix 
~ f V St ~ 
A(TI,TI) := Is=l It=l Tis Tit A ' . Its value u(TI,TI) is continuous on 
6r x 6v. The non-revealing game can be thought of as the game in which 
both players ignore their information. 
The following theorem which is due to Mertens and Zamir (1971-1972) 
states that the "limit of value" approach is valid for the games with lack 
of information on both sides we defined above and that this limit is de-
termined by two functional equations. 
In this paragraph we, from this moment on, will assume that for a function 
g : 6r x 6v -+JR, "Cav" is taken w.r.t. 6r, "Vex" w.r.t. 6v. Formally, 
Cav g := min{h : 6r x 6v -+JR; h(.,rr) concave for all TIE 6v and 
h(TI,n) ~ g(TI,rr) for all (TI,TI) E 6r x 6v}. 
Vex g ·= max{h : 6r x 6v -+JR; h(TI,.) convex for all TIE 6r and 
h(TI,TI) ~ g(TI,TI) for all (TI,rr) E 6r x 6v}. 
Theorem 7. Let TI E 6r, TI E 6v. Then we have 
(i) lim v (TI,TI) exists. v(TI,TI) := lim v (TI,rr). 
n n n-+OO n-+OO 
(ii) v(TI,TI) is the unique simultaneous solution of the following two func-
tional equations (a) and (b) : 
(a) w(TI,TI) Vex max{u(TI,TI),w(TI,rr)} 
(b) w(TI,rr) Cav min u(TI,TI),w(TI,rr)}. 
(iii) If Cav Vex u(TI,TI) Vex Cav u(TI,TI) then v(TI,rr) 
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Cav Vex u(TI,TI). 
The proof of (i) and (ii) can be found in Mertens and Zamir (1971-1972) 
in Sorin (1980). To get acquainted with the notation we give the proof 
(iii). 
Proof of (iii). We first prove that Vex Cav u(1T ,TI) is a solution of (a) 
in (ii). Observe that 
Vex Cav u(1T,TI) Vex max {u(1T,TI), Cav u(1T,TI)} 
f; Vex max {u(1T,TI), Vex Cav u(TI,TI)}. 
Further, 
Vex Cav u(1T,TI) ~ max{u(1T,TI), Vex Cav u(1T,TI)}. 
So Vex(Vex Cav u(1T,TI)) ~ Vex max{u(1T,TI), Vex Cav u(1T,TI)}. 
But Vex(Vex Cav u(1T,TI)) =Vex Cav u(1T,TI). 
or 
of 
Hence, Vex Cav u(1T,TI) is a solution of (a). Similarly we can also prove 
that Cav Vex u(1T,TI) is a solution of (b). Vex Cav u(1T,TI) (= Cav Vex u(1T,TI)) 
is the unique simultaneous solution of (a) and (b) because for any solu-
tion of (a) and (b) : 
v(1T,TI) f; Vex u(1T,TI) 
v (. ,TI) concave on l'lr 
Hence v(1T,TI) f; Cav Vex u(1T,TI). 
Similarly it follows that v(1T,TI) 
(cf. (a)) 
(cf. (b)) . 
~ Vex Cav u(1T ,TI) 
Originally, Mertens and Zamir showed that the set of equations (a) 
D 
and (b) had a unique solution by using the game-theoretical context of the 
problem. In 1977 the result was generalized by giving a proof which did 
not rely on any game-theoretical considerations. 
In the following definition "min max" and "max min" of G (1T,TI) are in-
oo 
traduced. By means of these concepts the "value of limit" approach is 
formalized (cf. Mertens and Zamir (1977)). 
Definition. Let 1T E l'lr, 1T E l'lv. Let p : l'lr x l'lv ~1R 
(i) p(1T,TI) is called a min max of G00 (1T,TI) if 
(a) VT 'v'E > 0 : 3 N E JN : 3 CJ [ y ( 1T , TI, CJ , T) f; T,E T,E n T,E 
(b) 'VE > 0 : 3 N E JN: 3 T [ y ( 1T ''IT' CJ' T ) ~ p ( 1T 'TI)+ E E n E 
p ( 1T , TI) - E Vn f; N ] T,E 
E'v'CJ'Vnf;N] 
E 
(ii) p(TI,TI) is called a max min of G00 (1T,TI) if 
(a) 'VCJ,'VE > 0:3 N E JN: 3T [y (1T,TI,CJ,T ) ~ p(TI,TI)+ E Vn f; CJ,E CJ,E n CJ,E 
(b) VE > 0:3 N E JN: :i 0 [y (1T ,TI,CJ ,Tn p(1T ,TI')- E 'VT Vn f; N . E E n E E 
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It is easy to verify that if a min max (or max min) exists it is unique. 
The min max (max min) can then be interpreted as the smallest (greatest) 
payoff player 2 (player 1) can guarantee. 
If min max G00 (n,n) and max min G00 (n,n) both exist and are equal, we 
say that G (n,TI') has a value which equals v (n,TI') = min max G (n,TI'). 00 00 00 
Hence, if a value exists, it is unique. 
The following theorem describes min max and max min and states that the 
"value of limit" approach is not valid for all games with lack of infor-
mation on both sides. 
Theorem 8. Let TI E ~r• ; E ~v Then we have 
(i) Min max G00 (TI,TI) Vex Cav u(TI,TI) 
Max min G (n,n) Cav Vex u(n,n). 
00 
(ii) v00 (n,1i') does not always exist. 
Part (ii) of theorem 8 was firstly shown by Aumann and Maschler (1966-1968). 
This was done by giving an example in which Cav Vex u ~ Vex Cav u. 
However, this example is a rather special one in which the "limit of value" 
equals Cav Vex u, i.e. lim vn Cav Vex u. Later, a second example was 
provided by Mertens andn-+oo Zamir (1971-1972), in which Cav Vex u ~ 
Vex Cav u and lim v is (almost everywhere) different from Cav Vex u and 
n 
Vex Cav u. n-+
OO 
2.2.3 Examples 
To eludicate the results given in the previous paragraphs we in detail 
consider a game with lack of information on one side. 
Example 1. (lack of informaiton on one side). 
In the following we identify (p,1-p) E ~2 with p E [0,1]. 
Consider games G (p), n E {1,2, ••• ,oo} of 2.2.1 determined by 
n 
p/~1-p 
L M R L M R 
L D 0 JJ L G ~ j] R 0 R A1 A2 
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For these games the non-revealing game l\(p) is given by A(p) below 
1 M R 
1 ~p 2 ( 1-p) 2p-J A(p) 
R p 2 ( 1-p) 1-2p 
Hence its value u(p) is given by 
2p if 0 ;,; p ;,; 1 /4 
1-2p if 1 /4 ;,; p ;,; 1/2 
u(p) = 2p-1 if 1/2 ;,; p ;,; 3/4 
2(1-p) if 3/4 ;,; p ;,; 
So we have 
t' if 0 ;,; p Cav u(p) voo(p) lim vn (p) /2 if 1/4 ~ p n-+OO 2(1-p) if 3/4 ~ p 
For determining v 1 (p), we look at the matrix B(p) below, 
described c,(p). In the notation pure strategy (L ,R) of 
choose 1 if A1 is being played, choose R if A2 is being 
1 M R 
(L,L) [ 2p 2 ( 1-p) 2p-:] (L,R) 2p 2 ( 1-p) B(p) (R,L) 2p 2 ( 1-p) -1 
(R,R) 2p 2 ( 1-p) 1-2p -
Because (L,R) is a (weakly) dominating strategy we have 
v 1(p) = min{2p,2(1-p),1} = min{2p,2(1-p)}. 
Figure 1 describes u, v00 and v 1 
1 
2 
" d 
• .
. 
.. 
. .. 
. .. 
~ 
. 
d 
. 
1/4 1/2 3/4 p Figure 1 
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;;;:; 1 /4 
;,; 3/4 
;,; 
which exactly 
player 1 means 
played. 
u 
Optimal strategies in G1 (p) are 
- for player (1,R) 
- for player 2 1 if p < 1/2 
R if p > 1 /2 
arbitrary if p 1/2. 
Using the recursion formula of ·theorem 1 we get 
for all p E [0,1]. 
We will only show this for p = 1/2. For notational convenience we intro-
duce 
1 
s := 0 1(1) (sis the probability of choosing 1 (according too) in 
the first stage if A' is the "real" game, 1-s = o~(R)) 
2 2 q := o 1(1) (1-q = o 1(R)) 
, 1 := (t 1,t2 ,1-t1-t2) (O ~ t 1 ~ 1, 0 ~ t 2 ~ 1, 0 ~ t 1+t2 ~ 1). 
Using this notation we get that the second stage posterior probability 
vector p2 is equal to p2(1) or p2(R), with 
= _s_ 
s+q 
1-s 
( 1-s) + ( 1-q) 
Substitution in the recursive formula yields (we implicitly assume 
o ~ s ~ 1, o ~ q ~ 1, o ~ t 1 ~ 1, o ~ t 2 ~ 1, o ~ t 1+t2 ~ 1) 
. 1 2 0 1 1 0 {mrn{z-(s, 1-s) (2 0 _1) (t 1,t2 ,1-t 1-t2)+ z-(q, 1-q) <0 
t1 ,t2 
2 -1 
2 1 ) • 
(t 1,t2 ,1-t 1-t2)} + (s+q)v 1<s!q) + ((1-s)+(1-q)). 
1-s 
( (1-s) +( 1-q»} 
= ±max {min {t +(s-_!_) (1-t -t )+t .-(!-q)(1-t -t )} + min{s,q} + 
s ,q t t 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 
1' 2 
min{ 1-s, 1-q}}. 
1 
= 2 max {min {s-q+t 1(1-s+q)+t2(1+q-s)} + min{s+1-q,q+1-s}} 
s,q t 1 ,t 2 
1 
= 2 max {s-q + min {s-q+1,q+1-s} 
s,q 
1 
= 2 max {min {2s-2q+1,1}} = 1/2. 
s,q 
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Optimal strategies in G2(p) are : 
- for player 1 in stage 1 choose 01 such that 
(i.e. s f; q) 
in stage 2 choose 02 such that 
0;(1) = 0. 
- for player 2 in stage choose R 
in stage 2 choose arbitrary. 
Now we come to determine optimal strategies in G00 (p). 
(i) for player 1. 
0;(1) ~ 2 01 (1) 
0~(1) 1 ' 
In case 0 ~ p ~ 1/4 an optimal strategy is to choose R in every stage, 
because R is optimal in ~(p) for 0 ~ p ~ 1/4 and v00 = Cav u = u on [0,1/4]. 
Similarly we see that for 
stage. Thus, let 1/4 < p 
3/4 ~ p 
< 3/4. 
~ 1 it 
We use 
is optimal to choose 1 in every 
proposition 4 and its notation. 
2 q = 3/4, r 1 = 3/2-2p, r 2 = 2p-1/2. So 2 and choose 
1 
= 1 /4' r = we can q 
Then indeed 
P = r q1 
1 
Cav u(p) 
An optimal strategy 
With probability 
Mp)). 
With probability 
With probability 
With probability 
o is therefore 
r (1/4) ;1(R) 
1 p ' m 
r <3/4) ;1 (1) 
2 p ' m 
r <3/4) ;2(R) 
1 1-p ' m 
r <1/4) ;2(1) 
2 1-p ' m 
given by (cf. proposition 4) 
= 1 for all m E JN (R is optimal 
for all m E JN. 
for all m E JN. 
for all m E JN. 
(ii) for player 2. 
In case 0 ~ p ~ 1/4 an optimal strategy is to choose 1 in every stage. 
In case 3/4 ~ p ~ 1 it is optimal to choose M in every stage. 
So let 1/4 < p < 3/4. We use proposition 5 and its notation. 
Define n (1/2,1/2). Then indeed 
Cav u(q) ~ n.q = 1/2 for all q E [ 0' 1] 
Cav u(p) 1 
- 2 - n.p. 
Now s {(z1,z2) E JR2 I z1 ~ 1 /2' z2 ~ 1/2} and 
v {(z1 ,z2) E JR2 I -2 ~ z1 ~ 2, -2 ~ z2 ~ 2}. 
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in 
Further we can define x 
n 
E V as the average payoff vector after stage 
n-1, and yn ES such that min d(x ,y) (to get a better under-
yE S n 
standing see figure 2). 
With the aid of these sequences {xn}n ElN and {yn}n ElN an optimal stra-
tegy is defined exactly like is done for proposition 5. 
2 v 
I ex J x' . n ... ~ n I 
I 
I :y . n 
-;,•"I 
-
-·- 11 I Yn 
-2 0 1/2 
s 
-2 Figure 2 
Example 2 is an example of Mertens and Zamir in which Cav Vex u f 
Vex Cav u. This example is referred to at the end of 2.2.2. A detailed 
elaboration can be found in Mertens and Zamir (1971-1972, example 2, 
p. 59). 
Exarrrple 2. Consider games G (n,n), n E {1,2, ••• ,00}, of 2.2.2 determined 
n 
by the following diagram (r = v = 2, identify n with n1) : 
n 1-TI' 
n [·'" A 1,2 J 1-n A2, 1 A2,2 
with 
A1,1 
=[; 0 0 ] A 1,2 Q_ -1 1 ] 1 1 0 0 
A2' 1 =~ 1 -1 ] and A2 •2 [ 0 0 ]· 0 0 -1 -1 
1 i 2 i Player 1 knows whether a game A' or a game A' , i E {1,2} is being 
i 1 . 2 played. Player 2 knows whether a game A' or a game Ai' , i E {1,2}, is 
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being played. 
2.3 The non zero-sum case 
Because a thorough knowledge of the zero-sum case seems indispensable 
for studying th~ non zero-sum case, and since the zero-sum case already 
leads to various difficultie_s, there has been little research on the non 
zero-sum case of repeated games with incomplete information. 
So far this study has been restricted to infinite games with standard in-
formation and lack of information on one side. The first approach to stu-
dy this kind of games was given by Aumann and Maschler (1968). It was on-
ly recently that Sorin (1983) and Hart (1985) continued this research. 
Hart extended the results of Aumann and Maschler and proved some of their 
conjectures. In this paragraph we will briefly discuss Hart's findings. 
Consider games G (p) of 2.1 with lack of information on one side 
1 00 and K2 (i.e. K = {{1}, ... ,{r}} = {{1, ... ,r}}) and standard information 
(i.e. >. 1({k},i,j) = >.2({1,2, ... ,d,i,j) = (i,j) for all k E {1, .•. ,r}, 
k k i E M1 and j E M2). The stage games (A ,B ), k E {1 , ..• ,r}, need not to 
be zero-sum. Let C5 denote a behavior strategy of player 1, i.e. an r-
vector (o1 , .•• ,or) with, for each k E {1, ... ,r}, Ok {o~}m ElN where 
k m-1 Orn : (M1 x M2 ) -+ tim1 (m E lN). 
Similarly T = {Tm}m EN' Tm : (M1 x M2)m-l -+ 6 , denotes a behavior 
m2 
strategy of player 2. 
We recall from 2.1 that the 
1 n x 
a = 2 l: 1 A. . and Bn n m= imJm 
average payoffs after stage 
1 l: n B.x. (n ElN) 
2 m=1 imJm 
and their expectations by 
y 1(p,CT,T) =JE (a) and yn2(p,o,T) =JE <B ). 
n p,CT,T n p,O,T n 
Further, since K2 = {{1, ... ,r}}, we have that 
2 2 
wn(p,o,T) = yn(p,O,T) (n E JN) • 
n are given by 
1 
simplicity we therefore write wn(.) instead of wn(.), and because 
= {{1}, •.. ,{r}}, we can write 
1 2 
wn (p ,o, T) = (un (o, T),. .. ,wn (o, T)) (n E lN) where, for each 
k E {1, ... ,r}, 
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k 1 n k 
w (0,T) :=lE (- l: l A.·) 
n 0, T n m= i J 
1 mm (Note that p (k) = 1 ElR for all k E {1, ••. ,r}). 
The non-revealing game corresponding to G00 (p) is described by the bimatrix 
game (A(p),B(p)) where 
k pk.A and A(p) := l:k~1 
Let uA(p) (uB(p)) 
toA(p) (B(p)). 
denote the value of the zero-sum (!) game corresponding 
In the fallowing definitions (Nash) equilibria and uniform (Nash) equi-
libria are introduced. The definitions of a uniform equilibrium is a 
strengthening of the definition of a "regular" equilibrium and is sugges-
ted by the results for the zero-sum case (cf. the definitions of "minmax" 
and "maxmin"). 
Definition. Co,T') is an equilibrium point in Goo ( p) if 
(E. 1) lim inf k~~ k -wn(0,T) ;;; lim sup w (0,T) 
n 
n -> oo n -+ oo 
for all strategies 0 of player 1 and k E {1, ••. ,r}. 
(E.2) 2 - - 2 -lim inf y (p,O,T) ;;; lim sup y (p,O,T) 
n n 
n-)oo n-+oo 
for all strategies T of player 2. 
The set of all equilibria in G00 (p) is denoted by E00 (p). 
It is easy to verify that (E.1) is 
* 1 - -(E.1) lim inf y (p,o,T) ;;; lim sup 
n 
n->oo n-+oo 
equivalent to 
1 -y (p,O,T) 
n 
for all strategies a of player 1. 
However, we prefer the description given in (E.1) because it is more 
appropriate in the incomplete information version of G00 (p). The payoffs 
in an equilibrium point (O,T) are determined by taking a= a in (E.1) and 
T =Tin (E.2). This leads to a vector w = (w1, ..• ,wr) E JRr and a number 
6 E lR such that 
and 
k - -
wk = lim wn(o,T) 
6 lim 
n->OO 
2 - -y (p,O,T). 
n 
(k E { 1 , ••. , r}) 
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The payoff vector (w,S) EJRr+1 corresponding to (o,T) E E00 (p) is denoted 
by n(a,T). 
Definition. (O,T) is a uniform equilibrium point in G00 (p) if k ~ ~ k ~ (U.1) lim inf wn(O,T) ~ lim sup (sup wn(O,T)) 
n-+OO U-+CO a 
for all 
(U.2) lim inf 
n -+ oo 
k E {1, .•. ,r}. 
2 ~ ~ . 
yn(p,o,T) ~ lim sup 
n -+ oo 
2 ~ (sup y (p,O,T)) 
T n 
The set of all uniform equilibria in G00 (p) is denoted by U00 (p). 
It is clear that every uniform equilibrium is also a "regular" equilibrium. 
However, the converse is not true. The difference between the two defini-
tions becomes clear when they are translated into E-language : for all 
E > 0 there exists an N EJN such that etc. Here, the main point is that 
for a uniform equilibrium this N only depends on E but for a "regular" 
equilibrium it may also depend on the strategy choices. 
However, the set of payoffs corresponding to equilibria and uniform 
equilibria coincide, as is stated in 
Theorem 9. Let G00 (p) be as above. Then we have 
{n(o,T) ElRr+l I (o,T) E E00 (p)} 
{n(o,T) ElRr+ 1 I (o,T) E U00 (p)}. 
The proof of theorem 9 can be found in Hart (1985). It is proved together 
with the main result about the non zero-sum case which is given in theorem 
10 below. We will restrict ourselves to its formulation in which we clo-
sely follow Hart. 
Let (A,B) .. := ((A~.)k E {l }'(B~.)k E {l }) ElRr xJRr iJ 1J ,. •• ,r 1J , .•• ,r 
(i E M1 ,j E M2 ) and F := conv{(A,B)ij Ii E M1 ,j E M2 } clRr xJRr, 
where conv denotes the convex hull of a set. 
F can be interpreted as the set of feasible (vector-)payoffs in the one 
shot game corresponding to G (p). We further define 
8 := max{ I A~. I, I B~. I 001 i E M1,j E M2 , k E {1,. •• ,r}} 1J 1J 
B(G,m) := [-8,G]m (m E JN) 
Let S cJRr x]R x lRr be the set consisting of all triples (w,S,p) with 
w E B(G,r), SE B(G,1) and p E 6 such that the following two conditions 
r 
are satisfied 
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(S. 1) q.w :;; uA(q) for all q E l:i <w is an individually rational payoff to 
r 
player 1 ) 
S f: Vex (-u-B(p)) (B is an individually rational payof f to player 2). 
(S.2) There exist a,b E lRr such that 
(a,b) E F, S = p.b, w f: a and pw p.a. 
Condition (S.2) implies that w is essentially the same as a : wk = ak if 
pk > 0, k E {1, ... ,r}. Thus, for (w,B,p) ES there exists a pair (a,b) EF 
such that w equals a in its relevant coordinates, and B is the expected 
payoff to player 2 corresponding to the vector-payoff b. 
A justification of the term "individually rational" in (S.1) can be found 
in Hart (1985, p.123). Note that -u-B(p) is the value of the matrix game 
B(p), if we assume that the payoffs in the corresponding matrix are the 
payoffs to player 2. 
The main result characterizes all equilibrium payoffs by means of the 
concept of an S-process, which is defined below. 
Definition. Lets= (w,B,p) E B(8,r) x B(8,1) x l:i • 
r 
Let {S} EJN = {w ,B ,p} EJN be a sequence of random variables on an 
n n n n n n 
"underlying" probability space (S1 ,A ,P) : 
Sn : ~-> B(8,r) x B(8,1) x tir (n El'/), 
Then {Sn}n EJN is called an S-process starting at s if 
(P.1) s 1 = s a.s. 
(P.2) There exists a nondecreasing sequence {An}n EJN of fields with fini-
tely many elements (i.e. corresponding with a partition of ~) to which 
{sn}n EJN is a martingale sequence : 
s is A -measurable 
n n 
JE(s 1 \ A ) s a. s. n+ n n 
(P.3) 
(P.4) 
If lim s 
n 
n->"' 
s00 a.s., then s00 ES 
For each n EN either wn+l 
(n E JN) 
a.s. 
Condition (P.1) and (P.2) imply that JEsn = s for each n EJN. Furthermore, 
since the sequence {sn}n E ]\/ is uniformly bounded, the Martingale Conver-
gence Theorem, see e.g. Billingsley (1979), theorem 35.4, p.416), states 
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that it has a.s. limit s00 • Hence condition (P.3) is a relevant one. 
Condition (P.4) is such that process is a so-called bimartingale (if we 
"forget" the 13 -coordinate). Bimartingales are studied in Aumann and 
n 
Hart (1983). 
* Finally, we define S to be the set of all points s, s E B(0,r) x 
B(0,1) x 6 , such that there exists an S-process starting at s. Having 
r 
this we are able to formulate 
Theorem 10. Let w ElRr, 13 ElR. Then the following two assertions are 
equivalent 
( 1) 
(2) 
(w,13) E {n(a ,T) E lRr+l I (a ,T) E E00 (p)} 
- * (w,13,p) E S • 
* It is easy to check that S is a non-empty set, but this does not imply 
that for every p E 6 , G (p) has at least one equilibrium point. For 
r oo 
r = 2, however, Sorin (1983) has shown that this is the case. 
The proof of theorem 10 consists of two steps : 
Step 
Step 2 
- - * (w,13) E E00 (p) ~ (w,13,p) E S 
* -(w,13,p) Es ~ (w,13) E U00 (p). 
In step 2 a special class of uniform equilibria is constructed to which 
all "regular" equilibria are payoff equivalent. These special equilibria 
consist of a "master plan", which is followed by each player so long as the 
other does it too, and of "punishments" which are used if a deviation from 
the "master plan" is detected. This "master plan" is a sequence of commu-
nications between the players. Its purpose is to settle on a "desired" 
point in S. Without explaining it any further, we say that these communi-
cations can be of two types : "signalling" and "jointly controled lotte-
ries". A punishment strategy is such that it keeps opponent's payoff down 
to an individually rationality one. This interaction between the two 
players is followed by means of an S-process. For a more detailed descrip-
tion we refer to Hart (1985). 
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3. ONE SHOT GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
In this (short) section we pay attention to another aspect of informa-
tion which is related to a question like : "Does my opponent know what in-
formation I have ?". In this context we are going to analyze and compare 
different types of information.· This is done for the relatively simple 
case of two person games with only one decision-round. The style is rather 
informal because the purpose is just to get some understanding about diffe-
rent types of information. A formal approach is given in Borm (1987). 
The research was initiated by an article of Levine and Ponssard (1977). 
3.1 describes the model of the games we will concentrate on as well as the 
information types we are going to analyze. The results of Borm are given 
in 3.2, together with an example. 
3.1 Model and information types 
We consider one shot games determined by the following scheme 
l<a11'b11) (a12'b12~ 
l_:a21'b21) (a22,b22~ 
(A 1 'B 1) 
f<c 11 'd 11 ) ( c 12 'd 12>1 
~c21 ,d21) (c22 ,d22~ 
(A2,B2) 
(a .. ,b .. ,c .. ,d .. E1R) iJ iJ iJ iJ 
Interpretation : the toss of a fair coin determines whether (A1 ,B 1) or 
( 2 2) . . 1 . 1 d A ,B is being played. Both p ayers have to move simultaneous y an 
both know the description so far. If none of the players is informed 
about the "real" game, we will call above one shot game a game without in-
formation. We are interested in situations where one of the players 
(read : player 1) gets full information, i.e. he is exactly informed about 
which game (Ai,Bi), i E {1,2} is being played. We distinguish three types 
of such information. 
(i) Secret information : Player 1 acquires his information secretly, 
which means that player 2 does not know (expect) that he is informed. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that player 2 will have the same 
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strategic behaviour in the game with secret information and the game 
without information. 
(ii) Private information Player acquires his information in front of 
player 2, which means that player 2 knows that player 1 has full informa-
tion. For convenience we make the following assumption : player 1 does 
not know (expect) that player 2 knows that he is informed. Therefore, we 
may assume that player 1 has the same strategic behaviour in the game with 
private information and the game with secret information. 
Remark : Without the last assumption an infinite interaction of informa-
tion could occur. Player 2 knows that player 1 has full information, but 
he also knows that player knows this. But player 1 knows that ..• etc. 
Such a situation could be difficult to analyze. However, this assumption 
is not necessary for a part of the results of Borm (1987). Here, strict 
1 1 2 2 dominance requirements on the bimatrix games (A ,B ) and (A ,B ) exclude 
an infinite interaction of information. 
(iii) Public information : Player 1 and player 2 both acquire full infor-
mation in front of each other, i.e. they know that they both have full in-
formation. 
To compare these information types, we have to say something about ex-
pected payoffs in the corresponding games. In general, there could be a 
difficulty in determining a unique expected payoff (to each player), be-
cause even in complete information games there can be several Nash equi-
libria with different playoffs. However, in all the games of Levine and 
Ponssard (1977) and Borm (1987) the strategic behaviour of the players is 
(uniquely) determined. Because we will only discuss that kind of games, 
it is allowed to talk about "the" expected payof f to player 1 and "the" 
expected payoff to player 2. 
Having the payoff-functions fixed (i.e. (A1 ,B 1) and (A2 ,B2)) the 
various information types will be compared in two ways : with respect to 
the expected payoff of (the informed) player 1, and with respect to the 
expected payoff of (the uninformed) player 2. The main result is given 
in 3.2, but two observations can be made immediately 
(a) the expected payoff to player 1 in the game with secret information 
is greater or equal to his expected payoff in the game without information 
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(b) the expected payoff to player 2 in the game with private information 
is greater or equal to his expected payoff in the game with secret infor-
mation. 
3.2 Evaluation 
Having in mind observation (a) of 3.1, there can be twelve (strict) 
orderings of the four information types, - considering no information as 
an information type too-, according to the expected payoff to player 1. 
Similarly, because of observation (b), twelve (strict) orderings are pos-
sible according to the expected payoff to player 2. 
Borrn (1987) showed that all these orderings indeed do occur by introducing 
two special classes of games. In one of them all 12 strict orderings 
w.r.t. player 1 occur, in the other all 12 strict orderings w.r.t. player 
2. 
As an illustration of the definitions and the results mentioned above, 
we give an example in which for the various information types the expected 
payoffs to player 1 and player 2 are computed, and give an indication how 
the example can be extended in such a way that it is seen that all 12 
strict orderings w.r.t. player 1 indeed occur. 
Exarrrp 'le 3 . 
Consider the following one shot game 
~ 
2 
lcs,4) (3,21 
l:_-1,6) (0,-~ 
!<1,2) (~,;i 
~2, 1) <2,~ 
(A 1 'B 1) (A2,B2) 
In the game without information the players' behaviour will be determined 
by the expected bimatrix game (A,B) 
(A,B) 
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Hence, player 1 will choose e 1 (the first row) and player 2 will choose 
e 2 (the first column). Consequently the expected payoff-vector for the 
game without information is given by (3,3). 
By assumption player 2 will also choose e 1 in the game with secret infor-
mation. Player 1 is aware of this and will therefore choose e 1 if (A1 ,B 1) 
is being played, e2 else. Consequently, the expected payoff-vector for 
1 1 1 1 1 1 this case is given by (2.5 + 2.2, 2·4 + 2·1) = (32,22). 
By assumption player 1 will have the same strategic behaviour in the game 
with secret information and the game with private information. Therefore 
player 2, in the game with private information will anticipate and will 
choose e 2 (instead of e 1), leading to an expected payoff-vector of 
1 1 1 1 1 3 1 
<2.3 + 2·2· 2·2 + z-.5) = (14,32). 
In case of public information both players will choose e 1 if (A 1 ,B 1) is 
the real game, and e2 else. This leads to the expected payoff-vectors 
1 11 1 1 3 1 
<z-.5 + 2°"2' z-·4 + 2.5) = (24,42). 
In this example we see the following strict ordering of the various in-
formation types, w.r.t. player 1 : secret information is more profitable 
than (">")no information, no information > public information, and public 
information > private information. 
We can get all 12 (strict) orderings by letting x ·= a 11 , x > 0 and 
Y := c 22 , 0 < y < 3, vary (cf. Borrn (1987)). 
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CHAPTER IV 
ZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC GAMES 
by Koos Vrieze 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we give a survey on zero-sum stochastic games. The 
theory of stochastic games started in 1953 with a paper of Shapley (1953). 
This paper was ahead of his time as will become clear below. 
Zero-sum stochastic games can be regarded as extensions of two other types 
of decision problems, namely matrix games and Markov decision problems. 
A matrix game (cf. Von Neumann, Morgenstern (1944)) is a decision pro-
blem for two players, who simultaneously and independently once have to 
choose an action out of a (finite) decision set. The action dependent 
payof f s to the players are conflicting in the sense that they add up to 
zero. Obviously such a decision problem can be represented by a matrix M 
of numbers, where the number of rows (columns) of M equals the number of 
actions of player (player 2) and where mij equals by convention the pay-
off to player 1, if player 1 chooses his i-th action and player 2 his j-th 
action. By the rules of the game, the payoff to player 2 in this case 
equals - m ... 
l.J 
This representation explains the term matrix game. Obvious-
ly the goal of player 1 is to maximize the outcome of the game (by choosing 
in an appropriate way some row of M), while player 2 tries to minimize the 
outcome (by choosing in an appropriate way some column of M). 
A zero-sum stochastic game can be viewed as an extension of matrix games 
in the following sense. A stochastic game is nothing else then repeatedly 
playing matrix games, at well-defined discrete decision moments, according 
to the following rules. There are fixed a finite number, say z, of matrix 
games. At each decision moment the players are informed about the matrix 
game at hand at that moment. Next both players make a choice (simultaneous-
ly and independently) out of the action sets available in this matrix game. 
These choices result not only in a payoff (like in a matrix game), but also 
in an action dependent probability measure on the set of matrix games. 
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Next, according to this probability measure, a chance experiment is carried 
out to determine the matrix game to be played at the following decision 
moment. So, in stochastic games, at each decision moment, the players 
have as well short term as long term interests. Short term in the sense 
that the chosen actions determine some payoff at that moment. Long term 
in the sense that the actions determine the dynamic behaviour of the sys-
tem at that moment, giving rise to intentions of the players of steering 
the system to more favourable matrix games. 
As already stated, in the second place, stochastic games can be regar-
ded as extensions of Markov decision problems (cf Denardo (1982)). A, 
say maximizing, Markov decision problem is defined analogously to stochas-
tic games, with the restriction that each of the z matrix games consists 
of a single column. This reflects the fact that in Markov decision pro-
blems, we have to do with only one decision maker who has to choose a row 
out of that single column. The immediate rewards and the dynamics of the 
system are defined completely similar to stochastic games. Obviously, a 
minimizing Markov decision problem can be exposed as a stochastic game, 
where each of the z matrix games consists of a single row. Thus a stochas-
tic game can be viewed as the extension of the multi-stage decision problem 
with one decision maker to the case of the multi-stage decision problem 
with two decision makers with strictly oppose interests. The theory 
of Markov decision problems evolved in the late fifties and the early 
sixties (Bellman (1957), Blackwell (1962, 1965)). At that time, people 
working in the field of Markov decision problems seem to be unaware of 
the pioneering work of Shapley. Some of the essential theorems were de-
rived for the (simpler) case of Markov decision problems a small decade 
later then Shapley did for stochastic games. In this sense, Shapley was 
ahead of his time. 
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2 the notion of sto-
chastic game is formally introduced. Strategies are defined and three 
possible evaluation criteria are given. 
In section 3 discounted reward stochastic games are treated. It is shown 
how the structural properties of these game can be discovered by combining 
the Shapley equations with the structural properties of matrix games. 
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In section 4 we look at average reward stochastic games. Puiseux series 
turn out to be extremely useful here. The main results are exposed, with 
special emphasis on optimal stationary strategies. 
In section 5 total reward stochastic games are considered. In a certain 
sense, this critarionappears to have similar properties as the average cri-
terion.However several problems remain open for this criterion. 
In section 6 we handle a number of structured stochastic games, i.e. sub-
classes of stochastic games, determined by properties on the reward and 
transition data. 
Finally in section 7 we give some approximation algorithms for computing 
the value and E-optimal stationary strategies for both the discounted re-
ward and the average reward stochastic game. 
2 • THE STOCHASTIC GAME MODEL 
In this section we state the formal definition of a stochastic game 
and the way it is played. 
A zero-sum stochastic game can be described by a six-tuple 
r < s,{A ,s E s},{B ,s E s},{r ,s E s},{p ,s E s},o >. 
s s s s 
The meanings of the components are as follows. 
S := {1 1 2, ••. ,z}, a finite set with IS I= z, denoting the 
states of the system; a state corresponds with a matrix game. 
I A I= m , 
s s 
A := { 1,2, •.• ,m } , for each s E s, a finite set with 
s s 
denoting the set of available actions of player 1 in state s. 
B := { 1,2, ••• ,n } , for each s E s, a finite set with 
s s 
I B I= n , 
s s 
denoting the set of available actions of player 2 in state s. 
Hence the matrix game corresponding to state s E s, notation Ms' has ms 
rows and n columns. 
s 
r A x B ~:R, for each s Es, a real-valued mapping on 
s s s 
the cartesian product As x Bs. Here rs(i,j) equals the (i,j)-the 
entry of Ms; rs is called the payoff function. 
ps : As x Bs ~ P(S), for each s ES, a mapping from the cartesian product 
As x Bs on the set of probability measures on the set of states, i.e. 
on P(S) := {x = (x 1 ,x2 , ... ,xz);xt ~ O, L:~=l xt = 1}. Here (p5 (i,j))t 
denotes the probability that the system will move to state t E S, if 
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in state s E S player 1 chooses action i E As and player 2 chooses 
action j E Bs. In the following (ps(i,j))t will be written as 
p(t I s,i,j). ps is called the transition map. 
D := {1,2, ... ,N} with N EN or D :=N, the set of decision moments. If 
D :=N then we speak of a game with infinite horizon, else of finite 
horizon. 
In this paper we only look at infinite horizon games. At the end of 
this section it will be made clear that stochastic games with a finite 
number of decision moments can be identified with matrix games. 
A stochastic game is played as follows. A starting state s 1 E S is 
given to both players at decision moment 1. Both players choose simul-
taneously and independently an action out of their respective available 
action sets. Say, that this results in action i 1 EA for player 1 and 
sl 
action jl E B for player 2. 
sl 
Then two things happen. First there is an 
immediate payoff rs (i1,j 1) to player 1 from player 2 and second, 
the system moves to a 1 next state according to the probability measure 
Ps 1 Ci1 ,j 1l, where p(t I s 1 ,i1 ,j 1), for each t E S, equals the probability 
that this next state will be state t. Then at decision moment 2 both 
players are informed about the new current state. Here the game proceeds 
as if it starts again, etc. 
We assume perfect recall and complete information, i.e. at each deci-
sion moment both players perfectly remember all past states and actions 
that have actually occurred and both players know each function rs and all 
mappings ps completely. 
As usually in non-cooperative game theory we allow the players to 
select at each decision moment a (pure) action according to the specifi-
cation of a mixed action. Since, at each decision moment, the players 
have full knowledge of the history of the game up to that moment, they 
may use this knowledge in specifying their mixed action. Furthermore, this 
mixed action may depend on the stage number. Formally, let, at decision 
moment n, hn be the'history of the game, i.e. hn := Cs 1 ,i1,j 1 ,s2 ,i2 ,j2 , ... , 
sn-l'in-l'jn_1), where at decision moment k, sk ES, ik EA and jk E B 
sk sk 
have occurred fork= 1,2, ••• ,n-1. Let P(As) (P(Bs)) denote the set of 
mixed actions for player 1 (player 2) in state s E S, i.e. 
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P(As) := { (x 1 ,x2 , ... ,xm ) ; xi 
s 
P(Bs) := {(y1,Y2•···•Yn ); 
s 
m 
~ 0 and Li:l xi = 1} and 
y .= 1}. 
J 
Then a behaviour strategy for player 1, notation n 1 , can be associated 
with a function n 1 on the set of triples (s,n,hn)' where 
n 1 (s,n,hn) E P(As) for each s,n,hn. 
Such a strategy is used as follows : if at decision moment n the state 
equals s and if history hn has occurred, then player 1 chooses his pure 
action according to the mixed action n 1 (s,n,hn). 
A behaviour strategy for player 2, n 2 , is defined analogously. 
Three special types of strategies are discerned. First, a pure stra-
tegy is a strategy where nk(s,n,hn) specifies with probability one some 
pure action for each s E S, history hn and decision moment n. 
Second, a Markov strategy is a strategy where at each decision moment the 
mixed action only depends on the stage number and on the current state and 
not on the history of the game. Hence a Markov strategy for player k is 
a function nk on the set of pairs (s,n), with the same interpretation as 
above for behaviour strategy. 
Third, a stationary strategy is a strategy where at each decision moment 
the mixed action only depends on the current state and not on the stage 
number or the history of the game. For stationary strategies we intro-
duce an apart notation, p for one of player and a for one of player 2. 
Then p = {p(s);s ES} with p(s) E P(As) and a= {CT(s);s Es} with 
CT(s) E P(Bs) and when player 1 (player 2) decides to play a stationary 
strategy p(CT), then each time the system is in states he will choose his 
pure action according to p(s) (CT(s)). 
If both players specify a strategy, say n 1 and n 2 , then for a fixed 
starting state s E S, for each n E D, this will determine a probability 
measure on the set of histories hn up to decision moment n. Denote these 
probabilities by Pn(s,n1 ,n2 ,hn). From these probabilities we can derive 
two things. 
First, since Pn_ 1 (s,n 1 ,n2 ,.) can be interpreted as some marginal distri-
bution of Pn(s,n1 ,n2 ,.) it follows by the Kolmogorov extension theorem, 
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that the sequence (Pn(s,n1 ,n2 ,.), n = 1,2, •.• ) can be extended to a unique 
probability measure on the set of infinite sequences Cs 1 ,i1 ,j 1 ,s2 ,i2 ,j 2 , ..• ). 
Second, for each decision moment n E D, the marginal distribution of the 
triples (sn,in,jn) occurring at decision moment n can be computed. Let 
pn(s,n1 ,n2 ,sn,in,jn) denote the probability that the triple (sn,in,jn) occurs 
at decision moment n if player 1 plays n 1 , player 2 plays n 2 and the star-
ting state is s. Then we can compute the expected payoffs at the decision 
moments. Let R(n) be the stochastic variable denoting the payoff at deci-
sion moment n, then 
(2 .1) 
Already Shapley (1953) showed that for stationary strategies this expression 
can be simplified considerably. 
Then for a pair of stationary strategies p and a it holds that 
E [R(n)] pa 
n-1 P (p,cr) r(p,cr), 
where Pk(p,cr) equals the k-fold product of the z x z-matrix P(p,O) and 
where the (s,t)-the element of P(p,cr), notation p(t \ s,p,cr), equals : 
n 
p(t \ s,p,cr) l:j:l p(t \ s,i,j) pi (s) crj (s) 
(2 .2) 
(2.3) 
(2 .4) 
The interpretation is as follows. p(t \ s,p,cr) being the (s,t)-th element 
of P(p,cr), equals the probability that the system moves in one step to 
state t E S if in state s E S player 1 plays p(s) and player 2 plays O(s). 
n-1 It can easily be shown by induction, that the (s,t)-th element of P (p,cr) 
equals the probability that at decision moment n the system is in state t 
if it starts at decision moment 1 in state s and if the players play the 
stationary strategies p and cr. Obviously rs(p,cr) is the expected imme-
date reward in state s when player 1 plays p(s) and player 2 plays O(s). 
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Now expression (2.2) is immediate. Observe that expression (2.2) speci-
fies simultaneously the expected payoffs at stage n for all z specific 
plays with starting state respectively 1,2, .•. ,z. 
Summarizing the above, we see that, associated with a pair of strategies 
(n1 ,n2) and a specific starting states, there is a sequence of expected 
payoffs (E [R(n)], n = 1,2~ •.• ). 
sn1n 2 
In order to compare the worth of strategies, an evaluation criterion 
is needed, i.e. a rule which uniquely associates a real number to such a 
sequence. In this paper we consider three evaluation rules. 
First, the discounted reward criterion, defined as 
L 00 Sn-l E [R(n)] 
n= 1 STI l TI 2 
Here S E (0,1) is the discount factor, reflecting the interest rate. 
Second, the average reward criterion, defined as 
lim inf 
N->OO N 
L N E [R(n)) 
n=l sTI 1n2 
Since the limit of the right-handside expression of (2.6) does not need 
to exist, a further specification is necessary. The choice of lim inf 
("the worst case") is more or less arbitrary. However the results for 
average reward stochastic games do not change, when lim inf is replaced 
by lim sup or any convex combination of them. 
Third, the total reward criterion, defined as 
lim inf 
N -> 00 N 
L N L k E [R(n)) 
k=l n=l sTI 1 n2 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
(2.7) 
In general this expression may be + 00 or - 00 We will apply this criterion 
to a class of stochastic games, where this expression makes sense. Obser-
ve that in case where L 00 E [R(n)] exists, we have vT(s,n1 ,n2 ) n=l sTI 1n2 
Ln:l E (R(n)]. 
sTI l TI2 
The expressions (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) specify the expected payoffs to 
player 1. By definition the payoffs to player 2 are the negatives of these 
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expressions. 
As solution concept for zero-sum stochastic games the usual concept 
for zero-sum games in normal form is adopted. The players seek strategies 
which guarantee them a payoff as high as possible. Since the payoffs, for 
any criterion, are defined as the payoffs to player 1 (and as minus the 
payoffs to player 2), this concept leads to the following: 
Let c ( s , • , • ) stand for any criterion. Then player 1 tries 
tegy which guarantees him a payoff as close as possible 
Analogously player 2 tries to find a strategy which 
guarantees him an expected payoff. as close as possible 
Whenever 
c(s) :=sup inf c(s,n1 ,n2 l 
7fl 7f2 
inf sup c(s,n1,n2J 
7f2 7fl 
to 
to 
to find a stra-
sup inf c(s,n1 ,n2). 
7fl 7f2 
inf sup c (s,TI1 ,TI2). 
7f 2 7f 1 
(2.8) 
we say that the game is strictly determined for starting state s. In that 
case, the number c(s) is called the value of the game for starting state s. 
A stochastic game is said to have a value if for each starting state the 
game is strictly determined. 
A strategy which guarantees a player the value of the game up to s, 
* E ~ O, is called E-optimal, so for player 1, n 1 is E-optimal if 
* inf c ( s , TI l , 7f 2 ) ~ c ( s) - E 
7f 2 
* and n2 is E-optimal for player 2 if 
* sup c ( s, TI 1 , TI 2 ) :;> c ( s) + s 
7fl 
A 0-optimal strategy is called optimal. 
(2 .9) 
(2 .10) 
We conclude this section by a remark on stochastic games with a finite 
number of decision moments. For all three evaluation criteria these games 
can be formulated(and therefore handled)as a matrix game. Observe that for 
a game with finite horizon both players have a finite number of pure stra-
tegies. When we display the stochastic game for a fixed starting state 
as a game in extensive form, then these sets of pure strategies for the 
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players coincide with the sets of pure strategies for the players in the 
extensive form game. By the results of Kuhn (1953) (cf. also the chapter 
by Van Dammein this book), it follows that these games can be regarded 
as matrix games, merely by numbering the pure strategies (being the sets 
of pure actions in the corresponding matrix game) and by relating to each 
pair of pure strategies the expected payoff as assigned by the evaluation 
rule to the finite stream of expected payoffs of the corresponding stra-
tegies. Hence (Von Neumann (1928)) the value of these finite horizon ga-
mes exists for any criterion and both players possess optimal strategies, 
consisting of mixtures of pure strategies. 
3 . THE DISCOUNTED CRITERION 
Though, in fact, Shapley considered stopping stochastic games with the 
total reward criterion, his 1953 paper can be signed as the start of the 
theory on stochastic games in general and of the discounted reward cri-
terion especially. The mathematical techniques used in discounted reward 
games are similar to those used in stopping total reward games. 
A stopping stochastic game is a game with the property q(s,i,j) := 
1 - Lt:l p(t I s,i,j) > 0 for each s,i and j. q(s,i,j) equals the stopping 
probability in state s when the players select action i and j respectively. 
A discounted reward stochastic game can be formulated as a total reward 
stopping stochastic game by adapting the transition probabilities. Take 
for the stopping game 1- S as the stopping probability and take 
$p(t I s,i,j) as the probability of moving from s tot by actions i and j. 
It can be verified that for each pair of strategies the total reward in 
this stopping game equals the discounted reward in the original game. 
We now state the main theorem, due to Shapley (1953), of discounted 
reward stochastic games. For that purpose, define for v = (v1 ,v2 , ••• ,vz)E 
Rz, for each s ES, the matrix game 
m 
[ ( . . > a "' z et I . . > l s := rs i,J + µ ~t=l p s,i,J vt i=l 
n 
s 
j=l 
Further Val(MS(v)) will denote the minmax value of this game. 
s 
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(3 .1) 
Theorem 3.1 
(a) 
(b) 
Discounted reward stochastic games are strictly determined. 
s s s s The value, say v := (v 1 ,v2 , ... ,vz) equals the unique solution to 
the following set of functional equations : 
v 
s 
Val(MS(v)), for each s Es 
s 
(3 .2) 
(c) A stationary strategy p for player 1 is optimal if and only if, for 
each s € s, p(s) is an optimal action for player 1 in MS(vS). A 
s 
similar result holds for player 2. 
The proof of this theorem is based on the fact that the right-hand side 
of (3.2) represents a contraction mapping with contraction factor Son the 
lRz. Hence Banach's contraction mapping theorem yields a unique solution 
(fixed point) to the set of equations (3.2), which turns out to be the 
value of the game. 
An alternative proof of theorem 3.1 is given in Vrieze (1987). There 
the set of equations (3.2) is formulated as a non-linear programming pro-
blem (linear object function subject to quadratic constraints). Applica-
tion of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to this NLPP gives a constructive proof 
of all parts of theorem 3.1. 
Theorem 3.1 makes in an essential way use of matrix game theory. In-
deed several structural properties of discounted reward stochastic games 
can be shown by suitable injection of matrix game properties. For instan-
ce, by (c) of theorem 3.1 and by the Bohnenblust, Karlin and Shapley (1950) 
characterization of solution sets of matrix games, we derive (Vrieze and 
Tijs (1980)) : 
Theorem 3.2. 
s The set of optimal stationary strategies, Ok, for player k, k = 1,2, in 
the discounted stochastic game is equal to the Cartesian product 
z 
x O~(s), where O~(s) is the convex polyhedron of optimal mixed actions 
s=l 
of player k in the matrix game M8(vS). 
s 
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Also the Shapley-Snow (1950) results concerning the extreme optimal 
actions for matrix games can be extended to stochastic games (Vrieze and 
Tijs (1980)). 
Theorem 3.3. 
s s Let p be an extreme point of o 1 and 0 be an extreme point of o 2 . Then 
there exists a stochastic subgame from which p and 0 can be computed in 
the Shapley-Snow manner. (Here a subgame arises when pure actions are de-
leted from one or several states for one or both players). 
Notice that this theorem gives a method, though not an efficient one, 
of computing the extreme optimal stationary strategies of o~ x O~ by looking 
at the finite nwnber of stochastic subgames in which at each state both 
players have the same number of pure actions. 
A next theme that lends itself to conveying matrix game properties 
to stochastic games, is perturbation theory. In the first place, from 
theorem 3.1, part {b) and the fact that the value of a matrix game is a 
continuous function of the entries of a matrix game, it follows that 
(Tijs and Vrieze (1980)) 
Theorem 3 .4 
The value of discounted reward stochastic games, considered as a function 
on the parameters (rewards, transitions, discount factor) is a continuous 
one. 
Also with respect to the sets of s-optimal stationary strategies (S ~0) 
a continuity statement can be made (Tijs and Vrieze (1980)). 
Theorem 3.5 
s Let Ok(S) be the set of s-optimal stationary strategies to player k, 
k E {1,2}. Then o!(s) is an upper semi-continuous multimap on the para-
meters of the stochastic game. 
A useful implication of theorem 3.5 is the following observation. Take 
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€ > 0. Then for any two games f and f which are "close enough" to each 
B ~S 
other it holds that Ok(€) n Ok (€) # 0. Moreover it can be shown that 
O~ (€) co: (€ + co), where c is some number determined by the parameters 
of r and 0 is the distance between r and r. 
In practical situations small deviations in the exact-values of the 
game parameters are inevitable. The theorems 3.4 and 3.5 show that then 
small changes in the game parameters induce only small changes in the solu-
tion of the game. This property increases the reliability and practicabi-
lity of discounted reward stochastic games. 
A last property for discounted reward stochastic games that we will 
mention is a topological one. Fix action spaces As' Bs' s ES. Let SG be 
the class of stochastic games with these action spaces. Let USG be the 
subclass of SG for which both players have a unique optimal stationary stra-
tegy. Notice from theorem 3.5 that this unique optimal stationary strate-
gy varies continuously over USG. (If a player possesses in a discounted 
reward stochastic game a unique optimal stationary strategy, then this 
strategy is his only optimal strategy, stationary or not). For a class of 
matrix games of fixed size, the subclass of matrix games with unique opti-
mal actions for the both players is a dense and open subset with respect 
to the whole class (Bohnenblust, Karlin and Shapley (1950)). For stochas-
tic games and analogous result, proved in an analogous way, holds (Tijs 
and Vrieze (1980)) 
Theorem 3.6 
The set USG is a dense and open subset with respect to SG. 
In fact theorem 3.6 states that each open neighborhood in SG of a 
fixed stochastic game has a non-void intersection with the set USG. Even 
more it can be shown that each such neighborhood contains elements of USG 
that have the same value as the fixed stochastic game. Furthermore, since 
USG is open, it follows that a "generic" stochastic game is one belonging 
to USG. 
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4. THE AVERAGE REWARD CRITERION 
Average reward stochastic games are considerably more difficult to 
analyse then discounted reward stochastic games. The reason can be found 
in the fact that the expected average reward is not continuous over the 
strategy space (in contrast to the discounted case). 
For example : 
1- £ £ 
0 / 2 
2 
Average reward equals 0 as long as £ > O, while for £ 
ward equals 1 for starting state 1. 
0 the average re-
Average reward stochastic games were introduced by Gillette (1957). He 
considered games with perfect information (in each state one of the players 
has only one action available) and irreducible stochastic games (games 
where for each pair of stationary pure strategies (p,o) the associated 
stochastic matrix P(p,o) (cf (2.3)) has a single ergodic class and no 
transient states). Blackwell and Ferguson (1968) used a slightly modified 
version of an example of Gillette to show for average reward stochastic 
games that, in general, the players need not possess optimal strategies. 
Even more for this example, called the big match, one of the players has 
no £-optimal strategy within the class of (semi-)Markov strategies for 
£ > 0 small enough. 
For a long time it was an open question whether average reward stochas-
tic games always have a value. Only around 1980 this question was answered 
in the affirmative by Mertens and Neyman (1981). Before that time, re-
sults for special cases of average reward stochastic games were obtained 
by several authors. The emphasis was laid mainly on the existence of op-
timal stationary strategies for the players. Hoffman and Karp (1986) 
treated irreducible stochastic games. Their approach is based on results 
of Markov decision theory. Kohlberg ( 197 4) analyzed so-called "repeated 
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games with absorbing states". These are games where all but one of the 
states are absorbing and where the remaining state is transient or re-
current, depending on the strategies played. The big match belongs to 
this class of games. Kohlberg showed that these games have a value which 
can be found by considering the T-step game and letting T tend to infinity. 
Later it appeared that Kohlberg's approach indicated the way in which in 
the general case the existence of the value can be shown. 
Bewley and Kohlberg (1976, 1978) exposed in an elegant way some of the 
relationships between the discounted game, the T-step game and the average 
reward game. Below we shall explain their use of the field of real 
Puiseux series. 
A characterization of stochastic games with optimal stationary strategies 
for the both players was given in Vrieze (1987). Further, in Tijs and 
Vrieze (1986) it was shown that for both players there are always states 
which are easy to them i.e. when the game starts in such a state then the 
respective player can guarantee the value of the game by playing an appro-
priate stationary strategy. 
Some of the above mentioned results will be worked out now. 
We start with the introduction of Puiseux series. 
Let for a positive integer M : 
k/M 
c(k)G 
that the series L ~ = 
large real numbers T}. 
K is an integer, c ( k) E E. and such 
k/M 
c(k)T converges for all sufficiently 
Here 8 represents an arbitrarily large real number; thus the members of 
FM are power series in Gl/M. 
00 
Let F := U FM' then it can be checked that F is an ordered field and F 
M=l 
is called the field of real Puiseux series. 
Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) extended Shapley's equations (cf (3.2)) for 
discounted reward stochastic games in the following way 
The set of equations (cf (3.1) and (3.2)) 
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x 
s 
Val(M 
s 
where x E F and x 
s 
equation. 
( x)) for each s E S, ( 4.1) 
That for x E F2 the right-handside of (4.1) belongs to Fis a consequence 
of the ordered field preserving property of the value function (Weyl (1950)). 
Notice that (4.1) is a set of equations in the function space Fz and that 
for 8 = T ER, (4.1) is equivalent to (3.1) with S = --1--_1 • 
. 1 + T 
Bewley and Kohlberg (1976, 1978) proved the following: 
Theorem 4.1 
(a) The 
say 
for 
set of equations (4.1) has a unique solution in Fz, 
/ = L: K c ( k) Gk/M 
S k= -CO S r s = 1,2, ... ,z, 
which it holds that K ~ M. 
(b) "M c (k)~k/M 2 h h "'k=-oos, ,s=l,, •.. ,z,istevalueofte _ 1 
(c) 
discounted reward stochastic game for all T sufficient- 1 + T 
ly large. 
-1 M k/M 
cs(M) = lim T (L:k= _ 00 cs(k)T ) = lim 
T-+oo T-+oo T 
Here FV (T) is the total reward value of the 
s 
tic game with T stages and starting state s. 
FV (T). 
s 
finite horizon stochas-
(d) If player 1 has, for each s E s, a real action p(s) such that p(s) 
guarantees player 1 Val(Ml/j+G- 1 (x*)) + O(GO) in the matrix game 
1/1+e-1 * s 
Ms (x ), then p = (p(l),p(2), ... ,p(z)) is an optimal stationary 
strategy in the average reward game. An analogous statement holds 
for player 2. 
Translated in terms of the discount factor S, part (c) of theorem 4.1 
states that lim ( 1- Sl v 6 exists for each s E S and that this limit equals 
s 
the limit of the St 1 average reward values for finite horizon games with 
the same starting state. Later on, Neyman and Mertens (1981) showed that 
these limits also equal the average reward value for the infinite horizon 
game with the same starting state s. From part (d) one deduces immediate-
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ly that stationary strategies which are uniform discount optimal are also 
average reward optimal. (A strategy is uniform discount optimal if it is 
optimal for each discount factor S close enough to 1) . 
The following theorem is due to Mertens and Neyman (1981) 
Theorem 4.2 
(a) Average reward stochastic games hava a value. 
(b) €-optimal strategies can be constructed from the solution to the 
limit discount equation by computing for each stage a discount factor 
with the aid of rules depending on the history of the game up to that 
stage. Next the action at that stage with that history can be chosen 
as an optimal action in Shapley's equation for the computed discount 
factor. 
The proof of this theorem is based on the results of Bewley and Kohl-
berg, using a martingale property. 
Surely, history dependent strategies are terrible to handle. Applica-
tion of stationary strategies is more favourable, since players only have 
to look at the current state. Below we give a characterization of stochas-
tic games for which both players have optimal stationary strategies 
(Vrieze (1987)). 
Theorem 4.3 
Both players possess optimal stationary strategies if and only if the 
following set of equations has a solution g, v(l) ,v(2) ERZ: 
(a) 
(b) v 
(c) v 
gs = Val 
A XB 
s s 
o::t:l p(tl s,.,.)gt), 
( 1) = Val (r S (•I•) + L: z s E ( 1) x B t=l 
s s 
(2) = Val (r S (•I•) + L: z s Ax E ( 2) t=1 
s s 
each s E s, 
p ( t I s, . , . ) v t ( 1) ) , each s E s, 
p(t I s,.,.)vt(2)),each s ES. 
(Here Val (f(.,.)) means the value of the matrix game on the polytope 
ex D 
( 4. 2) 
( 4.3) 
(4. 4) 
with extreme points the sets C respectively D for player 1 respectively 
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player 2; for (c,d) EC x D the payoff equals f(c,d); As and Bs have the 
usual meaning and Es(k), k = 1,2, are the sets of extreme optimal actions 
for player kin the matrix game (4.2)) 
For each solution to (4.2)-(4.4), g = (g1 ,g2 , ... ,gz), is the same, 
equalling the average reward value of the stochastic game. 
Equation (4.2) can be interpreted as the conservingness property in the 
sense that the players should take care, that they remain in their "good 
states" during the play. 
Equation (4.3) for player a and (4.4) for player 2 reflect the equalizing 
property in the sense that within their good states the average rewards 
have to approach the value. 
From a solution to (4.2)-(4.4) optimal stationary strategies can be con-
structed. Namely, let p = (p(l) ,p(2) , ... ,p(z)) be such that, for each 
s ES, p(s) is an optimal action for player 1 in the polyhedral game (4.3), 
then p is an optimal stationary strategy for player 1 in the average re-
ward stochastic game. Likewise one can construct an optimal stationary 
strategy for player 2. 
We already saw that optimal stationary strategies need not exist. One 
can wonder if for certain starting states one or both players can guaran-
tee themselves the value for that starting state with the aid of stationa-
ry strategies. In Tijs and Vrieze (1986) it is shown that both players, 
in every game, have at least one state for which this is the case. It is 
still an open problem to characterize for a player his whole set of such 
"easy" states. 
We finish this section by some remarks on games for which the value 
does not depend on the initial state. Already Bewley and Kohlberg (1978) 
showed that for games for which lim ( 1- Sl v6 does not depend on s, the 
St 1 s 
value of the game exists and that both players possess optimal 
Markov strategies. 
The following theorem can be found in Vrieze (1987) 
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Theorem 4. 4 
(a) For an average reward stochastic game the value is independent of the 
initial state if and only if, for some number g ER, for each s > 0, 
the following set of equations has a solution for 
v(s) = (v 1 (s),v2 (s), ... ,v2 (s)) 
v (s) + g - Val ;S s, for each 
s 
s E s. 
Ax B 
s s 
(4. 5) 
(b) Both players have optimal stationary strategies in an average reward 
stochastic game with value independent of the initial state if and 
only if equation (4.5) has a solution for s = 0 i.e. if and only if 
vs + g =AV=~ (rs(.,.) + L:t~l p(t I s,.,.)vt) for some g ER and 
s s 
v E R 2 • (4.6) 
As well in part (a) as in part (b) of theorem 4.4 the value of the 
game is g for each starting state. In part (a) s-optimal stationary 
strategies can be constructed by taking optimal actions in the matrix ga-
mes in (4.5). In part (b} optimal stationary strategies result by taking 
optimal actions in the matrix games in (4.6). 
5. TOTAL REWARD STOCHASTIC GAMES 
In section 3 we already mentioned that in fact Shapley considered to-
tal reward stochastic games under the restriction of stopping transitions. 
In this section we apply the total reward criterion to stochastic ga-
mes as defined in section 2. The motivations for looking at the total 
reward criterion lies in the fact that this can be seen as a sensitive 
criterion in addition to the average reward criterion. 
For instance, consider the following examples : 
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-1 /_,I 
fo,0, 1) 
2 
game 
,/ 
0 ./ 
../ (0I011) 
3 2 
game 2 
For game 1, obviously the average reward value is (0,0,0). However 
player would prefer to start in state (getting total reward 1) and 
player 2 would prefer to start in state 2 (paying total reward - 1) . 
Likewise in game 2 the average reward value is (0,0), but player 1 likes 
to start in state 1, thus owning half of the time one unit and half of the 
time zero units. And player 2 likes to start in state 2, being due half 
of the time minus one unit and half of the time 0 units. 
For both games the average reward criterion does not discriminate between 
the states for the players, while the total reward criterion would do. 
In general, total reward stochastic games need not have a value, as 
can be seen from the following example : 
(0, 1, 0) 
-1 ~----/ 
~~ (0 I 1, 0) 
2 
It can be easily be verified that for state 
T 
sup inf v ( 1, TI 1 , TI 2J - 00 f 0 
Til TI2 
' 1 I I~'L~i 
3 
Researchers in stochastic games will have recognized the above game 
as being the big match of Blackwell and Ferguson (1968). 
It can be proved that in case one of the players has no optimal stationary 
strategy for an average reward stochastic game, then this game has no to-
tal reward value. 
Therefore, we concentrate on games with the following property. 
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Property Pl : The stochastic game has average reward value (0,0, ... ,0) 
and both players possess optimal stationary strategies with respect to the 
average reward criterion. 
This class of games is introduced in Thuijsman and Vrieze (1987). 
It is still an open question whether for this class of games the total 
reward value always exists. It can easily be shown that property Pi im-
plies that both sup 
TI1 
T T inf v (s,n1 ,n2J and inf sup v (s,n 1 ,n2J are finite. 
TI2 TI2 TI1 
The following example, called the bad match, elaborated in Thuijsman 
and Vrieze (1987) shows that, in analyzing total reward games, similar 
problems as for average reward games are encountered. 
I i l:~I 
1 2 3 4 
For this game the total reward value equals (0,0,2,-2). Player 1 has 
no total reward optimal strategy, even more, player 1 has no €-optimal 
(semi-)Markov strategy for the game starting in state 1 (or state 3 or 
state 4). 
Observe the similarity between this game (the bad match) with the big 
match. In Thuijsman and Vrieze (1987) it is shown that total reward €-
optimal history dependent strategies for player 1 in the bad match can be 
constructed along the same lines as average reward ones in the big match. 
In spite of this similarity, the analysis of Mertens and Neyman (1981) 
can not be implemented straightforward to total reward stochastic games, 
which is mainly due to the fact that even under property Pl streams of 
payoffs may occur for which the partial sums are not uniformly bounded. 
Concerning the characterization of games with both players possessing 
total reward optimal stationary strategies, the following result can be 
mentioned: (Vrieze and Thuijsman (1986)). 
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Theorem 5.1 
For a total reward stochastic game the value exists and both players have 
optimal stationary strategies if and only if the following set of functio-
nal equations has a solution u = (u1,u2 , •.. ,uz)' w(1) 
wz(1)), w(2) = (w 1(2),w2(2), •.. ,wz(2)) ElRz and a~ 0 
us =AV~lB (rs(.,.)+ l:t~l p(t I s,.,.)ut)' for each s ES 
s s 
w (1) 
s 
w (2) 
s 
+ u 
s 
+ u 
s 
z 
=Val (ar (.,.) + l:t=l p(t 
E (1)XB s 
s s 
s,.,.)wt(1)), for each 
s E S 
=Val (ar (.,.) + l:t~l p(t I s,.,.)wt(2)), for each 
A x E (2) s 
s s s E S 
(Here Val(f(.,.)) has the same meaning as in theorem 4.3). 
CXD 
(5. 1) 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
Observe the similarity of this theorem with theorem 4.3. Analogous 
to the average reward case, the u part of any solution to (5.1)-(5.3) is 
the same, being the total reward value. Also here optimal stationary stra-
tegies can be constructed from optimal actions in the polyhedral games 
(5.2) and (5.3). Notice further that equation (5.1) is equivalent to pro-
perty P1 (cf part (b) of theorem 4.4). In case both players have total 
reward optimal stationary strategies it can be deduced from the limit dis-
count equation that the total reward value equals c(O) = (c 1(0),c 2(0), ... , 
c 2 (0)), i.e. the constant term of the Puiseux series solution to the limit 
discount equation. In this case c(O) is also the leading term since under 
property P1 it holds that c(1) = c (2) c(M) = 0. In terms of the 
discount 
lim vS. 
St1 
factor S this property can be stated as : total reward value = 
In Vrieze and Thuijsman (1986) it is conjectured that for games 
with property P1 the total reward value always equals lim v 6. 
St1 
6. STRUCTURED STOCHASTIC GAMES 
Since 1980 several subclasses of stochastic games are studied. Here 
subclasses of stochastic games are classes of stochastic games determined 
by conditions on the reward and/or payoff structure. 
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There are two reasons for analyzing structured games. First, practical 
situations seem to fit better into structural classes. Second, the value 
and optimal strategies can be computed more easy for structured games than 
in the general case. 
In the general rase neither the value nor optimal stationary strategies 
need to lie in the same ordered field as the data of the game. For in-
stance the game with rational data : 
4 
: 2 /// 
i / 
: .. / (0, 1) 
i---
1 0 / 
/ (0, 1) 
has,for B = 4/5,discounted reward value CVS,O). 
Stochastic games, for which the value and some pair of optimal statio-
nary strategies, with respect to one of the three evaluation criteria, lie 
in the same ordered field as the data of the game, are said to have the 
orderfield property. Only for games having the orderfield property, one 
can expect to find a solution in a finite number of computation steps, 
resulting in an exact solution of the game. This observation gives fur-
ther support to paying attention to structured games. 
Successively we mention the classes studied so far and give in short 
some characteristics. We do not state properties with respect to the to-
tal reward criterion, since this criterion has only recently been proposed in 
the literature. However, most of the properties concerning the average 
reward criterion will also hold for the total reward criterion, when, in 
addition to the structure on the reward and transitions, property P1 
(cf section 5) holds. 
(a) One player controls transitions. 
In this class, only one of the players controls the transitions. Say 
player 2, then p(t s,i 1,j) = p(t [ s,i 2 ,j) for each i 1 ,i2 E A8 , each 
j E B8 and each s,t ES. Hence we can denote the transitions by p(t [ s,j). 
The orderfield property for this class of games for as well the discounted 
as the average reward criterion, was first shown by Parthasarathy and 
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Raghavan (1981). For the discounted reward case they gave an LP algorithm. 
In Vrieze (1981), and independently in Hordijk and Kallenberg (1981), a 
constructive proof, using also an LP algorithm, for the average reward 
case can be found. Later on,this class of games is intensively studied 
by Filar (1984, 1987) especially as an application to the travelling in-
spector model. 
(b) Transitions with switching control. 
For this class of games in each state only one of the players governs 
the transitions. However, unlike the one player controls transition case, 
not in every state this has to be the same player. 
This class of games was introduced by Filar (1981). For as well the dis-
counted as the average reward case he proved the orderfield property. A 
constructive proof for the discounted version can be found in Vrieze 
(1987) and for the average version in Vrieze, e.a. (1983). In both cases 
the solution procedure consists of an iterative procedure of finite length, 
where at each iteration an LP problem has to be solved. 
(c) SER-SIT games. 
Separable reward and state independent transitions games are defined 
by the following structure: r 8 (i,j) = r 1(s) + r 2(i,j) and p(t I s 1,i,j) = 
p(t I s 2 ,i,j) for each s 1 ,s 2 E: S. Hence we may write p(t I i,j). As a con-
sequence of the imposed structure the action sets of the players are the 
same for each state. These games are introduced in Parthasarathy, e.a. 
(1984). They showed that SER-SIT games have the orderfield property and 
that this class can be solved ~elatively. 
For the discounted version this matrix game is 
[r2 (i,j) + S l:t~ 1 p(t \ i,j) r 2 (t)]i:1 j~ 1 • 
For the average version this matrix game is the limit of the S-discounted 
one's for S tending to one : 
[r2(i,j) + i:t~1 p(t I i,j) r2(t)]i:1 j~1· 
For both criteria the both players have optimal myopic stationary strate-
gies. Myopic means that the stationary strategy is even independent of the 
current state. A further result is that for the average case the value is 
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independent of the initial state. SER-SIT games are also partially studied 
by Sobel (1981). 
(d) ARAT games. 
Additive reward and additive transitions games are introduced by 
Raghavan, e.a. (1985). ARAT games are defined by rs(i,j) = r 1s(i) + r 2s(j) 
and p(t I s,i,j) = p1(t I s,i) + p2(t J s,j). Hence both the rewards and the 
transitions are additive with respect to the both player. 
They proved the following results. For as well the discounted as the 
average reward criterion both players possess optimal stationary pure 
strategies. This property immediately implies the orderfield property. 
Further, both players have uniformly discount optimal stationary pure stra-
tegies. These results follow straightforward from Shapley's equations 
(cf (3.2)), since the matrix game (3.1) can be decomposed in a term depen-
ding on i and a term depending on j for ARAT games. 
(e) One player controls rewards for a game with two states. 
This class of games is introduced by Vrieze, e.a. (1986). 
It is defined by : restriction to two states and r (i,j) = ~ (i), i.e. the 
s s 
rewards only depend on the action of player 1. Also for these class of 
games the orderfield turns out to hold for the discounted case. For the 
average reward criterion this is an open question. 
We conclude this section by the remark that the time has come to cha-
racterize the subclass of games having the orderfield property. Two 
approaches look promising at least for the discounted reward criterion. 
A first one is established in the paper by Vrieze, e.a. (1986). To each 
set of stationary pure strategies of a player they add a set of stationary 
strategies of the other player in the following way : 
Let Q be a set of stationary pure strategies for say player 1 and S(Q) the 
stationary strategies of player 2 added to Q, then o E S(Q) if and only if 
each p E Q is a best answer too. 
Vrieze, e.a. (1986) showed that , in their case, S(Q) is either void or a 
union of a finite number of disjoint polytopes with rational extremes (when 
the data is rational). In general this quality is enough for proving the 
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orderfield property. And as such this idea can be used for characterizing 
the orderfield property in more generally settings. 
A second approach can be found in Sinha (1986). He combined SER-SIT 
games and switching control games. For the discounted case he exploited 
a value iteration method based on Shapley's equations. In each step three 
connected LP problems have to be solved. In a finite number of steps the 
solution is reached. His technique of proof relies on the fact that the 
solution of the discounted reward game corresponds to an extreme point of 
a suitable chosen system of linear inequalities. Thus corresponding to a 
certain base of this system. In each iteration step this system comes 
back together with some base. Since each of his iterations approaches 
the value better and since there are a finite number of different base, 
Sinha was able to prove that his procedure stops after a finite number of 
steps. There are indications that this method can be extended to generally 
proving whether some subclass has the orderfield property (in the discoun-
ted case) or not. 
7. ALGORITHMS FOR STOCHASTIC GAMES 
In this final section we give a short review on algorithm for discoun-
ted and average reward stochastic games. Always the question is, how to 
compute the value of the game together with a pair of stationary strate-
gies (when existing). For solution methods for special subclasses we re-
fer to section 6. 
(a) Algorithms for discounted reward stochastic games. 
In the first place we mention the algorithm, which, in a natural way 
arises from Shapley's proof of the existence of the value, namely (cf 
(3.1) and (3.2)) : 
1. 
2. 
choose v0 = (v0 (1),v0 (2), ••• ,v0 (z)) arbitrary 
s let, for T = 1,2, ••• , : vT(s) := Val(Ms(vT_1)), each s ES. 
This value iteration method approaches the value of the game exponen-
tially fast, while at each iteration suboptimal stationary strategies 
can be deduced from the matrix games MS(v 1). s T-
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A second algorithm, proposed by Hoffman and Karp (1966), can be named 
as value oriented policy iteration. It runs as follows 
1. choose v0 = (v0 (1),v0 (2), ••. ,v0 (z)) arbitrary. 
2. let T = 0,1,2, ••. , CJT = (aT(1),CJT(2), ... ,a'(z)) be such that 
CJT(s) ib an optimal action for player 2 in M6 Cv ). 
s T 
3. solve for player 1 the Markov decision problem, which results when 
player 2 fixes CJT and let vT+ 1 be the optimal value; repeat from 2. 
A third algorithm we mention is an extension of the Brown-Robinson 
scheme for matrix games to stochastic games (Vrieze and Tijs (1982)). 
First they showed that the scheme can be applied at a converging sequence 
of matrix games. Next the contraction property of Shapley 1s value opera-
tor enables them to proof the convergence of the Brown-Robinson scheme 
when applied to discounted stochastic games. 
The convergence rate is low (the same as in the case of matrix games), 
however at each iteration only simple calculations have to be done. 
More about algorithms, especially viewed in a mathematical programming 
context (cf also Vrieze (1987)), can be found in Schultz (1987). 
Several facts about convergence rates for successive approximation 
schemes and value oriented policy iteration schemes can be found in Van 
der Wal (1981). 
(b) Algorithms for average reward stochastic games. 
For average reward stochastic games there are still many open problems. 
The existing algorithms only solve special classes. Surely, by the re-
sult of Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) (cf section 4), the average value, g, 
can be approached by computing the discounted value, v6 , and letting 6 
tend to 1 (g lim(1-6)v6). However there are no clear rules available 
St1 to estimate the convergence rate. A further difficulty is that 
the players need not possess optimal stationary strategies. 
We mention two algorithm. 
The first one is the application of the Hoffman and Karp schemes to avera-
ge reward games. However restricted to the class of irreducible stochas-
tic games, i.e. games for which for each pair of stationary pure strate-
gies the corresponding stochastic matrix (cf 2.3) has a single ergodic 
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class and no transient states. 
They showed that their scheme converges to a solution of the following set 
of equations (in g E: :R and v = (v1 , ... ,v) E: :Rz) 
g + vs =Val (rs(.,.) + l:t~l p(t \ s,. ,.)vt), each s E: S. 
A x B 
s s 
( 7. 1) 
By theorem 4.4, part (b) it follows at once that a solution to these equa-
tions is equivalent to a solution of the average reward stochastic game. 
A second algorithm is due to Federgruen (1984) and can be applied to 
games for which (1) both players have optimal stationary strategies and 
(2a) the average value is independent of the initial states or (2b) the 
stochastic game is irreducible. Federgruen's scheme is an extension of 
the modified value-iteration method of Hordijk and Tijms (1975) for 
Markov decision problems to stochastic games. The idea is to choose a 
suitable sequence of discount factors tending to 1, obeying certain desi-
red properties. Next at each step a (discounted) value iteration step 
is carried out, resulting in a scheme which converges to a solution of the 
set of equations (7.1). Related algorithm for the same classes can be 
found in Van der Wal (1981). 
Since playing stationary is preferable to playing nonstationary it 
would be nice if there was some algorithm yielding sup inf g(p,n2) for 
player 1 and inf g(n 1,er) for player 2. Observe 
er Tr 2 that these sup 
quantities er Tr 1 are the bounds for the respective players that can be 
reached by playing stationary. Only in case both players possess E-optimal 
stationary strategies, these bounds are the same, equalling the average 
value of the game. No algorithm for this problem is at hand. An adaption 
of the above mentioned algorithm of Federgruen, using extensions of the 
characterization in theorem 4.3, looks a promising candidate. However no 
convergence proof is available yet. 
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CHAPTER V 
NON-ZEROSUM STOCHASTIC GAMES 
by Frank Thuijsman *) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of stochastic games was born in 1953 by the appearance of a 
paper titled "Stochastic games", written by L.S. Shapley (1953). This pa-
per has inspired many people to examine stochastic games in order to get a 
better understanding of this complex and challenging kind of games, in 
which a link is made between Markov decision problems and finite non-coope-
rative games. In fact Markov decision problems as well as bimatrix games 
and repeated games can be seen as special kinds of stochastic games. Sto-
chastic games are also connected with stochastic processes, specially with 
Markov chains, and therefore these games are also known as Markov games. 
This chapter is arranged as follows. In section 2 we give the formal 
definitions that are of importance and we take a first look at an example 
which will be worked out in section 5. In section 3 we mention some results 
on zerosum stochastic games, which are necessary for a better understanding 
of non-zerosum stochastic games. In section 4 we give a review on non-
zerosum stochastic games. In section 5 we work out an example. We end 
this chapter with some concluding remarks in section 6. For more informa-
tion about zerosum stochastic games we refer to the chapter by Vrieze. 
Before turning to the formal definitions we give two ways of looking at 
a stochastic game. Those who are familiar with Markov decision problems 
may look at a two person stochastic game as a Markov decision problem for 
which in each state and on each stage, instead of one person, there are 
two people who simultaneous and independent of each other, each have to 
choose an action. Now the payoffs to the players as well as the transition 
*) Support was provided by the Netherlands Organisation for the Advance-
ment of Pure Research ZWO (project 10-64-10) . 
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to the next state are governed by the current state and the pair of actions 
chosen. Since the players in general do not have the same interest, nor-
mally do not know what the other is going to do and are not allowed to make 
binding agreements, we have a non-cooperative game situation. 
Those familiar with bimatrix games could think of a two person stochas-
tic game as a finite collection of bimatrix games to be played, every day 
one and never stopping, where the actions chosen on a certain day in some 
bimatrix not only determine a payoff to each player but also determine a 
probability vector over the set of bimatrices, according to which the play 
moves to a new bimatrix game to be played next day. So instead of playing 
one bimatrix game one time and keeping account of the direct payoff only, 
in the stochastic game the players have to look at the possibilities of 
current payoffs and future prospects at the same time. It should be clear 
that each player's objective is to get as rich as possible without making 
binding agreements, but perhaps by making use of threats (like in repeated 
games). 
In this chapter we restrict our attention to two person non-zerosum 
stochastic games with finite state and action spaces although several of 
the results mentioned also hold for more general stochastic games. We also 
assume the players to have complete information, i.e. at each stage both 
players know the current state as well as the sequence of states and actions 
that have been visited, respectively chosen, up to that stage. The players 
also know for all states and pairs of possible actions the corresponding 
direct payoffs and transition vector. 
2. GETTING INTO THE STOCHASTIC GAME MODEL 
2.1.1. Stoahastia games; the situation 
A two person stochastic game is a set of matrices {M 
s 
s E s}, where 
s = {1,2, ••. ,z}. Matrix M has size m(s) x n (s) and for i E A s s 
{1,2, ... ,m(s)} and j E B {1,2, •.. ,n(s)} entry (i, j) of M is of the form: s s 
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where r 1 (s,i,j), r 2 (s,i,j) EJR and p(s,i,j) = (p(l [ s,i,j),p(2 [ s,i,j),. .. , 
z 
p(z [ s,i,j)) E P(S) = {x ER2 : x f;; 0 and I 1x = 1}. t= t 
The elements of S are called states. 
For each s E S the elements of As, respectively Bs, are called the pure 
actions of player I, respectively player II, in state s. 
For each s ES, i E As,j E Bs,ri (s,i,j) and r 2 (s,i,j) are the payoffs to 
players I and II respectively, if in state s player I chooses i and player 
II chooses j. 
For all s,t E S,i EA ,j E B ,p(t [ s,i,j) is the probability that the play 
s s 
moves from state s to state t if in state s player I chooses i and player 
II chooses j. 
Unless mentioned otherwise we will deal with JN= {1,2,3, ... } as set of 
stages at which the players have to choose actions. 
In case for all s,i and j r 2 (s,i,j) = -r 1 (s,i,j) the game is called a 
zerosum stochastic game. 
2.1.2. Stochastic games; the rules 
A stochastic game, as just defined, is played in the following way. 
Each of the states can be considered as starting state of the play at stage 
1. At each stage n EN the play is in exactly one of the states; suppose 
it is in state s at stage n. Then, simultaneous and independent of each 
other player I has to choose an action out of A and player II has to choose 
s 
an action out of B Suppose player I chooses i and player II chooses j. 
s 
Then each of them informs the impartial referee about his choice. The 
referee anounces the pair of choices and orders the bank to pay r 1 (s,i,j) 
to player I and r 2 (s,i,j) to player II. Finally for this stage, the re-
feree carries out a chance experiment of which the outcome will be t with 
probability p(t [ s,i,j), for all t Es. The outcome of this experiment 
determines the state at which the play will be at stage n+l, the next stage. 
As such the play goes on indefinitely, moving from state to state. 
To get familiar with the stochastic game model, we now take a brief 
look at an example. 
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2.2. A bankrobbery game 
Think of a small town with 10 banks, one policeman and one thief. 
Every evening the thief can decide either to get to bed or to go out and 
rob one of the banks. Similarly the policeman can decide to go to bed or 
to go out to watch over one of the ten banks. The policeman has a fixed 
salary of 2 daily, but going out to watch over a bank takes effort costing 
him 1. On the other hand, staying home will cost him in case there is a 
bankrobbery that night, for then he is to blame for not doing his duty 
well. We even assume that each time the latter occurs the policeman has 
probability 1/10 of getting fired, in which case his daily income reduces 
to O, and the thief would then receive 10 each day. The thief earns 10 in 
case he robs a bank and he earns 0 if he stays at home. In case the thief 
decides to rob a bank he has probability 1/10 of getting caught and sent 
to prison if the policeman is on guard. In prison the thief's daily income 
is -1,while the policeman would simply get his salary 2 daily. Once in 
prison, or once fired it will stay that way forever. 
We can model this situation as a stochastic game with 3 states 
2,0 
_,/ 
1,10 // 
/ // 
/ ( 1 0 0) 9 10 0 1 10 
./ /// / 1,0 1I10 2,-1 
// 
/ 
1 0 0) /9 10 1 10 QJ. (0t1,0) 
2 3 
Player I, the row player, is the policeman and player II, the column 
player, is the thief. State 2 is the prison and in state 3 player I has 
been fired. Of course, the interesting starting state is state 1. The 
question is what the policeman and the thief could do, without making bin-
ding agreements, to "maximize" their individual incomes. An answer will 
be given in section 5. 
136 
2.3. Strategies 
A player, facing a stochastic game, should make a strategy that tells 
him for all possible situations, i.e. states, stages and sequences of past 
events, what to do. We allow the players to randomize over their pure ac-
tions, just like in bimatrix games. This means that each player is allowed 
to carry out a chance experiment to decide which pure action to choose. 
So in fact in state s E s player I can choose a mixed action from P(A ) 
E Rm(s) m(s) s {x : x ;;-; 0, i~l xi = 1}, which should be interpreted as player I 
choosing pure action i with probability xi. We identify the mixed action 
e. = choosing i with probability 1, with the pure action i. The players 
l 
never get to know the mixed actions that are used in the decision making 
by their opponent. The players are only informed about the pure actions 
that have actually been chosen, and those can be the "results" of using 
some unknown mixed actions. So a strategy should tell a player exactly 
what mixed action he should use for any given situation. This brings us 
to the following definition 
A strategy for player I (resp. II) is a function that assigns to each 
triple (s,n,hn), with s ES, n EN and hn (s 1 ,i1 ,j 1 ,s2 ,i 2 ,j 2 , ... ,sn-l' 
in-l'jn-l), an element of P(As) (resp. P(Bs)). Here hn is the history of 
the play at stage n: at stage k E {1,2, ... ,n-1} the play was in state 
sk E S, player I chose ik E A and player II chose jk E Bs . Strategies 
sk k 
will be denoted TI 1 and TI 2 for players I and II respectively. 
A strategy TI is called 
- a stationary strategy if for all (s,n,hn) : TI(s,n,h ) = TI(s) 
n 
- a Markov strategy if for all (s,n,hn) : TI(s,n,hn) = TI(s,n) 
- a behaviour strategy if TI depends on hn. 
Stationary strategies are denoted P for player I and a for player II. 
2.4. Evaluation criteria 
Given a starting state s and strategies TI 1 and n 2 for players I and II 
respectively, one can iteratively compute the expected payoff E (1\(n)) 
STI l TI 2 
to player k E {1,2} at stage n EJN. So for player k E {1,2} we 
have a stream of expected payoffs (E (1\(1)), E {1\(2)) , .•. ). As 
sTI 1TI 2 sn 1n 2 
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we mentioned before, each player wants to earn as much as possible. What 
does this mean for infinite sequences of expected payoffs ? It is obvious 
that the players need some evaluation criterion to relate each infinite 
stream of expected payoffs with a single expected reward, the worth of the 
stream. We will only consider stochastic games in which both players 
evaluate streams of expected payoffs by using the same evaluation criterion. 
There are several ways to evaluate a stream of expected payoffs. Two eva-
luation criteria have been studied extensively : the S-discount criterion 
and the average criterion. A third one is the total reward criterion. 
2 .4. 1. S-Discount stochast1'.c games 
A S-discount stochastic game is a stochastic game in which both players 
use the S-discount criterion. Here SE (0,1) and player k E {1,2} evaluates 
S 00 n-1 
vk(s,n 1,n)=£:1S E (~(n)). 2 n- sn 1n 2 
v!(s,n 1 ,n 2 )is the S-discounted income (reward) of player kif the play 
starts in states, player I uses strategy n 1 and player II uses strategy n2 . 
We al so write v! ( 1T 1, n 2 ) = ( v~ ( 1 , 1T 1 , TI 2 ) , •.. , v~ ( z , 1T 1' 1T 2 ) ) . 
The idea in S-discount stochastic games is, that the players discount 
future payoffs by a factor S E (0,1) which corresponds with a rate of in-
terest ( 1- Sl / S . A payoff x at the n-th stage is worth the same as a 
payoff sn-lx at the first stage, since sn-lx at stage 1 grows, under inte-
rest rate (1-Sl/S per stage, to x at stage n. It is clear that the S-
discounted incomes are mainly determined by the expected payoff s in the be-
n-1 ginning of the play since all expected payoff s are bounded and S tends 
to zero as n increases. 
In non-zerosum stochastic games, the players trying to maximize their 
income could look for stable pairs of strategies, called equilibria 
* * For E > 0 a S-discount E-equilibrium is a pair of strategies (n 1 ,n2 J 
such that for all n 1 ,n2 and s Es 
s * * s * v 1 ( s, 1T 1 , 1T 2 ) ;;; v 1 ( s, TI 1 , TI 2 ) - E and 
s * * s * 
v2(s,1T1,1T2);;; v2(s,1T1,1T2)-E. 
* * If one can take E = 0, then (TI 1 ,n2 ) is called an equilibrium. 
* * * For an E-equilibrium (TI 1 ,n2 J,TI 1 is an E-best answer for player I against 
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* * * TI 2 ,and TI 2 is an E-best answer for player II against TI 1 . So once the 
* * players would have agreed somehow to play (TI 1 ,TI 2 ) neither player could 
gain more than E by one-sidedly starting to play another strategy. Thus 
* * there is some stability in (TI 1 ,TI2 ). The above definition of E-equilibrium 
is due to Nash (1951), thus those equilibria are also called Nash-equili-
bria. 
A S-discount Nash equilibrium payoff, S-Nep, is a pair (x,y) E R 2 x JR2 
( E(n) E(n)) for which there exists a sequence TI 1 ,TI 2 n EN such that: 
i) lim E (n) = 0 
n-700 
the corresponding 8-Nep. Different equilibria can correspond with diffe-
rent Neps. 
In zerosum stochastic games the players have strictly opposite inte-
rests. Then we can talk of the value of the game and of E-optimal strate-
gies 
8 
v 
A 8-discount zerosum stochastic game has a (8-discount) value 
(vS(l), v 8 (2), ... ,vs(z)) if for all E > O there exists TI: and TI; such 
that for all TI 1 ,TI2 and s ES : 
8 . * 8 8 * v 1 (s,TI 1 ,TI2 ) + E <;: v 1 (s) <;: v 1 (s,TI 1 ,TI2 ) - E. 
* * Tik is called a 8-discount E-optimal strategy for player k E {1,2}. TI 1, 
* resp. TI2 , is called a 8-discount optimal strategy for player I, resp. II, 
if one can take E = 0 for the left-side, resp. right-side, inequality. 
2.4.2. Average stochastic games 
An average stochastic game is a stochastic game in which both players 
use the average criterion. This means that player k E {1,2} evaluates the 
stream of expected payoffs (E (R (1)), E (Rk(2)), ... ) as 
sTI1TI2 k sTI1TI2 
T 
gk(s,TI 1 ,TI2 ) = lim inf _!_ ~ E (~(n)). gk(s,TI 1 ,TI2 ) is the average in-
T-7 oo T n= 1 STI 1TI2 
come of player k E {1,2} for the play starting in state s and the players 
using TI 1 and TI 2 respectively. Let gk(TI 1 ,TI 2 ) = (gk(1,TI 1 ,TI2 ) , ... ,gk(z,TI 1 ,TI 2 )). 
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Average stochastic games were introduced by Gillette (1957). 
Whereas in S-discount stochastic games the early expected payoffs have 
the main impact on the S-discounted incomes, in average stochastic games 
the players are mainly concerned about the far-future expected payoffs. 
Average (E-) equilibria and average Neps, g-Neps, are defined analogous 
to S-discount ones. Also for zerosum average stochastic games the average 
value g and average (E-) optimal strategies are defined analogous to those 
s in the S-discount stochastic game (replace vk by gk and S-discount by 
average in the definitions in 2.4.1). 
2.4.3. Total reward stochastic games 
A third criterion makes sense for zerosum stochastic games which have 
average value 0 (ERZ) and for which both players possess average optimal 
stationary strategies. This criterion is the total reward criterion, in-
troduced by Thuijsman and Vrieze (1987). For the total reward (income) the 
expected payoffs in the beginning of a play are equally important as far 
future expected payoffs. For more about this criterion we refer to the 
chapter by Vrieze. Here we will only give the definition : 
A total reward stochastic game is a zerosum stochastic game with average 
value 0 and each player possessing an optimal stationary strategy. For 
strategies n 1 and ~ 2 and starting state s player I's total income is given 
by 
T t 
lim inf T L L E (R 1 (n)). 
T -> oo t= 1 n= 1 STI 1 TI 2 
T Note that in case ~ 1E (R 1 (n)) exists, it is equal to v (s,n 1 ,n2 ). n- sTI 1TI 2 
For total reward stochastic games a value vT and E-optimal strategies are 
defined analogous to those for S-discount stochastic games. 
2.5. The I-zeroswn stochastic game and the II-zeroswn stochastic game 
Any non-zerosum stochastic game is related with two zerosum stochastic 
games by looking at the payoffs to one of the players only and assuming 
that they have to be paid by the other player. If we only look at the pay-
offs to player I we get what we call the I-zerosum stochastic game. In case 
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this game has a value it will be denoted v 6 or g, corresponding to the 
criterion being used. If we only look at the payoffs to player II we get 
the II-zerosum stochastic game of which the value, to player II, will be 
denoted v6 or g, depending on the criterion. Note that usually a zerosum 
stochastic game is considered from the point of view of player I for whom 
the payoffs are given. Hence in the definition of the value of the II-
zerosum game the roles of the players are interchanged in comparison with 
the definition of value in 2.4.1. 
2.6. Some special stochastic games 
A bimatrix game is a two-person stochastic game with just one state 
and only one stage to go. A matrix game is a zerosum bimatrix game, in 
which case mostly the payoffs to player I only are given. 
A repeated game is a two-person stochastic game with just one state. 
So it is a bimatrix game that is played over and over again. 
A repeated game with absorbing states is a stochastic game in which 
all but one states are absorbing, i.e. once such a state is reached there 
is no way of leaving it again. Such a game can be seen as repeatedly 
playing a bimatrix game of which some entries are absorbing. 
2.7. The ordered field property 
As we will see in section 3 for every zerosum stochastic game the S-
discount value and the average value exist, and so do S-discount optimal 
stationary strategies. For non-zerosum stochastic games 6-discount sta-
tionary equilibria always exist. For the average criterion the existence 
of s-equilibria in general is still an open question though we have good 
indications that this question will be answered positively in the near 
future (cf. section 4). However, to find a solution to a stochastic game 
is often a hard struggle. Therefore one often restricts the attention to 
special classes of stochastic games, hoping that they are more easy to sol-
ve than general stochastic games. Suppose all data determining a stochas-
tic game are rational, then it would be interesting to know if a solution, 
i.e. value, (s-)optimal strategies, (S-)equilibrium, can be found of which 
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all components are rational as well. If one would have this "ordered field 
property" one could hope that a finite algorithm exists to solve the game. 
Even for very simple stochastic games the ordered field property need not 
hold. However in section 4.6 several special classes are given which do 
have the ordered field property. 
3. ABOUT ZEROSUM STOCHASTIC GAMES 
For a good understanding of non-zerosum stochastic games it is necessa-
ry to know some important facts of zerosum stochastic games. Therefore we 
now take a brief look at them, starting of with matrix games. For more de-
tailed information we refer to the chapter by Vrieze. 
3.1. Von Neumann's minimax theorem 
Von Neumann ( 1928) showed that for every m x n matrix M m n [aij]i=l'j=l 
it holds that 
t t 
max min p Mq min max p Mq 
pE Sm qE Sn qE Sn pE Sm 
sk k 
k 
where for k = m,n {x ER ; x ~ 0, I: x. 1}. 
i=l l 
This can be interpreted as follows 
every matrix game M has a value and each player has an optimal mixed action, 
* m * n i.e. there exist v ER, p ES and q ES such that for all p and q: 
* t *t p Mq ~ v ~ pMq ; vis unique and denoted val[M] or val[a .. ]. lJ 
This theorem is very important in the theory of stochastic games, as will 
soon turn out. 
3.2. Shapley's stochastic games 
In the fundamental paper on stochastic games Shapley (1953) considers 
zerosum stochastic games for which for every pair of actions in any state 
there is a strictly positive probability that the play stops. Such games 
are·considered as total reward stochastic games. Stopping can be seen as 
moving to an absorbing state with payoff 0. Let S = {1,2, ... ,z,z+l} where 
z+l corresponds to stopping. For x ElRz define Tx ERZ by 
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z+l 
(Tx) = val[r(s,i,j) + 
s 
l: p(t I s,i,j)xt], in which xt+l = 0. 
t=l 
Shapley (1953) shows that T is a continuous contraction mapping and T has 
a unique fixed point v ER2 • Shapley proofs that vis the total reward 
value of the stochastic game and that optimal stationary strategies cor-
respond 1 to 1 to optimal mixed actions in the matrix games M (v) = 
z+l s 
[r(s,i,j) + tfl p(t I s,i,j)vt] for s E {1,2, ... ,z}. So a solution to the 
stochastic game can be found by solving Tx = x, the "Shapley-equation". 
3.3. $-Discount stochastic games 
From Shapley's work one can directly conclude that any S-discount zero-
sum stochastic game has a value v 6. This follows because discounting by a 
factor Scan be seen as stopping with probability 1-S from every entry, 
and looking at the stochastic game as a total reward stochastic game. 
Hence for every S-discount stochastic game the unique solution of the sys-
tem of z equalities x = val[MB(x)], s ES, with x EJR2 and MS(x) 
z s s B s 
[r(s,i,j) + S tfl p(t I s,i,j)xt], is v and a stationary strategy p for player 
I, resp. a for player II, is $-discount optimal if and only if for each s 
Ps for player I, resp. as for player II, is an optimal mixed action in the 
matrix game MB(vB). 
s 
3.4. Average stochastic games 
Gillette (1957) was the first to study average stochastic games. He 
gave the following example of which it was uncertain a long time whether 
it had a value. Later it became known as the big match. 
1/lo,/' 
/ ; ./ 
./ (1 0 0 / 1 0 0 
I~ 
2 3 
The payoffs are those to player I, to be paid by player II. The states 2 
and 3 are absorbing, so state 1 is the interesting starting state. Note 
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that as long as player I chooses the first row, the play will remain in 
state 1; as soon as player I chooses the second row, the play moves to 
state 2 or state 3 depending on player II's choice. 
It is not hard to show that if player I restricts to Markov strategies then 
M M 1 
sup inf g(l,n 1 ,n 2 ) = 0 and inf sup g(1,n 1 ,n2 ) 2"' even if player II re-
M M 
Til TI2 ~2 TI1 
stricts to Markov strategies as well. 
For a long time it was unknown whether the value existed for this game. 
Blackwell and Ferguson (1968) solved the problem by showing that the avera-
ge value for starting state 1 is g 1 = 1/2. They gave E-optimal behaviour 
strategies for player I. In their paper one can also find that no average 
optimal strategy exists for this game. It was the start of solving the 
problem whether or not the average value exists for any zerosum stochastic 
game. 
Kohlberg (1974) extended the work of Blackwell and Ferguson (1968) by 
describing how any repeated game with absorbing states can be solved. So 
any repeated game with absorbing states has a value and each player has E-
optimal (behaviour) strategies. 
Then Bewley and Kohlberg (1978) noted that in case a player has a sta-
* tionary strategy p which is S-discount optimal for all S close to 1, then 
* p is also average optimal and the average value g exists and is related 
to the S-discount values by g lim ( 1- Sl v6 . 
wed 
g = 
Stl 
Finally Monash (1979) and Mertens and Neyman (1981) independently sho-
that for every zerosum stochastic game the average value exists and 
lim ( 1- Sl v6 always. They obtained this result by showing that average 
St1 
E-optimal strategies can consist of playing the proper S-discount optimal 
strategies while S varies and tends to 1. 
3 .5. Remark 
Notice that a limit of S-discount optimal strategies, S going to 1, 
certainly need not be optimal. Look for instance at the big match : v~ = 0, 
v~ = 1/ ( 1- Sl and v~ can be derived by solving the Shapley equation : 
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val The unique 13-
1/(1- Sl 
[ l+ SOv~ Sv~ J which gives us v~ = 1/(2-2 Sl 
discount optimal strategy for player I is pi3 ( 1/ (2- 13), ( 1- 13) / (2- Sl) and 
. 13 1 1 1 s for player II it is O = (2,2). Then p limp = (1,0). Let o 1 = (1,0) 
and o 2 = (0,1). Then g(1,Pi3,o 1) 0 for Stl all 13 < 1 whereas 
1 8 1 g(l,p ,o1) = 1, and g(l,p ,o2 ) = for all 8 < 1 whereas g(l,P ,o2 ) = 0. 
The average value of the big match is g = lim (1- Sl v 8 = (~,0,1). Hence 
1 S St1 
neither is p average optimal nor is p average E-optimal for 8 close to 
1. As we see there is a discontinuity in the average income of player I 
playing PS against several fixed pure stationary strategies, as 8 goes to 1. 
This discontinuity corresponds with a discontinuity in the underlying 
Markov chains : for every pS state 1 is transient whereas for p 1 state 1 is 
recurrent. This discontinuity makes average stochastic games difficult to 
play; sophisticated behaviour strategies can be indispensable to play 
average E-optimal. However there are several special classes of stochas-
tic games in which average optimal stationary strategies exist. 
chapter by Vrieze) . 
4. ABOUT NON-ZEROSUM STOCHASTIC GAMES 
4.1. Introduction 
(See the 
In non-zerosum stochastic games the players do not necessarily have 
strictly opposite interests. Player I could think that player II will do 
his best to minimize the income of player I, regardless whether this is 
also good for player II. This would make player I choose an (E-)optimal 
strategy in the I-zerosum stochastic game. However, player II has other 
interests so perhaps player I could do something better, but what ? Of 
course player II faces a similar problem. 
The idea in non-zerosum games is that the players, looking for some 
stability, would like to play an (E-)equilibrium : a pair of strategies 
(n 1 ,n2 J such that n 1 is an E-best answer for player I against n 2 and, at 
the same time, n 2 is an E-best answer for player II against n 1 . Hence, 
once they have come to play an E-equilibrium neither player I nor player II 
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would have a reason to start doing something else one-sidedly. How the 
players should actually get to play an (E-)equilibrium is a cooperative 
problem which we shall not deal with. One should note that different 
equilibria in the same game may correspond with different incomes for the 
players. Hence the players in general have a different preference for the 
equilibrium they had liked to be played. 
When playing a non-zerosum stochastic game, each player can always be 
sure that his income will be at least the value (-E) of his, i.e. I- or II-, 
zerosum game. Thus in case (n 1 ,n2 ) is an (E-)equilibrium then for each 
player the corresponding income is at least the value (-E) of his zerosum 
game. This follows directly from the definitions of value and E-equilibrium. 
Suppose for instance that we are dealing with an average stochastic game in 
which for each 0 > 0 TI~ is a 0-optimal strategy for player I in the I-zero-
* * sum game and suppose that (n 1 ,n2 ) is an average E-equilibrium. Then 
* * 0 * * * gl(TI1,TI2) ~ gl(TI1,TI2) - E ~ gl-0-E for all 0 > 0. Hence gl (TI1,TI2) ~ 
gl - E. 
Do E-equilibria exist in any two-person stochastic game ? This question 
has been answered in the affirmative for many classes. We are now going to 
take a look at them. 
4.2. Bimatrix games 
For every bimatrix game there exists at least one equilibrium. In fact 
Nash (1951) prove that every finite non-cooperative n-person game has an 
equilibrium. We sketch the proof of Nash for an m x n bimatrix game : Let 
Sm, resp. sn, be the set of mixed actions for player I, resp. player II, 
with pure actions e 1 ,e2 , ... ,em and f 1 ,f2 , ..• ,fn respectively. For a pair 
of (mixed) actions (p,O) let rk(p,O) be the expected payoff to player 
k E {1,2}. For i = 1,2, ... ,m define si(p,O) = max{o,r 1 (ei 1 0)- r 1 (p,O)} and 
for j = 1,2, ... ,n define tj(p,o) = max{O,r 2 (p,fj)- r 2 (p,o)}. Finally de-
p + s(p,o) 
fine T(p,o) = ( 
0 + t(p,O) 
n 
+ .l: 1t. (p 1 0) J= J 
) . 
One can show that T is a continuous function from the compact and convex 
set Sm x Sn into itself. Hence one can apply the Brouwer fixed point 
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theorem (cf. Kakutani (1941)) which gives us the existence of a pair 
* * * * * * (p ,a ) for which T(p ,a ) = (P ,a). It is easy to verify that a pair 
(p,CT) is an equilibrium if and only if T(p,a) = (p,a). So, the Brouwer 
fixed point theorem immediately gives us the existence of at least one 
equilibrium. 
For methods to actually find equilibria in bimatrix games we refer to Eaves 
(1971), Kuhn (1961), Lemke and Howson (1964), Mangasarian (1964), Mangasa-
rian and Stone (1964), Vorob'ev (1958) and Winkels(1979). 
4.3. Repeated games 
Repeated games are mostly considered under the average criterion. 
Looking for equilibria in a repeated game it is not difficult to see that 
an equilibrium in the one-step game immediately leads to a stationary equi-
librium in the repeated game. Since the one-step game is simply a bima-
trix game it has an equilibrium (p,CT). Considering pas stationary stra-
tegy for player I in the repeated game and similarly a for player II, 
(p,CT) is an equilibrium consisting of stationary strategies in the repeated 
game. So we know that at least one equilibrium exists. 
But there is more to say. For repeated games there is the following 
remarkable theorem, which is known as the Folk-theorem. It is known al-
ready for many years, but it's authorship is obscure. The Folk-theorem : 
the Nash equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game are the feasible indivi-
dually rational payoff vectors in the one-step game. Feasible payoff vec-
tors are payoff vectors that can actually occur for some pair of strategies 
Observe that for repeated games a payoff vector (r 1 ,r2 ) is 
feasible it it is a convex comtination of payoff vectors to pairs of pure 
actions. 
It is individually rational if rk ~ gk, fork = 1,2, where gk is 
the value of the one-step k-zerosum game. The proof of this theorem is in 
principal quite simple. Having a feasible payoff vector (r1 ,r2 ) one can 
construct a sequence of pairs of pure actions (in,jn), n EN, such that the 
corresponding average payoff vector converges to (r 1 ,r2 ). Now n 1 = (i 1 ,i2 , 
... ) and n 2 = (j 1 ,j 2 , ... ) are pure Markov strategies for players I and II 
respectively, for which gk(n1 ,n2 J = rk fork= 1,2. Let Panda be opti-
mal mixed actions for player I and II respectively in the II-zerosum and the 
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I-zerosum game respectively. 
* n 1 for player I by: at stage n EN choose in 
k < n, else choose an action according top. 
Define 
if player II chose jk for all 
* Define n2 analogously by corn-
bining n2 and G. 
* * Then (TI 1 ITT2 ) is an equilibrium in the repeated game and for k = 1, 2 
* * gk(TI 1 ,n2 ) = (r1 ,r2 ). Suppose n2 is such that at some stage n player II 
does not choose j , whereas player I has chosen ik for all k < n, then 
* - n 
g2(TI1,TI2) ~ g2 ~ r2. 
So each player threatens to keep his opponents income below g in case of 
doing something else than the equilibrium strategy. Hence (g 1 ,g2 ) is 
known as the threat point. 
For more abnut repeated games we refer to Aumann (1981) and Sorin 
(1986-b). 
4.4. S-Discounted stochastic games 
As we have seen zerosum S-discount stochastic games can be solved by 
finding a solution to the Shapley equation, in which matrix games play an 
important role. In non-zerosum S-discount stochastic games stationary 
equilibria are related with equilibria in bimatrix games in the following 
way (cf. Vrieze (1983)) 
A pair of stationary strategies (p,G) with S-discounted rewards v~(p,a) 
and v~(p,G) to players I and II respectively is a S-discount equilibrium 
if and only if for each s 
game with payoff matrices 
ES (p ,a) is an equilibrium in the bimatrix 
s SS s s s 
M15<v1 (p,G)) and M2 s(v2 (p,G)) to players I and 
II respectively and with equilibrium payoff 
(v~(P,a),v~(P,G)). Here {s<v~(p,a)) is M~lv~(p,G)) for the k-zerosum 
game (cf. 3.3). 
This lemma tells us that finding a S-discount stationary equilibrium 
* * * * * * * * is equal to finding p = (pl ,p2, · · · ,pz)' a = (al ,a2, ... ,az ) and, for 
k 1,2, (xkl'xk2'"""'xkz) ER 
z 
= xk = such that for all s, p and a s s 
* s *t s *t 
xls PS Ml s 1xl)Gs ~ pMls(xl)Gs and 
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Note that for stationary strategiesp and a and k = 1,2 v~(p,o) is the 
unique solution of the system of z equalities x = p ~ (x)O . 
s s ks s 
Fink (1964) was the first to show that stationary B-discount equilibria 
do exist. Proofs of existence of S-discount stationary equilibria can al-
so be found in ';:'akahashi (1964), Rogers (1969) and Sobel (1971). All these 
proofs are based on one or another fixed point theorem. Fink and Rogers 
use the fixed point theorem of Kakutani (1941); Takahashi uses a fixed 
point theorem of Fan (1952) and Glicksberg (1952); Sobel uses the Brouwer 
fixed point theorem, and his proof goes along the lines of the proof of 
Nash for equilibria in bimatrix games (cf. 4.2). Rogers' proof is based 
* * on the idea that a pair of stationary strategies (p ,o ) is an equilibrium 
* * * if and only if p is a best answer for player I against a and a is a 
best answer for player II against 
- B -
of player II B1 (o) = {p v 1 (p,o) 
* p Define for 
B 
= mrfx v 1 (p,o)}, 
stationaYy strategies a 
the set of stationary 
best answers for player I against o. Similarly define B2 (p) for player II. 
* * Then a pair of strategies (p ,o 
* * * * if p E B1 (O ) and a E B 2 ( p). 
is a S-discount equilibrium if and only 
Now B1 x B2 : Y x X -> 2YXX where y resp. 
X is the set of stationary strategies of player II resp. I. Rogers shows 
that the Kakutani fixed point theorem can be applied, giving the existen-
ce of a S-discount stationary equilibrium. 
For an algorithm to actually compute B-discount stationary equilibria 
we refer to Breton et al. (1986), who extend work of Filar and Schultz 
(1986) on solving zerosum B-discount stochastic games with a special struc-
ture. The technique presented by Breton et al. can also be viewed as a 
natural consequence of a characterization of S-discount stationary equili-
bria by a system of linear inequalities, which is given in Sobel (1971). 
A characterization of S-discount stationary equilibria in terms of a so-
lution of a related nonlinear complementarity problem is given in Vrieze 
( 1983). 
4.5. Average stochastic games 
For average non-zerosum stochastic games it is well known that equi-
libria need not exist. Take for example (cf. 3.4) 
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1,0 
0, 1 0, 1 1,0 
(0, 1,0) ( 0, 0, 1) 
2 3 
However, it is still unknown whether or not average E-equilibria always 
exist. For many special classes of stochastic games, i.e. stochastic ga-
mes with special properties for the transitions or for the rewards, avera-
ge (E-)equilibria turned out to exist. In the light of the latest develop-
ments in this field it is likely that the question of existence of avera-
ge E-equilibria for general stochastic games can be shown in the near fu-
ture. 
In 4.6 we take a look at several special classes of stochastic games, 
for most of which it is known that they possess average E-equilibria. 
4.6. Special stochastic games 
4.6.1. Irreducible stochastic games 
A stochastic game is called irreducible if each pair of pure stationa-
ry strategies gives rise to an irreducible Markov chain, i.e. for all sta-
tes sand t the play will move from s tot with probability 1. 
Rogers (1969) was the first to examine games with this property and 
he was able to show that for these irreducible stochastic games average 
stationary equilibria do exist. He also showed that the irreducibility 
property could be weakened : if each pair of pure stationary strategies 
determines a Markov chain with a single ergodic subchain, then this im-
plies the existence of an average stationary equilibrium. His proof makes 
use of a generalisation of the Kakutani (1941) fixed point theorem. 
Rogers (1969) also proves that average stationary equilibria can be cha-
racterized by being part of a solution to a related non-linear programming 
problem. 
Stern (1975) was able to reduce the irreducibility condition some more. 
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He shows that average stationary equilibria exist in case there is a state 
* s in the stochastic game such that a play starting in any state s will 
* pass through s with positive probability. 
Further, Federgruen (1978) shows that average stationary equilibria 
exist under any of the following properties : 
i) there is some set of states A and some number N such that for all pairs 
of stationary strategies (p,cr) and any starting states the expected 
number of stages to get from s to A is at most N. 
ii) there is some number N such that, given states s and t and a stationa-
ry strategy p for player I there exists a stationary strategy cr for 
player II such that the expected number of stages to get from s to t 
under p and cr is at most N. 
Federgruen (1978) also shows that the average stationary equilibria can be 
found as limits of $-discount stationary equilibria for S tending to 1. 
In fact for each irreducible stochastic game any converging sequence of 
$-discount stationary equilibria, for S going to 1,leads to an average 
stationary equilibrium. 
4.6.2. Single-controller stoahastia games 
These are stochastic games in which one of the players controls the 
transitions, i.e. p(s,i,j) = p(s,j) for all s,i,j if player II is the con-
troller. Parthasarathy and Raghavan (1981) show that for these games 
average stationary strategies can be found as limits of converging sequen-
ces of $-discount stationary equilibria. Parthasarathy and Raghavan also 
show that single-controller stochastic games possess the ordered field 
property (cf. 2.7) in the $-discount as well as the average case. 
Filar (1984) shows that for single-controller stochastic games the set 
of average stationary equilibria can be constructed from a finite number 
of extreme equilibrium strategies for player I and a finite number of 
pseudo-extreme equilibrium strategies for player II, the controller of the 
game. The (pseudo-)extreme equilibrium strategies can be constructed by 
finite algorithms. 
Average equilibria, as well as $-discount equilibria, can be obtained, 
for these games, from an optimal solution of an appropriately constructed 
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quadratic program (cf. Filar (1986)). 
4.6.3. SER-SIT stochastic games 
SER-SIT stnchastic games are stochastic games with separable rewards, 
i.e. rk ( s, i, j) = ck (s) + rk (i, j) for all s,i,j and k = 1, 2' and state in-
dependent transitions, i.e. p<t I s,i,j) = p(t SI ,i' j) for all s,s' ,t E 
and all i,j. Here it is assumed without loss of generality that all ma-
trices Ms' s E S, have the same size. These games were introduced by 
Parthasarathy et al. (1984). They show that S-discount stationary equi-
libria, as well as average stationary equilibria, exist which correspond 
with equilibria in related bimatrix games. Those bimatrix games are 
z 
p(t I i,j)c 1 (t), z p(t I i,jJc2 <tJJ [r 1 (i,j) + s t~l r 2 (i, j) + s l: for the t=l 
S-discount case, and the same with s = 1 for the average case. 
For SER-SIT stochastic games a limit of S-discount stationary equilibria 
leads to an average stationary equilibrium. 
Furthermore SER-SIT stochastic games possess the ordered field pro-
perty and Parthasarathy et al. (1984) give examples that neither the SER 
property alone nor the SIT property alone guarantee that the ordered 
field property holds. 
4.6.4. ARAT stochastic games 
s 
Raghavan et al. (1985) examined ARAT stochastic games : stochastic 
games with additive rewards, i.e. rk(s,i,j) = rk(s,i) + rk(s,j), and 
additive transitions, Le. p(t I s,i,j) = p(t I s,i) + p(t I s,j), for all 
s,i,j and k = 1,2. For these games the existence of average €-equilibria 
is unknown but of course S-discount stationary equilibria do exist. 
Raghavan et al. (1985) show that always S-discount stationary equilibria 
exist for which each player in each state has to mix only two pure actions. 
An example is also given that this cannot be sharpened any further, pure 
S-discount stationary equilibria do not need to exist. 
ARAT stochastic games possess the ordered field property in the S-
discount case, and also in the average zerosum case. 
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4.6.5. Stoehastie games with one player controlling the reUJards 
These are stochastic games with rk(s,i,j) = rk(s,i) for all s,i,j 
and k = 1,2. Vrieze et al. (1985) show that for 6-discount games of this 
type with just two states the ordered field property holds. We sketch 
the proof. If player I fixes a stationary strategy p = (p1 ,p2 ) then 
player II faces a 6-discount Markov decision problem, 6-MDP(P), for which 
it is well known that player II has pure optimal stationary strategies. 
Let C( P1l denote the carrier of p1 , i.e. the set of actions on which p1 
puts positive weight, and C(P2 ) the carrier of p2 . For a stationary 
strategy o = (o 1 ,o2 ) of player II 6-MDP(O), cco1), cco2 ) have analogous 
meaning. Further let F 1 (c(p1) x C(P2 )) = {o all elements of C(p1 ) xccp2 J 
are optimal stationary strategies for player I in 6-MDP(O)}, and let 
F 2 (C(o 1J x C(o2 J) be defined analogously. Then a pair of stationary stra-
tegies (p,o) is a 6-discount equilibrium if and only if p E F 2 Ccco 1 ) x 
cco2 )) and o E F 1 (C(p1J x C(p2)). Vrieze et al. (1985) prove that in 
case all data of the game are rational, then F 1 (C(p1) x C(p2 )) is either 
empty or a polytope with rational extreme points and F 2 CcCo 1) x C(o2 )J is 
either empty or the union of at most three polytopes with rational extre-
me points. The existence of 6-discount stationary equilibria (cf. Fink 
(1964)) gives that there exist (P,O) with PE F2 (c(o1) x C(02 )) and 
a E Fl (C(Pl) x C(P2)). From this and the above remark on polytopes with 
rational extreme points, Vrieze et al. (1985) derive that there exists a 
* * rational 6-discount equilibrium (p ,a). 
4.6.6. Repeated games with absorbing states 
Zerosum stochastic games of this type have first been examined very 
thoroughly by Kohlberg (1974), who was able to applicably describe avera-
ge S-optimal behaviour strategies for any game of this type. His work 
was a big step forward in solving the problem of existence of average 
value and average s-optimal strategies. 
Sorin (1986a) examined a non-zerosum repeated game with absorbing 
states. Whereas for zerosum stochastic games g = lim(l-6) v 6 , the example 
of Sorin (1986a) shows that such a relation need Btl not hold for the 
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average Nash equilibrium payoffs and the S-discount Nash equilibrium 
payoffs (cf. 2.4.1); so the relation g-Nep 
hold. Hence, Sorin concludes that the 
lim( 1- Sl (S - Nep) need not 
Stl 
average game cannot be 
properly approximated by a S-discount game, for any SE (0,1). 
The work of Sorin (1986a) and Kohlberg (1974) inspired Vrieze and 
Thuijsman (1986) to investigate the class of non-zerosum repeated games 
with absorbing states. They succeeded in proving the existence of avera-
ge s-equilibria for these games. Like in the zerosum case behaviour stra-
tegies are indispensable and like in repeated games threats are of im-
portance to establish the average s-equilibria. Vrieze and Thuijsman 
(1986) show how an average s-equilibrium can be constructed from conver-
ging sequences of S-discount stationary equilibria. Not always by taking 
the limit; the way the transition probabilities change as S goes to 1, 
sometimes has to be used to construct a second strategy for one of the 
players. In some cases one of the players has to play the two limit 
strategies in a behavioural way to form an s-equilibrium with a certain 
strategy of the other player, and by making use of threats, which can 
also be of the behaviour type. 
5. THE BANKROBBERY GAME 
We give a solution for the game introduced in 2.2 
2,0 -/~o 
1,10 2,-1 1,0 -----
_,..-
/,,.- (1,0,0) i ,/{9/10' 1/10 ,0) ~=i (0,1,0) O,~ -- (0,0,1) 
2 3 
5.1. The I-zeroswn stochastic game 
We examine the zerosum stochastic game which rises if we only consi-
der the payoffs to player 
Denote the S-discount 
v~ = 2/(1- S) and v~ = 0. 
I, starting of with the S-discount game. 
value by (v~,v~,v~). Then it is clear that 
v~ can be computed from the Shapley equation 
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(cf. 3.3) 
r+ Sv~ val S 
+ S v 1 
1+(9/10) .S v~ 
1+(9/10) .S v~ + < 1/10) .2BI<1- B>j 
From this one can derive : v~ = (10-6 Sl/ ( (1- Sl (10-7 Sl). The unique 
S-discount stationary optimal ;;trategies are PS= CS/(10-7S),(10-8Sl/(10-7Sll 
for player I and GS= (S/(5-4Sl ,(5-5S)/(5-4Sll for player II. 
Knowing that the average value g = lim(l- SlvS (cf. 3.4) we get for 
St1 1 . S this game g = (4/3,2,0). We also note that p = lim P = (1/3,2/3) is 
an average optimal stationary strategy for player I Stl in the I-zerosum 
stochastic game. However G 1 lim GS = ( 1,0) is no average optimal statio-
nary strategy for player II in Stl the I-zerosum stochastic game. In fact 
player II has not even got an average E-optimal Markov strategy in the I-
zerosum game (for E small enough) . 
5.2. The II-zerosum stoahastic game 
This time we only look at the payoffs to player II, again starting 
with the S-discount stochastic game. 
-s -s -s The S-discount value of the II-zerosum game is denoted (v1 ,v2 ,v3 l. 
-s -s We immediately have v 2 = -1/(1-Sl and v 3 = 10/(1-Sl. Again 
-s v 1 can be obtained from the Shapley equation : 
-s [Sv~ 10+ (9/10) . Sv~ + ( 1/10). lOS/ ( 1-Sll 
v 1 = val -S -8 
Sv1 10+(9/10). Sv·1 + (1/10).(-S)/(1-S) 
This gives us : v~ 0 for S E (100/101,1). 
For SE (100/101,1) the unique S-discount optimal stationary strategy for 
player II is OS= (1,0). 
For player I and S E (100/101,1) any stationary strategy ~S in 
co{((101S-100)/11S,(100-90Sl/11SJ,(0,1)} is S-discount optimal. Here "co" 
denotes "convex hull of". 
-s For S = 100/101 : v 1 = O; for player II any stationary strategy in 
co{(l,0) ,(0,1)} is S-discount optimal, for player I (0,1) is the unique 
S-discount optimal stationary strategy. 
For S < 100/101: v~ = (100-101S)/((1-S)(10-9S)J; for player II, as well as 
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for player I, (0,1) is the unique S-discount optimal stationary strategy. 
-s The average value of the II-zerosum stochastic game is g = lim(l-S)v = 
(0,-1,10) . An average optimal stationary strategy for player S·t-1 II is 
-1 -1 
O = (1,0); any stationary strategyp Eco{(l/11,10/11),(0,1)} is average 
optimal for player I. 
5.3. The non-zerosum stochastic game 
Let us now look for equilibria. First of all in the S-discount sto-
chastic game. 
For S ~ 100/101 one can verify that ((0,1) ,(0,1)) is a S-discount sta-
tionary equilibrium corresponding with the S-Nep ( ( 10-86) /(( 1-S) ( 10-96)), 
(100-1016)/( (1-Sl (10-9Sl l l. 
For S > 100/101 the unique S-discount stationary 
with pS = ((101S-100SJ/11S,(100-90Sl/11Sl and 0 6 
the corresponding . s -s s s -s s S-Nep is (v1 (p ,o) ,v2 (p ,o )) 
·1ib . . (-s si equi rium is p ,O 
(6/ (5-46), (5-56) /(5-46)); 
( < 10-6Sl I ( ( 1-Sl ( 10-7Bl l,OJ= 
s s (vl ,v2). 
-1 Now, consider the limits p -s 1 s limp= (1/11,10/11) ,o = lim O = (1,0), 
Stl St1 
. s -s s s -s s lim(l-S)(v 1 (p ,O ),v2 (p ,O )) = (4/3,0). 
Stl 
Note that (4/3,0) (g 1 ,g2 ). 
-1 1 -1 1 g 1 (p ,o) = 12/11 < 4/3 = g 1 and g 2 (p ,o) = 0 = g 2 . 
-1 1 Hence (p ,O ) is no average stationary equilibrium; player I can do better 
1 
against o . 
-1 1 Observe that for (p ,o ) state 
is transient for all S < 1. 
-1 s is recurrent whereas for (p ,o ) state 
2 -1 2 -1 2 Also note that for O = (0,1) g 1 (p ,o ) = 20/11 > 4/3 and g 2 (p ,o ) = 0. 
* Let 0 be an average s-optimal behaviour strategy for player II in the 
following modified I-zerosum stochastic game. 
-1 1 
gl (p ,o ) . 
2+8/11 
(1,0,0) f<f/10 ,O, 1/ 10) 
1+8/11 1 ,. 
-1 2 Here 8/11 = g 1 (p ,O ) -
0 
( 1,0 ,0) --~/10,0) /,, .. ---- (0,1,0) ~~ ~ /,/ (0,0, 1) 
2 3 
1 S6 
* -1 O can be constructed such that when playing against p any play started 
in state 1 will move to 
Now one can verify that 
-1 * -1 * (gl (p ,o) ,g2(p ,o)) = 
state 2 or state 3 with probability 1. 
-1 * (p ,o) is an average £-equilibrium with g-Nep 
(20/11,0). 
For a general approach of how to construct average £-equilibria in 
non-zerosum repeated games with absorbing states, we refer to Vrieze and 
Thuijsman (1986). 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
With respect to non-zerosum stochastic games, as we defined them in 
the beginning of this chapter, there are sti].l a lot of topics which ask 
for further research. To solve the problem of existence of average £-
equilibria is just one of them. A lot of work could be done in finding 
suitable algorithms to compute (£-)equilibria in the S-discount as well as 
the average case. To compute the rewards if behaviour strategies are 
being used is also mostly a rather difficult task. There are much more 
of such questions. 
The survey given in this chapter is far from complete. Very little 
has been said about algorithmic aspects, or about characterizations of 
special types of equilibria (cf. Couwenbergh (1977), Groenewegen and 
Wessels (1979), Wessels (1981)). Also a lot of work has been done on non-
zerosum stochastic games other than with finite state and action spaces. 
Concerning such games we mention in alphabetic order Nowak (1985), 
Parthasarathy (1982), Parthasarathy and Raghavan (1975), Parthasarathy and 
Sinha (1986), Sobel (1973) and Tijs (1980). 
Finally we would like to refer to the survey papers of Parthasarathy 
and Stern (1977) and Raghavan (1984) which, beside dealing with a lot of 
aspects of stochastic games, have very comprehensive bibliographic lis-
tings. 
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CHAPTER VI 
FROM DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
TO GAME THEORY 
by Peter Wakker 
1. INTRODUCTION 
From a mathematical point of view many results from game theory and 
decision making under uncertainty are equivalent. An example is the cha-
racterization, as the class of "balanced" games, of the class of coopera-
tive games with side-payments which have nonempty core. This was found 
by Shapely (1967); earlier Bondareva (1963, in Russian) had obtained this 
result; see also Driessen (1985, section 2.8). In Huber (1981, Lemma 
10.2.2) the same result, obtained independently, is given for the context 
of decision making under uncertainty. Many other results have been for-
mulated for one of the two contexts, but seem to be as interesting when 
formulated for the other context. One such example, not elaborated in 
this paper, is the theory of "belief functions" of Shafer (1976), formu-
lated for the context of decision making under uncertainty. We think 
that notions such as the "degree of internal conflict" of a belief function, 
as developed by Shafer, are of utmost interest when studied for game 
theory. For a concise introduction into the basic concepts of Shafer's 
theory, see Zang (1986, section 1). 
This paper presents new approaches to several topics in game theory. 
The obtained results have in common that they have been derived, by simple 
translation algorithms, from results on probability theory and decision 
making under uncertainty. Section 5 will show how thj_s was done. Further 
in section 5 proofs will be indicated. 
The aim of this paper is to show the usefulness of the adopted trans-
lation algorithms. 
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2. ORDERING COALITIONS IN COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY 
First we present the basic definitions of the theory of cooperative 
games with side payments. Let N = {1, ... ,n} be a nonempty finite set of 
players, and 2N the set of coalitions. A function v : 2N ~lR with v(0) = 
0,S ~ T ~ v(S) ~ v(T), and v(N) = 1 is called characteristic function; the 
second (monotonicity) condition, and the third (normalizing) condition, 
are not generally assumed in literature, but for convenience will be assu-
med throughout this paper. The quantity v(S) may designate for instance 
the power, or earnings, or (negative) costs of a coalition S, or the num-
ber of publications of S in the International Journal of Game Theory; in 
this paper v(S) 
x = (x 1 , ... ,xn) 
assigning x. to 
J 
will be called the worth of the coalition s. An element 
ERn is an allocation, and is interpreted as a function, 
+ 
player j, for all j. 
ning 0 and all positive real numbers. 
In this paperlR+ is the set contai-
The quantity x. may for instance 
J n 
stand for money. If Z. 1x. J= J = v(N), x may be interpreted as a division of 
the worth of the "grand" coalition { 1, ... ,n}, and x is called efficient. 
A central question in the theory of cooperative games with side payments is 
the question which efficient allocation is "fair" for a characteristic 
function v. The usual procedure to determine this is to compare the amount 
x(S) := Z.E x., allocated to the coalition S, with the worth v(S) of the J s J 
coalition S, and,for instance, to take as a criterion that every x(S) 
should be at least as large as the worth of the coalition. In that case 
x is called a core allocation. 
This paper will propose criterions of a different character. The idea 
of our criterions will be that the central notions to be considered are 
the orderings of coalitions as induced by the worths and allocations, and 
not the worths and allocations themselves. As an example where this may 
be natural think of the many cases, e.g. in politics, where an (inefficient) 
allocation (5,5, ... ,5) over a set of persons with equal worth is preferred 
over an allocation (6,7,6,7, ... ), simply because the second allocation would 
induce "unjust" inequalities, and tensions. As a second example think of 
definitions of wealth which say that a person is rich if she (or he) belongs 
to the 20 percent of most wealthy persons in her country. Again it is the 
ordering induced by allocated money which is relevant, not the absolute 
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amounts of money. 
Let us now consider some criteria of the new kind. They all express 
the idea that more worthy coalitions should get allocated more. 
DEFINITIONS 2.1. An allocation x is 
Almost agreeing with v if, for all coalitions S,T, 
[v(S) ~ v(T) ~ x(S) ~ x(T)]; 
Strictly agreeing with v if, for all coalitions s,T, 
[v(S) > v(T) ~ x(S) > x(T)]; 
Agreeing with v if, for ~ll coalitions S,T, 
[v(S) ;;-; v(T) <'* x(S) ~ x(T)]. 
The first criterion above might be called "socialistic" since it allows 
for the occurrence of coalitions S,T with x(S) = x(T) while v(S) > v(T), 
whereas v(S) = v(T) will always imply x(S) = x(T); thus equality is in-
creased by it. The second criterion might be called "capitalistic" since 
it allows for the occurrence of coalitions S,T with x(S) > x(T) while 
v(S) = v(T), whereas v(S) > v(T) will always imply x(S) > x(T). Obviously 
an allocation is agreeing if and only if it is both strictly agreeing and 
almost agreeing. Also one elementarily verifies that x is almost agreeing 
with v if and only if, for all coalitions S,T, [x(S) > x(T) ~ v(S) > v(T)], 
and strictly agreeing with v if and only if for all coalitions S,T, 
[x(S) ;;-; x(T) ~ v(S) ~ v(T)]. 
It will be observed that not for every characteristic function v there 
exist agreeing allocations x. For example let N = {1,2,3}, and let v 
assign 1/3 to every one-player coalition, 1/2 to {1,2}, and 2/3 to every 
other two-player coalition. Then, to be agreeing, x will have to assign the 
same to every one-player coalition, which will imply x{1,2} = x{2,3};however 
v{l,2} < v{2,3} should imply x{l,2} < x{2,3}. The characteristic function 
just described does not satisfy the following condition (set S = {1}, 
T = {3}, V = {2} in the definition below): 
DEFINITION 2.2. The characteristic function v is ordinally additive if, 
for all coalitions S,T,V with S n V = 0 = T n V : 
v(S) ;;-; v(T) <'* v(S U V) ;;-; v(T U V). 
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It is straightforwardly verified that this condition is necessary for the 
existence of an agreeing allocation. Still, it turns out not to be suffi-
cient, as the following example shows. 
EXAMPLE 2.3. (Kraft, Pratt & Seidenberg). Let N = {1,2,3,4,5}, and let 
v(0) 0, v{l} = 2/32, v{2} = 3/32, v{3} = 4/32, v{l,2} = 5/32, v{l,3} = 6/32, 
v{4} 7/32, v{l,4} = 8/32, v{2,3} = 9/32, v{5} = 10/32, v{l,2,3} = 11/32, 
v{2,4} = 12/32, v{3,4} = 13/32, v{l,5} = 14/32, v{1,2,4} 15/32, v{2,5} = 
16/32, v{1,3,4} 17/32, v{3,5} 18/32, v{2,3,4} = 19/32, v{1,2,5} = 20/32, 
v{1,3,5} 21/32, v{4,5} = 22/32, v{1,2,3,4} = 23/32, v{1,4,5} = 24/32, 
v{2,3,5} 25/32, v{1,2,3,5} = 26/32, v{2,4,5} = 27/32, v{3,4,5} 28/32, 
v{1,2,4,5} = 29/32, v{1,3,4,5} = 30/32, v{2,3,4,5} = 31/32, v(N) 1. 
It is straightforwardly checked that this v is a characteristic function 
which satisfies ordinal additivity. Still, no agreeing allocation x 
exists since the inequalities x{l} + x{3} < x{4}, x{l} + x{4} < x{2} +x{3}, 
x{3} + x{4} < x{l} + x{5}, x{2} + x{5} < x{1} + x{3} + x{4}, when added up, 
reveal a contradiction. 
In the above example there does exist an almost agreeing efficient 
allocation, viz. (1/16,2/16,3/16,4/16,6/16). There do exist characteristic 
functions for which no almost agreeing efficient allocation exists, and 
characteristic functions for which no strictly agreeing allocation exists, 
whereas these characteristic functions do satisfy ordinal additivity. 
Further it can be seen that for all cooperative games with side payments 
with less than five players, ordinal additivity is sufficient for the 
existence of agreeing allocations. For all cooperative games with side 
payments with less than six players ordinal additivity is sufficient for 
the existence of an almost agreeing efficient allocation. The reader may 
want to check these facts by writing a computer program on his personal 
computer which checks all cases. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the seve-
ral kinds of agreeing allocations can be obtained by standard applications 
of theorems of the alternative, (see for instance Scott, 1964), and are as 
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follows, with x ~~ y if xj ~ yj for all j,x >> y if xj > yj for all j, 
and x > y if x. ~ y. for all j, and x ~ y. 
J J 
THEOREMS 2.4. There exists an almost agreeing efficient allocation if and 
only if: For every pair of sequences of coalitions cs 1 , .•. ,sn) and 
(T 1, ••• ,Tn) for which every player occurs in more coalitions in the left 
sequence than in the right 
(2 .1) 
There exists a strictly agreeing efficient allocation if and 
only if: For every pair of sequences of coalitions (s 1 , ... ,Sn) and 
(T 1 , ... ,Tnl for which every player occurs in at least as many coalitions in 
the left sequence as in the right 
(2 .2) 
There exists an agreeing efficient allocation if and only 
if: For every pair of sequences of coalitions (s 1 , ... ,sn) and (T 1 , ... ,Tnl 
for which every player occurs in the same number of coalitions in the left 
sequence as in the right 
(2 .3) 
D 
Obviously the third condition in the theorem has to imply ordinal additivity 
of v. Note that the only property of v, used in our analysis, has been the 
way v orders the coalitions. Thus we might also have taken an ordering of 
the coalitions, instead of v, as primitive in our analysis. Note that 
without the efficiency restriction there always exists an almost agreeing 
allocation: (0, ... ,0). For agreeing allocations, and strictly agreeing 
allocations, v{l, ... ,n} is positive, so x can always be normalized, and 
the requirement of efficiency in the above theorem does not induce any 
restriction, so might have been omitted. 
We end this section with a conjecture there exists a characteristic 
function which is ordinally additive, which has both an almost agreeing 
and a strictly agreeing allocation but no agreeing one. 
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3. BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS 
Let n EJN be fixed, n ~ 3. Let E EN be fixed, and let 
n d = (d1 , .•• ,dn) EN0 . Eis an amount of money, to be divided among n 
players (or claimants) 1, .•. ,n where each player j has advanced a claim 
of d. • For any d, by d we denote the total amount L: d. of claims. A J + . J division rule f : N~ -+ JRn is a function which assigns to every claim 
d = (d1, •.• ,dn) a sequence of proportions (f1 (d), •.. ,fn (d)), with fj (d) ~ 0 
for all j, and L: f. (d) = 1, such that player j will receive a portion J 
f. (d) x 
J 
E of the amount E. Obviously one might think of other interpreta-
tions, e.g. where d. reflects the salary of a person j, and f.(d) the tax J J 
which the person is to pay; also d. may stand for investment, one-player-) 
coalition-worth, etc. Our set-up differs from the usual set-ups such as 
Aumann, R.J. & M.Maschler (1985), Moulin (1985a,b), Curiel, I., M. Maschler 
& S.H. Tijs (1986), and Young (1987) in considering only natural numbers 
as claims (and amounts) to be divided, and in leaving out of the analysis 
variability of the amount E to be divided. 
We shall now proceed to consider some conditions for division rules. 
DEFINITION 3.1. We call f monotone if, for all i and d 
fi (d1 , ... ,di+l, •.• ,dn) > fi (d1 , •.. ,di, .•• ,dn). 
So if a player can increase her (or his) claim, it will give her a larger 
portion of the amount E. 
DEFINITION 3.2. We call a player i uninvolved for the division rule f if, 
for all j ~ i ~ k, and all d : 
f.(dl, ... ,d.+1, ... ,dk, ... ,d) 
i J n f. (d1 I••• ,d. r • • • ,d +1, • • • ,d ) • i J -k n 
So if a player i is uninvolved, she has no interest in a replacement of part 
of the claim of player j to another player k. Her proportion fi(d) will 
depend only on her own claim di and the total claim (d+ - di) of the other 
players, as is easily verified. It protects player i against a manipula-
tion of the remaining players to increase the sum of their shares by re-
distributing amongst each other the sum of their claims. Moulin (1985a) 
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introduced the condition that all players shall be uninvolved in a related 
context and called it "No Advantageous Reallocation". 
DEFINITION 3.3. we call a pair of players i,j proportionally uninvolved 
if, for all ii k i j : 
where one denominator being zero is to imply that the other denominator 
is zero too; in the presence of monotonicity that can only happen if d. 0. 
J 
So then the proportion of the portions that player i and j receive 
from E depends only on di and dj, and is independent of the other claims. 
This condition is somewhat stronger (in also restricting f./f. if f. +f. 
l J l J 
varies) than the consistency property as introduced in Kolm (1976, in a 
context with varying number of players and nonrational claims and amounts 
E); see also the consistency condition in Moulin (1985b). Now we charac-
terize the division rules with the above properties. 
THEOREM 3.4. For a division rule f the following two statements are 
equivalent 
(i) There exist nonnegative constants y 1 , ... ,yn, summing to one, and a 
nonnegative constant A, such that for all i : 
f. 
l 
d i-. (AY i + di) 
(/. + d) 
(ii) The division rule f satisfies monotonicity, every player is uninvol-
ved, and every pair of players is proportionally uninvolved. 
Note that f. as in (i) above can be considered to be a convex combination 
l 
D 
of the amount Yi that player i would receive if no player would have clai-
med anything, and di/d+,the share of the total amount of claims that has 
been advanced by player i, with weights respectively A and d+. An indica-
tion of a full proof is provided in subsection 5.2. Let us just sketch 
here a way of proof. It is straightforward that statement (i) above im-
plies (ii). So we assume (ii), and derive (i). First one determines the 
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constants y 1 , ... ,yn as f 1 (0, ... ,0), ... ,fn(0, ... ,0). Next one calculates 
;\from f 1 (1,0, ... ,0) (Ay 1 + 1)/(;\ + 1). Note that the division rule as 
defined in (i) above is one division rule with the mentioned values 
f 1 (0, ... ,0), ... ,fn(0, ... ,0) and f 1 (1,0, ... ,0), satisfying all conditions 
of (ii) . Finally the most involved part of the proof is to demonstrate 
that the above-mentioned values off, together with the mentioned condi-
tions, uniquely determine all values f(d) with d+ 1, next those with 
d+ = 2; by induction with respect to d+, the uniqueness of f (d) follows 
for all d. In this the monotonicity condition serves to prevent that 
certain equalities will reduce to the trivial 0 = 0. 
4. BETTER AND WORSE ALLOCATIONS 
As in the previous sections, we consider in this section the question 
of how to choose between several possible allocations (x 1 , ... ,xn) over n 
players. And, as in section 2, a characteristic function v will occur in 
our analysis. Still the approach of this section will be different, and 
in Theorem 4.2 the status of observability of v will differ from the usual 
set-up in the theory of cooperative games with side payments. 
Let us first sketch the approach by means of "Choquet integrals" , cen-
tral for this section. For simplicity of exposition we shall assume that 
an arbitrator will finally decide which of a set of available allocations 
to choose. 
4.1. The choquet-integraZ-approach 
The approach of this subsection will be split up in six stages. 
Stage 1. The arbitrator concentrates for a moment on one available allo-
cation x. 
Stage 2. For this allocation x, the arbitrator takes a permutation TI on 
1, ... ,n such that : xTI(l) ~ xTI( 2 ) ~ ... ~ xTI{n). So TI(l) is the richest 
player under allocation x, TI(2) the one-after-the-richest-player, etc. 
Note that we have not specified the way in which equally-rich players are 
to be ordered according to TI. They may be ordered in any arbitrary way, 
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the approach sketched in the sequel will be such that this ordering is 
immaterial. 
Stage 3. The players will enter, one by one, a room where the arbitrator 
is. First the richest player TI(l) enters, then TI(2), etc. 
Step 3.1. After entrance of p1ayer TI(l) the arbitrator pays to TI(l) the 
amount xTI(l) - xTI( 2 ) that TI(l) receives more than player n(2). 
Step 3.2. Next player TI(2) enters the room, and the arbitrator pays to 
{TI(l),TI(2)} the amount xTI( 2 ) - xTI( 3 ) that TI(l) and TI(2) still are to re-
ceive more than player n(3). 
Step 3.i. Next player TI(i) enters the room, and the arbitrator pays to 
the present players TI(l) , ... ,TI(i) the amount xTI(i) - xTI(i+l) that the 
present players still are to receive more than player n(i+'I). 
Step 3 .n. Finally player TI (n) enters, all players are present now, and 
get payed the remaining amount xn(n)' 
Stage 4. Now that the payment in stage 3 has been fixed for every step, 
at every step the payment is valued by its product with the worth of the 
involved group of players. 
Stage 5. The allocation x is valued by adding up all valuations of Stage 
4, to give, with xTI(n+l) := 0 
L:i~l[(xTI(i) - XTI(i+l)) x v{TI(l) , ... ,TI(i)}] (4 .1) 
If we consider an allocation x as a function, assigning xj to every player 
j, then the value in (4.1) is the Choquet integral of x with respect to 
the characteristic function v, see for instance Wakker (1986a, formula 
VI.2 .5). Indeed, if v happens to be "additive", then (4 .1) reduces to 
the usual integral. 
Stage 6. For all available allocations a valuation is determined as it 
was for x above. Then the allocation with maximal valuation is chosen. 
If there are more allocations where the maximal valuation is attained, 
from these an arbitrary choice is made. If the supremum value of the 
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valuations is not attained by any allocation, then some allocation is cho-
sen which is close enough to the supremum in some sense. If the set of 
available allocations is compact, then the maximum will always be attained 
for some allocation. 
4.2. A characterization by ordering allocations 
In this section we characterize the approach of subsection 4.1. The 
method of characterization will differ from that of section 2. In this 
section we assume that the arbitrator takes a binary ("preference") rela-
tion~ on Rn, the set of all allocations. Here x ~ y means that the arbi-
+ 
trator would be willing to choose x if only x and y were available, i.e. 
she (or he) considers x at least as good as y. Next we consider conditions 
which will characterize the approach of subsection 4.1. 
The binary relation ~ is a weak order if it is complete (i.e. for all 
x,y in Rn 
+ 
x ~ y or y 
x ~ y and y ~ z then x 
~ x) and transitive (i.e. for all x,y,z inR:: if 
z). As usual we write x > y if x ~ y and not 
y ~ x, x ~ y if x ~ y and y 2 x, x S y if y 2 x, and x < y if y > x. Fur-
ther is strictly monotonic if, for all allocations x ,y, [x > y '* x > y], 
and 2 is continuous if, for all allocations y, the sets 
{x ERn: x ~ y} and {x ERn : x ~ y} are closed. 
+ + 
We call a pair of allocations x,y comonotonic if for no players i,j 
simultaneously x. > x. and y. > yi·· This is exactly the case where in 
l J J 
Stage 2 of subsection 4.1 there can be chosen a same permutation TI for x 
and y, see Wakker (1986a, Lemma VI.3.5, (i) ~(iii)). A set of allocations 
is comonotonic if every pair of allocations in the set is comonotonic. 
The main characterizing condition will be : 
DEFINITION 4.1. The binary relation ~ satisfies comonotonic independence 
if for all comonotonic x,y,z and a E (0,1) we have : 
[x > y =<> ax + (1- a) z > ay + ( 1- a) z]. 
With this we get 
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THEOREM 4.2. For the binary relation~ on the set of allocations the 
following two statements are equivalent 
(i) There exists a characteristic function v such that, for all 
allocations x,y, x ~ y if and only if the Choquet integral of x is at 
least as large as that of y. 
(ii) The binary relation ~ is a continuous strictly monotonic weak order 
which satisfies comonotonic independence. 
Furthermore the characteristic function v is uniquely determined. D 
So, if the approach of subsection 4.1 applies, then ~ satisfies the 
conditions mentioned in statement (ii) above, and reversedly, if ~ satis-
fies the conditions in statement (ii) above, then there exists a charac-
teristic function v such that by means of this the approach of subsection 
4.1 applies. The implication (ii) => (i) above is mainly interesting in 
contexts where the characteristic function v is not easily available. As 
an example think of the case where players are ministers in a government, 
who during some years have been choosing among allocations of money over 
their departments. From their choices we can reveal "group preferences" of 
the form x ~ y; if these preferences satisfy the conditions in statement 
(ii) above, then according to the above theorem we can derive from the 
choices of the ministers the characteristic function v. Then for any 
group S of ministers v(S) can be interpreted as an index for the power of 
this group of ministers. 
5. THE RECIPE FOR THE ABOVE RESULTS, AND LITERATURE 
The results presented in the previous sections were simple translations 
of results, formulated before in literature for decision making under un-
certainty. The following translation has been involved everywhere : 
Replace state of nature by player. (5 .1) 
5.1. The translation algorithm of section 2 
In section 2 we translated results from a field of decision making under 
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uncertainty which goes under the heading of "comparative probability theory". 
In comparative probability theory one considers a "more probable than" re-
lation~ on subsets (events) of the state space {1, ... ,n}, and one searches 
for a probability measure agreeing in some way with the more-probable-than 
relation. So, besides the already mentioned translations, the following 
translations are involved : 
Replace event by coalition 
Replace S is more probable than T by the worth of S is higher-
than that of T 
Replace probability by allocation. 
(5 .2) 
(5 .3) 
(5 .4) 
The condition of ordinal additivity has been introduced by de Finetti 
(1931). For a long time it was not known whether this condition would 
suffice, in presence of some "natural" presumptions, to guarantee the 
existence of an agreeing allocation/probability measure, see for instance 
Savage (1954, page 40/41). The matter was settled by Kraft, Pratt & 
Seidenberg (1959), who provided the Example 2.3, and gave the necessary 
and sufficient condition of (2.3). Their work used an algebraic notation 
which may not be easily accessible for every reader. Later Scott (1964) 
sketched a general procedure to use theorems of the alternative or sepa-
rating hyperplane theorems to solve inequalities such as those involved 
in section 2, for finite state/player spaces. Since then, the conditions 
as in Theorem 2.4 are well-known. Jaffray (1974a,b) gave a more general 
approach by which also inequalities for infinite state/player spaces can 
be solved; by means of this technique Chateauneuf (1985) obtained nece-
ssary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an agreeing probabi-
lity measure/allocation for general state/player spaces. The author of 
this paper studied the topic in Wakker (1979) and Wakker (1981), mainly 
for infinite state/player spaces. In Wakker (1981, Theorem 4) it was 
indicated that, with ordinal additivity presupposed, the characterization 
of almost agreement in Theorem 2.4 also holds for infinite state/player 
spaces. Also Gilboa (1985) considered questions of this nature; in his 
work a nonadditive characteristic function was interpreted as a distortion 
of an additive probability measure. A recent and complete overview of 
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comparative probability theory is provided in Fishburn (1986). 
5.2. The translation algorithm of section 3 
The results of section 3 were obtained by translating work of Carnap 
on inductive reasoning, see Carnap (1962), Carnap & Jeffrey (1971), Fine 
(1973, section VII.D), Stegmuller (1973), Koerts & De Leede (1973), or 
Zabell (1981). As an example let us suppose that a die has been thrown 
several times. In this subsection 1, ... ,n are the sides of the die; 
after every throw exactly one side ("state of nature") will come up. 
Further: d = (d 1 , ... ,dn) describes the number of times that the several 
sides have been observed after d throws. And f.(d) designates the con-
+ J 
ditional subjective probability (Carnap preferred the interpretation as 
logical probability) that the (d+ + 1)-th throw will give side j up, given 
the result of the previous throws. So the following translations are in-
volved : 
Replace claim of player j by number of previously observed oc-
currences of side j of the die 
Replace proportion for player jby conditional probability for 
side j of the die 
(5 .5) 
(5.6) 
Like us, Carnap assumed monotonicity; so a new observation of a side of 
the die makes a next occurrence of this side more probable. And like us, 
Carnap assumed uninvolvedness of every side/player. Instead of our pro-
portional uninvolvedness Carnap assumed "exchangeability", i.e. the pro-
bability of a sequence of outcomes depends only on the number of occurren-
ces of the several sides of the die, and is independent of the particular 
order in which these sides occurred. This is equivalent to the equality, 
for all d,i,j : 
f. (dl, ... ,d. , ... ,d., .•. ,d) x f.(dl, ... ,d.+1, ... ,d., ... ,d) = 
i i J n J i J n 
f, (d 1 I.•. ,d, f ••• ,d, f • •• ,d ) X f, (d1 ' .. • ,d, f • •. • ,d, +1, •. 0 1 d ) f J i J n i i J n 
since the left-side gives the conditional probability that, given d, first 
side i will come up, next side j, whereas the right-side deals with the 
reversed order of occurrence of i and j. 
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In the presence of the other conditions, exchangeability is equivalent to 
proportional uninvolvedness of every pair i,j. Let us only show the deri-
vation of exchangeability from proportional uninvolvedness, plus uninvol-
vedness. For any k such that i f k f j (such a k exists since n ~ 3) 
f.(dl, .. ,d., .. ,d.,.,d) 
i i J n fk(dl, .. ,d. , .. ,d., .,d) i J n 
f.(dl,. .. ,d,, .. ,d.+1, .. ,d) 
i i J n 
fk(dl, .. ,d., .. ,d.+1, .. ,d) 
i J n 
fk(d1, .. ,d., .. ,d .. ,d) 
i J' n 
f.(dl, .. ,d., .. ,d., .. ,d) 
J i J n 
fk(dl, .. ,d.+1, .. ,d,, .. ,d) 
i J n f.(dl, .. ,d.+1, .. ,d., .. ,d) J i J n 
where the first equality follows from proportional uninvolvedness of i,k, 
the second from uninvolvedness of k, and the third from proportional unin-
volvedness of j and k. The equality of the first and fourth quotient im-
ply the equality given above as an equivalent of exchangeability. 
Carnap showed that his conditions are equivalent to statement (i) in 
Theorem 3.4 (see for instance Zabell, 1981). This, together with the just 
derived observations, gives an alternative proof for our Theorem 3.4. 
The author studied Carnap's work for its applicability in probability cal-
culations for the protection of statistical data files against anonimity 
disclosure, see Wakker (1986b). 
5.3. The translation algorithm of section 3 
The work of section 3 was obtained by translating work of Schmeidler 
for decision ~aking under uncertainty, see Schmeidler (1984a,b,c). As an 
example, suppose a horse race will be held. There will participate n num-
bered horses, j is the "state of nature" that horse j will win. An act 
x EJR: is a function from the states of nature toJR+' interpreted as an 
investment (or bet, or whatever) that will result in a net gain of x. if 
J 
horse j will win. Now ~ denotes the preference relation of a decision 
maker over the set of acts,x ~ y meaning that the decision maker considers 
x to be at least as good as y. The characteristic function vis now in-
terpreted as a nonadditive subjective probability measure for the decision 
maker; the higher v(S), where now S is an event, the more probable S is 
considered to be by the decision maker. So now the following translations 
are involved : 
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Replace event ey coalition 
Replace arbitrator )2y_ decision maker 
Replace allocation by act 
Replace characteristic function by subjective nonadditive 
probability 
(5. 7) 
(5.8) 
(5 .9) 
(5.10) 
Schmeidler (1984a) showed the equivalence of statements (i) and (ii) in 
Theorem 4.2 in a slightly different context; in his work payment was not in 
money, as in section 4 above, but in lotteries over some set. The genera-
lization of Schmeidler's work to the case where payment is in terms of 
elements of a "mixture space" (see for instance wakker, 1986 a, Definition 
VII.2) is completely straightforward. One example of mixture spaces is 
the case of sets of lotteries over another set, as in Schmeidler's work; 
another example is R+' as in section 4 above. Hence in a mathematical 
sense Theorem 4.2 is completely analogous to Schmeidler (1984a, The Theorem). 
The author made use of Schmeidler's work on nonadditive probabilities in 
Wakker (1986a, Chapter VI). 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper is based on the observation that the same mathematical 
structure is underlying many problems in decision making under uncertainty 
and in game theory. By simple translations, mainly by interchanging 
"state of nature" and "player", many results derived for decision making 
under uncertainty and game theory can be interchanged. This paper gave 
some examples. Admittedly, sometimes, such as in Definition 3.3, a minimal 
amount of creativity was needed. Still, an author in lack of inspiration, 
but in need of publications, may succeed with the following algorithm : 
Take any theorems from a journal dealing with the topic of game theory, or 
probability theory/decision making under uncertainty. 
Carry out the translations as described in this paper. 
Send the resulting theorems to a journal dealing with the other topic than 
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the original journal. 
Do not refer to the original journal. 
Do not refer to this paper. 
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CHAPTER VI I 
THE CORE 
BOUNDS 
OF A 
AND 
COOPERATIVE GAME 
CHARACTERIZATIONS 
by Theo Driessen 
1. A COOPERATIVE GAME IN CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION FORM 
Thi.s chapter is devoted to cooperative games in characteristic func-
tion form and the core concept for these games. In particular, we de-
velop a theory concerning the relationship between the core and certain 
core catchers which are based on upper or lower bounds for the core. 
Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the core catchers in 
question to coincide with the core. 
The notion of a cooperative game in characteristic function form re-
presents a mathematical model of a situation in which cooperation and 
side payments between the participants are allowed. In terms of costs, 
two or more participants in a multipurpose project can profit by cooper-
ation because they can combine their plans with respect to common purpo-
ses in order to save expenses. Let N = {1,2, ... ,n} be the set of all n 
participants who are supposed to cooperate in the undertaking of a joint 
project. For any nonempty subset S of participants, let c(S) be the 
least cost of undertaking a similar joint venture which is designed sole-
ly for the purposes of the subset S. So, the above cooperative situation 
in which n participants are involved, generates a cost function c: 2N ~lR 
where the cost of the empty set 0 is zero, i.e., we put c(0) := 0. 
Clearly, the various possibilities to meet the purposes of the union of 
two disjoint nonempty subsets S and T include the possibility to meet the 
purposes of S alone and T alone. As a consequence, the cost function 
c: 2N ~lR possesses the following property : 
c(S U T) ~ c(S) + c(T) 
for all S,T c N with S n T 0. 
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This property of the cost function c is known as the subadditivity of c. 
The cost savings which are due to the cooperation between all the par-
ticipants instead of acting alone are given by L c({j}) - c(N). The 
'EN 
subadditivity of the cost function c guarantees] that these cost sav-
ings of the set N of all participants are indeed nonnegative. Now the 
basic problem is to allocate these cost savings to the participants in 
an equitable and justifiable way. Usually, the proposed allocations of 
the total cost savings are to a greater or lesser extent based on the 
cost savings L c({j}) - c(S) of all nonempty subsets S of participants. 
'Es Thus, the J above cooperative situation in terms of costs gives 
rise to a cost savings function v: 2N ~R given by v(0) 0 and 
v(S) := L c({j}) - c(S) 
jE s 
for all s c N, s ~ 0. 
The subadditivity of the cost function c implies the nonnegativity (i.e., 
v(S) ~ 0 for all s c N) as well as the superadditivity of the associated 
cost savings function v, i.e., 
v(S U T) ~ v(S) + v(T) ( 1.1) 
for all S,T c N with S n T 
The superadditivity condition (1.1) expresses that it is advantageous 
(with respect to the cost savings) for any two disjoint subsets of par-
ticipants to form their union. Moreover, the cost savings function v on 
2N is said to be zero-normalized because v({i}) = 0 for all i EN. The 
ordered pair (N;v) itself is called a cooperative savings game. 
DEFINITION. Let n EN where n ~ 2. A cooperative n-person game in 
characteristic function form is an ordered pair (N;v) where N := {1,2, ... ,n} 
and v: 2N ~Risa real-valued function on the set 2N of all subsets of N. 
Any subset S of the player set N (notation : s c N) is called a coali·tion 
and the worth v(S) of the coalition S in the game (N;v) represents the 
savings which can be achieved by cooperation solely between the members 
of the coalition S. For mathematical convenience, the savings of the 
182 
empty coalition 0 are zero, i.e., we always put v(0) := 0. In the gener-
al model, no other conditions are required to be satisfied by the so-
called characteristic function v and hence, it may happen that the char-
acteristic function v does not satisfy the superadditivity condition (1.1). 
As usual, we identify a cooperative game (N;v) with its characteristic 
function v: 2N -+JR. 
In order to elucidate the notion of a cooperative game in character-
istic function form, we consider a production economy consisting of n 
traders who can increase the number of units of produced goods by cooper-
ation. various raw materials are needed to produce the goods concerned 
and each trader initially holds several units of the raw materials in 
question. The production process is supposed to be linear and each unit 
of a produced good can be sold at some net profit. 
This economic situation can now be modelled as a cooperative n-person 
game (N;v) in characteristic function form where its player set N consists 
of the n traders and its characteristic function v is precisely the total 
net profit function. That is, the worth v(S) of a nonempty coalition S 
in the game (N;v) represents the largest possible monetary value of the 
goods produced by cooperation solely between the traders in the coalition 
S. Notice that the characteristic function v so defined must be super-
additive. 
The above cooperative game is known as the linear production game (Owen, 
1975). We conclude this first section with three examples of linear 
production games. These three examples will also be used to illustrate 
the theory developed in the sequel. 
EXAMPLE 1.1. Let the linear production economy consist of three traders 
and three raw materials where the i-th trader merely holds one unit of 
the i-th raw material M., 1 ~ i ~ 3. One unit of the first (second re-
l. 
spectively) good requires one unit of the first (second) and third raw 
material, whereas the second good G2 is twice as valuable as the first 
good G1 . So, the production process has the form 
aM1 + aM3 .... aG1 (a E JN), 
i3M2 + i3M3 .... i3G2 <i3 EN) . 
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Let (N;v) be the associated linear production game and in addition, let 
(N;w) be the linear production game generated by the above linear produc-
tion economy in which the third trader holds two units (instead of one 
unit) of the third raw material. Then the 3-person games v and ware 
given by N 
v({ i}) 
v({l ,3}) 
{1,2,3} and 
0 for all i E N, 
1 , 
v({ 1,2}) 
v({ 1,2 ,3}) 
0, 
2, 
w({l,2,3}) = 3 
v({2 ,3}) 
and w(S) v(S) for all S c N, S i N. 
EXAMPLE 1.2. Let the linear production process with three raw materials 
M1 , M2 , M3 and two goods G1 , 
aM 1 + aM2 + aM3 4 aG 1 
SMl + SM2 + 2SM3 4 SG2 
G2 be described by 
(a E JN), 
(S E :N) • 
Further, the second good G2 is twice as valuable as the first good G1 . 
The raw material bundles of the three traders are as follows 
(0, 1, 2), ( 1, 0, 1) and ( 1, 1 , 0) respectively. 
Then the associated linear production game v is given by 
v({i}) = 0 
v({1,2}) 
for all i E N, v({2 ,3}) 
v({1,3}) = 2 and v ( { 1 , 2, 3}) 
1 , 
3. 
EXAMPLE 1.3. Consider the linear production economy consisting of three 
traders and three raw materials M1 , M2 , M3 which are needed in equal 
quantities to produce the unique good G. Thus, the production process is 
described by 
(a E JN). 
A unit of the good G can be sold at a net profit of one unit of money. 
Further, the raw material bundles of the three traders are as follows : 
(1,0 ,0)' ( 1, 2, 1) and (1, 1 ,2) respectively. 
Then the associated linear production game w is given by 
w({l}) = O, 
w({2,3}) = 2 
w({2}) = w({3}) = w({1,2}) = w({l,3}) 
and w ( { 1 , 2 , 3}) = 3 . 
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1 , 
2. THE CORE OF A COOPERATIVE GAME 
Since the introduction of the notion of a cooperative game in charac-
teristic function form (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, page 240), 
many solution concepts for these games have been proposed. A solution 
concept prescribes for any game (N;v) either no or at least one distri-
bution of the total savings v(N) of the grand coalition N among the 
players. A distribution of the amount v(N) among the players in an n-
person game (N;v) is represented 
numbers satisfying the so-called 
by an n-tuple x = (x 1 ,x2 , ... ,xn) of 
efficiency condition Z x. = v(N). 
Here the i-th component xi is interpreted as the 
jE N J 
real 
monetary award to player i EN according to the allocation x EJRn. 
total allocated award to the members of any nonempty coalition S is 
The 
x(0) 
usually denoted by x(S) instead of Z x. and further, we always put 
jE s J 
:= o. 
The most well-known solution concept for cooperative games is the 
core which was first introduced and named in game theory in Gillies (1953). 
Informally, an efficient allocation belongs to the core of the given game 
if it is disadvantageous for the members of any nonempty coalition to 
withdraw from the allocation concerned in order to form their own coali-
tion. In other words, the core consists of efficient allocations that 
can not be improved upon by any nonempty coalition. 
DEFINITION. The core C(v) and the uppercore UC(v) of an n-person game 
(N;v) are given by 
C(v) := {x EJRn x(N) v(N) and x(S) ~ v(S) for all Sc N}, 
UC(v) := {x EJRn x(S) ~ v(S) for all Sc N}. (2 .1) 
The one-person constraints x. ~ v({i}) for all i E N are known as the 
l 
individual rationality condition for the allocation x EJRn in then-
person game v. These one-person constraints express that no player i E N 
receives less than the alternate worth v({i})which he can attain for 
himself in the game v. An efficient allocation which also satisfies the 
individual rationality condition, is called an imputation. The set of 
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all imputations for an n-person game (N;v) is denoted by I(v), i.e., 
I(v) := {x ERn I x(N) = v(N) and x. 
l. 
G v({i}) for all i EN}. 
The coalition constraint x(S) G v(S) is known as the group rationality 
condition for the allocation x ERn with respect to the nonempty coalition 
S in the n-person game v. The uppercore consists of (not necessarily 
efficient) allocations that satisfy all the group rationality conditions 
in the game. Obviously, the uppercore of an n-person game is a nonempty 
unbounded subset of Rn. However, the 2n-1 uppercore constraints in an n-
person game may be inconsistent with the efficiency principle and hence, 
the core of a game may be empty. In the remainder of this section we pay 
attention to the conditions that determine whether or not the game has a 
nonempty core. As a matter of fact, a balancedness condition is necessary 
and sufficient for the game to possess a nonempty core. 
DEFINITION. Let N = {1,2, ... ,n}. 
A aolleation B {s 1 ,s2 , •.. ,sk} of distinct nonempty coalitions is said 
to be balanaed over N if there exist positive numbers a 1 ,a2 , ..• ,ak, such 
that 
L a. for all i E N. (2.2) 
j ;iE s. 
J 
J 
An n-person game (N;v) is said to be balanaed if for any balanced collec-
tion B = {s1,s2 , ... ,sk} over N with corresponding positive numbers 
k 
L a.v(s .) ~ v(N). (2 .3) 
j=l J J 
Any player participates in several coalitions of the balanced collec-
tion B over the player set N and the proportions of these participations 
are described with the aid of the positive numbers corresponding to the 
coalitions of the balanced collection B. The associated positive numbers 
can be regarded as weights for the coalitions of the balanced collection. 
Notice that the weights are equal to one if and only if the balanced 
collection over N is a partition of the set N. Hence, the notion of a 
balanced collection is a generalized version of the partitioning notion. 
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The balancedness condition (2.3) for a game expresses that it is not ad-
vantageous with respect to the savings in the game to divide the player 
set N into the coalitions of any balanced collection over N on the under-
standing that the savings of the coalitions are adjusted in accordance 
with the corresponding weights. 
The next fundamental theorem concerning the core states that a game 
possesses a nonempty core if and only if the game is balanced. The result 
is due to Bondareva (1963, in Russian) as well as Shapley (1967). 
THEOREM 2.1. The following two statements for an n-person game (N;v) are 
equivalent. 
(i) The core of the game (N;v) is nonempty, i.e., C(v) ¥ 0. 
(ii) The game (N;v) is balanced. 
PROOF. For any coalition Sc N we first define the indicator function 
1 · N->{0,1} by s· 
ls(i) = 1 if and only if i ES. 
(a) We prove the implication (i) => (ii). Suppose C(v) ¥ 0 and let 
B = {s1 ,s2 , ••. ,sk} be a balanced collection over N with corresponding 
positive numbers a 1 ,a2 , •.• ,ak. Because C(v) ¥ 0, there exists x E C(v). 
By (2.2) and (2.1) respectively, we have 
k 
Z a .1 (i) 
j=l J sj 
v(S .) :'S x(S .) 
J J 
Now it follows that 
k k 
for all i E N, 
for all 1 :'S j :'S k and x(N) 
k 
Z a.v(s .) :'S La, L X, 
j=l J iES. i 
J 
Za. Z x.1 (i) 
j=l J iEN l Sj j= 1 J J 
k 
Z x. Z a. 1 ( i) = Z x .. 
iE N i j = 1 J S j iE N l 
x(N) v(N). 
v(N). 
So, the balancedness condition (2.3) holds. This completes the proof of 
the implication (i) => (ii). 
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(b) Secondly, we prove the converse implication (ii)~ (i). For that 
purpose, we fix some notation. Put m := 2n- 1, let {s1 ,s2 , ... ,sm} be an 
arbitrary ordering of the set of all nonempty coalitions and further, let 
the vectors b E Rn, c E Rm and the real-valued m x n matrix A 
defined by 
b. := 1, 
1. 
c. := v(S .) , 
J J 
a .. 
Jl. := ls. Cil 
J 
for all 1 ~ i ~ n, ~ j ~ m. For any x ERn we have that Ax~ c is 
equivalent to x(S) ~ v(S) for all Sc N, S # 0, and hence, Ax ~ c iff 
x E UC(v). From this and UC(v) # 0, we obtain 
n 
min[ I b.x. Ix ERn, Ax~ c] 
i=l 1. 1. 
min[x(Nll x E UC(v)] ~ v(N). 
Due to this, the duality theorem for linear programs yields 
n 
min [ I b . x . I x E Rn, Ax ~ c] 
i=l 1. 1. 
m 
max [ I y . c . I y E Rm, yA 
j=l J J + 
b]. 
Here y ERm means y ERm such that y, ~ 0 for all 1 ~ j ~ m. Note that 
+ J m 
the vector equality yA bis equivalent to I y.18 (i) 1 for all j=l J j 
1 ~ i ~ n. In view of this, the positive coordinates of a non-
negative vector y ERm satisfying yA = b can be regarded as the weights 
of the corresponding coalitions. In other words, any y E: '!Rm satisfying 
+ 
yA = b can be associated in a natural way with a balanced collection over 
the player set N. 
Suppose that (ii) holds. By the above reasoning, the balancedness of the 
game v implies 
m 
max [ I y . c . I y E R:, yA 
j=l J J 
b] 
m 
max[ I y,v(S.) I y ER:, yA 
j=l J J 
b) ~ v(N). 
Now it follows that min[x(N) Ix E UC(v)] = v(N) or equivalently, there 
exists x E UC(v) such that x(N) = v(N). By (2.1), we get x E C(v) and 
in particular, C(v) # 0. This completes the proof of the implication 
(ii)~(i). 0 
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3. THE INVARIANCE OF THE CORE UNDER SUPERADDITIVE COVERING 
It is desirable that the notion of the core behaves in a natural way 
with respect to plausible transformations on games. We first consider 
the game-theoretic version of the positive affine transformations known 
from geometry and calculus. Given an n-person game (N;v), a positive 
real number a and an n-tuple d = (d 1,d2 , ... ,dn) of real numbers, we define 
the n-person game (N;av + d) by 
(av + d) (S) := av(S) + Z: d. 
jE s J 
for all Sc N. 
In view of (2.1), it is straightforward to verify that the core behaves 
in a natural way with respect to these changes in scale, i.e., 
C(av + d) = aC(v) + d. This invariance property of the core is known as 
the relative invariance under strategic equivalence. 
Next we pay attention to a procedure which transforms a nonsuper-
additive game into a closely relatedly superadditive game without affect-
ing the core. The transformation in question is based on the idea of the 
least superadditive game that majorizes the original game. 
DEFINITION. The superadditive cover (N;v) of a game (N;v) is given by 
v({O) := 0 and 
k 
v(S) := max[ Z: v(S.) I {s 1 ,s2 , .•• ,sk} is a partition of s] j=l J 
for all S c N, S ¥ {O. (3 .1) 
The worth v(S) of a nonempty coalition S in the game (N;v) represents the 
largest possible total savings in the original game (N;v) that is attained 
by dividing the members of S into pairwise disjoint coalitions. The term 
superadditive cover is explained by the following three properties of the 
game v. 
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LEMMA 3.1. Let (N;v) be a game. 
(i) The game (N;v) majorizes the game (N;v), i.e., 
v(S) G v(S) for all Sc N. 
(ii) The game (N;v) is superadditive, i.e., 
v(S u T) G v(S) + v(T) for all S,T c N with s n T = 0. 
(iii) If (N;w) is a superadditive game such that w(S) G v(S) for all 
Sc N, then also w(S) G v(S) for all S c N. 
PROOF. (i) Let S c N, S # 0. Because {s} is the trivial partition of the 
nonempty set S, we derive immediately from formula (3.1) that the inequal-
ity v(S) G v(S) holds. 
(ii) Let S,T c N be such that S n T = 0. In case S = 0 or T = 0, then 
the equality holds in the superadditivity condition. So, suppose S # 0 
and T # 0. By (3.1), there ex~st partftions {s 1 ,s2 ,.:.,sk} o~ sand 
{T1 ,T2 , ... ,T} of T such that v(S) = E v(S.) and v(T) = E v(T.). 
m "=1 J · 1 J Because S n T = 0, we obtain that J J= 
{s 1 ,s2 , .. ,sk,T1 ,T2 , ••. ,Tm} is a partition of s U T. Now it follows from 
(3 .1) that 
k m 
v(S U T) G E v(S .) + E v(T.) v(S) + v(T). 
j=1 J j=l J 
(iii) Let (N;w) be a superadditive game such that v(T) ;;;; w(T) for all 
Tc N. We show that v(S) ;;;; w(S) for all Sc N. Let Sc N, s # 0, and 
let {s 1 ,s2 , .•. ,sk} be a partition of s. 
k k 
Then v(S.) ;;;; w(S.) for all 
J J 
1 ;;;; j ;;;; k and hence, E v(S.) ;;;; E w(S.) 
"=1 J "=1 J 
;;;; w(S) where the last inequality 
follows from the J J superadditivity of the game w. From 
this and the formula (3.1), we conclude that v(S) ;;;; w(S). 0 
From the above lemma we deduce that a game (N;v) is superadditive if and 
only if v(S) = v(S) for all Sc N. According to the next theorem, the 
cores of a balanced game and its superadditive cover are identical. The 
result is due to Aumann and Dreze (1974). 
THEOREM 3.2. If a game (N;v) possesses a nonempty core, then C(v) C(v). 
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PROOF. Let (N;v) be a game with C(v) 1 0. We assert that 
x(S) ~ v(S) for all x E C(v) and all Sc N. (3 .2) 
(i) In order to prove the statement (3 .2), let x E C(v) and s c N, s 1 
Further, let {s1,s2, ... ,sk} be a partition of s. Because x E C(v), we 
have that v(S .) ;S x(S .) for 
J J 
k k k 
Z v(S.) :S Z x (S .) z 
j=l J j=l J j=l 
all 1 ;S 
z X, 
iE s. l 
J 
j ;S k. From this 
L X, 
iE s 1 
x(S). 
we deduce 
Together with the formula (3.1), this implies v(S) :S x(S). So, (3.2) 
holds. 
(ii) Secondly, we assert v(N) v(N). Choose y E C(v). Then (3.2) and 
(2.1) respectively yield v(N) ;S y(N) = v(N). Moreover, v(N) ~ v(N) by 
Lemma 3.l(i). Now it follows that the equality v(N) = v(N) holds. 
0. 
(iii) The inclusion C(v) c C(v) is a direct consequence of v(N) = v(N) 
and (3.2). In addition, the inverse inclusion C(v) c C(v) follows imme-
diately from v(N) = v(N) and the fact that v(S) ~ v(S) for all S c N by 
Lemma 3.l(i). Therefore, C{v) = C(v) as was to be shown. 0 
The above theorem expresses that the core is invariant under super-
additive covering on the class of balanced games. We conclude this section 
with some remarks concerning the invariance of the core undec totally 
balanced covering on the class of balanced games. 
The notion of total balancedness is closely related to the balanced-
ness notion because a game (N;v) is said to be totaZZy balanced if the 
induced subgames (T;vT) are balanced for all Tc N, T 1 0. Here the 
subgame (T;vT) with player set T is determined by the restriction of the 
characteristic function v to the set of all subsets of T, i.e., 
vT{S) := v(S) for all Sc T. Due to Theorem 2.1, a game is totally 
balanced if and only if any induced subgame possesses a nonempty core. 
The totally balanced cover (N;v) of a game (N;v) is given by 
v(0) := 0 and for all Sc N, S f 0, 
k 
v(S) := max Z a.v(S,). 
B j=l J J 
The maximum in formula (3.3) is taken over all balanced collections 
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(3 .3) 
B = {s 1 ,s2 , ... ,sk} of distinct nonempty subsets of the set Sand where 
the corresponding positive numbers a 1 ,a2 , ... ,ak, satisfy the condition 
(2.2) in which the player set N is replaced by the nonempty coalition S. 
The term totally balanced cover is explained by the fact that the game 
(N;v) is the l8ast totally balanced game that majorizes the original game 
(N;v). From this, it follows that a game (N;v) is totally balanced if 
and only if v(S) = v(S) for all Sc N. According to a result in Shapley 
and Shubik (1969), the cores of a balanced game and its totally balanced 
cover coincide. 
Finally, we remark that the superadditive cover of a game is much easier 
to compute than the totally balanced cover of the given game. 
4. CORE CATCHERS BASED ON UPPER BOUNDS FOR THE CORE 
The core of a cooperative game is bounded below by the individual 
rationality condition. Together with the efficiency condition, this 
implies that the core is also bounded above. Therefore, the core of an 
n-person game is a bounded subset of Rn. The purpose of this section is 
to study a relationship between the structure of the core and a given 
upper bound for the core. 
Informally, an allocation is called an upper bound for the core of a 
game if the payoff to any player according to a core-element is at most 
the payoff to the player by the allocation concerned. 
DEFINITION. The set UB(v) of upper bounds for the core of an n-person 
game (N;v) is given by 
UB(v) X. 
l 
~ y. for all x E C(v) and all i E N}. 
l 
In view of (2.1), it is clear that UB(v) c UC(v) whenever C(v) 1 0. In 
general, an upper bound for the core fails to meet the efficiency prin-
ciple. Obviously, there are various possibilities to construct an effi-
cient allocation from a given upper bound for the core. The most naive 
192 
way is as follows : start off at the upper bound for the core and proceed 
by letting merely one component decrease till the efficiency principle is 
met. The procedure can be restarted at each of the n components of the 
given upper bound for the core and it yields n efficient allocations. 
According to the next theorem, the convex hull of the set of these ob-
tained efficient allocations is a core catcher because it always includes 
the core. For any i EN, let ~i ERn denote the i-th unit vector in Rn. 
i So, e. 
J. 
i 
:= 1 and e. := 0 for all j E N-{i}. 
J 
THEOREM 4.1. Let (N;v) be a game and y E UB(v). Then 
C(v) c conv {y - [y(N) - v(N)]ei i EN}. 
PROOF. The inclusion is trivial if C(v) = 0. So, suppose C(v) 1 0. 
Put a:= y(N) - v(N). Because y E UB(v) c UC(v), we have y(N) ~ v(N) and 
thus, a ~ 0. We distinguish the two cases a = 0 and a > 0 respectively. 
(i) Suppose a = 0. Then we must show that the inclusion C(v) c {y} holds. 
Let x E C(v). Since y E UB(v), we have that x. :;; Yi for all i EN. J. 
Together with x(N) = v(N) = y(N), this implies that x. Yi for all i E N. J. 
Hence, x = y for all x E C(v) and so, C(v) c {y}. 
(ii) Suppose a > 0. Let x E C(v). For any i E N, define the real number 
-1 
Si by Si :=a (yi - xi). Then Si ~ 0 for all i EN because a> 0 and 
y E UB(v). Further, we get 
S(N) a- 1 (y - x)(N) = a-1 [y(N) -x(N)] = a-1[y(N) - v(N)] = 1. 
The last equality follows from the definition of the real number a. Now 
we obtain 
E S.(y-aei) 
iEN 1 
S(N)y - E (y. 
iE N 1 
We conclude that x = 
S(N) = 1. In other 
E S.y - E aS.ei 
iE N 1 iE N 1 
y - (y - x) x. 
E S. (y - aei) where S. ~ 0 for all i E N and 
iEN 1 1 
words, the core-element x can be written as a 
convex combination of the efficient allocations y - aei, i EN, as was to 
be shown. 
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D 
The above theorem expresses that each upper bound for the core generates 
a core catcher. Next we direct our attention to the conditions that de-
termine whether or not the core catcher in question coincides with the 
core. For that purpose, it is useful to introduce a notion which measures 
the gap between the worth of a given coalition and the total payoff to the 
members of the coalition by_a given allocation. 
DEFINITION. The gap function gv: 2N x Rn ~R of an n-person game (N;v) 
is given by 
gv (S,x) := E x. - v(S) 
jE s J 
x(S) - v(S) 
for all Sc N and all x ERn. (4.1) 
Notice that gv(0,x) = 0 for all x ERn. The expression gv(S,x) is called 
the gap of the coalition S with respect to the allocation x in the game v. 
In view of (2.1), the uppercore of a game consists of allocations that 
give rise only to nonnegative gaps. In particular, an allocation belongs 
to the core of a game if and only if the corresponding gaps are nonnega-
tive in such a way that the gap of the grand coalition is equal to zero. 
The next theorem describes a relationship between the structure of the 
core and a property for the gap function with respect to an upper bound 
for the core. 
THEOREM 4.2. Let (N;v) be a game and y E UB(v). Then the following two 
statements are equivalent. 
(i) C(v) = conv {y - gv (N,y)ei J i E NL 
(ii) 0 ~ gv(N,y) ~ gv(S,y) for all Sc N, S f 0. 
PROOF. For any i EN, define the vector xi ERn by xi 
Then Theorem 4.1 yields C(v) c conv {xi I i E N}. 
Further, we always have that the core is a convex set. 
that 
C(v) = conv {xi I i E N} iff xi E C(v) for all i E N. 
(4.2) 
v i 
:= y - g (N,y)e . 
Now it follows 
(a) We first prove the implication (i) ~(ii). Suppose that (i) holds 
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and let s c: N, S i 0. Choose i E S. i Then x E C(v) because (i) holds. 
By y E UB(v), we have that x~ ~ y, for all j EN which is equivalent to 
v i J J i v 
g (N,y) ~ 0. From x E C(v) we also deduce v(S) ~ x (S) = y(S) - g (N,y) 
or equivalently, gv(N,y) ~ gv(S,y). So, the condition (4.2) holds. 
This completes the proof of the implication (i) ~ (ii) . 
(b) Secondly, we prove the converse implication (ii) ~ (i). Suppose that 
i . (4.2) holds. We show that x E C(v) for all i EN. Let i EN and Sc: N, 
S i 0. By using the formula (4.1), we obtain 
xi(N) y(N) - gv (N,y) v(N), 
xi(S) y(S) - gv(N,y) gv(S,y) - gv(N,y) + v(S) ~ v(S) 
whenever i E S, 
xi(S) y(S) gv(S,y) + v(S) ~ v(S) whenever i ~ s 
where the inequalities follow from (4.2). In view of (2.1), we conclude 
that xi E C(v). This completes the proof of the implication (ii)~ (i). D 
The condition (4.2) for a game expresses that, with respect to the given 
upper bound for the core of the game, the gap of the grand coalition is 
minimal among the gaps of the nonempty coalitions. As usual, the gap 
function is also required to be nonnegative. According to Theorem 4.2, 
the condition (4.2) is necessary and sufficient for the core of the game 
to coincide with the core catcher generated by the given upper bound for 
the core of the game. 
In the remainder of this section we look at upper bounds for the core 
that are based on the marginal contributions of the players. Here the 
marginal contribution v(S) - v(S-{i}) of player i E N to the coalition S 
in the game (N;v) represents the increase or decrease of the savings in 
the game v whenever player i joins the coalition s-{i}. We are especially 
interested in the marginal contribution of any player to the grand coali-
tion N as well as the largest marginal contribution of any player in the 
game. 
DEFINITION. The T-Vector tv EJR.n and them-vector mv ERn of an n-person 
game (N;v) are given by 
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tv := v(N) - v(N-{i}) i 
m: := max[v(S) - v(S-{i}) Is c N, i E s] 1. 
for all i E N. 
PROPOSITION 4.3. Let (N;v) be a game. Then 
(i) v E UB(v), tv E UB(v) and tv E UB(v). m 
(ii) tv s v for all i E m. N. 
!- 1. 
v s v for all i E whenever C(v) f. IL t. t. N ~ 1. 
v 
t: for all i EN whenever v is superadditive. t. 1. 1. 
(iii) gv(N-{i},tv) gv(N,tv) for all i E N. 
(iv) gv(S-{i},mv) s gv(S,mv) for all i E N and all S c N with 
PROOF. (i) Let x E C(v) and i. EN. By (4.3) and (2.1), we obtain 
t: = v(N) - v(N-{i}) = x(N) - v(N-{i}) ~ x .. So, tv E UB(v). 1. 1. 
(4.3) 
(4 .4) 
i E s. 
Moreover, m: ~ t: ~ x. where the first inequality is a direct consequence 1. 1. 1. 
of the formulas (4.3) - (4.4). Hence, mv E UB(v). 
Because Theorem 3.2 yields C(v) = C(v), we also have x E C(v). By 
applying the first resu~t to the superadditive cover v instead of the 
g~me v itself, we get tv E UB(~): Together with x E C(v), this implies 
t: ~ x. . Now we conclude that t v E UB (v) . 1. 1. 
(ii) In case the game v is superadditive, then v(S) v(S) for all S c N 
and hence, t: = t: for all i E N. Suppose now C(v) f. 0. As was shown in 1. 1. 
part (ii) of the proof of Theorem 3.2, C(v) f. 0 yields v(N) = v(N). In 
view of the formula (4.3), we obtain that for all i EN 
t: = v(N) - v(N-{i}) 
1. 
v(N) - v(N-{i}) S v(N) - v(N-{i}) 
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3.l(i). 
(iii) It follows immediately from formulas (4.1) and (4.3) that for all 
i E N 
tv(N-{i}) - v(N-{i}) 
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(iv) Let i E N and Sc N be such that i E S. Then we deduce from formula 
(4.4) that m~;;;: v(S) - v(S-{i}). In view of (4.1), this implies 
]_ 
Them-vector is known as Milnor's upper bound (Milnor, 1952), while a 
detailed study of the T-vector is presented in Driessen (1985). Part (i) 
of the above proposition states that the T- and m-vector of the game v 
itself as well as the T-vector of the superadditive cover v are indeed 
upper bounds for the core of the game v. Part (ii) describes that the 
core bounds by the T- and m-vector of the game are not so sharp as the 
core bounds by the T-vector of the superadditive cover. Part (iv) ex-
presses the monotonicity of the gap function with respect to Milnor's 
upper bound, i.e., the gaps weakly increase as the coalition grows. In 
particular, the grand coalition generates the largest gap. As a conse-
quence, condition (4.2) applied to Milnor's upper bound reduces to the 
requirement that the corresponding gap function is constant and nonne-
ga ti ve for all nonempty coalitions. As an example, we consider the 
3-person game v given by 
v({i}) = 0 for all i EN, 
and v({l,2,3}) = 4. 
v({ 1,2}) v({ 1,3}) v({2,3}) 2 
Then mv = (2,2,2) and gv(S,mv) = 2 for all Sc N, S f 0. So, the con-
dition (4.2) holds with respect to Milnor's upper bound mv for the core 
of the game v. Due to Theorem 4.2, we obtain 
C(v) conv {mv v ( v) i I . } - g N,m e i E N or equivalently, 
C(v) conv {(0,2,2), (2,0,2), (2,2,0)}. 
Finally, we pay attention to the examples of the first section in order 
to elucidate the theory concerning the core catchers. By Proposition 
4.3(ii), the T-vectors of a linear production game and its superadditive 
cover coincide because the linear production games are always superaddi-
tive. We denote by CC(tv) and CC(mv) respectively the core catchers 
generated by the T- and m-vector of the game v in question. 
EXAMPLE 4.4. Consider again the 3-person games v and w of Example 1.1. 
The determination of their cores by (2.1) yields 
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0 
( 0' 1 ' 1) 
0 0 
I(v) 
(2,0,0) (0,2,0) 
FIGURE la. The core C(v). 
v 
t (0' 1, 2) 
I (v) 
FIGURE le. The core catcher CC(tv). 
I (v) 
FIGURE le. The core 
catcher CC(mv). 
CC(mv) 
mV = (1,2,2) 
(3,0,0) (1,2,0) (0,3,0) 
FIGURE lb. The core C(w). 
FIGURE ld. The core catchers 
CC(tW) and CC(mw). 
(-2' 2. 2) 
FIGURE lf. The core catcher 
CC (tV-ctV). 
0 
FIGURES la-f are related to the 
cores and the core catchers of 
the games v and w of Example 1.1. 
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C(v) {xER3 ix1 O,x2 +x3 =2,0~x2 ~1}and 
C(w) {x EJR3 j x 1 + x 2 + x3 = 3, 0 ~ x 1 ;'11, 0 ;'1 x2 ~ 2}. 
The core in each case is drawn in the Figures la-lb from which we deduce 
that the core of the game v is a straight line segment, whereas the core 
of the game w is a quadrilateral. In point of fact, the vertices of the 
core can be used to describe the entire core as follows : 
C(v) conv {(0,1,1), (0,0,2)} and 
C(w) conv {(1,0,2), (1,2,0), (0,2,1), (0,0,3)}. 
By formulas (4.3), (4.4) and (4.1) respectively, we obtain 
1, gv(N,mv) = 3, 
3 = gw(N,mw). 
The gap functions of both games with respect to the T- and m-vector are 
listed in Table 1. In the same table we observe that each of these four 
gap functions does not satisfy the corresponding condition (4.2). There-
fore, the cores are strictly included in the core catchers generated by the 
T- and m-vector. The geometric positions of the cores inside these core 
catchers are drawn in the Figures le-le. Notice that CC(mw) = CC(tw) 
because mw = tw. 
>~ > ~~ 
coali- .µ El .µ 
~ t/l t/l ~ t/l tion t/l t/l 
~ >~ >~ ~ ~~ 
s > 
°' °' 
~ 
°' 
{1} 0 0 1 0 1 
{2} 0 1 2 0 2 
{3} 0 2 2 0 3 
{ 1,2} 0 1 3 0 3 
{ 1,3} 1 1 2 1 3 
{2,3} 2 1 2 2 3 
{1,2,3} 2 1 3 3 3 
TABLE 1. The games v and w of 
Example 1.1 and their corres-
ponding gap functions. 
~-;;; 
~ 
t/l 
~~ 
O· 
1 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
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> ~ ~~ ~-;;; .µ .µ coali-
~ t/l t/l ~ t/l t/l t/l t/l tion 
~ >~ >~ ~ ~~ ~~ 
> 
°' °' 
~ 
°' °' 
s 
0 2 2 0 1 1 {1} 
0 1 2 1 1 1 {2} 
0 1 2 1 1 1 {3} 
2 1 2 1 2 2 {1,2} 
2 1 2 1 2 2 {1,3} 
1 1 3 2 2 2 {2,3} 
3 1 3 3 2 2 {1,2,3} 
TABLE 2. The games v and w of the 
Examples 1.2 - 1.3 and their cor-
responding gap functions. 
(0' 0, 3) 
v ( 2' 1 '1) I (v) t 
x2 0 
( I , 1 , 1 ) 
xl 0 
x ; 0 
(3,0,0) (2,1,0) (0,3,0) 
FIGURE 2a. The core C(v) and 
the core catcher CC(tv) ; C(v). 
FIGURE 2c. The core catcher CC(mv). 
(3,0,0) (1,2,0) 
v 
- et (1,0,0) 
FIGURE 2e. The core catcher CC(tv-ctv}. 
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0 
(3,0,0) (0,3,0) 
FIGURE 2b. 'rhe core C(w} 
satisfying C(w} ; I(w). 
FIGURE 2d. The core catchers 
CC(tw} and CC(mw) satisfying 
CC(tw} ; CC(mW). 
FIGURES 2a-e are related to the 
cores and the core catchers of 
the games v and w of the 
Examples 1.2.-1.3. 
EXAMPLE 4 .5. Consider again the 3-person games v and w of the Examples 
1.2 and 1.3. The determination of their cores by ( 2 .1) yields 
C(v) {x E lR 3 3' ;:;; 2, ~ 1 , ;:;; 1} and xl + x2 + x3 xl x2 x3 
C(w) {x E: lR 3 3, ~ O, ~ 1 , ;;: 1} I (w) xl + x2 + x3 xl x2 x3 = 
The core in each case is drawn in the Figures 2a-2b from which we deduce 
that both cores are equilateral triangles. Note that the core of the 
game w is precisely the imputation set of the game. As a matter of fact, 
the three vertices of the core can be used to describe the entire core 
as follows 
C(v) conv {(1,1,1), (2,0,1), (2,1,0)} and 
C(w) conv {(1,1,1), (0,2,1), (0,1,2)}. 
By formulas (4.3), (4.4) and (4.1) respectively, we get 
(2,1,1), v m (2,2,2), gv(N,tv) 
gw(N,tw) 
1, gv(N,mv) = 3, 
2 = gw(N,mw). 
The gap functions of both games with respect to the T- and m-vector are 
listed in Table 2. In the same table we observe that the corresponding 
condition (4.2) is satisfied solely by the gap function of the game v 
with respect to the T-vector tv. Hence, the core of the game v coincides 
with the core catcher generated by the upper bound tv for the core of the 
game v, i.e., CC (t v) = C (v) . The geometric positions of the cores C (v) 
and C(w) respectively inside the core catchers CC(mv) and CC(mw), based 
on Milnor's upper bound for the core, are drawn in the Figures 2c-2d. 
5. CORE CATCHERS BASED ON LOWER BOUNDS FOR THE CORE 
The theory developed in the previous section is completely based on 
the notion of an upper bound for the core. Because the core is always 
bounded below by the individual rationality condition, it is also possible 
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to look at lower bounds instead of upper bounds for the core. As was done 
in section 4 with respect to upper bounds, we now develop a similar theory 
concerning lower bounds for the core. 
DEFINITION. The set LB(v) of lower bounds for the aore of an n-person 
game (N;v) is given by 
LB(v) := {y ERn I xi ~ yi for all x E C(v) and all i EN}. 
Generally speaking, the efficiency principle is not met by a lower bound 
y for the core of a game v because the corresponding nonpositive gap 
gv(N,y) may fail to be zero. In order to construct an efficient allocation 
from a given lower bound for the core, we apply the following procedure 
start off at the lower bound for the core and proceed by letting merely 
one component increase till the efficiency principle is met. The proce-
dure can be restarted at each of the n components of the given lower 
bound y for the core of the n-person game v and it yields the efficient 
allocations y - gv(N,y)ei, i EN. Part (i) of the next theorem states 
that the convex hull of the set of these obtained efficient allocations 
is a core catcher. Furthermore, in part (ii) of the theorem we formulate 
the condition which is necessary and sufficient for the core of the game 
to coincide with the core catcher generated by the given lower bound for 
the core of the game. 
THEOREM 5.1. Let (N;v) be a game and y E LB(v). Then 
(i) C(v) c conv {y gv(N,y)ei i EN}. 
v i (ii) C(v) = conv {y g (N,y)e i EN} if and only if 
gv(N,y) ~ O ~ gv(S,y) for all Sc N, Si N. 
The proof of the above theorem is completely similar to the proofs of 
(5 .1) 
the Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. Therefore, it is left to the reader to verify 
the validity of Theorem 5.1. By condition (5.1), the gap function with 
respect to the given lower bound for the core is required to be nonnegative 
except for the trivially nonpositive gap of the grand coalition. 
As an example, we consider the lower bound for the core which is 
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derived from the individual rationality condition. That is, the trivial 
lower bound y E JR.n for the core of an n-person game (N;v) is determined 
by y, = v({i}) for all i EN, whereas the associated efficient allocations 
l . 
y - gv(N,y)ei, i EN, are precisely the vertices of the nonempty imputation 
set I(v) for the game v. Hence, the core catcher generated by the trivial 
lower bound for the core is equal to the nonempty imputation set, i.e., 
v ii conv {y - g (N,y)e i EN} = I(v) (5 .2) 
whenever I(v) ~ 0 and yi = v({i}) for all i E N. 
Usually, the core is a proper subset of the imputation set. From Theorem 
5.1(ii) applied to the trivial lower bound for the core, we conclude that 
the core of a game (N;v) coincides with the imputation set if and only if 
v(N) ~ L v({j}) and 
jE N 
v(S) ~ L v({j}) for all Sc N, S ~ N. 
jE s 
In case the game v is also superadditive, then (5.3) reduces to 
v(S) L v({j}) for all Sc N, S ~ N. 
jE s 
(5 .3) 
(5 .4) 
Condition (5.4) for a game expresses that the worth of any proper multi-
person coalition is completely determined by the worths of the associated 
one-person coalitions. Notice that the linear production game of Example 
1.3 satisfies condition (5.4) and as already observed in Example 4.5, its 
core does indeed coincide with the imputation set. 
Next we present a procedure to construct a lower bound for the core 
from a given upper bound for the core. Let y EJR.n be an upper bound for 
the core of an n-person game (N;v). Suppose that player i E N wants to 
participate in a multiperson coalition S and the other members of S are 
willing to cooperate with player i if they are paid for their cooperation 
according to the given upper bound y for the core. Player i receives the 
remaining part of the savings due to the formation of the coalition S. 
That is, as a reward for the participation in the coalition S, player i 
is allocated the amount 
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v(S) - y(S-{i}) or equivalently, y, - gv(S,y). 
l 
In other words, player i receives less than yi and the gap gv(S,y) re-
presents the monetary value of the concession that player i has to make 
because of the participation in the coalition S. Subsequently, the lar-
gest possible payoff to player i is attained by minimization of the con-
cession amounts gv(S,y) over all coalitions S containing player i. 
In view of the above reasoning, we introduce a notion which describes the 
resulting concession amounts made by the single players with respect to 
an upper bound for the core. 
DEFINITION. Let (N;v) be an n-person game and y E UB(v). Then the 
associated concession vector cyv E Rn is given by 
cy: := min[gv(S,y) Is c N, i E s] 
for all i E N. 
(5. 5) 
PROPOSITION 5.2. Let (N;v) be a game and y E UB(v). 
(i) Then y - cyv E LB(v). 
(ii) In case y = mv, then yi v({i}) for all i E N. 
PROOF. (i) Let x E C(v) and i EN. We prove cy: ~ yi - xi. Let Sc N 
be such that i E S. Because x E C(v) and y E UB(v), we have x(S) ~ v(S) 
and yj ~ xj for all j E s-{i}. Now it follows that 
gv(S,y) y(S) - v(S) ~ y(S) - x(S) (y - x) (S) ~ y i - xi. 
v 
From this and formula (5.5), we conclude that cyi ~ yi - xi or equivalent-
ly xi ~Yi - cy:. Hence, y - cyv E LB(v). 
(ii) Let i EN. It follows directly from Proposition 4.3(iv) that 
gv({i},mv) ~ gv(S,mv) for all Sc N with i ES. Therefore, formula (5.5) 
applied toy= mv reduces to cm~= gv({i},mv) = m~ - v({i}). 
l l 
Part (i) of the above proposition states that any upper bound for the 
0 
core induces a lower bound for the core which is determined by the differ-
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ence vector of the upper bound itself and the associated concession vector. 
In case Milnor's upper bound for the core is considered, then the induced 
lower bound for the core is precisely the trivial lower bound derived 
from the individual rationality condition. Due to (5.2), the core catcher 
generated by the lower bound mv - cmv for the core coincides with the 
nonempty imputation set for the game v, i.e., 
I(v) for all games v with I(v) F 0. 
Finally, we illustrate the developed theory by the examples of the first 
section. 
EXAMPLE 5.3. Consider once again the 3-person games v and w of Examples 
1.1 and 4.4. By using formula (5.5) and Table 1, we obtain 
ctv = (0,1,1), tv - ctv = (0,0,1) and gv(N,tv-ctv) = -1. Hence, the 
core catcher CC(tv-ctv) is given by 
CC(tv-ctv) = conv {(1,0,1), (0,1,1), (0,0,2)}. 
The core catcher CC(tv-ctv) is drawn in Figure lf. Obviously, we have 
C(v) F CC(tv-ctv) which is due to the fact that condition (5.1) is not 
satisfied by the gap function of the game v with respect to the lower 
bound tv - ctv for the core, e.g., gv({2,3},tv-ctv) = -1 < 0. As usual, 
the core catcher CC(mv-cmv) = I(v) and further, the equality tw = mw im-
plies CC(tw-ctw) = CC(mw-cmw) = I(w). 
EXAMPLE 5.4. Consider once again the 3-person games v and w of Examples 
1.2, 1.3 and 4.5. By using Table 2 and formula (5.5), we get 
(1,1,1), tv 
( 1 , 1 , 1) , t w - et w 
(1,0,0), gv(N,tv-ctv) 
(0,1,1), gw(N,tw-ctw) 
-2, 
-1. 
Hence, CC(tv-ctv) = conv {(3,0,0), (1,2,0), (1,0,2)} and the geometric 
position of the core C(v) inside the core catcher CC(tv-ctv) is drawn in 
Figure 2e. The strict inclusion C(v) c CC(tv-ctv) is due to the negative 
gaps gv(S,tv-ctv) for all two-person coalitions S. As usual, CC(mv-cmv) 
I(v), while tw = mw implies CC(tw-ctw) = CC(mw - cmw) = I(w). Neverthe-
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less, the core C(w) of the game w coincides with the core catchers con-
cerned because condition (5.1) holds, i.e., 
gw(N,tw-ctw) 
gw(S,tw-ctw) 
-1 and 
0 for all Sc N, S i N. 
In point of fact, C(w) = I(w) as already observed in Example 4.5. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The notion of a core catcher is often used to characterize a specific 
subclass of games. The core catchers as studied in Theorems 4.1 and 5.l(i) 
possess a very regular structure. In fact, the equidistant n vertices of 
those core catchers are derived in a natural way from an upper or a lower 
bound for the core of an n-person game. It may happen that these n ver-
tices of the core catcher in question degenerate into a single point which 
coincides with the given upper or lower bound for the core. Weber (1978) 
and Driessen (1985, cf. page 117) presented other core catchers which are 
useful to characterize the so-called convex and k-convex games respective-
ly in terms of the core instead of the characteristic function itself. 
Here a game (N;v) is said to be 1-convex if the corresponding gap function 
with respect to the T-vector tv satisfies condition (4.2), i.e., the game 
(N;v) is 1-convex if and only if 
(6 .1) 
We conclude this chapter with the detailed remark that the notion of 
the so-called nucleolus is closely related to the centre of gravity of 
the vertices of the core catcher generated by the T-vector. The nucleolus 
of a game was introduced in Schmeidler (1969) and this one-point solution 
concept occupies a central position within the core of a balanced game. 
An interrelationship between the nucleolus n(v) E Rn of an n-person game 
v -1 v v (N;v) and the centre t - n g (N,t) (1,1, ... ,1) of the core catcher 
CC(tv) can be described in terms of the smallest marginal contribution of 
any player to the nonempty coalitions in the game. 
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DEFINITION. The m-veator mv ERn of an n-person game (N;v) is given by 
m~ := min[v(S) - v(S-{i}) Is c N, i Es, s ~ {i}] 
J_ 
(6.2) 
for all i E N. 
The m-vector is neither an upper bound nor a lower bound for the core. 
For instance, for the 3-person game w of Example 1.1 we have 
mW = (0,0,1) I whereas (1,2,0) E C(w). We mention two interesting results 
concerning the m-vector. 
THEOREM 6.1. Let (N;v) be a superadditive n-person game. 
(i) (Kikuta, 1983). If the game (N;v) is such that m v (N) > v(N), then 
the game (N;v) is totally balanced. 
(ii) (Funaki, 1986). The following two statements are equivalent. 
( 1) t~ - -1 gv (N,t v) ;;; -v for all i E (6.3) n m. N. 
J_ J_ 
(2) 11. (v) -v E ;;; m. for all i N. 
J_ J_ 
-1 In addition, 11 (v) tv - n gv(N,tv) (1,1, •.. ,1) if (6.3) holds. 
(iii) (Driessen, 1985). 11 (v) tv -1 g V (N 1 t V) ( 1 , 1 , • • • 1 1) if (6 .1) holds. n 
Part (ii) of the above theorem states that the m-vector m v is an upper 
bound for the nucleolus ll(v) of a superadditive game v if and only if the 
m-vector is an upper bound for the centre of the core catcher generated 
by the <-vector tv. In view of the formulas (6.2) and (4.1), the condi-
tion (6.3) for a game (N;v) is equivalent to 
gv(S,tv) - gv(S-{i},tv) ;;; n-lgv(N,tv) (6.4) 
for all i EN and all s c N with i ES, s ~ {i}. 
From the Tables 1-2 we deduce that condition (6.4) is satisfied solely 
by the gap function of the 3-person game v of Example 1.2 and thus, its 
v -1 v v 1 
nucleolus ll(v) = t - n g (N,t) (1,1,1) 3 (5,2,2). Conditions (6.1) 
and (6.3) respectively are sufficient, but not necessary for the coinci-
dence in question. For example, the 3-person game w of Example 1.3 does 
not satisfy conditions (6.1) and (6.3), but nevertheless its nucleolus 
1 11(w) = 3(1,4,4) coincides with the centre of the core catcher generated 
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by the T-vector tw of the game w. 
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CHAPTER VI I I 
THE T -VALUE A SURVEY 
By Theo Driessen 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with a specific one-point solution concept for coope-
rative games in characteristic function form. The concept in question is 
called the T-value and was introduced in Tijs (1981). The T-value is based 
on the idea of an efficient compromise between suitably chosen upper and 
lower bounds for the core. The relevant bounds for the core were already 
considered in the previous chapter. Throughout this chapter, it is supposed 
that the reader is familiar with the notions treated in the previous chapter. 
In section 2 we present the notion of the T-value. In section 3 we review 
various interesting results concerning the T-value concept. In particular, 
an axiomatization of the T-value will be mentioned. 
2. THE T-VALUE OF A QUASIBALANCED GAME 
Let (N;v) be a balanced n-person game. Then the T-vector tv EJRn of 
the game v is an upper bound for the core of the game v. As an initial 
step, we allocate the upper payoff t: to player i, i EN. Generally spea-
1 
king, the efficiency principle is not met by the upper bound tv for the 
core because the corresponding nonnegative gap gv(N,tv) may fail to be zero. 
In the second and final step, each player is charged a part of the joint 
concession amount gv(N,tv). Here the joint concession amount is prorated 
in proportion to the concession amounts made by the single players and 
described by means of the concession vector ctv ERn. The resulting effi-
cient allocation is called the T-value of the given balanced game. 
An equivalent interpretation of the T-value for a balanced game (N;v) is 
as follows. The upper bound tv for the core of the game v induces the lo-
wer bound tv - ctv for the core where the vector ctv denotes the concession 
vector with respect to the upper bound tv. We suppose that the players in 
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the game v regard their payoffs by the upper bound tv as maximal payoffs 
and further, payoffs by the lower bound tv - ctv are seen as minimal 
payoffs to the players. In other words, the relevant upper (lower respec-
tively) bound for the core of the game is interpreted as the utopia (dis-
agreement) allocation. The T-value of the balanced game is obtained as an 
efficient compromise between.the utopia and disagreement allocation. That 
is, the T-value is obtained as the unique efficient allocation lying on the 
straight line segment with end points the utopia vector tv and the disagree-
v 
ment vector t ctv. Due to this interpretation, the T-value allocation is 
well-defined for games (N;v) satisfying 
et~;;; 0 
l 
for all i E N and 
or equivalently , 
gv(S,tv) ;;;Qforall S cN and ctv(N);;; gv(N,tv). ( 1) 
Condition (1) for a game (N;v) requires that the gap function of the game 
v with respect to the T-vector tv is nonnegative and in addition, the joint 
concession amount gv(N,tv) is at most the total sum of the concession 
amounts made by the single players. Condition (1) is known as the quasi-
baZancedness condition for the game (N;v). It is clear that balancedness 
implies quasibalancedness. The notion of the T-value on the class of 
quasibalanced games is due to Tijs (1981). 
DEFINITION. The T-VaZue T (v) E Rn of a quasibaZanced n-person game (N; v) 
is given by 
T(v) := tv 
v v v v ]-1 v t - g (N,t )[et (N) et 
An extension of the T-value from the class of quasibalanced n-person games 
to the class of n-person games with a nonempty imputation set is presented 
in Driessen (1985). The T-value of a quasibalanced game is drawn in Figure 1. 
As an example, we determine the T-value of the balanced games considered 
in Examples 1.1 - 1.3 of the previous chapter. The relevant results are 
as follows. 
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game of T-vector concession gap T-value 
Example t vector et g· (N,t 0 ) T ( •) 
v of 1.1 (0, 1,2) (0, 1, 1) 1 1 2(0,1,3) 
w of 1.1 ( 1, 2 ,3) ( 1, 2, 3) 3 1 2( 1,2,3) 
v of 1.2 ( 2 I 1f1) ( 1, 1, 1) 1 1 3<5,2,2) 
w of 1.3 ( 1, 2 ,2) ( 1, 1 , 1) 2 1 3(1,4 ,4) 
3. RESULTS CONCERNING THE T-VALUE 
First of all, we list various useful properties of the T-value on the 
class QBn of quasibalanced n-person games. 
THEOREM. The T-value T : QBn ~JRn possesses the following six properties. 
(i) Efficiency. For all (N;v) E QBn : Z T. (v) = v(N). 
jE N J 
(ii) Individual rationality. 
For all (N;v) E QBn and all i E N T. (v) ::;; v({i}). 
l 
(iii) Core stability. 
For all (N;v) E n with gv (N,t v) 0 C(v) {T(v)} QB = : = 
(iv) Core stability. For all (N;v) C QBn with gv(N,tv) 
T(v) E C(v) if and only if 
v . v v -1 v v v -1 
et (N) Lg (N,t ) ] ::;; et (S) [g (S,t ) ] 
for all Sc N with 2 :;; Is I:;; n-2 and gv(S,tv) > 0. 
(v) Core stability. 
For all (N;v) E QBn where 2 ~ n :;; 3 T(v) E C(v). 
(vi) Relative invariance under strategic equivalence. 
For all (N;v) E QBn, all a E (0, 00 ) and all d EJRn 
T(av + d) = aT(v) +d. 
> 0 
Although the T-value of a quasibalanced game is efficient as well as indi-
vidually rational, it does not necessarily belong to the core of the game 
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whenever there are at least four players. The T-value of quasibalanced 
3-person games is always included in the core. Note that the T-value of 
the balanced 3-person games, considered in Examples 1.1 - 1.3 of the pre-
vious chapter, is even the centre of gravity of the vertices of the core. 
Part (vi) of th0 above theorem states that the T-value behaves in a natural 
way with respect to changes in scale. Further, it is obvious from the de-
finition that the T-value of a quasibalanced game v is proportional to the 
T-vector tv of the game v whenever the concession vector ctv is equal to 
the T-vector tv. According to the next theorem, this property together 
with the relative invariance under strategic equivalence fully characte-
rize the T-value on the class of quasibalanced n-person games. This axio-
matization of the T-value on the class QBn is due to Tijs (1987). 
THEOREM. The T-value T : QBn ~JRn is the unique function~ 
with the following two properties : 
(i) For all (N;v) C QBn, all a E (0, 00 ) and all d CJRn 
~(av + d) = a~(v) +d. 
(ii) For all (N;v) E QBn with ctv tv, the vector ~(v) is proportional 
to the T-vector tv of the game v. 
In spite of the fact that the T-value of a balanced game can be inter-
preted as an efficient compromise between an upper and a lower bound for 
the core of the game, it may fall outside the core. Nevertheless, the T-
value on the class of so-called 1-convex games occupies a central position 
within the core because it coincides with the centre of gravity of the 
vertices of the core. 
THEOREM. Let (N;v) be a 1-convex n-person game, i.e., 
O ~ gv(N,tv) ~ gv(S,tv) for all Sc N, SI 0. 
Then 
and 
C(v) 
T (v) 
{ v v v i . t - g (N,t )e i E N} 
-1 v v 
n g (N, t ) ( 1, 1, ... , 1) E C(v). 
In addition, the nucleolus n(v) equals the T-value T(v). 
PROOF. The statement concerning the core structure is a direct consequen-
ce of Theorem 4.2 of the previous chapter applied toy tv. The 1-con-
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vexity of the game v implies that the concession vector ctv is given by 
et:= gv(N,tv) for all i E N. In view of (1), it is clear that the game 
l 
v is quasibalanced. Now the formula for the T-value follows immediately 
from its definition and the T-value belongs to the core because it repre-
sents the centr2 of gravity of the core. The statement concerning the 
nucleolus is valid because of Theorem 6.l(iii) of the previous chapter. D 
Note that the game v of Example 1.2 of the previous chapter is 1-convex. 
The notion of 1-convexity was introduced in Driessen (1985) as an adjunct 
to the detailed study of the T-value. There other results for the T-value 
can be found. 
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FIGURE 1. The T-value T(v) of a quasibalanced n-person game v. 
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CHAPTER IX 
ON THE EXTREME ELEMENTS OF THE CLASS OF 
(Q,1)-NORMALIZED SUPERADDITIVE GAMES 
by Jean Derks 
1. INTRODUCTION 
From the introduction of the theory of cooperative games (in charac-
teristic function form) in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) the super-
additive games have played a prominent role. Economical models which give 
rise to cooperative games usually impose the superadditivity property. 
Furthermore, the class of superadditive games, seen as a set in the game 
space, has a very nice structure. After a normalization procedure this 
class may be seen as a (bounded) polyhedron, i.e. an intersection of a 
finite system of closed halfspaces. From this point of view the charac-
teristics of the class of (normalized) superadditive games will be known 
when its extreme elements are characterized. 
Unfortunately the characterization of the extreme superadditive games is 
still an open problem. Only partial characterizations have been given 
such as in Gurk (1959) and Griesmer (1959). The main result in this work 
is the introduction of a new partial characterization. For this introduc-
tion we will use established concepts like "essential coalitions" and 
"decomposable games". 
In the next section we will present the basic definitions from the theory 
of cooperative games. Section 3 is devoted to a survey of the results on 
extreme superadditive games which are known in literature. In section 4 
the notion of uniform games is introduced. It is shown that the extrema-
lity of a uniform superadditive game is equivalent to the non-decomposabi-
lity of the game. For the proof of this characterization a result is nee-
ded which has nothing in common with our main subject and, therefore, it 
is stated and proved in an appendix. 
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2. PRELIMINARIES 
Let N = {1,2, ••• ,n} denote a finite set of players. Ann-person aoope-
rative game v (in characteristic function form) is a real valued function 
on the set 2N of subsets of N such that v(0) = 0. The subsets of N are 
called aoalitions. A game v assigns to each coalition s c N the value 
v(S) which may be seen as the maximal gain of the coalition S which can be 
reached by the players in S when they join their resources. 
If a game v fullf ills 
v(S) + v(N\S) = v(N) for each coalition S S N 
then v is said to be a aonstant sum game. In this chapter we will special-
ly pay attention to games v which fullfill 
v(S) + v(T) ~ v(SUT) for all disjoint coalitions S,T ~ N. 
Such games are called superad.d.itive. In superadditive games it is not un-
profitable for two disjoint coalitions to cooperate. For a more detailed 
description of the notion of a cooperative games and examples of superaddi-
tive games the reader is reffered to chapter 6. 
An other property which will be mentioned frequently is the convexity pro-
perty. A game v is said to be aonvex if 
v(S) + v(T) ~ v(SUT) + v(snT) for all coalitions S,T ~ N. 
One immediately sees that for a superadditive game v we have 
v ( s) ?: l:. . E v ( { i}) 
l.:l. s for each coalition S c N. 
Let Cl.v denote the constant v(N) - l:i:iEN v({i}). 
Whenever Cl. is positive we define the game v0 as follows 
v -1 
v0 (s) = Cl.v (v(S) - l:i:iESv({i})) for each Sc N. 
(1) 
Because of (1) it is clear that v0 assigns a non-negative value to each 
coalition. The game v0 is called the (0,1)-normalization of v and it 
assigns 0 to the one-person coalitions and 1 to the grand coalition N. 
Such games are called (0,1)-normalized. 
This normalization procedure is a well-known concept in the cooperative 
game theory. We will often apply this normalization. Specially we will 
use the fact that the values of the coalitions in a (0,1)-normalized su-
peradditive game v are restricted between 0 and 1 
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0 ~ v(S) ~ v(S) + v(N\S) ~ v(N) 1 for each coalition Sc N. (2) 
Examples of (0,1)-normalized games are the so-called unanimity games 
with TE 2N \{0,{1},{2}, ... ,{n}}, defined as 
J 1 if S? T, 
' 
for each Sc N. [_o otherwise 
Note that the unanimity games are convex and, thus, superadditive. 
Furthermore, the values for the coalitions are only 0 and 1. Such games 
are called simple games. 
Let K denote the set of (0,1)-normalized superadditive n-person games. n 
From (2) we conclude that the set Kn is a bounded set in the game space 
and the reader is invited to check that the set K is convex, i.e. for 
n 
each two elements v and w of K and scalar a, 0 <a< 1, we have 
n 
av + (1-a)w EK , 
n 
where av + (1--a)w is defined to be the game which assigns to each coali-
tion s the value av(S) + (1-a)w(S). The game av + (1-a)w is called a 
convex combination of v and w. 
A game v E Kn is called extreme if it is not a convex combination of two 
other games of Kn' i.e. if v = aw 1 + (1-a)w2 for two games w1 ,w2 E Kn and 
a scalar a, 0 <a< 1, then v w1 w2 . 
Also the set L {v EK 
n n 
v a constant sum game} is a convex set. 
Its extreme elements are, as for Kn' the games in Ln which 
ten as a convex combinations of two different games of L . 
n 
cannot be writ-
In the following section we will give a summary of the results concerning 
the extreme games of Kn and Ln which can be found in literature. One 
proof is included as an example of the argumentation techniques which are 
used frequently. 
3. A SURVEY OF RESULTS IN LITERATURE 
In Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) the notion of a cooperative 
game in characteristic function form is introduced. There also the study 
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on the subject of extreme superadditive games started. The game theoreti-
cal model which gave rise to the definition of a cooperative game imposed 
the superadditivity and the constant sum property on the game. Therefore, 
the first results concern the set Ln and Von Neumann and Morgenstern sho-
wed that the extreme games of L4 are exactly the simple games of L4 . 
The question raised whether this was generally true. A negative ans-
wer was given in Gurk (1959) by characterizing the extreme games of L5 . 
First Gurk noticed that each simple game in Ln is extreme. Then the con-
sidered three-valued games, i.e. games in which the value of each coalition 
can admit only three values. For (0,1)-normalized constant sum games 
these values are, of course, 0, 1 and 1. Furthermore the following notion 
is introduced : 
Let v be an element of L . 
n 
A sequence (T 1 , ... ,T2R) of coalitions is called a K-chain if 
i) T1 T2R' 
ii) Tr n Tr+l = 0 for each r E {1,2, ... ,2R-1}, 
iii) v(Tr) + v(Tr+l) for each r E {1,2, ... ,2R-1}. 
For 
v{T 1) = 
equality 
a K-chain (T 1 , ... ,T2R) we obviously have 
v(TZr+l) and v(T2Rl = v{T2rl for each r E {1,2, ... ,R-1}. The 
T1 = T2R now implies that the coalitions in a K-chain all have 
the same value in the game v. Because of iii) this value equals~- (3) 
THEOREM 1. (Gurk ( 1959)) 
Let v E Ln be a three-valued game. If for each coalition S with v(S) = 1 
there exists a K-chain (T 1 , ... ,T2R) with S = T 1 = TZR then vis extreme. 
Proof. Suppose vis not extreme. Let w1 and w2 be elements of Ln' unequal 
to v, and scalar Cl, 0 < Cl < 1, such that v = aw1 + (1-Cl) w2 ·There is a coali-
tion, say S', such that v(S') -f w1 (s'). Then also v(S') -f w2 (s'). 
We already noticed that each game in Kn and, therefore, in Ln assigns non-
negative values to the coalitions. Thus, if for a coalition s we have 
v{S) = 0 = aw1 (S) + (1-Cl)w2 (s) then w1 and w2 also assign 0 to S, i.e. 
w1 {S) = w2 (s) = 0. Therefore, v(S') -f 0. Also v(S') -f 1 since otherwise 
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1 = aw1 (S') + (1-a)w2 (S'), w1 (S') i 1 and w2 (s') i 1 which imply that one 
of the values w1 (S') and w2 (S') has to be greater than 1 which is impossi-
ble according to (2). 
We conclude that v(S') = 1 and w1 (S') i 1 and w2 (s') i 1. 
Therefore, there is a K-chain (T 1 , ... ,T2Rl with S' = T 1 = T2R. 
Let the index r E {1,2, ... ,2R-1} be arbitrary. 
The equality v(Tr) + v(Tr+l) = 1 implies that 
a(w1 (Tr) + w1 (Tr+lll + (1-a) (w2 (Tr) + w2 (Tr+l)) = 1. 
(4) 
(5) 
Using the superadditivity property of wj, j = 1,2, and Tr ~ N \ Tr+l 
we gain 1 w. (N) = w. (T ) + w. (N \ T ) 
J J r J r 
;;; w.(T) + w.(T 1), j = 1,2. (6) J r J r+ 
Combining (S) and (6) we conclude that 
1 = w. (T ) + w. (T l) , j 1, 2. J r J r+ 
Therefore, (T 1 , ... ,T2Rl is also a K-chain for the games w1 and w2 . Thus, 
applying (3) we gain that!= w1 (T 1) = w1 (S') which is in contradiction 
with (4). We conclude that the assumption that v is not extreme is false. D 
The K-chain property, as formulated in theorem 1, is also sufficient when 
considering S-person games : 
THEOREM 2. (Gurk (1959)) 
A game v in LS is extreme if and only if for each coalition S with value 
v(S) unequal to 0 or 1 there exists a K-chain such that S = T 1 = T2R. 
Theorem 2 obviously implies that the extreme elements of LS are three-
valued games or simple games. There are extreme games in Ln' with n > S, 
which assign more than three values to the coalitions. An example is 
given in Gurk (1959). Section 4 will also provide an example. 
In Griesmer (19S9) the reverse of theorem is shown 
THEOREM 3. (Griesmer (19S9)) 
Let v be a three-valued game of Ln. If v is extreme in Ln then for each 
coalition S with value ! there exists a K-chain with S = TJ. = T2R. 
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D 
D 
The above theorems can also be used for the characterization of the three-
valued extreme games of Kn. To show this each game v of Kn is identified 
with an (n+l)-person constant- sum game v' of Ln+l defined by f v(S) 
L1-v(N\S) 
if n+l f S 
v' (S) for each coalition Sc NU {n+1}. 
if n+l E s 
In this context player n+l is called the fictitious player. 
THEOREM 4. (Spinetto (1971)) 
A game v of Kn is extreme if and only if v' is extreme in Ln+l" D 
(7) 
By using the results in Gurk (1959) on 5-person constant sum games, as dis-
played in theorem 2, and applying theorem 4 Spinetto was able to list the 
extreme superadditive games of K4 (Spinetto (1971)). Of course, these games 
are three-valued or are simple games. 
In Rosenmuller (1977) a completely different approach to the problem of 
characterizing (the) extreme games of Kn is proposed. The aim is to repre-
sent each game in Kn in such a way that the extremeness property can be 
translated into properties of the representation. This approach has been 
applied succesfully in the characterization of the extreme elements of the 
class of (0,1)-normalized convex games (Rosenmuller and Weidner (1974), 
Rosenmuller (1977)). Although the fact that convex games and superadditive 
games have similar definitions the representation approach for superadditi-
ve games has not been succesfull yet. For a detailed discussion of the 
used techniques and related subjects the reader is referred to Rosenmuller 
(1986). 
4. UNIFORM GAMES 
In this section WP will introduce the notion of uniform games. In the 
definition of a uniform game essential coalitions play the central role. 
For a superadditive game v a coalition S is called essential whenever 
v(S) > v(T) + v(S \ T) for each non-empty coalition Tc S. 
This property for a coalition S may be seen as an incentive for the players 
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in S to stay in cooperation because any split up of the coalition S will 
be unprofitable. 
Let us denote with B(v) the set of all essential coalitions of v. The 
superadditive game v is called unifOY'171 if all essential coalitions have 
the same value denoted by av' i.e. v(S) = av for each S E B(v). For a 
uniform game v in Kn the value av is the smallest positive value that a 
coalition can admit in v. 
Examples of uniform games are the superadditive simple games. For a 
superadditive simple game v we have av = 1 and B(v) consists of all those 
coalitions S with 
v(S) = and v(T) = 0 for each coalition Tc S. 
These coalitions are also known as the minimal winning coalitions. Another 
example of a uniform game is the n-person superadditive game ';; defined as 
(where I s I denotes the number of players in the coalition S) 
s I if S f- 0 and I S I is even 
';; ( s) for each Sc N. 
i ( I s I -ii if I S I is odd. 
[
1 I 
Then a-;; equals 1 and the set B(~) 
~ ~ -1 ~ 
consists of all two-person coalitions. 
is also uniform and is an element of K 
n 
Obviously the game v 0 = (v(N) )v 
Note also that ';;0 is a constant sum game whenever the number n is odd. 
A superadditive game can easily be checked whether it is a uniform game. 
Furthermore, there is a simple characterization of the extreme superadditi-
ve games in Kn which are uniform and the remaining part of this section is 
devoted to this characterization. 
LEMMA 5. Let v and w be two superadditive games. 
If v(S) ~ w(S) for ~11 S E B(v) then v ~ w, i.e. v(S) ~ w(S) for each Sc N. 
Proof. Suppose there is a coalition T with v(T) > w(T). Let T be chosen 
such that it does not contain more players than any other coalition S with 
v(S) > w(S). Of course, T cannot be an essential coalition for the game v. 
Hence, there is a non-empty coalition S c T such that v(T) = v(S) + v(T \ S). 
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According to the choice of T we have 
w(S) + w(T \ S) ;::: v(S) t- v(T \ S) v(T) > w(T) 
which is contradictory to the fact that w is superadditive. The lemma 
follows. o 
In Shapley (1971) one may fi.nd an application of essential coalitions to-
gether with a decomposability criterion which will be used here also. 
A game v is called deeorrrposable if there is a coalition s such that 
v(S) f 0, v(N \ S) f 0 and 
v(T) v(T n S) + v(T \ S) for all T c N. 
A decomposable game v in Kn cannot be extreme for let coalition S be as 
in (8) and consider the games w1 and w2 defined as 
1 -1 
w1 (T) = (v(S)- )v(T n S) and w2 (T) = (v(N \ S) )v(T \ S), Tc N. 
(8) 
Then w1 and w2 are (0,1)-normalized superadditive games. Furthermore, w1 
and w2 unequal v and 
v = v(S)w1 + v(N \ S)w2 = v(S)w1 + (v(N)-v(S))w2 v(S)w 1 + (1-v(S))w2 which 
shows that vis not extreme. 
A non-decomposable game of Kn may not be extreme either 
Consider the 3-person game v with 
v(S) = 0 for each coalition S with IS I< O, v(S) 
v({ 1,2 ,3}) = 1. 
1 if I s I 2 and 
One easily checks that v is an element of K3 and non-decomposable (or apply 
lemma 6). Now let w1 and w2 be the simple games with 
w1 (S) = 1 if s E {{1,2},{1,3},N} and w2 (s) = 1 if s E {{2,3},N}. Then 
w1 and w2 are superadditive games, unequal to v, elements of K3 and 
v = !w1 + 1w2 . Hence, v is not extreme. 
A set B of coalitions is said to be deeorrrposable if there exists a non-empty 
coalition s c N such that 
"' N\S B n 2- f 0, B n 2 f 0 and 
B = (B n 2s) u (B n 2N\S) . 
LEMMA 6. Let v be a superadditive game. Then vis decomposable if and 
only if B(v) is decomposable. 
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(9) 
Proof. The "only if" part of the lemma is obviously true. Thus suppose 
that B(v) is decomposable and let S be as in (9). Furthermore, let w1 and 
w2 be the game defined as 
wl(T) = v(T n S) and w2(T) = v(T \ S), Tc:: N. 
Then, for each coalition T c:: N, v(T) ~ v(T n S) + v(T \ S) 
Therefore, v ~ w1 + w2 • 
On the other hand, for each essential coalition T E B(v) we have T ~ S or 
TC:: N\S according to (9). This implies that v(T) = w1 (T) + w2 (T). 
Applying lemma 5 on the supera.dditive games v and w1+w2 we gain that 
v ~ w1 + w2 • Hence, v = w1 + w2 and the lemma follows. 
THEOREM 7. Let v be a uniform game of Kn. Then vis extreme if and only 
if v is not decomposable. 
D 
Proof. The "only if" part follows immediately. Thus, let v be a game of 
Kn' uniform and not decomposable. Let w1 ,w2 E Kn and scalar a, 0 <a< 1, 
be such that v = aw1 + (1-a)w2 • The theorem is proved whenever we have 
shown that v w1 = w2 • From lemma 6 it follows that B(v) is not decompo-
sable. Of course, B(v) is non-empty and fullfills 
if S ~ T for two coalitions S,T E B(v) then S = T. 
Therefore, B(v) fullfills the conditions of the theorem mentioned in the 
appendix. Applying this theorem we state that there exists a sequence of 
essential coalitions, say Q = (T 1'' •.. ,TR), such that 
i) each essential coalition occurs at least once in Q; 
ii) the union of each two adjacent elements of Q does not contain 
two disjoint essential coalitions, i.e. 
if S,T C:: Tr U Tr+l for an r, 1 ~ r ~ R-1 and S,T E B(v) then 
SOTfliL 
Of course, we have v(Tr U Tr+l) ~ v(Tr), ~ r ~ R-1. Suppose 
v(Tr U Tr+l) > v(Tr) av for an index r E {1,2, ••• ,R-1}. Consider the 
game v' which equals v on all coalitions except Tr U Tr+l and 
(11) 
(12) 
v'(Tr U Tr+l) = v(Tr). Since vis uniform and v(Tr U Tr+l) > av the coali-
tion Tr U Tr+l cannot be essential. Therefore, v'(S) = v(S) for each coali-
tion S of B(v). Furthermore, one easily checks with the help of (12) that 
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v' is superadditive. Applying lemma 5 we gain that v' ;::; v. Then 
v(T ) = v' (T u Tr+1) ;::; v(T u Tr+1) > v(T ) . A contradiction. r r r r 
We conclude that v(T u Tr+1) = v(T ) a v' ;:; r ;:; R-1. r r 
Using w. (T 
J r U Tr+l);::; j(Tr), j= 1,2, 1;:; r;:; R-1, we gain 
a"i(Tr) + (1-a)~!Tr) v(T ) r 
;:; a"i(Tr U Tr+l) + (1-a)~(Tr U Tr+l) = v(Tr U Tr+l) = v(Tr). 
This implies that w. (T U T 1 ) = w. (T ) , j 1,2, 1 ~ r ;£ R-1. J r r+ J r 
Analogously one proves that wj(Tr U Tr+l) wj(Tr+l), j = 1,2, 1 ;:; r;:; R-1. 
We conclude that w1 and w2 assign to each coalition in the sequence Q the 
same value, say a 1 and a 2 . Of course, aa 1 + (1-a)a2 = av. 
Then w1 (S) = a 1 and w2 (s) = a 2 for each SE B(v) according to (11). 
Therefore, w1 (S) = (a 1/av) v(S) for each coalition S of B(v). Using 
lemma 5 we gain that w1 ;::; (a 1/av) v. Similarly, w2 ;::; (a2/avlv. 
v = aw 1 + (1-a)w2 ;:; a(a/a ) v + (1-a) (a/a ) v 
-1 v v 
av (aa 1 + (1-a)a2 )v = v. 
From this we conclude that w1 
Applying w1 (N) = w2 (N) = v(N) 1 we gain that a 1 
w1 = w2 = v and, therefore, v is an extreme game. 
(a/av) v. 
a 2 = av. Hence, 
Then 
D 
Now let us return to the examples of uniform games which are displayed at 
the beginning of this section : the simple games and then-person game v0 . 
The essential coalitions of a superadditive simple game have value 1. 
This implies that each two different essential coalitions are not disjoint 
for otherwise there exists a coalition with value at least 2 which is im-
possible in a simple game. Therefore, the set B(v) of essential coalitions 
of a superadditive simple game v is non-decomposable. We conclude that 
the simple games in Kn are extreme. 
In the game ~O each two-person coalition is essential. Therefore, the 
set B(~0 ) is non-decomposable and, thus, v0 is extreme in Kn. Of course, 
the game ~O is, for n > 5, not simple and not three-valued. We mentioned 
already that, for n odd, ~O is a constant~sum game : ~O E Ln. Since 
Ln c Kn and v 0 is extreme in Kn the game v0 has to be extreme in Ln also, 
for n odd. 
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Theorem 7 does not characterize all extreme games of Kn. For example, in 
Spinetto (1971) the following 4-person extreme superadditive game may be 
found : 
v({l,2}) v({l,3}) = v({2,3}) = v({3,4}) = v({l,2,3}) = v({2,3,4}) = L 
v({l,2,4}) = v({l,3,4}) = v({l,2,3,4}) = 1 and v(S) = 0 for the other 
coalitions S. 
This game is not uniform since {1,2} and {1,2,4} are essential coalitions 
of v with different values. 
APPENDIX 
ON A PROPERTY FOR A NON-DECOMPOSABLE FAMILY OF SUBSETS OF A FINITE SET. 
Let N be a non-empty finite set. The family of all subsets of N is denoted 
by 2N. Let B c 2N be a non-empty set. Bis called decomposable if there 
is a subset S of N such that 
B n 25 i 0, B n 2N\S and 
B (B n 2sl u (B n 2N\sl . 
THEOREM. Let B c 2N, B i 0. Furthermore, suppose that if 
S c T for two elements S,T E B then S = T. 
Then there exists a sequence Q 
that 
i) each element of B occurs in Q, i.e. 
for each s E B there is an r, 1 ;;: r ~ R, with s = 
ii) the union of each two adjacent elements of Q does not 
disjoint elements of B, i.e. 
T r; 
contain 
if S,T ~ Tr U Tr+l for an r, 1 ;;: r;;: R-1, and S,T E B, 
then S n T i 0. 
(1) 
(2) 
two 
(3) 
Proof. In the following we shall construct a sequence which has the de-
sired properties. Note that for sequences which fullfill (3) each intersec-
tion of two adjacent elements is non-empty. Let Q = (T 1 , ... ,TR) be an ar-
bitrary sequence of elements of B for which 
Tr n Tr+l f 0 for each r, 1 ;;: r S R-1, 
and suppose that there is an element of B which does not occur in Q. Let T 
be the union of the sets T 1 , ... ,TR. 
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(4) 
Consider the following two cases 
a) B n 2N\T F 0. 
Then there is an element, say S', of B\{T 
r 
s• n T f 0. 
bl B n 2N\T f 0. 
~ r ~ R} such that 
(B n 2T) u (B n 2N\T) F _B since B is not decomposable by assumption. 
Therefore, there is an element, say S', of B such that 
S' n T F 0 and S' n N\T F 0. 
In both cases S' is chosen such that it does not occur in Q. Moreover, 
from S' n T f 0 we achieve that there is an element Tr such that S' n Tr f 0. 
Now the sequence Q' = (T 1 , •.. ,Tr,S',Tr, •.• ,TR) fullfills (4) also and it 
contains one extra element of B. 
We conclude that one may construct a sequence of elements of B in which 
each element of B occurs at least once and which fullfills (4) by applying 
the above method as many times as needed. 
Now let Q = (T 1 , •.• ,TR) be a sequence for which (2) and (4) holds and con-
sider the index set 
I(Q) = {r : there exist S,T E B with S,T c Tr U Tr+l and Sn T 0 }. 
Furthermore, let d(Q) max{ IT U T 1 I : r E I(Q)} and r r+ 
IM(Q) = {l E I(Q) : I Tl u Tl+l I= d(Q)}. 
If I(Q) = 0 or, equivalently, IM(Q) = 0, then Q is a desired sequence. 
Thus, suppose IM(Q) f 0 and let s1 ,si E B, s1 ,si c T1 U T1+1 and s1 n s~ = 0 
for each 1 E IM(Q). 
Then, for each index 1 of IM(Q), we have: 
If s1 n T1 = 0 then s1 c Tl+l which implies s1 = Tl+l according to (1). 
Then, using s 1 n s 1• = 0, we conclude that S' c T which implies S' T . 1 1 1 1 
Thus, 0 = s n S' = T n T 1 F 0. A contradiction. 
1 1 1 l+ 
Therefore, s n T F 0 and, similarly, s n T 1 F 0. (5) 
1 1 1 l+ 
Consider the sequence Q' = (Tl, ••• ,T~) which we obtain by inserting the 
element s1 between T1 and Tl+l in the sequence Q, for each 1 E IM(Q). 
Q' obviously fullfills (2) and, according to (5), also (4). 
We will prove now that d(Q') < d(Q). 
For each 1 E IM(Q) we have 
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d(Q) and [ s1 U Tl+l ~ d(Q) since 
Sl := Tl U T1+1" 
If [ T1 U s1 [ = d(Q) = [ T1 U Ti+l [ then we must have T 1\T c s1 . 1 + 1 -
s1 n S' = 0 now implies S' c T 1 and, therefore, S' = T according to (1). 1 1 - 1 1 
Thus, S c T 1 , implying S = T 1 A contradiction. 1 l+ 1 l+ 
Hence, [ T U S [ < d(Q) and [ S U T 1 [ < d(Q) by the same reasoning. (6) 1 1 . 1 l+ 
Using (6) and the construction of Q' from Q we conclude that d(Q') < d(Q). 
We described a method that constructs from a sequence Q, fullfilling the 
conditions (2) and (4) and d(Q) > O, a sequence Q' for which also (2) and 
(4) holds and d(Q') < d(Q). Now d(Q) is a non-negative integer for each 
sequence Q with I(Q) i 0. 
Therefore, by applying the method finitely many times we obtain a sequence 
Q, fullfilling (2) and (4) and I(Q) = 0. 
Then Q is a sequence for which (2) and (3) holds. 
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CH.APTER X 
COMBINATORIAL GAMES 
by Imma Curiel 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Combinatorial optimization problems are well-known in the literature. 
Examples of such problems are the traveling salesman problem, the optimal 
assignment problem and the minimum cost spanning tree problem. These 
problems can be viewed as describing situations where one person wants to 
maximize his revenues or minimize his costs and has to solve a combina-
torial problem to do this. In the following we will consider combinato-
rial games. These games describe situations where there is a group of 
people each of which wants to maximize his profits or minimize his costs. 
Each has to solve a combinatorial problem to do this. These people can 
decide to combine their forces in order to have more profit or less costs. 
They can work together in the whole group or in subgroups. Each subgroup 
has to solve a combinatorial optimization problem in order to maximize 
its profits or minimize its costs. If they decide to work together in a 
group they have to decide how the profits or costs should be divided 
among the members of the group. Cooperative game theory proposes several 
methods for the division of profits or costs. In the following sections 
we will consider seven combinatorial games which are studied in literature. 
In the second section we give the necessary definitions of cooperative 
game theory. In the third section we introduce the seven games and give 
the most important results for them from the literature. In the fourth 
section we give a general method to generate core elements for five of 
these games and indicate why this method does not work for the two other 
games. In the last section we make some concluding remarks. 
2. COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY 
Cooperative game theory is used to describe and analyse situations in 
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which a group of people can decrease their costs or increase their 
revenues by working together. Formally, a cooperative game in characte-
ristic function form is an ordered pair <N,v> where N is a finite set, 
the set of players and v is the characteristic function which assigns to 
every subset S of N a real number v(S) with v(0) = 0. The set of subsets 
N l" . of N is denoted by 2 , we call a subset of N a coa ?,t?,on. In this con-
text v(S) is regarded as the worth of the coalition S, i.e. the revenue 
that the members of S can achieve if they work together. A cooperative 
game < N, v > is said to be superadditive if 
v(S) + v(T) ~ v(S U T) for all S,T E 2N with S n T (*) 
and convex if 
v(S) + v(T) ~ v(S U T) + v(S n T) for all S,T E 2N. (**) 
The question which arises once the grand coalition N is formed is how 
v(N) should be divided among the players. Let N = {1,2, ... ,n}, then an 
allocation of v(N) among the players can be described by a vector x EJRn 
with L x = v(N) . 
iE: N i 
Here xi denotes the amount allocated to player i. 
In the following we will denote L x. for a vector x E:Rn and an 
iE s i 
S E: 2N \ {0} by x(S). Solution concepts assign an allocation or a set of 
allocations to a game. 
The core is a solution concept which assigns a, possibly empty, set 
of allocations to a game. The core of <N,v> is denoted by C(v) and 
defined by 
C(v) := {x E Rn : x(N) = v(N), x(S) ~ v(S) for all S E 2N \ {0}}. 
If v(N) is allocated according to an element of C(v) no coalition has an 
incentive to split off the grand coalition because it cannot do better on 
its own. A convex game always has a non-empty core, cf. Shapley (23). 
Let us imagine that the formation of N takes place according to a 
permutation TI of N, with the players joining one after the other in the 
-1 -1 -1 
order TI (1), TI (2), ... ,TI (n). Let P(TI,i) denote the set of predecessors 
of i with respect to TI, P(TI,i) :={j E NITI(j) < TI(i)}. The marginal con-
tribution of i with respect to TI is denoted by W~(v) and defined by 
J. 
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ijJ~(v) := v(P(TI,i) u {i}) - v(P(TI,i)). 
]_ 
The Shape Zy-value <Ii assigns the following allocation to < N, v > 
<Ii. (v) := 1 L: ijJ~(v) for all i EN. 
i n! i 
TIE IIN 
The Shapley-value gives player i his expected marginal contribution if 
all possible orders of formation are considered equally likely to occur. 
For each S E 2N \ {0} we denote by ITS the set of permutations of S. Even 
for a game with a non-empty core the Shapley-value may not be in the core. 
For a convex game the Shapley-value is the barycenter of the core. 
For an allocation x we define the excess of a coalition S relative 
to x by 
e(x,S) := v(S) - x(S). 
Schmeidler (21) has defined the nucleolus of v as that allocation which 
minimizes the maximum excess lexicographically. Schmeidler has proved 
that there is a unique allocation for which the lexicographical minimum 
is achieved. If the core of a game is non-empty then it contains the 
nucleolus. 
The last solution concept that we treat here is the T-Value intro-
duced by Tijs (28). For a cooperative game <N,v> we define 
Mv = v(N) - v(N \ {i}) for all i EN. i 
M: is the maximum payoff that player i can expect to obtain, if he 
asks for more, the others will do better by working without him. Let S 
be a coalition with i E S, suppose all members of S \ { iJ get their ma-
ximum then what is left for player i is equal to 
Rv(S,i) := v(S) - Mv(S \ {i}). 
The minimum that i will consent to get is 
max Rv(S,i), 
S3 i 
because he can ensure himself this by offering the members of a coalition 
S, for which 
with r~ 
]_ 
fv (N) ;-::; v(N) 
the maximum is achieved, their maximum payoff and remaining 
A cooperative game <N,v> is said to be quasi-balanced if 
;-::; Mv(N). For a quasi-balanced game the T-value is defined by 
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v 
T. := 
l 
for all i E N. 
Here A is uniquely determined by T(N) = v(N). 
The notions that we have introduced have all been stated in terms of 
revenues but in an analogous way we can state them in terms of costs. 
The characteristic function of a cost game will be denoted by c instead 
of v. For a cost game the notions of subadditivity and concavity are 
important. A game is subadditive (concave) if it satisfies (*) ((**)) 
with the inequalities reversed. 
For the definition of the core of a cost game we also have to reverse the 
inequalities. The Shapley-value of a cost game is defined in the same 
way as the Shapley-value of a revenue game. The nucleolus of a cost game 
is defined to be that allocation which maximizes the minimum excess lexo-
graphically. For a cost game < N ,c > we define M~ 
l 
in the same way 
as for a revenue game. But here Mc is considered 
l 
to be the minimum cost 
Rc(S,i) can also be defined that i can expect that he will have to pay. 
in the 
"min", 
pay. 
same way. For the definition of r~ we have to change "max" into 
l 
r~ is considered to be the maximum that player i will consent to 
l 
A cost game < N ,c > is said to be quasi-balanced if re (N);;; c (N);;; Mc (N) . 
The T-value of <N,c> is defined with the aid of M~ and re in the same 
l i 
way as the T-value of a revenue game. 
In the following we will denote the worth of a coalition {i,j, ... ,k} 
by v(i,j, ... ,k) instead of v({i,j, ... ,k}). The same holds for the cost 
of the coalition. 
With every permutation TI E TIN a peY'l"ITUtation matrix P 
is associated with p .. E {0,1} for all i,J· EN and p 
n n 
[pij l i=l, j=l 
if and only if lJ ij 
n(i) = j. Such a permutation matrix [p .. ]~ 1 n 1 satisfies the following lJ l= ,J= 
conditions 
n 
jf 1 pij for all i E N, 
n 1 for all E 
if 1 
= N, 
pij 
pij E { 0, 1} for all i,j E N. 
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If we change the last condition into p .. ~ 0 for all i,j E N we get a l.J 
larger set of matrices. These matrices are called douhly stochastic. 
3 • COMBINATORIAL GAMES 
A cooperative game is said to be a combinatorial game if for every 
S E 2N \ {0} the worth or cost of S is given by the value of a combinato-
rial optimization problem which depends on s. In this section we will 
study seven different combinatorial games which appear in literature and 
describe the results obtained for these games. 
Mininrum aost spanning tree games. 
Claus and Kleitman (2) studied the following situation. Several cus-
tomers who are geographically separated have to be linked to a certain 
supplier. We can think, for example, of the supplier being an electrici-
ty plant and the customers being firms or cities which want to make use 
of the service provided by the supplier. A user can be linked directly 
to the supplier or via other users. Let us denote the set of users by 
N = {1,2, ... ,n} and the supplier by 0. A link between elements i and j 
of NU{O} we denote by 1 ... Every link induces a non-negative cost. The l.J 
cost of link lij we denote by k(lij). Note that lji = lij" If the cus-
tomers cooperate they can try to find a cheapest way to connect them all 
with the supplier. Let us think of the customers and the supplier as 
vertices of a complete graph GN. We denote the edge set of this graph by 
EN. Every edge corresponds to a link 1,. with i,j E N U {O} and vice l.J 
versa. To edge 1 .. we attach cost k(l .. ) . Then the problem of finding l.J l.J 
a cheapest way to connect all customers with the supplier is equivalent 
to the problem of finding a minimum cost spanning tree of the graph GN. 
The question that Claus and Kleitman raised is how to allocate this cost 
among the customers. They studied several methods to allocate this cost 
and discussed their pro's and contra's. Further, they gave a list of 
desirable criteria for a cost allocation. 
Bird (1) applied cooperative game theory to this situation. A cooperative 
game <N,c> can be defined as follows. The set of players is equal to the 
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set of customers. For every coalition S we define c(S) to be the cost of 
linking all members of S to the supplier in a cheapest possible way 
without making links which involve non-members of S. Hence c(S) is equal 
to the cost of a minimum cost spanning tree in the complete graph GS with 
set of vertices equal to SU {0}. We denote the edge set of this graph 
by Es. The game < N ,c > is called a minimum cost spanning tree game, cf. 
Granat and Huberman (11). Bird proved that this game has a non-empty core. 
THEOREM (Bird) . Let < N ,c > be a minimum cost spanning tree game. Then 
C ( c) of 0. 
PROOF. Let TN be a minimum cost spanning tree of GN. For every i E N 
let ei be the edge on the unique path from 0 to i in TN incident to i. 
We construct an element x of the core in the following way. Let xi = k(ei) 
for every i EN. Then x(N) Z k(e.) = c(N). For SE 2N \ {0} let T be 
iE N i SS 
a minimum cost spanning tree of GS. For every i E S let e i be 
the edge on the unique path from 0 to i in TS incident to i. Then 
c(S) = Z k(e~). Suppose x(S) > c(S), then there is an i E S such that 
'E i k(e~)< i- Sk(e.). Remove e. from T and add e~, this results in a span-
i i i N i 
ning tree of GN with lesser cost than TN which contradicts the fact that 
TN is a minimum cost spanning tree of GN. Hence x(S) ~ c(S) for every 
S E 2N \ {0} and it follows that x E C(c). D 
The following example illustrates the fact that a minimum cost spanning 
tree game needs not be concave. 
EXAMPLE. Let N = {1,2,3}. The costs are given in the following figure. 
Then c ( 1) = 4, c ( 2) = 1 , c ( 3) = c(l,2) = c(l,3) = c(2,3) = 2, c(l,2,3)= 3. 
We see that c(l,2) + c(l,3) = 4 < 7 = c(l) + c(l,2,3) so the game is not 
concave. This game has core C(c) { ( 1, 1, 1)}. The Shapley-value c.p(c) = 
(2,1,1) g C(c). Bird considers a class of weighted Shapley-values which 
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lie in the core of minimum spanning tree games. He abandons the assumption 
that all permutations of N are equiprobable. Only feasible permutations 
may have non-zero probability. A permutation TI E TIN is called feasible if 
there exists a minimum cost spanning tree TN of GN such that GN contains 
minimum cost spanning trees of GS for all coalitions S of the form 
{ -1 -1 -1 S = TI (1) ,TI (2) , ... ,TI (q)} with q E {1, ... ,n}. Note that every mini-
mum cost spanning tree TN of GN induces at least one feasible permutation 
TI E TIN. In the definition of TI we only have to make sure that if j is on 
the unique path from 0 to i then TI(i) > TI(j). Bird proves that if we 
assign probability pTI = 0 to TI whenever TI is not feasible and probability 
pTI ~ 0 if TI is feasible with the sum of pTI over all feasible TI equal to 1, 
then the weighted Shapley-values defined with these probabilities are al-
ways contained in the core of a minimum cost spanning tree game. 
Granot and Huberman (12) have introduced the notion of a perrrrutationally 
concave game. A game < N ,c > is called permutationally concave if there 
exists a permutation TI such that for all U E 2N and S c T c N \ U with S 
-1 -1 -1 
and T of the form {TI (1) ,TI (2), ... ,TI (q)} where q E { 1, ... ,n} the follow-
ing holds 
c (S U U) - c (S) ~ c (T U U) - c (T) (*). 
It follows that every concave game is permutationally concave. Granot and 
Huberman prove that the core of a permutationally concave game is not empty 
and that minimum cost spanning tree games are permutationally concave. The 
results of Bird and Granot and Huberman are related in the sense that if 
< N ,c > is a minimum cost spanning tree game then (*) holds for every feasi-
ble permutation. Further, for every permutationally concave game c, if TI 
is a permutation for which (*) holds then the marginal vector mTI(c) is an 
element of C(c). Hence every convex combination of such mTI (c)' s is an ele-
ment of C(c). This implies that for minimum cost spanning tree games 
every convex combination of the marginal vectors corresponding to feasible 
permutations is an element of the core and the result of Bird concerning 
the class of weighted Shapley-values follows. 
Granot and Huberman also prove : if a minimum cost spanning tree game can 
be decomposed into q games < Nk, ck>, where the Nk' s form a partition of N, 
then the core and the nucleolus of < N ,c > is the Cartesian product of the 
cores and nucleoli of the games < Nk ,ck>. 
235 
Megiddo (15) has proved that if the customers may use other arcs besides 
the ones connecting two customers or a customer and the supplier the re-
sulting game can have an empty core. 
In (16) Megiddo studies a class of games related to minimum cost spanning 
tree games. In these games a spanning tree TN of GN is given and the 
cost c(S) of a coalition S is the total cost of edges that belong to some 
path from 0 to a vertex i E S. This game is, in fact, not a combinatorial 
game as the computation of the characteristic function c does not involve 
a combinatorial optimization problem. Megiddo shows that the core of this 
game is not empty and gives algorithms to compute the nucleolus within 
O(n3 ) operations and the Shapley-value within O(n) operations. One can 
prove in a straightforward way that this game is concave. 
Discrete flow games 
We consider the following situation. A directed network G is given 
through which discrete quantities of a product have to be transported. 
Let P be the set of vertices of G and L the set of arcs. Every arc 1 EL 
has a certain capacity c(l) EN which denotes the maximum quantity that 
can be transported through this arc. Let N = {1,2, ... ,n} be the set of 
players. Every arc belongs to a player. Two vertices are distinguished 
from the others. One is called the source, the other the sink. A dis-
crete flow from source to sink in this network is a function f from L to 
1il with f(l) ~ c(l) for every 1 EL and such that for every vertex p except 
the source and the sink I{f (l) 1 starts at p} = I{f(l) 
The value of such a flow is L:{f (l) : 1 ends at the sink} 
1 ends at p}. 
L:{ f (1) : 1 
starts at the source}. A discrete flow with maximal value is called a 
maximum discrete flow. Let A be a subset of P such that the source is an 
element of A and the sink is not an element of A. By (A, P \ A) we denote 
the subset of L consisting of arcs which have as their starting point an 
element of A and as their endpoint an element of P \ A. Such a subset of 
L is called a cut of the network G. The capacity of a cut is the sum of 
the capacities of its members. A well-known result of Ford and Fulkerson 
states that the value of a maximum discrete flow is equal to the capacity 
of a minimum cut, i.e. a cut with minimum capacity. A cooperative game 
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<N,v> can be defined as follows. For every S E 2N \ {0} the worth v(S) 
of S is the value of a maximum discrete flow f from source to sink with 
f(l) = 0 if 1 does not belong to a member of S. Such a game is called a 
discrete flow game. These games are discretizations of the flow games in-
troduced by Kalai and Zemel in (13). Kalai and Zemel proved that flow 
games have non-empty cores. The following theorem states that discrete 
flow games have non-empty cores. The proof runs in the same way as the 
proof of Kalai and Zemel. 
THEOREM. Let <N,v> be a discrete flow game. Then C(v) f. 0. 
PROOF. Let (A, P \ A) be a minimum cut in the network G of the game < N, v >. 
We define an x ERn as follows. For every i EN xi is the sum of the capa-
cities of the arcs in (A, P \ A) which belong to i, if i does not own any 
arc in (A, p"\ A) then x. 
l. 
0. We prove that x E C(v). Because v(N) is 
equal to the capacity of (A, P \ A) it follows that x(N) = v(N). Let 
SE 2N \ {0}, then v(S) is the value of the maximum discrete flow in the 
network GS which we construct from G by deleting all arcs which do not be-
long to a member of S. Then the restriction of (A, P \ A) to the network 
GS is a cut in GS. It follows that v(S) is less than the capacity of the 
restriction of (A, P \ A) to GS which equals x(S) and we have proved that 
x E C(v). 
EXAMPLE. Let N = {1,2,3}. The network G is given in the following 
figure. The first number gives the capacity of an arc, the second the 
owner. 
1 3 
source 
'50 1 2 sink 
D 
Here v(l) = v(3) = 0, v(2) = 2, v(l,2) = 4, v(l,3) = 1, v(2,3) = 2 and 
v(l,2,3) = 5. The core element corresponding to the minimum cut is (0,4,1). 
C(v) is the convex hull of the points (2,2,1), (3,2,0), (0,4,1) and (1,4,0). 
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Assignment and perrrrutation games. 
Shapley and Shubik (25) have considered the following market. Let 
there be m merchants who want to sell one indivisible commodity each, e.g. 
a house and n buyers who want to purchase one of the indivisible commodi-
ties each. Let M be the set of merchants and B the set of buyers. Amer-
chant j EM values his house at c. units of money. For all i E Band 
J 
j EM we denote the value for buyer i of the house of merchant j by hij" 
A buyer i E B and a merchant j E M can try to cooperate and make some 
profit. If j values his house more than i does then they can make no pro-
fit. If i values the house of j more than j does then they can make a 
joint profit of h .. - c > 0. For all i E B and j EM we define a .. to be lJ j lJ 
the profit they can make i.e. 
aij := max{O, hij - cj}. 
The assignment game < B U M,v > corresponding to this market is defined as 
follows. For every s E 2N \ {0} 
v(S) := + ... + 
where r = min{ S n B [ S n M I } and the maximum is taken over all 
assignments of players j 1 , ... ,jr in Sn M to players i 1 , ... ,ir in Sn B. 
Here and in the rest of this paper we take the maximum (minimum) over the 
empty set to be equal to zero. This implies that v(S) = 0 for S c M or 
S c B. 
A game which is closely related to the assignment game is the perrrrutation 
game introduced by Tijs et al. (29). They consider a situation in which n 
persons all have one job to be processed and one machine on which each job 
can be processed. No machine is allowed to process more than one job. If 
player i processes his job on the machine of player j then the processing 
cost equals c ... Let N = {1,2, ... ,n} be the set of players. The permu-lJ 
tation game <N,c> is defined by 
c(S) min l: c. (.) 
E II 'E i'IT1 
'ITS S l S 
Although the assignment game is defined in terms of revenues and the 
situation it describes is typically bipartite while the permutation game 
is defined in terms of costs and generally there is no bipartiteness in the 
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situation it describes,the two games are closely related. In Tijs et al. 
(29) and in Curiel and Tijs (5) several relations between the two games 
are studied. Both games have a non-empty core. This can be proved in 
several ways for both games. All of these proofs use the following theorem 
of Birkhoff-von Neumann on the extreme points of doubly stochastic matrices. 
THEOREM (Birkhoff-von Neumann) . The extreme points of the set of n x n-
doubly stochastic matrices are exactly the n x n-permutation matrices. D 
As an illustration we give one of the proofs of the non-emptiness of the 
core of a permutation game. This proof is similar to the proof of 
Shapley and Shubik of the non-emptiness of the core of the assignment game 
and can be found in Curiel and Tijs (5). 
THEOREM (Tijs et al. (29)). Permutation games have a non-empty core. 
PROOF. Let <N,c> be a permutation game with costs c .. for i,j EN. We 
l] 
consider the problem of determining c(N). That is the following integer 
programming problem 
min Z c .. x .. subject to 
i,jEN lJ lJ 
Z x .. = 1 for all j EN, Z x .. 
iE N lJ jE N lJ 
1 for all i EN, 
x. . ;;;; 0 and x. . E { 0, 1} for all i, j E N. 
lJ lJ 
Here x .. = 1 indicates that player i uses the machine of player j. Because lJ 
of the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem this problem is equivalent to the linear 
programming problem with the integer conditions left out. So from the 
duality theorem of linear programming it follows that c(N) is equal to the 
value of the dual problem which is 
max Z y, + Z z. subject to 
iE N i iE N i 
y, + z. ~c .. for all i,j EN. 
l J lJ 
Let (y1 , •.. ,yn,z 1 , •.. ,zn) be an optimal 
Z (y. + z.) = x(N) and Z (y. + z.) ~ 
iE N i i iE s i i 
solution of this dual problem then 
Z c. ( . ) for all permutations 
iE S i TI S l 
TIS of S, so Z (yi + zi) ~ c(S) for all S E 2N and it follows that 
iE s 
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D 
The core element described in this theorem corresponds in the following 
way to a price mechanism. Let every player i E N ask a price -z for his j 
machine. To miPimize his cost player i will look for the minimum of 
c .. - z. over all j E N. For all j E N we have c .. - z. ;; Yi and from the l] J l] J 
fact that (yl, ... ,yn' 2 1'"""' 2 n) is optimal for the dual problem it follows 
that for at least one j E N equality holds. So the cost of player i will 
be yi minus the price he gets for his machine which equals -zi. His total 
cost will be yi - (-zi) = yi + zi which is exactly the cost allocated to 
him according to the core element. 
EXAMPLE. Let N {1,2,3} and let <N,c> be the permutation game with the 
following costs c 11 1 , c12 = 4, c13 = 5, c21 = 2, c22 = 8, c23 = 10, 
c31 = 5, c32 = 6, c33 7. Then c (1) 1 , c(2) = 8, c (3) = 7, c(l,2)=6, 
c ( 1,3) = 8, c(2,3) = 15 and c(l,2,3) = 13. The core C(c) of this game is 
the convex hull of (-2,8,7) and (1,5,7). 
Curiel and Tijs (5) studied extensions of assignment games and permu-
tation games, tridimensional assignment games and bipermutation games, 
respectively. In these games, there occur two types of indivisible goods. 
Curiel and Tijs proved that these games can have an empty core. They gave 
two classes of these games for which the members have a non-empty core. 
Shapley and Scarf (24) study a game without side payments arising from a 
market with indivisibilities. They prove that this game has a non-empty 
core and that it is always possible to find competitive prices in the 
market. Wako (30) also studies a market with indivisible goods. Quinzii 
(19), Gale (8) and Wako (31) study a market with indivisible goods and 
a perfect divisible good which can be regarded as money. 
Sequencing games 
Sequencing games have been introduced by Curiel et al. (4). They con-
sider the following situation. Let there be n customers waiting in a 
queue before a counter. Each customer i E N {1,2, ... ,n} has a certain 
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service time s. > 0 and a cost function c . : R -> R. For each customer i l l + 
his cost, if his waiting time plus service time equal t, is given by ci(t). 
The original position of customer i in the queue is given by 0(i) where 0 
is a permutation of N. Let P(0,i) denote the set of predecessors of i with 
respect to 0, P(0,i) ·= {j EN I 0(j) < 0(i)}. Then the total cost of a 
coalition S E 2N \ {0} if everyone is served according to 0 is given by 
l: c. 
iE s 1 jEP(0,i) 
s. + s.). 
J l 
By rearranging their positions before the counter the customers can de-
crease the total cost of N. The sequencing game < N, v > is defined as 
follows. The worth v(S) of a coalition S E 2N \ {0} is defined to be equal 
to the maximal cost savings that S can obtain by rearranging its members. 
But not all rearrangements are allowed, S may only rearrange its members 
in such a way that two members who have a non-member between them may not 
change position. Curiel et al. prove that if the cost functions are linear 
then the sequencing game as defined above is convex and hence it has a non-
empty core. They introduce a division method which generates an element 
of the core. They also give expressions for the Shapley-value and the T-
value in this case. 
If it is allowed for a coalition S to jump over non-members in the process 
of rearranging its members the resulting game can have an empty core. 
EXAMPLE. Let N = {1,2,3}, 0 (1) = 1 I 0(2) = 2 I 0 (3) = 3, sl = 3 I s2 = 1 I 
s3 2 I C(l = 6, C(2 = 5, C(3 = 6. Then C0 (N) = 74. An optimal order would 
be 2 first then 3 and 1 last. For the sequencing game <N,v> we have 
v(i) = 0, for all i EN, v(l,2) = 9, v(l,3) = 0, v(2,3) = 0 and v(l,2,3) 
15. C(v) is the convex hull of (9,0,6), (0,9,6), (15,0,0) and (0,15,0). 
Traveling salesman games. 
In (18) Potters et al. consider the following problem. A speaker is 
invited by several universities to deliver a talk. How should his travel 
costs from his home town along all the universities and back be allocated 
among the universities ? To analyse this situation they consider two ty-
pes of games. Let us denote the home town of the speaker by 0 and the 
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universities by 1,2, ... n. Let N {1,2, ... ,n}. For all i,j EN U {o} we 
denote the travel cost from i to j by cij" It is assumed that cij ~ 0 for 
all i,j EN and that the triangle inequality holds, i.e. cij + cjk ~ cik 
for all i, j ,k E N. The traveling salesman game < N ,c > is defined as follows. 
For every s E 2N \ {0} 
C(S) := min E c .. (") 
TI S iE S U { 0} 1 TI S 1 
where the minimum is taken over all cyclic permutations of SU {o}. 
Potters et al. show that if the costs are not symmetric, i.e. c .. ¥ c .. 
lJ Jl 
for certain i,j E N then the traveling salesman game as defined above can 
have an empty core. In the case of symmetric costs it is still an open 
question whether or not the game always has a non-empty core. 
In the traveling salesman game for every S E 2N \ {0} the cost c(S) is 
equal to the cost of a traveling salesman tour with minimal cost along the 
members of SU {O}. The other game that Potters et al. define is in fact 
not a combinatorial game because only the cost of N is defined by a combi-
natorial optimization problem. Let 0 be a cyclic permutation of N U {O} 
which defines a traveling salesman tour with minimal cost on NU {O}. Then 
the game <N,c0 > is defined as follows. For every SE 2N \ {0},c0 (s) is 
equal to the cost of the tour on S U {O} which results when all i E N \ S 
are skipped and the members of S are visited in the same order as in the 
tour on NU {O} defined by 0. Potters et al. have proved that this game 
has a non-empty core. 
the traveling salesman 
1 . [ ] n n For a certain c ass of cost matrices cij i=O,j=O 
game <N,c> coincides with a game <N,c >for a 
T 
certain cyclic permutation T and hence for this class the traveling sales-
man game has a non-empty core. 
EXAMPLE. Let N = {1,2,3}. Let <N,c> be the symmetric traveling salesman 
game with costs as given in the figure below. 
Then c ( 1) 2, c (2) 
4 ~ 1 2~3 
6, c(3) = 4, c(l,2) = 8, c(l,3) 
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4, c(2,3) 8 and 
c(l,2,3) = 8. An optimal tour is to visit 1 first then 3 then 2 and re-
turn to 0. C(c) is the convex hull of (0,6,2), (0,4,4), (2,6,0) and 
(2 ,2 ,4). 
Location games 
Tamir (26) considered the following situation. A graph G with set of 
vertices V and edge set E is given. Each edge has a certain positive 
length. The length of a path in G is the sum of the lengths of the edges 
that belong to the path. Let v 1 and v 2 be two vertices of G. The dis-
tance d(v1 ,v2 ) between v 1 and v 2 is defined to be the length of a shortest 
path from v 1 to v 2 . Two subsets N and Q of V are given. N = {1, ••• ,n} is 
the set of players. Each player is considered to be located in the cor-
responding vertex. Service centers have to be located in G in order to 
provide service to the players. The set Q = {q1 , .•• ,qt} denotes the pos-
sible locations for service centers. The cost of establishing a center at 
qj is cj ~ 0. Player i EN demands that at least one center will be lo-
cated at a distance of at most ri ~ 0 from him. The problem is to locate 
the centers in such a way that all the demands are fulfilled and the cost 
is minimized. It is assumed that all the demands can be met. The loca-
tion game < N, c > is defined as follows. Every S E 2N \ { 0} wants to fulfil 
the demands of its members, c(S) is the minimum cost needed to do this. 
Tamir shows that in general this game can have an empty core. If the 
graph G is a tree however, the game has a non-empty core. 
THEOREM (Tamir}. Let < N ,c > be a location game defined on a tree G. 
Then C(v) ¥ 0. 
PROOF. Define the n x t - matrix A ] n t [aij i=l,j=l as follows. 
if d(i,q.) ;;;; z 
a .. = J 
lJ 0 otherwise. 
Then for every SE 2N \ {0} the cost c(S) is given by the value of the 
problem 
min c . x subject to 
p._x ~ es 
x E {0,1}. 
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Here e 8 ERn is the vector with e~ equal to 1 if i ES and 
l 
e~ equal to 0 
l 
otherwise. This problem is equivalent to the linear programming problem 
with the 0-1 constraints replaced by x ~ 0, cf. Tamir (27). From the dua-
lity theory of linear programming it follows that c(S) is equal to the 
value of the problem 
max y . e 8 subject to 
yA ;:; c 
y ~ 0. 
Let y be an optimal solution for the problem with objective function eN 
Then y is feasible for all the problems. Hence for every S E 2N \ {0} 
have c(S) ~ y(S) and it follows that y C C(c). 
we 
D 
Tamir proves in fact that the core is equal to the set of optimal solutions 
of the dual problem with objective function eN. 
EXAMPLE. Let N = Q = {1,2,3}. G is the tree given below, the distances 
are given in the figure. 
2 
Let c 1 = 3, c 2 = 1, c 3 = 2, r 1 
game < N ,c > is given by c ( 1) 
1, r 2 
1, c (2) 
3 
1, r 3 = 1. Then the location 
1, c(3) = 2, c(l,2) = 1, c(l,3) 
c(2,3) = 3, c(l,2,3) = 3 and C(c) = {(0,1,2)}. 
4. GENERAL APPROACH 
If we consider the discrete flow game, the assignment game, the per-
mutation game and the location game we see that the existence of the core 
has been proved for all of these games in a similar way. For all these 
games the cost or worth of a coalition S can be found by minimizing or 
maximizing a linear function which does not depend on S, on the integer 
points of a polytope P8 . In all these cases an integer optimal solution 
can be found without requiring integrality explicitly. So c(S) or v(S) 
can be computed by solving a linear optimization problem. By the duality 
theorem of linear programming it follows that this problem and its dual 
have the same value. For all S this dual probler.1 has the same feasible 
region so an optimal solution y for the dual problem 
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2, 
with N is feasible for all the other dual problems and a core element 
can be generated by y. The following general model contains all the four 
games mentioned above. We will describe it for a cost game. Let < N ,c > 
be a cost game such that for all S E 2N \ {0} 
c(S) = min L(x) 
x E PS 
x integer. 
Here L is a linear function which does not depend on S. Suppose that the 
minimum does not change if the integrality condition is left out. Then 
c(S) is equal to the value of the dual problem, say 
c(S) max HS(y) 
y E R. 
Here HS is a linear function which depends on S and R is a polyhedron 
s i which does not depend on s. Further, H (y) = E H (y) for every 
N iE S N -SE 2 \ {0}, y ER. Let y ER be such that c(N) = H (y). Define 
z ERn by z. Hi(;) for every i EN. N -Then z(N) = H (y) c(N) and S _i N 
z(S) = H (y) ~ c(S) for all S E 2 \ {0} and we see that z E C(c). The 
moment the integrality conditions are dropped everything we do is similar 
to the procedure Owen (17) follows in proving that a linear production 
game has a non-empty core. We can generalize this model a little bit more 
by replacing the assumption that HS(y) = E Hi(y) by the assumption that 
for each y E R the cost game H defined iE S by H (S) = HS (y) for every y y 
SE 2N \ {0}, has a non-empty core, cf. Granot (10) and Curiel et al. (3). 
s -Let y be as above and let w E C(H-). Then w(S) ~ H-(s) = H (y) ~ c(S) y y 
and it follows that w E C(c). 
In the case of the location game we have seen that the whole core is gene-
rated by optimal solutions of the dual problem. This is also true for the 
assignment game. Samet and Zemel (20) discuss conditions which are ful-
filled by these games and which guarantee that the core is equal to the 
set generated by optimal dual solutions. 
If we try to treat the traveling salesman game in the way described 
above we encounter the difficulty that the integrality conditions which 
arise in the computation of c(S) cannot be left out because the polytope 
PS that we obtain has non-integer extreme points. This is also the case 
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For the minimum cost spanning tree game c(S) is the value of the 
following integer programming problem 
min L 
iENU {O} 
L k(l .. l xiJ' jE NU {O} l.J 
subject to 
L L xiJ' 1T(i) (1 - 1T(J')) ?: 
iE s U {o} jE s U {O} 
for all 0 i T c S 
x .. ?; 0, x .. integer 
l.J l.J 
for all i,j E N U {O} 
Here lT is the characteristic function of T, i.e. 1T(i) = 1 if i ET, 
1T(i) = 0 if i ~ T. Edmonds (7) has proved that the integrality condition 
are not needed explicitly here. Hence c(S) is equal to the value of the 
dual problem of the linear programming problem which we obtain when the 
integrality conditions are left out. 
c(S) = max L yT 
0 i Tc S 
subject to 
~ k(lij), for all i,j EN U {o} 
YT ?; 0 for all 0 i T c N. 
Let y be an optimal solution for the dual problem which determines c(N). 
Define z EJRn by z. L 1 (i)y IT 1-l Then z(N) = L y c(N). 
J. T T T 0 i T C N T 
Let S E 2N \ {0} be a coalition with minimum cost spanning tree TS. For 
every i E S we denote the vertex which immediately precedes i on the 
z(S) = 
path from~ to i in TS by p(i). Then c(S) 
I YT I T n s I I T I - 1 ~ I 
T n s i 0 T n s i 
YT ~ 
0 
unique L k(l. (. l l 
iE s i P i 
and 
L L yT 1T(i) (1 - 1T(p(i))) ~ L k(l. (')) = c(S) and it follows 
iE S T c N iE s i P i 
that z E C(c). The second inequality follows from the fact that a Tc N 
with T n S i 0 cannot contain both i and p(i) for all i E T n s because 
then TS would not be a spanning tree in GS. So minimum cost spanning tree 
games can also be treated in the general way we described. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We have studied seven combinatorial games and we have given several 
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for the tridimensional assignment game and the bipermutation game. The 
sequencing game raises another difficulty if we want to approach it in 
this way. In the computation of v(N), we have to maximize the cost sa-
vings over all permutations of N. Because of the Birkhoff-von Neumann 
theorem, maximizing a linear function over the set of n x n- permutation 
matrices is the same as maximizing the function over the set of n x n-
doubly stochastic matrices. In the case of the sequencing game the 
function that we want to maximize is only given in the points corresponding 
to permutation matrices. So if this function could be extended to a 
linear function on the set of doubly stochastic matrices there would be 
no problem. However, the following example shows that even in the case 
that the cost functions of the customers are linear this need not be 
possible. 
EXAMPLE. Let N = {1,2,3}, a ( 1) = 1 , 0(2) = 2, 0(3) = 3, sl = 7, s2 = 3, 
s3 = s, c 1 (t) 10t, c 2 (t) = 20t, c 3 (t) = 30t. We consider the six per-
mutation matrices corresponding to the permutations of N. (: 0 D 0 (: 0 n (; n , p2 0 , p3 0 0 0 
(: :) (: 
0 
D (: 
0 
D 0 ' PS 0 , p6 0 0 
Let w(P.) 
l 
be the cost savings if the customers are arranged according to 
Pi. Then w(P 1J = O, w(P2 ) = -10, w(P3 ) = 110, w(P4 ) = 1SO, w(PS) = 270, 
260. Let D be the doubly stochastic matrix defined by 
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 pl + 3 p4 + 3 PS then D = 3 p2 + 3 p3 + 3 P6. 
It follows that for w to be extendable to a linear function on the set of 
3 x 3-doubly stochastic matrices the following must hold : 
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 w(Pl) + 3 w(P4) + 3 w(PS) = 3 w(P2) + 3 w(P3) + 3 w(P6). 
But the left hand sight of the equation equals 
1 0 + 1 lSO + .!_ 270 = 140 and the right hand sight equals 3 3 3 
1 1 1 
3 -10 + 3 . 110 + 3 . 260 = 120, so w cannot be extended to a linear 
function on the set of doubly stochastic matrices. 
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results for these games. For six of the seven games it has been proved 
that the core is not empty. For several of the games other allocation me-
thods have also been studied. For the symmetric traveling salesman game 
it is still an open problem whether or not it has a non-empty core. The 
same holds for ~equencing games with general cost functions. In the cases 
where the core is empty it is of course necessary to look for other reaso-
nable allocations. But even when the core is not empty the question of 
how revenues or costs should be allocated is not completely answered. In 
general the core contains more than one element and it is not clear which 
core element should be chosen or even if a core element should be chosen. 
But again, this is not a question which could or should be answered by 
game theoreticians only. All they can do is study the properties of the 
different allocations for the different situations. It is to the people 
who are in need of an allocation to decide which properties they want the 
allocation to have and hence which allocation serves their purpose best. 
Especially a set of properties which uniquely determine an allocation can 
be very useful in this context and one should try to find such characteri-
zing properties stated in terms which are natural for the underlying situa-
tion. 
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CHAPTER XI 
LINEAR OPTIMALIZATION GAMES 
by Jos Potters 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The subject of this contribution is the theory of cooperative games 
with transferable utility or more precisely cooperative games arising from 
optimalization problems. In the literature of the last two decades there 
is an overwhelming amount of papers describing how optimalization situa-
tions give rise to cooperative games with transferable utility. Therefore 
the need for unification was experienced. Two recent papers (Dubey/Shapley 
(1984) and Kalai/Zemel (1982a) made an attempt to unification. They start 
from the same underlying idea, namely that coalitions have a set of feasi-
ble actions (or possibilities) and that they are optimizing a given func-
tion over the set of feasible actions, i.e. for each coalition S 
max 
w(S) {f(x) Ix E 8(S)} 
min 
where f is the function to be optimized and 8 (s) i.s the set of feasible 
actions of coalitions S. The action spaces O(s) are supposed to be sub-
sets of a parameter space lRP. In Dubey/Shapley (1984) the action spaces 
are described by equalities and inequalities like 
x ~ 0, and g. (x) = c. 
J J 
for i E I and j E J 
and only the numbers (c.). E and (c.). E are dependent of the coalition 
i i I J J J 
to be considered. In fact, the constraints c.(c.) can take only two values 
l J 
0 and a value c?(c~) ~ O, dependent on the fact, if a coalition has access 
l J 
to resource i (j) or not. In Kalai/Zemel (1982a) each coalition has a set 
of parameters p(S) c p under control. The other parameters are bound 
to vanish. This means 8(S) cRp(S) cRP. Both papers give sufficient 
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conditions which the action spaces 8(S) and the function f should satisfy 
in order to give rise to a cooperative game with a non-empty core. 
In this paper we also endeavour an attempt to unification. In con-
trast with the papers mentioned before we explicitly include the possibi-
lity of the action spaces being discrete. The approach of Dubey/Shapley 
and Kalai/Zemeldoesn't seem very suited to cover optimalization situations 
of this kind. On the other hand we only investigate the case of linear 
goal functions; in Dubey/Shapley and Kalai/Zemel the goal functions are 
only supposed to have a kind of concavity property. 
The purpose of this chapter is to exhibit the underlying optimalization 
situation of many examples of cooperative games, to unify the methods to 
prove the existence of core elements and to emphasize the problems arising 
when the action spaces are discrete. 
Although outside of the scope of this chapter, we mention other recent 
attempts to unification by Quinzii (1984), Wako (1986) and Kaneko (1982, 
1983). These papers are in the field of the NTU - games (= cooperative 
games with non-transferable utility). But, since cooperative games with 
transferable utility can be understood as special cases of NTU-games, these 
authors have been able to cover many optimalization situations too. 
2. THE MODEL AND THE METHODS 
Let us consider an economic situation where n agents (persons or firms) 
are involved. The set of agents N = {1,2, ... ,n} will be the player set of 
the cooperative game to be considered. Let X be the set of all imaginable 
actions which an agent or a coalition of agents may be able to carry out. 
For each coalition S c N, there is a subset X(S) c X of actions which lie 
inside the possibilities of coalition S, the s-feasible actions. Moreover, 
there is an evaluating function W : X ~JR which assigns to an action the 
monetary consequences (profits, losses or cost) of that action i.e. as 
far as the model covers the reality, the total change in welfare caused 
by the chosen action is completely described by the value of the function W. 
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Under these circumstances it is natural for a coalition to optimize the 
function W over the possible actions and we define 
w(S) 
max sup 
or {W(x) Ix E X(S)} 
min inf 
if these optimal values exist. 
If each coalition S has a feasible action x 5 E X(S) optimizing W, then 
we call the situation described above an optimalization situation and the 
associated cooperative game (N,w) an optimalization game. If, moreover, 
the set X is a subset of a finite dimensional linear vector space and W is 
a linear function, then we use the terms linear optimalization situation 
and linear optimalization game. 
In the following sections many examples of cooperative games which can 
be understood as linear optimalization games, will pass in review. One of 
the principal goals of this paper is to bring more unity in the methods of 
proving the existence of core elements. 
Let (N,w) be a cooperative game with transferable utility. The core 
of the game (N,w) (notation : C (w)) is defined by 
{x E RN I L: x. 
iE N i 
w(N) and L: x. C; (or ;;;) w(S) for all S c N} 
iE s i 
where the C;-sign should be read if players 'like high payoffs' (profit) 
and the ;;;-sign if they 'dislike high payoffs' (losses or cost). 
Essentially, there are two major ways to prove the existence of core 
elements. 
1. The Bondareva/Shapley approach. A crucial role in this way to prove 
the existence of core elements is played by the theorem, independently 
proved by Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967). 
Theorem 2.1 (Bondareva/Shapley) : A cooperative game (N,w) has a non-
empty core if and only if for every non-negative solution {y5 }5 c N 
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of the equation L y e~ = e the inequality 
SCN S ::> N 
L y8w(S) ~ (or ~) w(N) 
SCN 
holds. The inequality signs are opposite to the inequality signs 
N 
used in the definition of the core. The vectors e8 ER are the cha-
racteristic vectors of Sc N. 
For linear optimalization situations the following alternative version 
of theorem 2.1 will be very useful : 
Theorem 2.1 (bis) : Let< N, {x(s)} 8 >be a linear optimalization CN 
situation and X(N) c X compact. Then the associated cooperative game 
has a non-empty core for every linear function w if and only if 
L y8 X(S) is contained in co(X(N)), the convex hull of X(N), for 
ScN 
every non-negative solution {y8 }8 c N of the equation L y e 
SCN S S 
Remark : The advantage of theorem 2.1 (bis) compared with the origi-
nal Bondareva/Shapley theorem is that only the feasible sets X(S) are 
to be considered. A drawback is that this theorem can only be used 
if every linear function W yields a cooperative game with non-empty 
core. 
Proof We prove the maximum-version i.e. if 
w(S) max{w(x) Ix E X(S)}. 
Suppose L y e = e with y8 ~ 0 for all coalitions S c N. Let SCN S S N 
x 8 E X(S) be an S-feasible action maximizing W over X(S). 
Then S~N y 8 w(S) = ~N y 8 W(x8 ) = W\~N y 8x 8 ) by linearity of w. 
Because L y X(S) c co(X(N)) and linear functions have the same 
SCN S 
maximum over X(N) as over co(X(N)), we find 
L y w(S) ~ max{W(x) Ix E co(X(N))} = w(N). 
SCN S 
The core C(w) is non-empty by theorem 2.1. Conversely, suppose we 
have a non-negative solution {y } of the equation L y e e 
S S c N SCN S S N 
and for every Sc N (with y 8 > 0) an S-feasible action 
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x := Z y x g co(X(N)). x 8 E X(S) such that 
Then by a well-known 
function W with 
SC:N S S 
separation theorem, there is a linear 
W(x) > max{W(y) I y E co(X(N))}. 
The cooperative game (N,w) defined by means of this linear function W 
theorem 2 .1 
satisfies the inequalities Z y w(S) ~ W(x) > w(N) and C(w) = 0 by 
SCN S 
D 
In applying theorem 2.1 (bis) in order to prove the existence of core 
elements, we have to show that 
Z y X(S) c co(X(N)) 
SC:N S 
for all non-negative solutions of Z y e = e . This may be very 
SCN S S N 
easy but can also be very unpleasant, if X(N) is dis-
crete. In the following sections we shall in fact meet the following 
situation : 
There is a convex subset Y c X described by inequalities of the kind 
Ax~ band x ~ 0 where A is an sXt-matrix (t =dim X) and b EJRs 
such that the integer-valued points of Y are precisely the points of 
X(N). In that situation the proof of Z y X(S) c co(X(N)) splits 
SCN S 
up into two parts : 
and 
(i) Prove Z y X(S) c Y 
SCN S 
(ii) prove that the extreme points of Y are integer-valued (and 
lie consequentially in X(N)). 
2. The Gwen approach. Computing the value of w(N), we have to solve a 
linear programming problem, P(N). Owen (1975) used the dual programm 
to find particular core elements. This approach has the advantage 
that core elements are actually found (and not only the existence of 
core elements is proved) . Moreover the solution of the dual problem 
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has often an economic interpretation as 'shadow prices'. This makes 
the core allocation found in this way often rather convincing i.e. 
the players will be easier convinced that the proposed distribution 
of profit or cost is a fair division. 
3. In one case (see section 7) there will be a directly appealing distri-
bution of cost which appears to be a core allocation. 
In the next sections the following cooperative games will pass in 
review : 
1. Assignment Games (section 3). 
2. Exchange Market Games (with linear utility of money) (section 4). 
3. Production Games (section 5). 
4. Coalitionally Controlled Flow Games (section 6). 
5. Minimum Cost 0-Rooted Arborescence Games (section 7). 
6. Traveling Salesman Games (section 8). 
3. ASSIGNMENT GAMES 
An assignment situation occurs when there are two types of agents most-
ly called sellers and buyers. The sellers initially have one or more items 
of an indivisible good and try to sell it. The buyers do not possess ini-
tially any good but they want to buy one or more items from the sellers. 
Each seller i has a minimum price ci he wants to get for each item of his 
goods and each potential buyer j has a maximum price a .. he is willing to 
1] 
pay for one item of the goods of seller i. 
This means that all goods of seller i are equally appreciated by buyer j. 
< 0 We define W .. a .. - c. for each seller i and each buyer j. If w .. 1] 1] 1 1] 
there will be no trade between seller i and buyer j; if w .. ~ 0 then lJ this 
number gives the 'negotiation gap' between seller i and buyer j. 
Let N be the set of buyers : N {1, ... ,n} and M = {1,2, ... ,m} is the set 
of sellers. The player set is N U M in this case. 
3a. A house market (Shapley/Shubik (1972)). 
In the cited paper each seller has one house for sale and each buyer 
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wants at most one house. For a coalition S c N U M the possible 
trades can be described by an MXN-matrix X with zeroes and ones. 
If X .. = 1 then the house of player i E M is sold to player j E N. 
1.J 
The constraints are the following : 
(meaning : a house can only be sold to buyers of 
the coalition and they need only one house). 
(meaning : a house can only be purchased from 
sellers of the coalition and they have only one 
house) • 
Hence we find X = :RMXN and for each coalition S c N U M 
The evaluating function W is defined by W(X) 
The associated linear optimalization game 
E E W .. x .. =: w * x 
iE M "EN 1.J 1.~ 
J assigns to a 
coalition Sc N U M the value w(S) = max{W * X IX E X(S)}. 
w(S) is well-defined because X(S) is a finite set. 
This cooperative game is the same as defined in Shapley/Shubik (1972), 
apart from the fact that we allow W .. to be negative. We shall not 
1.J 
discuss the existence of core elements in this case since we shall 
meet a more general situation in 3b. 
3b. General assignment games (Potters/Tijs (1986), cf also Kaneko (1976) 
and Crawford/Knoer (1981)). 
The more general situation we shall consider here, differs from the 
house markets of section 3a by the fact that sellers may have more 
then one house and buyers may be willing to purchase more than one 
house. Lets= (si)i EM 
lers and d = (d.). E the 
J J N 
of the matrix (W .. ) . E . 
1.J 1. M, J 
denote the initial possessions of the sel-
demand vector of the buyers. 
E N is as before. 
The meaning 
a coalition S c N U M can be described by The possible trades within 
MXN 
an MXN-matrix X E z+ where x .. is the number of houses going from 
1.J 
seller i to buyer j. The constraints are the following : 
eM X ~ d * e8 n N and X eN ~ s * e8 n M. 
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Here we use the notational convention : if p and q are vectors inlRN, 
then p * q is the vector inJRN with i-th coordinate piqi for all i EN. 
Hence, 
The evaluating function W is as before and w(S) = max{W(X) IX E X(S)}. 
Note that d = eN and s = eM gives the house market of 3a. 
Theorem 3.1 : General assignment games have non-empty cores. 
Proof : (The Bondareva/Shapley approach) : Let {y8 }8 c N UM be a non-nega-
tive solution of Z y 8e 8 = eN U Mand 
SCNUM 
The integer-valued points of Y are the points of X(N UM). 
Let x = z y x E z Ys X(S) with xs E X(S) for each s c N u M. 
ScNUM SS SCNUM 
d and analogously X eN ~ s. Hence, Z y X(S) c Y. 
scNUM 8 
Further, we have to prove that the extreme points of Y are integer-valued. 
Because we need this result in section 4 too, we formulate the proposition 
Proposition 3.2 (cf Brualdi/Gibson (1976)) The extreme points of the 
set 
Y := {X E JRMXN I e X ~ d and X eN ~ s} 
+ M 
are integer-valued if d E ZN and s E ZM. 
+ + 
Proof : In fact we shall prove that (also if s and d are not integer-
valued) all extreme points of Y are generated by the following procedure 
(i) Take a subset Ac MXN and order the elements of A linearly 
a(1) < a(2) < ... < a(p) 
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(ii) Start with X = 0 and change the entries of A successively according 
the given order as follows : 
min(si(k) ,dj(k)) if a(k) = (i(k),j(k)) 
si(k) - xa(k) and dj(k) = dj(k) - xa(k)" 
Note that every time that xa (k.) > 0 the number of completed rows and 
columns (i.e. rows and columns with maximal row or column sum) increases 
with at least one (and at most two in the exceptional case that xa(k) = 
si(k) = dj(k)). 
Let X be an extreme point of Y and A = {a I x > O} c: MXN. 
a 
We have to find a linear order of A such that the procedure described 
above, generates X. The proof proceeds by induction on I MXN I . 
For I MI = I NI the set Y = {x EJR Ix~ min(s,d)} and the extreme 
+ 
points are x = 0 and x = min(s,d) generated by A=~ and A= MXN = {(1,1)}. 
In order to complete the induction we have to find an entry a E A such that 
xa si(a) or xa = dj(a) where a= (i(a) ,j(a)). 
We find such an entry by constructing what we shall call a maximal i-j-
string of A. 
A i-j-string of A is a string aq,aq+ 1 , ... ,a0 , ... ,ap of elements of A with 
the following properties 
(i) i(~) = i(ak+l) if k is even; j(ak) = j(ak+l) if k is odd. 
(ii) the entries a , ... ,a are all different. q p 
(iii) each row and each column index occur at most twice, immediately 
after each other. 
An i-j-string may, for example, look like this 
(1,3) (7,5) (3,2) (4, 7) 
~ / '\ / '\ / / / / / / / / / / 
( 1I5) (7,2) (3 I 7) 
-2 -1 0 2 3 4 
An i-j-string is called ma:x;imaZ if it cannot be extended conserving the 
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properties (i), (ii) and (iii). Since a one-element string a0 EA is an 
i-j-string, there are maximal i-j-strings too. Let a , ... ,a be a maximal q p 
i-j-string in A. Let us suppose that q and p are even. The proof is not 
essentially different if p or q is odd. There are two possible reasons 
why the string a , ... ,a cannot be extended with a 1 q p q-
(a) There is no entry a EA with a fa and j(a) = j(a) q q 
or 
(b) there is an entry a EA with a f a but i(a) occurs already among the q 
row indices. 
We consider the second case first. Let s be the smallest index with 
i(a) = i(a). Then sis even and a a 1 ,a , ... ,a is an i-j-cycle of s q- q s 
even length. It may be clear what is meant with i-j-cycle. We can do the 
same analysis at the endpoint a of the string and we find : p 
(A) an i-j-cycle of even length 
of 
(B) an i-j-string a ,a 1 , ... ,a such that the column of a and the row q q- p q 
of a do not contain other elements of A. p 
In both cases (A) and (BJ we define an MXN-matrix E by 
E if a occurs in the i-j-cycle or string with even index. a 
E -1 if a occurs in the cycle or string with odd index. a 
E 0 if a does not occur in cycle or string. a 
In case (A) the matrix E has all row and column sums zero and x ± EE E y 
if 0 < s ~ min{x I a occurs in the cycle}. This is in contradiction with a 
the extremality of X. 
In case (B) the matrix E has all row and column sums zero except the 
column sum of a and q the row sum of a . p If the j(a )-th column sum q 
of X and the i (a ) -th row sum of X are not maximal, then X ± SE E Y, if p 
0 < s ~ min{xa I a in the i-j-string; dj (a ) - xa , 
q q 
S,( )-X}. i a a p p 
But, X is extreme point of Y. Hence, xa(q) 
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We assume, without loss of generality, that xa = si(a) ~ 0 for some 
entry a EA. Let X be the MXN-matrix obtai~ed by skipping the i(a)-th row. 
M = M\{i(a)}, s = (sl, ••• ,si(a)'"""'sm) E:R~ and a= d - xaej(a) ER:. 
Then 
X E Y 
X is even an extreme point of Y. For, if X 
X1• X2 E Y, then x 1(X1 + X2) where xi is the extension of xi with the 
i(a)-th row of X. Furthermore, x 1 # x2 and x 1 ,x2 E Y. This contradicts 
the extremality of x. 
By the induction hypothesis X can be obtained by the algorithm above 
from an ordering of A= fo E MXN \ x (= x ) > O}. Note that A= AU fo}. 
a a 
Then we order the elements of A by taking a first, followed by the elements 
of A in the order which generated X. This order of A yields X as can be 
easily seen. Since we do not need the converse part of the proposition, 
we skip this part of the proof. If sand dare integer-valued, the algo-
rithm only produces integer entries. D 
Before closing this section, we will devote a few words to the model of a 
house market introduced by Kaneko (1976). In this model we have also two 
types of players, sellers and buyers. These two types are distinguished 
by their initial endowments and their utility functions. 
The initial endowment of a seller i is an integer-valued vector 
k 
w. = (w. 1 , .•. ,w. kl EZ. l. i, .l., + Seller i has w. houses of type s for sale. i,s k 
The initial endowment of a buyer j is empty (0 E Z+). 
The utility functi.on ui zk ~R of a seller i has the following pro-
+ 
perties 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
k 
u. (a 1 , •.. ,ak) = l: u. (a e ) . i s=l i s s 
the functions uis z+ ~R defined by uis(a) = ui (aes) are non-
decreasing and have non-increasing marginals for s = 1, ••• ,k. 
u. (a) 
l.S 
u. (w. ) if a ~ w. and 1 S s S k. is i,s i,s 
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Buyer j's utility function has the properties 
( 1) 
and 
uj(a 1 , ... ,ak) = max 
s=l, ... ,k 
u. (a e ) 
J s s 
(2) u. (0) ;';; u. (1) = u. (a) if a~ 1and1 ;';; s ;';; k. 
JS JS JS 
Kaneko defines a cooperative game with side payments by 
v( ) max{ L: u.(xi)+L: u.(x.) 
iEsnMi jEsnN J J 
L X, + L X, ;';; L W,}. 
iESnM :L jEsnN J iEsnM :L 
The following trick (also considered by Kaneko) changes this house 
market into a house market of the Shapley/Shubik type. Think of seller i 
as a firm with L: k 1w. agents, indexed by (s,f) where 1 ;';; s ;';; k and s:::: i,s 
1 ;';; f ;';; W. 
l,S 
Agent i(s,f) has the f-th house of type s for sale and has a minimum price 
ui(fes) - ui ((f-l)es), the marginal utility of the f-th house of types. 
Buyer j's maximum price is u.(e ). Core elements of Kaneko's game can be 
J s 
obtained by summing up the payoffs of all agents of one selling firm i of 
a core allocation in the Shapley/Shubik market. 
4. EXCHANGE MARKET GAMES 
In an exchange market the same agents are selling and buying. Each 
agent j E N has an initial endowment with indivisible goods (say houses) 
of different type 
Qj = (Qlj'Q2j'"""'Qmj) · 
The set M = {1, ... ,m} is the set of house types. By exchanging their hou-
ses under monetary compensation, the agents try to improve their situation. 
The MXN-matrix W = (W .. ) . E . E is given as before and expresses the 
:LJ i M,J N 
appreciation of agent j for a house of type i. Further the vector 
d = (dj)j EN E z: is the demand vector i.e. dj is the number of houses 
that agent j finally wants to possess. 
A special case of an exchange market is a permutation situation 
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4a. Perrrrutation games (Tijs et al. (1984), curiel/Tijs (1985)). 
In a permutation situation all agents possess one house and need also 
one house. I.e. the initial endowments are e E ZN , N = M and the demand j + 
vector d is e 
N 
(1,1, ... ,1). 
The feasible actions of a coalition S c N are the permutations of s i.e. 
X (S) 
The evaluating function W is defined by W(X) W * X and the permutation 
game is the linear optimalization game 
w(S) max{W*XIXEX(S)}. 
The fact that in Tijs et al. (1984) a cost game is considered does not 
influence the essential features of the situation since cost games can 
easily be transformed in cost-saving (i.e. profit) games. But let us 
proceed in a more general situation. 
4b. Exchange market games (Potters/Tijs (1986)). 
The tradings feasible for coalition s can be described by an MXN-
matrix X ( ZMXN where x .. denotes the number of houses of type i which 
+ l.J 
agent j E N finally possesses (and appreciates) . 
The following constraints should be satisfied eM X $ d * e s (d * e s is the 
demand vector of coalition S) , X e N $ Q e s (Q e s is the supply vector of 
coalition S). 
Hence, 
x ( S) = { X E ZMXN I e x $ d * e and X c $ Q es} 
+ M S N 
and the associated optimalization game is defined by 
w(S) = max{w * X IX E X(S)}. 
In Potters/Tijs (1986) the following theorem has been proved 
Theorem 4.1 : Exchange market games have non-empty cores. 
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Proof : Suppose, {y S} Sc N is a non-negative solution of 
Then 
have 
and 
X e 
N 
for x = 
e x 
M 
l: ySXS with x5 E X(S) 
SCN 
L Ys (eMXS) ;;; Z Ys d * 
SCN ScN 
for all s c N, we 
e = d * Z y5e 8 s SCN 
l: Ys e 
SCN S 
d * eN 
i.e. l: y 5 X(S)cy 
SCN 
{x MXN 
:= ER+ X < d and x ;;; Q eN}. eM ~ eN 
eN. 
d 
The integer-valued points of Y are precisely the points of X(N) and the 
extreme points of Y are integer-valued by proposition 3.1. Hence the 
theorem follows from the alternative version of the Bondareva/Shapley 
theorem. 
For permutation games we get l: y X(S) c Ywhere 
SCN S 
y NXN I {X ER e X 
+ N 
The extreme points of Y, the set of double stochastic matrices, are the 
points of X(N) by the theorem of Birkhoff/Von Neumann. 
5. PRODUCTION GAMES (Owen (1985), Granat (1986)). 
Suppose, there is a finite set of producers N = {1, ... ,n} and each 
coalition S c N can dispose of certain amounts of raw materials, resour-
ces. More precisely for each coalition Sand each kind of resource j, 
b(S). ER is the amount of resource j which coalition S has at its dis-
J + 
posal. From the resources they have at their disposal, the agents in a 
0 
coalition can produce certain quantities of products. If P is the set of 
products to be considered, a production plan is given by a vector x EJRP. 
+ 
The connection between resources and products is given by a PXR-matrix 
A ~ 0, the production matrix. The entry ~j is the amount of resource 
needed for the production of one unit of product k. We assume that all 
producers use identical production processes i.e. have the same production 
matrix. 
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Furthermore, there is a vector c ERP where ck is the net profit which can 
be earned by producing and selling one unit of product k. 
The possibilities of a coalition Sare given by a production vector x ER~ 
under the constraints xA $ b(S) (there have to be enough raw materials 
available). The evaluating function W is the inner product with c, the 
total net profit. 
Hence, 
X(S) 
w(S) 
{ x E R p I xA $ b ( S) } and 
+ 
max{< c,x >Ix E X(S)}. 
R Remark : In Owen (1975) the producers have a resource vector bi E:IR+ at 
their disposal and b(S) E b .• Granot (1986) investigates the more ge-
iE S i 
neral situation described above. 
Theorem 5.1 (Granot (1986), Owen (1975)). If the 'resource games' 
S ~ b(S). have non-empty cores for all j ER, then the production game has 
J 
also a non-empty core. 
Proof : Let {y8 } S c N be a non-negative ;elution 
x = E y5 x5 with x 8 E x(S). Then x ER+ and 
SCN 
of E y e 
SCN S S 
eN and let 
XA E Ys (xs A) $ E Ys b (S) • 
SCN SCN 
Because E y b(S) $ b(N) (the resource 
SCN S 
games have non-empty cores) we find xA $ b(N) and x E X(N). The core is 
non-empty by theorem 2.1 (bis). D 
We give also an alternative proof of theorem 5.1 using the duality 
theory of linear programming. 
Proof: (Owen approach) : Computing the value w(S), we have to solve the 
L.P. problem. 
Maximize< c,x >under the constraints 
p (S) 
xA $ b(S) and x 6 0. 
The dual problem is 
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Minimize< y,b(S) >under the constraints 
D(S) 
Ay ~ candy~ 0. 
Note that both L.P. problems are feasible (A ~ 0 is important here) and 
further that the feasibility domain of D(S) is independent of S. 
Consider the L.P. problem P(N) and D(N). We have by duality theory 
w(N) = min{< y,b(N) >I Ay ~candy~ o}. 
- R N Let y EJR.+ be an optimal solution of D(N) and aj EJR. a core element of the 
resource games S-> b(S). for 
- J 
Define u. : = l: y .. a. . for i 
l jER J Jl 
element. We prove this directly 
1, ... ,r. 
1, ... ,n. Then u 
l: u. l: y. l: a l: y .. b(N) since a. is l jE R l ji j, iE N iE N jE R J 
tion in the game s 
Furthermore, l: u. 
iE s i 
->b. (S). Then l: 
J iE N 
l: y. l: a .. ~ 
jE R J iE s Jl 
Since y is feasible in D(S), we find 
J 
u. < y,b(N) > 
l 
l: y .. b(S) . 
jE R J J 
in a core 
an efficient alloca-
= w(N). 
< y,b(S) >. 
l: u. ~ min{ < y ,b (S) > I Ay ~ c and y ~ o} 
iE s i 
w(S) by duality. 0 
- R Remark 1: If we take the vector y EJR.+ as shadow prices for the resources 
pro unit, then ui is the value of the resources assigned to producer i un-
der the core allocations (a 1 , ... ,ar). 
Remark 2 : Assignment games as well as exchange market games can be under-
stood as production games. In both types of games the 'products' are tra-
des (i,j) and the resources are N U M. The production of one unit (i,j) 
demands one unit i and one unit j. The price vector is the matrix W = (W .. ) . 
lJ 
For assignment games the player set is N U M, the resource vector of seller 
i is bi= (O, ... ,si 1 ••• ,0.,0, ... 0) and the resource vector of buyer j is 
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b.= (0, •.. 0;0, •.. d., .. O). 
J J 
A coalition Sc N U M has the resource vector b(S) L: b. + L: b .• 
iESOM 1 jESON J 
The production constraints are L: x .. SdJ. eSON,J' = (d* eSON)J. 
iE M l.J 
and L: x .. S (s * e8 OM) i (cf section 3b). jE N l.J 
For e:xahange market games the player set is N and the resource vector of 
agent j E N is b.= (Q 1 ., ••• ,Q .;O, ... ,d., .• O). J J ID] J 
The production constraints are 
L: x .. S (d * e8). and L: x .. S iE M l.J J jE N l.J L: Q .. = (Q es). jE s l.J 1 
(cf section 4b). 
Remark 3 Let us consider the shadow prices in both types of games. 
Assignment games : Shadow prices are optimal solutions of D(N U Ml i.e. 
minimize< y,s > + < z,d >under the constraints 
y E :RM+ , z E lRN and y . + z . ;;: W. . for all i E M and j E N. 
+ l. J l.J 
Then the core element generated by these shadow prices is 
((siyi)i EM' (d{j)j EN) E:RM UN 
If x is an optimal assignment, then x .. l.J > 0 implies y 1. + z. = W. . by com-J l.J 
plementary slackness. Recalling that W. . = a .. 
J.] A J.] 
seller i and buyer j negotiate succesfully (x .. l.J 
This is the price paid by player j to player i. 
- ci, we find that if 
> 0) then yi + ci aij - zj. 
For e:xahange markets the shadow prices are optimal solutions of D(N) 
i.e. minimize< y,.Q e > + < z,d >under the constraints 
M N N 
y E lR , z E lR and y. + z. ;;: W. . for all i E M and j E N. 
+ + l. J l.J 
The core allocation generated by these shadow prices is u 
L: y. Q .. + z. d. for all j EN. 
iE M 1 l.J J J 
Remark 4 : In Potters/Tijs (1986) pooling situations are investigated. 
These are situations which can be described just as well as an assignment 
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game as an exchange market game. The initial endowments are the option 
rights to buy certain amounts of products from the sellers. 
The Owen approach works very nicely in such a situation because the dual 
L.P. problems D(N UM) and D(N) are identical if we puts= QeN. Hence 
the same shadow prices prevail and the core elements generated by these 
shadow prices are connected by the relation 
Qij 
L (y.s.) ~~- + (zJ. dJ.) for all j EN. 
iE M i i L Q .. 
jE N l.J 
-1 Note that ( L Q .. ) Q .. is the fraction of jE N iJ l.J s. = L Q .. of which player j i jE N l.J 
has the option rights. 
6. FLOW GAMES WITH COALITIONAL CONTROL (Kalai/Zemel (1982), Curiel/Tijs 
( 1987)) 
Let P be a finite point set with two particular points a and b. 
Suppose, the connections between different points of P are controlled by 
coalitions of a player set N in the following way. 
For each coalition S there is a capacity map c(S) : PxP ~JR+, express-
ing to what extent the connections between points of P are allowed to be 
used by coalition S. Hence, for each coalition S c N, we have a network 
with capacities (P, c(S)). 
A flow from a to b is a PxP -matrix X E Rpxp such that 
+ 
I x .. 
iE P iJ 
I x .. 
iE p Ji 
for all j E P \ {a,b}. 
A flow is feasible for coalition S if, moreover, 0 ~ xij ~ c(S) (i,j) for 
all (i,j) E PxP. 
Then it is easy to prove that L x - L x. 
iE P ai iE P ia 
This is the value of the flow X. 
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I x - I x .. 
iE p i ,b iE p b I 1. 
We define a flow game with coalitional control as a linear optimalization 
game with 
X (S) = {x E Rpxp I X 
+ ep ei ei Xep, for ii a,b and xij :;; c(S) (i,j) for 
all ( i, j) E pxp} 
and the evaluating function W(X) 
flow. 
We prove the following theorem : 
e I 
a 
the value of the 
Theorem 6.1 : A flow game with coalitional control has a non-empty core if 
the capacity games S ~ c(S) (i,j) have a non-empty core for all pairs 
( i, j) E PxP. 
Proof We proof that L y5 X(S) c X(N) for all non-negative solutions 
sc N Let X L y5x8 with x8 E X (S) for all coali-
SCN 
of Iy 5e 5 = eN. 
tions s (with y 8 > O). 
Then eiX ep L y5 (ei 
SCN L 
E P \ {a,b}) 
e .. 
1. 
Furthermore, 
X,. 
1.J 
L y5 (X5 )ij:;; L y5 c(S)(i,j):;; c(N)(i,j) because {c(S)(i,jJ}8cN 
SCN SCN 
satisfies the Bondareva/Shapley theorem. So X E X(N) and the non-emptiness 
of the core follows from theorem 2.1 (bis). D 
An alternative proof uses the max-flow-min-cut theorem of Ford/FUlker-
son ( 1956). 
Proof: Let X be a maximal flow in the network (P,c(N)). Then by the 
theorem of Ford/Fulkerson there is a cut (Q,P\Q) with a E Q and b g Q such 
that 
c (N) (i,j) w(N) (the value of the maximal flow X). 
iE Q jg Q 
For all pairs (i,j) E Q x P\Q we take a core element a .. ERN of the capa-lJ 
city game S ~ c(S) (i,j). Define u = (uk)k EN by 
uk = L L aiJ.(k). 
iE Q jg Q 
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Then u E C(w). For, u(N) a .. (N) 
1-J 
l.: l.: c (N) (i ,j) 
iE Q j!l Q 
and u(S) l.: l.: a .. (S) ~ l: l: c(S)(i,j). 
iEQ j!lQ 1-J iEQ j~Q 
Because (Q,P\Q) is a cut in network (P,c(S)) too, we find 
w(N) 
u(S) ~ l.: l.: c(S) (i,j) ~ min{ l.: l.: c(S)(i,jJJaEQ'cp\{b}}= 
iEQ j!lQ Q' iEQ I jflQ' 
w(S) by Ford/Fulkerson. 
7. MINIMUM COST 0-ROOTED ARBORESCENCE GAMES (Granot/Huberman (1981)). 
Consider the situation of n cities which want to be connected with a 
water resource O. The cities decide to cooperate and to build a common 
pipe-line system connecting each city with the water resource. Let C be 
D 
a N0XN-matrix of which the entries C .. denote the cost of a pipe-line from 1-J 
city i to city j. We do not assume that the matrix C is symmetric (e.g. 
the connection from i to j may require more water-pumps than a connection 
in the opposite direction) . The feasible actions of a coalition S are all 
pipe-line systems connecting the cities of S with the water resource only 
using the cities of S as intermediate points. So, we are looking for a 
directed graph with nodes s0 = s U {O} and the following properties 
1. There is exactly one edge ei pointing to a city i ES. 
2. For every city i E s there is a directed path from 0 to i. 
The second condition can be replaced by 
2'. For every non-empty set Tc S there is at least one edge pointing 
from outside of T to a point of T. 
If we represent the graph on s0 by its incidence matrix we find the con-
ditions 
e X = es and ~ \T X eT ;;; 1 if T c N and T n s f o, and eN\s X = 0. 
So 0 
Hence we define x 
NO N 
X(Sl = {x E z+ Jes 0 x = es' eN\s X = o and eN0 \T XeT;;; 1 for all 
Tc N with T n Sf 0}. 
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It is easy to see that x .. = 0 or lJ 
if X E X(S). FUrthermore, for each 
i ES there is exactly one city j E s0 such that x .. = 1. Hence for each Jl 
= 1 
for j = 1,2, .. t. We can not get into a cycle 
it= i 0 , it_ 1 , •• i 0 for in that case eN \T X eT = 0 if we take 
T = {i0 ,i1 .•. ,it_1} c S. Hence we O find a path from it= 0 to i. 
The optimalization game belonging to this situation is defined by 
w(S) = min{C * X IX E X (S)}. 
We call this type ofgameaMinimum Cost 0-Rooted Arborescence Game or 
MCA-game for short. We can immediately give a core element in MCA-games 
and therefore 
Theorem 7.1 (cf Granot/Huberman (1981)) : MCA-games have non-empty cores. 
Proof : Let X E X(N) be a 0-rooted arborescence with minimum cost. Let, 
in N0 with x (') . = 1. p l ,l for each i E N, p(i) be the unique element 
Define u. = c (') . for all i EN. Then u 
l p l ,1 = (ui)i EN is a core allocation. 
Clearly L u. := L c (') . is the total 
iE N 1 iE N p 1 ' 1 
cost C * X = w(N). 
Let S be a non-empty coalition and x5 E X(S) a 0-rooted arborescence for 
the cities of S. We extend the 0-rooted arborescence X by adding the s 
arcs (p(i) ,i) of X if i g S. Then we only have to check the condition 
eN \T X eT ~ 1 if Tc N, non-empty. If T n S ¥ 0, then there is an arc of 
X5 °pointing from the outside of T n Stoa point of T n S. This arc is 
also in the extension of x5 • 
If T n S 0, there is an arc of X from N0\T to a point of T. The end-
point is a point of T and not a point of s. So, this arc also lies in the 
extension of X5 • Hence we find C * X + L u. ~ w(N) = 
S i E N\s 1 
L U,. 
iE N 1 
Therefore, L u. ~ C * X5 for all 0-rooted arborescences in s0 . 
iE s 1 
Z u. ~ w(S) and u = (ui)i EN is a core element. 
iE s 1 
We also try the Bondareva/Shapley approach. 
Proof : Let 
z yses 
SCN 
{y5 }5 c N be a non-negative solution 
e and X = Z y X with X E X(g). 
N SCN S S S 
271 
of the equation 
D 
Then eN \T X eT 
0 
I: Y e x = I: Ys <es xs ) = I: Y e 
SC N S NO S Sc: N 0 S S 
N XN 
Hence, we find ~ y X(S) c:y = {x E:ll\O leNX 
Sc:N S 0 
if T f [6}. 
We have to prove that the extreme points of Y are integer-valued. 
A proof of this fact can be found in Edmonds (1967). Then theorem 2.1 (bis) 
gives the non-emptiness of the core. D 
Remark : If we want to prove directly, that Y = co(X(N)), we have to find 
with each element X E y an element X 0 E X(N) such that 
(i) (xO)ij = 1 implies x. . > 0 l.J 
(ii) if e \ X e = NOT T 
1 for some Tc: N, then e \ X0 e NOT T 
1 too. 
-1 If this can be done, then ( 1-E) (K -E x0J E Y if E is chosen not too large 
-1 
and, in fact, we can choose E > 0 in such a way that (1-E) (X-EX 0 ) has 
more entries zero than X or more equalities of the kind e NO \T X e T 1. 
Note that for a 0-rooted arborescence,e \ x0 e,r = 1 means that T is con-N0 T 
nected in the graph x0 . 
8. TRAVELING SALESMAN GAMES (Potters/Curiel/Tijs (1987)). 
A speaker with residence t 0 is invited by n universities t 1 , ••. ,tn for 
a lecture. Therefore he plans a round-trip along the universities with 
minimal travel cost. The total travel cost has to be paid by the univer-
sities visited. Let (cij>i,j ENO be the cost matrix i.e. cij denotes 
the travel cost on the traject t.-t .. We want to find a dis-
J. J 
tribution of the total cost among the universities such that no coalition 
of universities has an incentive to split off and to invite the speaker 
for their own universities only. This means : we look for core elements 
of the game (N,w) defined by 
w(S) min{ I c. (")I TI is a cyclic permutation of so} 
iE s0 i,TI 1 
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where s 0 = S U {O}. 
Introducing permutation matrix XTI for (cyclic) permutations TI, we get 
w(S) min{C * X IX E X(S)} 
where 
X(S) 
N XN 
X E z O O I e X = es , X e = e and e 
{ + No 0 No so No\T 
for all non-empty Tc N0 , T n s0 f ~, T ~ s0 . 
Note that the inequalities e \ X e G 1 exclude non-cyclic s 0-permutations. NOT T 
The results in this section will be negative for the most part. 
1. The Bondareva/Shapley approach fails. 
If L Ys es = eN and XS E X(S) for alls c N (with Ys > 0), then 
if L Ys f 1. But this is true unless we have the trivial equality 
SCN 
We find the same outcome for 
that L y X(S) et co(X(N)). 
SCN S 
The cost matrix should have special properties to make the core non-
empty. 
2. Let C be any cost matrix and disturb the entries (0,j) of 0 only 
where a ER and j f 0. 
c .. c .. ifi>O. 
l., J l., J 
Then we find 
;(s) = min{ L ci,TI (i) I TI is cyclic ins o} = 
iE s0 
min{ ( L c. (.)) + a) TI is cylcic in so} 
l. 'TI l. iE s0 
w(S) + a. 
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For a non-negative solution {y } of L y e 
S S c: N SC:N S S 
eN' not equal to the 
trivial solution 1. ~ ~· we obtain 
L y w(S) + L y . a and this is at least 
SC:N S SC:N S 
';;(N) = w(N) +a if ( L y - l)a ~ w(N) - L y w(S). This means 
sc:N s sc:N s 
that there is to every cost matrix Ca real number a(C) such that';; 
has a non-empty core if and only if a~ a(C). To prove this, we need 
the fact that for non-trivial solutions of L y S e 5 = eN with y S ~ 0 
for all S c: N, the inequality L y S > 1 SC: N holds . 
SC:N 
Proof: Since L y ~ L y 1 we have L y 8 ~ 1. If 
SC:N S S:l ES SC:N 
1 then 
y8 > 0 implies 1 E S. The same holds if we replace 1 by i. 
Ys > 0 implies N c: Sand {y 8}s c: N is the trivial solution. 
3. In Potters et al. (1987) we gave an example of an asymmetric cost ma-
tric C satisfying the triangle inequalities cij + cjk ~ cik for all 
i,j,k E N0 such that the associated traveling salesman game has never-
theless an empty core. Whether this can occur with symmetric cost ma-
trices C too,is up to this moment an open question. But we know that 
only the triangle inequalities c .. + c.k ~ cik with j = 0 can be re-
l.J J ~ 
levant, since the transition fromC to C, as we investigated under 
(2), only influences these triangle inequalities. In fact, there is 
for each cost matrix C a real number 8(C) such that C satisfies the 
triangle inequalities 
for all i,j E N 
if and only if a~ 8(C). The question above can be paraphrased as 
follows : Do we have a(C) ~ 8(C) for all syrrmetria cost matrices c ? 
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CHAPTER XII 
NONSYMMETRIC NASH BARGAINING SOLUTIONS 
by Hans Peters 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Without any doubt the Nash bargaining solution (Nash(1950)) is the most 
well-known and popular solution concept in bargaining - in the theoretical 
literature as well as in applied and empirical work. Moreover the family 
of nonsymmetric Nash bargaining solutions has been the subject of much 
theoretical and applied work, much more so than nonsymmetric extensions of 
other solution concepts. Which could be the causes of or reasons for this 
popularity ? Empirical evidence for the Nash bargaining solution(s) cer-
tainly is not overwhelming and besides, lack of empirical results concerning 
other solution concepts makes any comparison difficult if not impossible. 
(For some recent empirical work see Svejnar (1986), or Van Cayseele (1987)). 
Further, quite some experiments have been conducted (see Roth and Malouf 
(1979) for an overview), but also these are not unambiguously conclusive 
in favor of the Nash solution(s). Even, earlier experiments by Crott (1971) 
point into the direction of the next popular solution, the Raiffa-Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution (Raiffa(1953), Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)). A psy-
chological advantage of the latter solution might be its easy visualization: 
perhaps, it is easier for persons in an experiment to draw the straight 
line occurring in the definition of the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 
than to draw the hyperbolas corresponding to the Nash product maximization. 
In actual computations, however, the Nash product maximization sometimes 
gives "nicer" formulas than the calculation of the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky 
solution (see, e.g., McDonald and Solow (1981)). 
Thus, apart from historical or chronological considerations, the cause 
of the popularity of the Nash solution(s) must be a theoretical one. In-
deed, there exist many axiomatic characterizations of the Nash solution(s), 
and there are also some noncooperative approaches to the bargaining problem 
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which give support to the Nash solution(s). Further, Nash solutions have 
their twins in Cobb-Douglas utility or production functions. And the in-
dependence of irrelevant condition used by Nash to characterize his solu-
tion, also occurs in decision theory (e.g. Luce (1979)) or consumer theory 
(e.g. Weddepohl (1970), Peters and Wakker (1987)), and is related to the 
condition with the same name in social choice theory (Arrow (1951)). 
The obvious conclusion is that there must be something special about 
the Nash solution(s). This chapter tries to support this conclusion by 
making explicit some of the items listed in the preceding paragraph. That 
is, we will describe quite a few axiomatic and other models for the Nash 
solution(s). 
Briefly, the chapter is organized as follows. The first four of the 
remaining sections are mainly concerned with axiomatic considerations : in 
section 2 the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition is central, 
sections 3 and 4 consider other conditions and characterizations, and sec-
tion 5 discusses properties with respect to changes in the status quo point 
as far as these relate to Nash solutions. In sections 6 and 7, some non-
cooperative and economic models are described in which Nash solutions play 
an important role. Section 8 concludes. 
This chapter contains almost no proofs : the reader will be referred 
to the original works. As a consequence we will not always formulate the 
strongest possible results since this would require additional proofs. 
For instance, the extreme solutions - the dictator solutions - are some-
times excluded. However, we do not think that this will influence any re-
sults in this chapter in an essential way. 
2. PRELIMINARIES. INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES 
A (2-person bargaining) game is a pair (S,d) where d is an interior 
point of and is closed subset ciR 2 such that max{x. E s} s s a convex : x 
l 
exists for i 1,2, and such that y E S whenever y ~ x and x E s. 
(y ~ x and x ~ y mean yi ~ xi for i 1,2, y < x and x > y mean yi < xi 
for i = 1,2.) In interpreting a game (S,d) we have in mind two players 
who either agree on an x E S giving utility xi to player i, or fail to 
agree in which case they end up with utilities di. The point dis called 
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status quo point or disagreement point. Closedness of s is required only 
for mathematical convenience (and is often implicitly satisfied, e.g. if an 
underlying set of "physical" alternatives is finite), convexity of S may 
come from the use of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions defined on 
lotteries between underlying alternatives, or e.g. from the use of concave 
utility functions in division problems. The last requirement in the defi-
nition of a game (S,d), called corrrprehensiveness, can be interpreted as 
free disposibility of utility for both players. Most of the results in 
this chapter, however, can be adapted to the case of no free disposibility 
without essential changes. 
The definition of an n-person bargaining game is similar to the defini-
tion of a 2-person game : replace 2 by n everywhere. We will concern our-
selves mostly with 2-person games. These have received much more attention 
in literature; reasons for this are the fact that many interesting conflict 
situations involve only two parties, and that in conflict situations with 
more than two parties the formation of coalitions, which are not allowed 
in n-person ("pure") bargaining games ("unanimity games"), often is a na-
tural occurrence. Nevertheless, many results for 2-person games can be ex-
tended straightforwardly to n-person games; see further our remark in the 
final section. 
Nash (1950) proposed to solve the bargaining problem by looking at the 
whole family of bargaining games. In general, an (n-person bargaining) 
solution is a map~: Bn ~Rn with ~(S,d) ES for every (S,d) E Bn 
(feasibility) where Bn denotes the family of all n-person bargaining games. 
The axiomatic approach to bargaining consists of specifying a list of pro-
perties and trying to find the solution(s) satisfying these properties. 
Most theorists agree that this approach is best understood if one has an 
arbitrator in mind who considers these properties as reasonable and advises 
(or prescribes) the corresponding solution(s) to the players. 
Before we can give the definition of the central concept of this chap-
ter, namely the Nash solution and its nonsymmetric extensions, we need some 
2 n additional notation. We write B instead of B . For (S,d) E B , we denote 
by P(S) the Pareto optimal subset of s 
P(S) := {x ES : for ally ES, if y ~ x then y = x}, 
and by P(S,d) := {x E P(S) x ~ d} the individually rational Pareto optimal 
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set of (S,d). Further Sd := {x ES : x ~ d}, and W(S) := 3S, the boundary 
or weakly Pareto optimal subset of s. 
DEFINITION 2.1. For every (S,d) E Band 0 < t < 1, let Nt(S,d) maximize 
t 1-t t 2 the product (x 1-\l (x2-a2 ) over ~a· We call N : B ->R a (nonsyrrone-
tric) Nash solution. We call N N2 the Nash solution. The dictatorial 
7t" 1 2 2 c SOi,U 1-0ns D ,D : B -> R assign to each (S ,d) c B the lower and upper point 
of P(S,d), respectively. We also write N1 := n1 and NO := n2 . Further, 
N := {Nt : 0 ~ t ~ 1} and NO := {Nt : 0 < t < 1}. 
The Nash solution N was first proposed by Nash (1950), and the nonsym-
metric Nash solutions Nt were (may be not first) proposed by Harsanyi and 
Selten (1972). Nash (1950, 1953) proposed the following properties for a 
solution tp on B. 
WPO (Weak Pareto optimality) tp(S,d) E W(S) for every (S,d) E B. 
IAUT (Independence of positive affine utiUty transformations) 
For all a,b ER2 with a> 0 and every (S,d) E B, we have 
2 tp(aS + b, ad+ b) atp(S,d) +b. Here ax := (a 1x 1 ,a2x 2 ) for x ER, 
and aT ·= {ax : x ET} for T cR2 . 
SYM (Syrronetry) : If (S,d) E B is syrronetric, i.e. a1 d 2 and 
S = {(x2 ,x 1) : x Es}, then tp1 (S,d) = tp2 (S,d). 
IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) For all (S,d), (T,d) E B 
with Sc T and tp(T,d) E S, we have tp(T,d) tp(S,d). 
The WPO-property needs no further comment. The IAUT-property is reaso-
nable and even compelling if the utility functions are of the von Neumann-
Morgenstern type, so unique only up to positive affine transformations. 
As a matter of fact, the IAUT-property requires that the solution depend 
only on the players' preferences over the underlying "physical" alternati-
ves and not on the particular representation of these preferences. The 
symmetry property reflects according to some authors equal bargaining abi-
lity, and according to others lack of such information as to enable us to 
distinguish between the players. Both arguments become questionable if 
knowledge of the underlying bargaining situation makes it possible to dis-
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tinguish between the players. The well-known argument (e.g. Harsanyi. (1977)) 
that all information must be incorporated into the players' utility func-
tions is perhaps theoretically appealing, but tends to limit the applicabi-
lity of the theory. Kalai (1977) presents a model which accounts for non-
symmetric Nash sulutions, see section 4 of this chapter. See also sections 
6 and 7. 
The IIA-property is the most discussed and criticized property in li-
terature (e.g. Luce and Raiffa (1957), Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)). For 
this moment, we only want to stress that in order to have a meaningful in-
terpretation of IIA it should be taken literally : eeteris paribus (e.g. 
the players and their utility functions) , if the set of underlying "physi-
cal" alternatives shrinks while some (there may be more) original solution 
alternative is still available, then the new solution alternative should 
be such an originally available solution alternative. The formulation of 
IIA reflects an implicit axiom present in many axiomatic models of bar-
gaining and called the Bargaining Theory Axiom by Roemer (1986) : this axiom 
requires that the solution depend only on the bargaining game (i.e. the 
pair of objects in utility space) and not on the underlying "physical" bar-
gaining situation. For instance, the IIA-property is assumed to hold also 
if the physical bargaining problem giving rise to (S,d) cannot be obtained 
by merely shrinking the set of alternatives in the problem underlying (T,d). 
A user of bargaining theory should be aware of this. 
Nash (1950) proved the following theorem. 
THEOREM 2.2. The Nash-solution N : B ~lR2 is the unique solution with 
the properties WPO, IAUT, SYM, and IIA. 
Three other properties for a solution ~ on B, which need no further 
comments, are defined as follows. 
(S) IR ((Strong) individual rationality) : ~(S,d) f; (>) d for every (S,d) E B. 
PO (Pareto optimality) : ~(S,d) E P(S) for every (S,d) E B. 
The following two theorems for 2-person solutions are proved in Roth 
(1979) and de Koster et al. (1983), respectively. 
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THEOREM 2.3. NO is the family of all solutions with the properties SIR, 
IAUT, and IIA. 
THEOREM 2.4. N is the family of all solutions with the properties IR, PO, 
IAUT, and IIA. 
Theorem 2.4 is the first characterization of the family N, consisting 
of all the nonsymmetric Nash solutions and both dictator solutions, in this 
chapter : a large part of the remainder will present variations on this 
theme. The dictator solutions are the extremes in this family; they have 
many appealing properties, and it is only a pity that they are dictatorial. 
There is an interesting parallel here with Arrow's famous impossibility 
result (Arrow (1951)). 
There exist many variations on the bargaining model and Theorem 2.4 
that involve IIA or properties in the same spirit. Peters et al. (1983) 
consider rrrultisolutions , which assign a subset of feasible outcomes to 
each bargaining game. Kaneko (1980) also considers multisolutions, and 
obtains a characterization of the "symmetric Nash correspondence" for non-
convex bargaining games. Peters and Tijs (1983) consider so-called proba-
bilistic solutions with an !IA-property; probabilistic solutions assign 
probabilities to the feasible points in a bargaining game. Patrone et al. 
(1987) show that in Theorem 2.4 the !IA-property may be considerably 
weakened if a weak continuity property (Pareto continuity) is added. This 
weaker version of IIA requires that if a game (T ,d) E B is reduced by omitting 
all points above a certain utility level for player 2 and all points to 
the right of a certain utility level for player 1, then the solution point 
does not change provided it is still feasible. This variation or other 
ones on Theorem 2.4 may be useful in case the bargaining games in question 
are derived from "physical" situations in which the rather strong premises 
of the !IA-property are void of meaning. 
A bargaining game can be viewed as a decision problem in which the de-
cision maker consists of the two bargainers as a group, and in which the 
decision or compromise is the point assigned by some solution ~- In this 
context one might expect the "decision maker" to maximize certain "pref e-
rences"; formally, we say that the binary relation> on JR2 represents~ if 
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for every game (S,d) there is a unique point z with z >x for all x in S, 
and z = ~(S,d). The following result is proved in Peters and Wakker (1987): 
THEOREM 2.5. 2 There exists a binary solution~ onJR representing~ if and 
only if ~ satisfies IIA. 
Theorem 2.5 holds for n-person solutions as well; its proof depends on-
ly on the intersection-closedness of the domain. Peters and Wakker (1987) 
also give a characterization of the family NO of nonsymmetric Nash solutions 
by characterizing the Nash product functions defining them. Like Theorem 
2.5, this characterization emphasizes the "social welfare" character of the 
nonsymmetric Nash solutions; alternatively, the result can also be conside-
red as a characterization of the Cobb-Douglas production or utility func-
tions, for the case of convex compact production or consumption sets. 
3. ALTERNATIVES FOR IIA 
Our first aim in this section is to show that in Theorem 2.4 the inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives property may be replaced by a property 
called independence of irrelevant expansions and introduced by Thomson 
(1981). We first give the definition. Here,~ is a two-person solution. 
IIE (Independence of irrelevant expansions) : For every (S,d) E B there 
· E 2 · h 1 h h exists a vector p JR+ wit p 1 + p 2 = sue t at : 
(i) p.(x-d) = p.(~(S,d)-d) is the equation of a supporting line of S 
at ~(S,d), 
(ii) for all (T,d) E B with Sc T and p.(x-d) ;; p.(x-~(S,d)) for all 
x ET, we have ~(T,d) ~ ~(S,d). 
2 (x.y denotes the inner product x 1y 1 + x 2y 2 , for x,y EJR .) 
Contrary to IIA, IIE says something about the way in which a game may 
be expanded without essentially changing the solution. A nonsymmetric Nash 
solution Nt (0 < t < 1) satisfies IIE with equality in (ii), i.e. ~(S,d) = 
~(T,d); p is the normal vector of the supporting line separating a game from 
the hyperbola which is the level set of the maximal nonsymmetric Nash pro-
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duct. Only for the dictator-solutions in N, it may actually happen that 
~(T,d) ~ ~(S,d) in (ii), namely if p = (1,0) or p = (0,1). 
Stressing the social welfare aspect of a nonsymmetric Nash solution 
(see also the last part of the preceding section) , we obtain an interpre-
tation of IIE : ~he addition of feasible points with - apparently - lower 
social welfare does not influence the location of the maximal social wel-
fare. This interpretation is related to the interpretation Shapley (1969) 
offers of the symmetric Nash solution N = N! as a compromise between "maxi-
mization of social welfare" and "sharing of social profit". Shapley's ar-
gument is based on the fact that the Nash solution point of a game is the 
unique Pareto optimal point where there is a supporting line ("maximization 
of social welfare") the slope of whir.h is the negative of the slope of the 
straight line through that point and the status quo point ("sharing of so-
cial profit"). A proof of the following result can be found in Peters 
( 1986b) . 
THEOREM 3.1. N is the family of all solutions with the properties IR, PO, 
IAUT, and IIE. 
Theorem 3.1 concludes the first part of this section. Our third cha-
racterization of the family N will involve a weaker version of the follow-
ing property for a solution ~ on B. 
SA (Super-Additivity) : For ~11 (S,d) and (T,e) E B we have 
~(S + T, d + e) 6 ~(S,d) + ~(T,e). 
(Here S + T := {s + t : s E S, t ET}.) 
Perles and Maschler (1981) give the following interpretation of the 
Super-Additivity property. 
OBSERVATION. Suppose ~ satisfies SA and IAUT. For any game consisting of 
a lottery on two games (S,d) and (T,e) in B, players who obey ~will prefer 
to reach an agreement before the outcome of the lottery is available. 
(Proof. Let (p,1-p) be the distribution of the lottery, w.l.o.g. 0 < p < 1. 
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If the players reach an agreement immediately, it must be \P(V,f) where 
(V,f) = p(S,d) + (1-p) (T,e). By IAUT and SA we obtain \P(V,f) 2; p\P (S,d) + 
(1-p)\P(T,e). The right hand side of this inequality is the expectation of 
the players from a delayed agreement.) 
Peters (1986a) offers another interpretation of the Super-Additivity 
property. Suppose the players have to play two bargaining games (on two 
different issues, say). Intuitively, it may be advantageous for both 
players to play the games simultaneously rather than separately because 
then agreements like "if you grant my wishes in one game then I will grant 
yours in the other game" can be effective. If the simultaneous game can 
be expressed as the sum of the separate games then this intuition is equi-
valent to requiring a solution to be super-additive; necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for this "sum-property" are given in Peters ( 1985). Perles 
and Maschler (1981) characterize their so-called Super-Additive solution on 
the class of games where every Pareto-optimal outcome is individually ra-
tional; on a larger class (e.g. B) they obtain an impossibility result. 
For the interpretation of Peters (1986a) it is essential to consider all 
games since concessions made by one player to his opponent in one game can 
be, typically, non-individually rational for the player who makes them. 
Peters (1986a) proposes a few weakenings of Super-Additivity, of which the 
following one is relevant in this chapter. Here, we call an (S,d) E B 
smooth at x E S if S has a unique supporting line at x. 
RA (Restricted Additivity) : For all (S,d) and (T,e) in B such that S and 
T are smooth at \P(S,d) and \P(T,e) respectively, and 
\P(S,d) + \P(T,e) E P(S + T), we have 
\P(S + T, d + e) = \P(S,d) + \l)(T,e). 
All members of N satisfy RA; RA is strictly weaker than SA since for 
instance the Nash solution does not satisfy SA, and SA implies RA. 
Theorem 3.2 below gives a third characterization of the family N. First we 
need to define another property for a solution \I); this property was men-
tioned before, in the preceding section. 
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PCO (Pareto aontinuity). 1 1 2 2 Let (S,d), (S ,d), (S ,d ), .•. E B be a sequence 
of games with dn ~ d and conv(P(Sn))~ conv(P(S)) (w.r.t. the Hausdorff me-
tric, see Peters (1986b, section 19)). Then ~(Sn,dn) ~ ~(S,d). 
Pareto continuity is weaker than aontinuity : in the latter property 
instead of conv(P(Sn)) ~ conv(P(S)) only Sn~ S is required. PCO is strictly 
weaker than continuity : the dictator solutions are Pareto continuous but 
not continuous. We can now state the announced theorem, a proof of which 
can be found in Peters (1986a). 
THEOREM 3.2. N is the family of all solutions with the properties IR, PO, 
IAUT, PCO, and RA. 
We conclude this section with a fourth axiomatic characterization of 
the family N. We will call the main property involved the rrrultipliaation 
property. We have chosen this mathematically sounding name since we will 
restrict ourselves in this case to formulating the property without giving 
an interpretation. Interpretations can be found in Binmore (1982) and 
Peters (1986b) : both interpretations, we think, are not quite convinving. 
For notational simplicity, we restrict ourselves to a class BO of ob-
jects which we also call bargaining games. An S c:R2 is an element of BO 
ifs= T n:JR: for some (T,0) E B: so the status quo point is fixed at O 
and all non-individually rational points are discarded. Most definitions 
can be modified for BO in a straightforward manner. For S,T EBO we deno-
te ST := {st : s ES, t ET}. 
MP (Multipliaation property) 
~(ST)= ~(S)~(T). 
0 0 For all S,T E B , if ST E B , then 
Note that the condition ST E BO cannot be omitted since ST does not 
have to be convex. 
THEOREM 3.3. N is the family of all solutions on BO with the properties 
PO and MP. 
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In theorem 3.3 N is characterized by only two properties, but notice 
that IR is implied by our restriction to BO and IAUT follows easily from 
MP. The result can be formulated for solutions on B at the price of a few 
extra notations; for this and for a proof, see Peters (1986b). 
So far we have formulated four axiomatic characterizations of Nash solu-
tions. In the next section we discuss some further axiomatic and nonaxio-
matic odds and ends of solutions in N. 
4. REPLICATIONS AND RECURSIVITY 
In this section we first discuss a model proposed by Kalai (1977), who 
derives nonsymmetric Nash solutions by considering certain replications of 
two-person bargaining games. Then we consider another axiomatic characte-
rization of the symmetric Nash solution obtained by Van Damme (1986), in 
which a property called recursivity is used. 
Replication of two-person bargaining 
Let (S,d) E B and let m and Q, be two positive integers. The (m,£)-
m+£ 
replication of (S,d) is defined as (S',d') E B where S' is the compre-
{ m+£ hensive hull of y E lR : there is an x E S such that y i x 1 for 
1 ~ i ~ m and yi = x 2 for m+l ~ i ~ m+£}, and di= d 1 if 1 ~ i ~ m, di d 2 
if m+l ~ i ~ m+£. (The comprehensive hull of T cJRn is defined as 
T - Rn.) Then-person symmetric Nash solution is defined analogous to the 
+ 
(2-person) Nash solution; i.e., for every (S,d) E Bn it picks out the 
unique point where the product IT.n 1 (x.-d.)a, with a= l, is maximized on i= i i n 
P(S,d). Note that, for a game (S,d) E B with (m,£)-replication (S',d') E 
m+Q, 
B , the (m+£)-person symmetric Nash solution point z of (S',d') has the 
first m coordinates equal to the first coordinate of Nt(S,d) and the last 
Q, coordinates equal to the second coordinate of Nt(S,d), where t := m:£ ; 
this follows by writing down the Nash products which have to be 
maximized. A.ny 0 ~ t ~ 1 can be (at least) approximated by a quotient m:£ 
with m and £positive integers. This is, briefly, the main insight 
of Kalai (1977) : Every member of N can be (at least approximately) derived 
from the symmetric Nash solution applied to replications of two-person bar-
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gaining games with the appropriate dimensions. (Kalai does not include 
the dictator-solutions but there is no problem in including these as well.) 
The meaning of the idea of replicating games in this way is well illu-
strated by Kalai's own example which we quote here. 
EXAMPLE. Consider two players, 1 and 2, who have one dollar to divide be-
tween them. If they do not come to an agreement on how to divide the dol-
lar they lose it, and each receives nothing. Each player has utility y for 
y units of money that he receives. Nash's solution states that the dollar 
should be divided evenly between the players. Now assume that player 1 
has an enthusiastic supporter 1', (say a mother), who also has utility y 
for y units of money that 1 receives. In addition 1' has to agree to the 
decisions that 1 makes. The 2-person game becomes a 3-person game which is 
a (2,1)-replication of the original game. If the symmetric Nash solution 
. 'd d abl h h c2 2 1) 1 . . . h' is consi ere as reason e, t en we ave 3'3'3 as so ution point in t is 
3-person game; this corresponds to giving~ of the dollar to player 1, so 
to the point assigned by the solution Nt with t = ~ in the original 2-per-
son game. (We may add to Kalai's example that a more plausible interpre-
tation for this outcome would be that player 1 and his mother split the ~ 
dollar evenly.) 
Reaursivity 
In section 2 (second paragraph before Theorem 2.5) we have indicated 
an axiomatic characterization of the family N in which the !IA-property 
was weakened at the price of adding a weak continuity property. Van 
Damme (1986) does a similar thing by weakening IIA to a property called 
recursivity while "adding" the following property for a solution (j). 
RS (Risk Sensitivity) : For all (S,d) and (S',d') in B such that (S',d') 
arises from (S ,d) by applying a nondecreasing concave function k : R -> R 
to the i-th coordinates of points in S (i = 1 or 2) with k(di) 
have (j).(S,d) ~ (j),(-S',d') (j -Ii). 
J J 
dj_, we 
This property states that replacing a player (called player i here) by 
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a more risk averse player (according to the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk 
aversion) is not disadvantageous for that player's opponent (j here). The 
property was first proposed in Kihlstrom et al. (1981), who also showed 
that the symmetric Nash solution is risk sensitive. De Koster et al. (1983) 
showed that every member of N is risk sensitive. 
Let F denote the family of all individually rational, Pareto optimal, 
risk sensitive, symmetric 2-person bargaining solutions. For (S,d) E B 
let (S,d) F := {ljl(S,d) : lP E F}. Van Damme (1986, Proposition 1) shows that 
(S,d)F is a closed connected subset of P(S,d). 
(S,d)F denotes the comprehensive hull of (S,d)F. 
the following property. 
F So ((S,d) ,d) E B where 
Van Damme (1986) considers 
R (Reoursivity) For all (S,d) E B, lj)(S,d) F lj)( (S ,d) ,d) . 
The recursivity property requires that the solution should not depend 
on outcomes which cannot be obtained as the result of any solution in a 
"reasonable" family, in this case F. The following result is Proposition 
5 in Van Damme (1986). 
THEOREM 4.1. The Nash solution N is the unique solution with the proper-
ties IR, PO, SYM, RS, and R. 
If we add SYM in Theorem 2.4 and compare the result with Theorem 4.1, 
we notice that IIA has been replaced by R, and IAUT by RS. Indeed, for a 
solution in F, IIA implies R (as is straightforward to verify); further, 
Kihlstrom et al. (1981) have already shown that IAUT is implied by the 
combination of PO and RS. Thus, in Theorem 4.1, IIA is weakened to Rat 
the price of the substitution of RS for IAUT. We conclude with the con-
jecture that Theorem 4.1 can be extended to the whole family N by modifying 
the symmetry condition, e.g. by requiring solutions to assign the same 
point to same "standard" game like (T,0) with T the convex comprehensive 
hull of (1,0) and (0, 1) . 
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5. THE STATUS QUO POINT 
Up to now the premises of important properties like IIA, IIE, and R, 
had in common that in a game (S,d) the set of feasible outcomes S was chan-
ged (to a super- or subset) whereas the status quo point d remained fixed. 
More generally, none of the properties formulated so far focuses on possi-
ble changes in the solution outcome as a result of changing the status quo 
point. In Peters (1986c) characterizations are given of some two-person 
bargaining solutions with the aid of properties in which the status quo 
point plays a central role. This also leads to a characterization of the 
symmetric Nash solution. We need the next two properties for a two-person 
solution tp. 
INIR (Independence of Non-Individually Rational outcomes) : For every game 
(S,d), tp(S,d) = tp(T,d) where T is the comprehensive hull of the indi-
vidually rational set Sd of (S,d). 
LIN (Linearity) : For every game (S,d), if d' is an interior point of S on 
the straight line through d and tp(S,d), then tp(S,d') = tp(S,d). 
The INIR-property is a very mild kind of "independence of irrelevant 
alternatives". Linearity can be interpreted as a kind of proportionality 
as long as the proportion of the relative gains of the players (relative 
w.r.t. the status quo utilities) does not change while the status quo point 
changes, the solution outcome should not change. From Peters (1986c, 
Theorem 3.1) can be derived : 
THEOREM 5.1. The Nash solution N is the unique 2-person bargaining solu-
tion with the properties PO, INIR, SYM, IAUT, and LIN. 
In this theorem the combination of SYM and IAUT may be replaced by a 
property called Split-the-difference (see Peters (1986c)) : suppose x,y E JR2 
with x 1 < y 1 and x 2 > y 2 and let T be the convex comprehensive hull of x 
and y, then the Split-the-difference property requires tp(T,(x 1 ,y2 )J = ix+!y. 
We further note that PO and INIR together imply individual rationality. 
Peters and van Damme (1987) show that in Theorem 5.1 the linearity pro-
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perty may be replaced by a weaker property (which requires d' in the for-
mulation of LIN to lie in between d and ~(S,d)) if continuity of~ with 
respect to changes in the status quo point (for a fixed set of feasible 
outcomes) is added. Let us call the latter property : SC (Status quo point 
continuity). Instead of the former property, we formulate the following 
property : 
MSC <Mid Status quo point Convexity) : For all (S,d), (S,d') E B with 
~(S,d) = ~(S,d') we have ~(S,d) = ~(S,1d + !d'). 
MSC may be interpreted in the following way. Suppose that in a game 
the status quo point is still unknown and that the players consent to the 
same agreement regardless whether d or d' will be the status quo point; 
suppose they know that each of these two points has a probability of ! of 
becoming the status quo point; then the expected status quo point should 
induce the same agreement. From Peters and Van Damme (1987) the following 
result can be derived : 
THEOREM 5.2. The Nash solution N is the unique 2-person bargaining solu-
tion with the properties PO, INIR, SYM, IAUT, SC, and MSC. 
Finally, we conjecture again that also in these two theorems characte-
rizations of the whole family N are obtained by omitting the symmetry pro-
perty, or modifying the split-the-difference property mentioned after Theo-
rem 5.1. 
6. ECONOMIC MODELS FOR NASH SOLUTIONS 
In recent years there have been quite some applications of Nash solu-
tions to economic problems. We mention the work of McDonald and Solow 
(1981), Grout (1984), and Svejnar (1986), but there are many others. Often, 
these works are not particularly concerned with the question why the Nash 
solution or nonsymmetric rash solutions should be appropriate for the eco-
nomic model or problem under consideration. 
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In Roemer (1986), this author considers certain economic environments 
distribution problems - and formulates axioms for distribution schemes -
bargaining solutions - in terms of these economic environments. In this 
way he arrives at characterizations of some well-known solution concepts, 
among which is the Nash solution. In a technical sense, these axioms are 
weaker than the corresponding axioms (properties) in general bargaining 
theory as presented in this paper so far, but this is compensated by the 
richer economic structure of the underlying bargaining situation, i.e. di-
vision problem. The advantage of this approach over the works indicated in 
the preceding paragraph, is that the properties which may guide us to choo-
se a particular solution concept are formulated in economic terms and 
therefore, presumably have clear economic contents. The availability of 
such economic information and its use in characterization theorems clearly 
is also an advantage of Roemer's approach over the general abstract model. 
In Roemer's words, the general model adopts the Bargaining Theory axiom 
which states that bargaining solutions do not distinguish between bargai-
ning situations which have the same image in utility space, i.e. give exis-
tence to the same game (S,d). On the other hand, Roemer's characterization 
results are valid only for a(n admittedly broad) class of distribution pro-
blems. For other economic problems, the work has to be done anew. 
Roemer's results stipulate the importance of justifying the use of a 
specific game-theoretic solution concept in terms of the specific economic 
problem to which it is applied. Thus, as an example, if the independence 
of irrelevant alternatives property does not have any sensible meaning in 
some economic model then one should hesitate using the Nash solution; any-
way, even if one wants to use it, one should not appeal to Theorem 2.3 
(or 2.4) for a justification. 
Broadly speaking, bargaining game theory can be applied to economic 
models involving more parties where a choice has to be made from some set 
of feasible outcomes and where a reasonable interpretation can be given to 
an economic event serving as the status quo outcome. E.g., in an exchange 
economy it is generally agreed upon that a choice must be made from the 
contract curve; here no trade : the agents are left with their initial 
endowments, may serve as the status quo event. For such models other kinds 
of solution concepts exist; the most well-known is aompetitive (or 
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WalPasian) equilibPiwn. An interesting question is whether there exist 
relations between bargaining solutions in general, or particular solutions 
like Nash solutions, and a concept like competitive equilibrium. A partial 
affirmative answer to this question is given in Peters (1986b, section 13), 
who considers an economy in which two agents with different initial money 
endowments are bargaining over the division of a continuum of goods which 
they can buy together. A characterization of all competitive equilibria, 
and of all bargaining solutions giving rise to equilibrium allocations, is 
obtained. Special attention is paid to Nash solutions the weights of which 
turn out to correspond to the initial money endowments of the players. 
A related model was already presented in Gale (1960). The remainder of 
this section is devoted to a discussion of that model. 
In this model there are m aonswnePs labelled c 1 ,c2 , .•. ,cm and n goods 
labelled G1 ,G2 , ..• ,Gn. The utility of 1 unit of good Gj to consumer Ci is 
a .. ~ 0, and we suppose that utility is additive if y = (y1 ,y2 , ... ,yn)~O l.J n 
is a bundle of goods, then .I1a. ,y, is the utility of y to consumer ci·· J= l.J J 
Each consumer Ci has an amount of money bi, which he is willing to spend 
entirely on the n goods. There is one unit of each good available, and 
n 
i~l bi is exactly enough to buy all the goods. We suppose further that 
each good is wanted (for every j there is an i with a .. > 0) and that each l.J 
consumer wants something (for every i there is a j with a .. > 0). A pPiae l.J 
v~atoP p =m(p 1 ,p2 , •.. ,pn) is a nonnegative vector with 
j~l pj i~l bi. A aompetitive equilibPiwn consists of a price vector 
i p = (p 1 ,p2 , •.. ,pn) ~ 0 and a bundle of goods y for each consumer Ci such 
that 
(i) i n y maximizes Ci's utility j~l aijyj subject to the budget constraint 
p.y =b., for every i. (.denotes the inner product.) 
m . i i~l yi = (1,1, •.. ,1), that is, all goods are bought completely. (ii) 
Let the price vector p and the 
Suppose that the qu~ntities y~ 
i ~undles y form a competitive equilibrium. 
i 
and yk for consumer i are positive but un-
l. 
equal to 1. Since y maximizes c. 's utility subject to the constraint 
i -1 l. i -1 
p.y = bi, we must have Yi Pi yk pk since otherwise Ci could improve 
upon his bundle without violating his budget constraint by buying more 
(less) of the good with the higher (lower) ratio of marginal utility over 
price. For the same reason, this ratio must not be higher for the goods 
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of which he buys nothing, but it may be higher for a good of which he buys 
everything but which does not exhaust his budget. 
EXAMPLE. (Cf. Gale (1960, p. 287) .) Consider the following matrix for the 
(marginal) utilities a .. and money endowments b. 
lJ l 
4 
2 
3 
The vector p 
1 (6 ,o,1) form a 
3 
3 2 
2 
6 4 
c5 ,1 ,5) and 
competitive 
1 price ratios are 33, 3, and 
2 c3 these numbers are 13, 3, 
b. 
l 
1 5 2 3 the bundles y = (6 ,o,O), y = (0,1,0), y 
equilibrium. 
1 
For c 1 , the marginal utility/ 
14 for G1 , G2 , and 
1 1 
and 22, and 22, 1, 
G3 , respectively; for c2 and 
1 
and 22, respectively. These 
numbers are in accordance with our remarks made above. Note that also the 
-3 - 13 7 -1 10 -2 
vector p = (10,1,lO) and the bundles y = <13 1 0,0), y = ( 0 , 1 , 0 ) , and y 
3 <13 1 0,1) constitute a competitive equilibrium. Again the marginal utility/ 
price ratios are consistent with our earlier remarks; note in particular 
that for consumer c3 these ratios are 2* for G3 and 2;3 for G1 . Still, c3 
buys also a quantity of G1 since he has already bought all available G3 and 
has some money left. 
- -1 -2 -3 In this example, considering the competitive equilibrium (p,y ,y ,y ) , 
we could as well omit the third good G3 . We are then left with a 3 consu-
mers - 2 
1, 1, and 
-3 
and y 
goods model where the consumers c1 , c2 and c3 have money endowments 
3 
- 13 -1 10 -2 
10 , respectively, and where p = <10 1 1), y = (13 1 0), y = (0,1), 
( 133 , 0) still constitute a competitive equilibrium. For this 
competitive equilibrium the general idea that a consumer buys only those 
goods for which the marginal utility / price ratio is maximal, is restored. 
In the same way, any competitive equilibrium can be reduced in this way to 
what we shall call : an essential corrrpetitive equilibriwn, and which con-
i 
sists of a price vector p = (p1 ,p2 , ... ,pn) and a bundle of goods y for each 
consumer C such that, besides (i) and (ii) in the definition of a competi-
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tive equilibrium, we moreover have 
(iii) p > 0 
(iv) i 1,2, ... ,m, if yj > 0 then For every j = 1,2, ... ,n and every i 
-1 { -1} 
a. . p . = max a . kpk . 
lJ J k l 
In order to justify requirement (iii), suppose that for a competitive equi-
librium p, = 0 for some j. Then there can be only one consumer who wants 
J 
GJ., i.e. a .. > 0 for only one C., and that consumer will receive all of G .. lJ l J 
But then we could as well omit G. from consideration, i.e. give it all to 
J 
Ci for nothing, without essentially changing the competitive equilibrium. 
We will restrict further attention to essential competitive equilibria and 
describe Gale's (1960, p.281 ff.) results. 
m 
We normalize money and prices so that if lbi 
the optimization problem 
n . b 
Maximize IT.~ 1 ( Z a.iy~) i 
l- j= 1 lJ J 
s.t. 
i 
Z YJ. 
j=1 
n 
1 for every i 1,2, ... ,m. 
n 
·~1 P. J- l 1 and consider 
For each collection bundles y 1 , ... ,ym satisfying the constraints of this 
n i 
problem we can calculate the point with i-th coordinatejfl aijyj. Taking 
the comprehensive hull of all such points, we obtain an m-dimensional bar-
gaining game, where we take the origin as status quo point. So solving 
the above problem is the same as calculating the m-person nonsyrrmetric 
Nash bargaining solution with weights b 1 ,b 2 , ... ,bm, for the corresponding 
bargaining game. (The definition of this bargaining solution is obvious.) 
Let y 1 , y 2 , ... , ym be a maximizing combination of bundles of goods : exis-
tence is no problem since a continuous function is maximized on a compact 
n -i -1 
set. For every j = 1,2, ... ,n let p, = max a .. b. (Z. 1a. ,y,) . Then Gale J lJ l J= lJ J 
(~960, Theorem 8.5) shows that p = (p 1 ,p2 , ... ,pn) together with the bundles 
yl constitute an essential competitive equilibrium ! This result is of 
special importance because, as Gale also shows (Theorem 8.6), prices in an 
essential competitive equilibrium are unique. 
We conclude that this model provides a "noncooperative" foundation for 
the use of nonsymmetric Nash bargaining solutions. This foundation is es-
pecially attractive since the weights bi which are usually - and rather 
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vaguely - interpreted as "bargaining ability" measures, get a clear meaning: 
they are the initial money endowments of the agents. In more general terms, 
the model gives a relation between a noncooperative solution concept (com-
petitive equilibrium) and a cooperative concept (bargaining solution) . 
Gale's treatment of this model contains a flaw in that he considers 
(what we have called) essential competitive equilibria without making this 
assumption explicit. Further, the assumptions on the nature of the consu-
mers' utility functions are rather restrictive. It is not difficult to de-
rive similar results for the case where the utility functions are homogeneous 
of degree at most one, and to exclude nonessential competitive equilibria 
by appropriate extra conditions. The interested reader may verify this remark. 
The next section will be concerned with other, strategic, noncooperati-
ve models for Nash solutions. 
7. STRATEGIC MODELS FOR NASH SOLUTIONS 
Nash invented two fundamental concepts in game theory. One of these -
the Nash bargaining solution - is the subject of this chapter, and the 
other one - the Nash equilibriwn concept which is at least as important -
is the subject of about half of the chapters of this book. The Nash bar-
gaining solution was proposed by Nash in his 1950 paper, and the equilibrium 
concept in his 1951 paper. Nash (1953) is about the Nash bargaining solu-
tion, but the author is also concerned with trying to give a noncooperati-
ve foundation to his solution, i.e. with describing a noncooperative game 
corresponding to a given bargaining game such that the Nash bargaining so-
lution outcome coincides with "some" equilibrium of the noncooperative ga-
me. There is general agreement in literature that he did not fully suc-
ceed; still, also in this respect he has led the way for later work by 
other authors. For more details on Nash's approach, we refer to Sutton 
( 1986). 
Thus, Nash himself was the first one to contribute to - what is called 
by some authors - the Nash program. In a broad sense, this program looks 
for noncooperative, strategic implementations of cooperative (normative) 
concepts in game theory. In a narrow sense, it means the same thing but 
then for the Nash bargaining solution(s). The economic model of Gale 
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described in the previous section of this chapter is an example. There, 
one can imagine an arbitrator defending his forcing a nonsymmetric Nash 
solution on the consumers' distribution problem by pointing out that it 
leads to a competitive equilibrium; moreover, if the arbitrator is confi-
dent that the bargaining of the consumers will lead to a competitive equi-
librium automatically, then he does not need to force the nonsymmetric Nash 
solution in question upon the consumers. 
Harsanyi (1956) recognized the relation that exists between a bargaining 
process discussed by Zeuthen (1930) and the Nash bargaining solution. In 
the Nash demand game corresponding to a two-person bargaining game (S,d), 
each player proposes an outcome in P(S,d). If the proposals are incompa-
tible, so if the outcome by player 1 is lower on P(S) than the outcome pro-
posed by player 2, then in the Harsanyi-Zeuthen model the player with the 
lower risk limit will make a concession, that is propose a new outcome 
which is better for his opponent. The risk limit is the net loss of conce-
ding to the proposal of one's opponent divided by the net loss in case dis-
agreement occurs and d is the final outcome. It is easy to show that this 
model leads to the symmetric Nash bargaining solution provided there is 
some lower bound to the concessions. Harsanyi also proposed a two-step 
version of this model in which intermediate concessions are excluded, and 
of which the unique Nash equilibriwn is equal to the pair of maximwn stra-
tegies in which each player proposes the Nash bargaining solution outcome. 
Peters (1986b, section 14) provides a model which implements nonsymmetric 
Nash bargaining solutions by a mixture of the ideas present in the 
Harsanyi-Zeuthen model and the Kalai replication model (see section 4 of 
this chapter) . There have been some variations and many criticism on the 
Harsanyi-Zeuthen model in literature. Apart from the mentioned works, we 
refer to Harsanyi (1977), Roth (1979), Battinelli et al. (1986). 
In Anbar and Kalai (1978), again the Nash demand game is played. Now 
each player thinks that his opponent proposes randomly according to a uni-
form distribution. For each player, maximizing his expected utility means 
demanding the Nash bargaining solution outcome. For a game (S,d) let x be 
the boundary point of S with second coordinate d 2 and let y be the boundary 
point of S with first coordinate d 1 . Suppose player 1 proposes an outcome 
x with first coordinate x 1 E [d1 ,x 1] and thinks that the second coordinate 
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of player 2's proposal i.s drawn from a uniform distribution over [d2 ,:Y2 J. 
Then player l's expected utility equals 
x2-d2 y2-x2 (xl-dl) (x2-d2) 
+ dl dl + y -d 2 2 y2-d2 
here, a "one shot" bar-
gaining model is assumed. So player 1 maximizes his expected utility by 
proposing the Nash bargaining. solution outcome, and so does player 2. In 
this model, the bargaining game is reduced to two single-player decision 
problems. For further discussion and criticisms on this model, see Roth 
(1979, p. 25 ff.) 
Another model was proposed by Van Damme (1986). In this model, the 
players start with a 2-person bargaining game (s0 ,a) = (S,d) at time 0. 
The game is played in successive rounds and lasts at least 1 round. If the 
game is not over at time t (t = 0,1,2, ... ), both players must choose an out-
come in the remaining game (St,d) attainable by a solution belonging to a 
specific class of "well-behaved" solutions; a solution is "well-behaved" if 
it is Pareto optimal, symmetric, independent of positive affine utility 
transformations, and risk sensitive (; see sections 2 and 4 for the defini-
tions of these properties). If the chosen outcomes are incompatible in 
(St,d) which is the case if the outcome chosen by player 1 lies below the 
outcome chosen by player 2, then the players continue with the game 
t+l t+l t t (S ,d) where S c S arises by deleting all points of S which are 
either above player 2's choice or to the right of player l's choice : 
apparently - and this is the justification for the prescribed bargaining 
procedure - these outcomes were already given up by either player 2 or 
player 1. If a player always adopt the Nash bargaining solution outcome 
then obviously (in view of IIA) he will never have to "concede". Van 
Damme's surprising result is that this is the only outcome with this pro-
perty, so no player can do better than always propose the Nash bargaining 
solution outcome. Actually, Theorem 4.1 in this chapter is an immediate 
consequence of this result, as Van Damme shows ((1986, Proposition 5)). 
Van Damme's model makes the IIA-property or rather a weak version of it -
in fact, it is reminiscent of the weaker version of IIA mentioned in the 
discussion following Theorem 2.4 - operational in a bargaining procedure. 
This section would not be complete without a discussion of Rubinstein's 
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bargaining model (Rubinstein (1982)). Indeed, also that model leads to 
the Nash solution(s), as is pointed out in Binmore et al. (1986). We will 
now describe these results in more detail, thereby making a few assumptions 
on the players' preferences which do not substantially restrict the general 
ideas. 
Two players have to agree on the division of one unit of a perfectly 
divisible good, say a cake. A player's preferences depend not only on the 
slice of the cake he manages to obtain, but also on the time. If player 
gets a portion x between 0 and 1 of the cake at time t = 0,1,2, ... , then 
his utility equals o~u(x) where 0 $ 0 $ 1 is player l's discounting factor 
(we define o0 := 1) and u : [0,1] ~JR is a continuous increasing concave 
function with u(O) = 0 and u(l) 1. There are a number of hidden assump-
tions on player l's preferences here, among which is stationarity in time 
(see Rubinstein (1982), Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982)). Similarly, 
t player 2's utility for receiving x at time t equals o 2v(x) where o 2 and v 
have similar properties as o 1 and u. 
The game is played in successive rounds. At times t = 0,2,4, .•. , 
player 1 makes a proposal concerning the division of the cake and player 2 
answers yes or no. At times t = 1,3,5, ... , player 2 makes a proposal and 
player 1 answers yes or no. The game ends as soon as and only if some 
player says yes at some time. A strategy for a player is a complete plan 
which tells him what to do (i.e. which offer to make, or which answer to 
give) at each point of time (on to infinity) and for each history of offers 
and answers until that point of time. A pair of strategies constitute a 
Nash equilibriwn if no player can gain from unilaterally deviating from 
his strategy. It turns out that for the model under consideration the 
Nash equilibrium is too weak a concept : each division x for player 1 and 
1-x for player 2 can be obtained by a Nash equilibrium pair of strategies, 
as follows. Player 1 always proposes the division (x,1-x), and rejects any 
proposal which gives him less than x; player 2 always proposes (x,1-x) and 
rejects any proposal in which he gets less than 1-x. It is easy to verify that 
these two strategies form a Nash equilibrium; they result in the division 
(x,1-x) at time 0. We call the described pair of strategies a sirrrple Nash 
equilibrium for (x,1-x). 
A pair of strategies actually determines a "path" in the "game tree" 
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although a strategy contains a prescription for every point in the tree, 
that is for every point of time and every history of offers and answers, 
most points in the tree are never reached. At each point of time and given 
a certain history the players can be said to play a new game ("subgame") 
from that time on; in the game tree, at each node a subgame begins. Even 
if the players play a Nash equilibrium pair of strategies, these strategies 
do not have to induce a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. If they do, 
however, then we call the pair of strategies a perfect Nash equilibrium 
(see Selten (1975)). 
EXAMPLE. Take u(x) = x, v(x) = x,62 = 0.9. Suppose the players adopt the 
simple Nash equilibrium for (0.5,0.5). Suppose player 1 proposes the di-
vision (0.54,0.46) at time 0. (This leads to a node in the game tree off 
the equilibrium path : it may be reached for instance by accident, player 
1 making a mistake.) If player 2 sticks to his equilibrium strategy, he 
rejects and obtains 0.5 in round 1 which means 0.9 . 0.5 = 0.45 in terms 
of utilities : this is worse than the 0.46 which he can get at time 0. So 
the simple Nash equilibrium for (0.5,0.5) is not a perfect equilibrium 
we have described a subgame in which it is better for player 2 to deviate, 
even if player 1 plays his original strategy from time t = 1 on. 
Rubinstein has shown that for the described game, if at least one dis-
counting factor is positive and at least one is smaller than 1, there 
exists a unique division of the cake which can be obtained by a perfect 
Nash equilibrium. Consider the following system of equations 
u(y) = 61u(x), v(l-x) = 62v(l-y). 
* * Let (x ,y ) be the unique solution, then the pair of strategies in which 
* * * * player 1 (2) always proposes (x ,1-x) ((y ,1-y )) and rejects any offer 
* * which gives him less then y (1-x ) is a perfect Nash equilibrium. 
If u(x) = v(x) = x, then the equations above reduce toy = o1x and 
1-x 62 (1-y). E.g., if player 1 is offered y, then he is indifferent be-
tween receiving y (saying yes) and receiving his own proposal only in the 
next round. A similar reasoning applies to player 2. Solving the equations 
for this case, we obtain 
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* x y * 
The numbers 1-o 1 and 1-o 2 can be regarded as the interest rates of the 
players : If player i gets x tomorrow instead of today, that delay costs 
him (1-oi)x. Suppose the time between successive rounds falls to 0. This 
means that the interest rates (measured over the time between bargaining 
-1 
rounds) decrease to zero but their proportion a := (1-o 1) (1-8 2 ) remains 
constant. In our example with u(x) = v(x) = x, the numbers x* and y* both 
converge to (l+a)- 1 . So if the perfect equilibrium strategies described 
above are played, this results in the limit division ((l+a)-l ,a(l+a)-l) if 
the time between successive bargaining rounds approaches 0. This limit 
division is also obtained by applying a nonsymmetric Nash solution Nt, 
with t = (l+a)- 1 , to the 2-person bargaining game with all possible di-
visions of the cake as Pareto optimal outcomes and 0 ("no one gets any 
cake") as status quo point. Moreover, Binmore et al. (1986) show that 
this fact is true for general u and v. Note further that (l+a)-l 
-1 
r 2 Cr 1+r2 J where ri = 1-oi is the interest rate of player i. So we have 
an interpretation of the weight of a nonsymmetric Nash solution in terms 
of interest rates. 
We conclude that Rubinstein's model implements the nonsymmetric Nash 
solutions as limiting cases. As it were, in the limit all the bargaining 
is condensed in one moment of time; and this is, in fact, an often heard 
argument to defend the axiomatic approach. So here the axiomatic and the 
strategic approaches to bargaining are in striking harmony. 
Finally, it is worthwile to note that the interest rate r. = 1-o. can 
l l 
also be viewed as the probability assessed by player i that the bargaining 
process breaks down (and perpetual disagreement or status quo results) 
between two successive rounds. This gives a different interpretation to 
the model without essentially changing the results in a technical sense. 
Binmore et al. (1986) provide more details. 
8. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have reviewed many axiomatic, economic, strategic 
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(noncooperative), and other models which in some way give rise to the 
Nash solution or solutions. We think that the mere multitude of these 
models strengthens our feeling that the Nash solution(s} has (have) great 
theoretical appeal. We apologize already here to those authors whose 
work has not been mentioned; most probably some works have escaped our 
attention. For instance, we know that a great deal more can be said 
about Rubinstein's work and related results (see section 7). Also, we 
did not mention the work by Aumann and Kurz (1977) who give an account 
for nonsymmetry of Nash solutions in terms of "boldness" and "fear of 
ruin" .. 
Our motivation for reviewing all these models has not only been the 
theoretical one mentioned above. We also hope to have contributed to the 
applicability of the Nash solution(s) by collecting all these different 
models. 
A brief remark on the n-person case : most models and results have 
been stated for 2-person games, but in many though not all cases exten-
sions to n-person games are straightforward. The 2-person case has re-
ceived much more attention in literature (cf. section 2). Some references 
to work on "n-person Nash solutions" are Lensberg (1982), and Peters 
(1986b, section 28). 
Ongoing research in this field is devoted to finding relations between 
several kinds of models. In particular, a lot of work can be done on fin-
ding strategic models to support axiomatic approaches, and vice versa. 
Our leasthope is to have provided a list of references to the interested 
researcher. 
REFERENCES 
Anbar, D. and E. Kalai (1978). A One-Shot Bargaining Game. International 
Journal of Game Theory 7, 13-18. 
Arrow, K.J. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values. Wiley, New York. 
Aumann, R.J. and M. Kurz (1977). Power and Taxes. Econometrica 45, 1137-
1161. 
Battinelli, A., P. Tani and A. Villanacci (1986). Harsanyi's Axiomatic 
Derivation of Zeuthen's Principle : A Critical Examination. Working 
302 
Paper, Department of Economics, Florence. 
Binmore, K.G. (1982). Bargaining Conventions. LSE Discussion Paper, 
London. 
Binmore, K., A. Rubinstein and A. Wolinsky (1986). The Nash Bargaining 
Solution in Economic Modelling. Rand Journal of Economics 17, 176-
188. 
Crott, H.W. (1971). Experimentelle Untersuchung Zurn Verhandlungsverhalten 
in Kooperativen Spielen. Zeitschrift fur Sozialpsychologie 2, 61-74. 
De Koster, R., H.J.M. Peters, S.H. Tijs and P.P. Wakker (1983). Risk 
Sensitivity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Continuity 
of Bargaining Solutions. Mathematical Social Sciences 4, 295-300. 
Fishburn, P.C. and A. Rubinstein (1982). Time Preference. International 
Economic Review 23, 677-694. 
Gale, D. (1960). The Theory of Linear Economic Models. McGraw-Hill, 
New York. 
Grout, P.A. (1984). Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Con-
tracts : A Nash Bargaining Approach. Econometrica 52, 449-460. 
Harsanyi, J.C. (1956). Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and 
After the Theory of Games : A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', 
and Nash's Theories. Econometrica 24, 144-157. 
Harsanyi, J.C. (1977). Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in 
Games and Social Situations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Harsanyi, J.C. and R. Selten (1972). A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-
Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information. Management Scien-
ce 18, 80-106. 
Kalai, E. (1977). Nonsymmetric Nash Solutions and Replications of Two-
Person Bargaining. International Journal of Game Theory 6, 129-133. 
Kalai, E. and M. Smorodinsky (1975). Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining 
Problem. Econometrica 43, 513-518. 
Kaneko, M. (1980). An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Problem and the 
Nash Social Welfare Function. Theory and Decision 12, 135-148. 
Kihlstrom, R.E., A.E. Roth and D. Schmeidler (1981). Risk Aversion and 
Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem. In : Game Theory and Mathe-
matical Economics (0. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, eds.), 65-71, 
North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
303 
Lensberg, T. (1982). Stability and the Nash Solution. Norwegian School 
of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, Norway. 
Luce, R.D. (1979). Individual Choice Behavior. Greenwood Press, Westport, 
Connecticut. 
Luce, R.D. and H. Raiffa (1957). Games and Decisions Introduction and 
Critical Survey. Wiley., New York. 
McDonald, I.M. and R.M. Solow (1981). Wage Bargaining and Employment. 
American Economic Review 71, 896-908. 
Nash, J.F. (1950). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18, 155-162. 
Nash, J.F. (1951). Noncooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics 54, 286-
295. 
Nash, J.F. (1953). Two-Person Cooperative Games. Econometrica 21, 129-
140. 
Patrone, F., H. Peters and A. Torre (1987). On an Application of Nash 
Bargaining Theory. Working Paper, Maastricht, The Netherlands (forth-
coming). 
Perles, M.A. and M. Maschler (1981). The Super-Additive Solution for the 
Nash Bargaining Game. International Journal of Game Theory 10, 163-
193. 
Peters, H. (1985). A Note on Additive Utility and Bargaining. Economics 
Letters 17, 219-222. 
Peters, H. (1986a). Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining. 
Econometrica 54, 153-169. 
Peters, H. (1986b). Bargaining Game Theory. Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Maastricht, The Netherlands. 
Peters, H. (1986c). Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions by Proper-
ties of Their Status Quo Sets. Working Paper, Maastricht, The 
Netherlands. 
Peters, H. and S.H. Tijs (1983). Probabilistic Bargaining Solutions. 
Operations Research Proceedings, Springer, Berlin. 
Peters, H., S. Tijs and R. de Koster (1983). Solutions and Multisolutions 
for Bargaining Games. Methods of Operations Research 46, 465-476. 
Peters, H. and E. Van Damme (1987). A Characterization of the Nash Bar-
gaining Solution not using IIA. Working Paper, Bonn, West-Germany. 
304 
Peters, H. and P. Wakker (1987). Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
and Revealed Group Preferences. Working Paper, Maastricht, The 
Netherlands. 
Raiffa, H. (1953). Arbitration Schemes for Generalized Two-Person Games. 
Annals of Mathematics Studies 28, 361-387. 
Roemer, J.E. (1986). Equali~y of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 751-784. 
Roth, A.E. (1979). Axiomatic Models of Bargaining. Springer, Berlin. 
Roth, A.E. and M. Malouf (1979). Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of 
Information in Bargaining. Psychological Review 86, 574-594. 
Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. 
Econometrica 50, 97-109. 
Selten, R. (1975). Re-examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equili-
brium Points in Extensive Games. International Journal of Game Theory 
4, 25-55. 
Shapley, L.S. (1969). Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games. In 
La Decision (G.Th. Guilbaud, ed.), Editions du CNRS, Paris. 
Sutton, J. (1986). Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory. In: An Introduc-
tion. Review of Economic Studies 53, 709-724. 
Svejnar, J. (1986). Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage 
Settlements : Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry. Econometrica 
54, 1055-1078. 
Thomson, W. (1981). Independence of Irrelevant Expansions. International 
Journal of Game Theory 10, 107-114. 
Van Cayseele, P. (1987). Regulation and International Innovative Activi-
ties in the Pharmaceutical Industry. Nieuwe Reeks nr. 63, Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven, Belgium. 
Van Damme, E. (1986). The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal. Journal 
of Economic Theory 38, 78-100. 
Weddepohl, H.N. (1970). Axiomatic Choice Models. Rotterdam University 
Press, Wolters-Noordhoff Publishing, Groningen, The Netherlands. 
Zeuthen, F. (1930). Problems of Monopoly and Economic Welfare. 
G. Routledge, London. 
305 

CHAPTER XIII 
SOME SOCIAL CHOICE PROBLEMS 
by Ton Storcken *) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We are all familiar with situations in which a group of individuals 
has to agree upon a collective choice or preference, e.g. the election of 
a president or chairman, or the ranking of true-bred dogs by a jury at a 
dogshow. In fact everyone has been in such situations and probably has 
become engaged by arguments and the points of v.iew of the other group mem-
bers brought about in a discussion, which often precedes the decision of 
the group. Although a great deal of consideration is absorbed by such 
discussions, whenever we have to make a collective choice, the methods 
which yield these choices are seldom at stake. In the theory of social 
choice this is the other way around. There the whole interest is dedicated 
to the methods, by which groups of individuals make their collective choice 
or preference and no attention is paid to an eventually preceding discussion. 
Otherwise stated, in social choice theory constitutional decision pro-· 
cedures, by which a group of individuals determines its collective choice 
or preference, are investigated. It is assumed that these procedures 
depend on the individual preferences over the alternatives among which a 
group has to decide. Especially the properties of those procedures are 
studied. It appears that several, at first sight socially defendable and 
appreciable conditions for those procedures are contradicting each other, 
whenever there are three or more alternatives. These results are often 
called impossibility theorems and play an important role in social choice 
theory. For this reason this chapter is structured by these impossibility 
theorems. 
*) Financial support by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement 
of Pure Research (Z.W.O.) is gratefully acknowledged. 
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The structure of this chapter is as follows : 
In section 2 the notion decision procedure is formalized and illustra-
ted by some (well-known) examples. In section 3 several conditions for 
these procedures are discussed. In the next section a short historical 
survey of social choice theory is given and finally in section 5 a new 
impossibility theorem is discussed, in order to make the reader acquainted 
with the technical aspects of the impossibility theorems. 
It is notified here that this chapter on social choice theory does not 
give a "total" or "complete fractional" survey of social choice theory. 
This has been done already, even lately, by e.g. Sen (1986) in which the 
reader may find many references to that theory. This chapter tries to 
introduce the reader to the problems which are studied by social choice 
theory. 
2. WELFARE FUNCTIONS AND CHOICE FUNCTIONS 
In this section we introduce two models by which constitutional de-
cision rules can be studied. Both models use the following notions 
A= {a 1 ,a2 , .•. ,ap} called the set of alternatives. Hence there are 
p =I A I alternatives. They are often indicated by small letters : a,b,c, 
x,y, and z. 
N = { 1, 2, •.• ,n} called the set of individuals. There are 2 :;; n = I N I 
individuals, which are frequently indicated by small letters : i,j,k,l, 
m and n. 
Let R be a relation on A, i.e. RCAxA. Then 
cR := {<x,y> E Ax A : <x,y> ~ R} is the aomplement of R 
aR := {<x,y> E R <y,x> ~ R} is the asymmetria part of R 
sR := {<x,y> E R <y,x> E R} is the symmetria part of R 
dR := {<x,y> E R x = y} is the diagonal part of R 
vR := {<x,y> E Ax A : <y,x> ER} is the aonverse of R 
R 0 R := {<x,z> E AxA 3y EA <x,y> E R&<y,z> ER} is the 
aomposition of R with itself 
Furthermore R is called 
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transitive if (R 0 Rl c R 
negatively transitive if cR is transitive 
asymmetric if ~R = 0 
irreflexive if dR = 0 
corrrplete if R U (vR) U dcdR = Ax A 
a linear ordering if it is transitive, asymmetric and complete. The 
set of linear orderings on A is indicated by:U:..(A) 
a weak ordering if it is negatively transitive and asymmetric. The 
set of weak orderings on A is denoted by !W(A). 
a quasi-ordering on A if it is transitive and asymmetric. The set of 
quasi-orderings on A is denoted by ~(A). 
A society f is an ordered pair <A,N>, where A is a set of alternati-
ves among which the individuals of set N have to make a collective choice. 
Let f = <A,N> be a society and Va set of orderings on A, e.g. 
V = lW(A). Then Vn is then-fold cartesian product set of V. Let r E Vn 
such that r = < R1 ,R2 , ... ,Rn>, then r represents a combination of indivi-
dual orderings, where Ri is the preference ordering of individual i at 
combination r. r is called a profile. The set of profiles Vn is the set 
of possible combinations of individual orderings and is the domain of the 
decision rules in which we are interested. 
2 0 { } (1 2} 1 . h t" f EXAMPLE .. Let A= x,y,z , N = , , xyz : R is t e representa ion o 
{<x,y>,<y,z>,<x,z>}, x(y) : R2 is the representation of {<x,y>,<x,z>} 
z 
and (xy) R3 is the representation of {<x,y>}. Then x is preferred to 
z 
y in Rl, y and z are incomparable in R2 , R1 E :U:..(A), R2 E IW(A) - L(A) and 
R3 E <!l (A) - IW (A) . It is easy to prove that :n:.. (A) c IW (A) c <!l (A) . Further-
2 1 2 . . 2 
more (R ,R ) E IW(A) is a profile, where R is the ordering of individual 
1 and R1 is the ordering of individual 2. 
DEFINITION 2.1. Welfare function I Choice function. Let r < A,N> be a 
society and V a set of orderings on A. Then 
F is a welfare function from n v to w (on f) if w is a set of orderings 
on A and F is a function from Vn to w. 
K is choice function from n (on f) if K is function from a v to A a 
n 
to F(A), the power set of A. v 
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A welfare function F from Vn to W assigns to every possible combina-
tion of individual orderings r in Vn an ordering F(r) in W, which is in-
terpreted as the collective or aggregated preference of society r at 
situation r. Similar for a choice function K, K(r) is interpreted as the 
choice of society at situation r. It is evident that these functions 
describe constitutional decision rules, which depend only on the indivi-
dual preferences in V. 
Unless otherwise stated, we assume that V and W are both the set of 
linear orderings on A and by a welfare function (choice function) on 
r = <A,N>, we mean a welfare function (choice function) from:IT..(A)n to 
:IT..(A) (A) on I'. 
Notice that every welfare function F from Vn to W on r induces a cor-
responding choice function KF on r in the following way : 
Vr E :IT..(A)n KF(r) := Max(R), 
where Max(R) = {a EA : Vb EA <b,a> !l R} 
Max(R) is the set of maximal elements of R. 
If R E ')2(A), then Max(R) i 0. This follows by the transitivity of R and 
the finiteness of A. For R E:n:..(A) it follows by the completeness of R 
that I Max (R) I = 1. 
Now several welfare and choice functions are discussed. 
EXAMPLE 2.2. Pairwise majority rule. Let r = <A,N> be a society. The 
pairwise majority rule on r is a welfare function F from :n:.. (A) n to lP (Ax A) 
(the power set of Ax A) on r defined as follows : 
v<R1 ,R2 , ... ,Rn> = r E:n:..(A)n, v<a,b> E AxA 
<a,b> E F(r) =~I {i EN : < a,b > E R.} > I { j E N, <b,a> E R.} I 
l J 
Evidently F is well-defined. Note that I {i E N : <a,b> E R.} I is the 
l 
number of individuals who prefer a to b. Hence <a,b> E F(r) if and only 
if there are more individuals who prefer a to b than individuals who pre-
fer b to a at combination r. This explains the name pairwise majority 
rule. If A 
over, [NI 
= p = 2, then the range of F is equal to \W(A). If more-
n is odd the range is :IT..(A). May (1952) investigated the 
rule C from:IT..(A)n tolP(A), where C(r) = Max(F(r)) for the case where 
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\ A [ = 2. He has found a nice characterization of this rule, which 
evidently is strongly related to F : C = KF. 
If [ N \ = 2, then the range of F is ill (A) . Unfortunately the range of F 
contains cyclical relations, whenever \ N \ ~ 3 and [ A [ ~ 3. We will illu-
strate this fact. 
Without loss of generalization suppose \ A [ = 3 and A = {a,b,c}. Since 
N ~ 3 there are n 1 ,n2 and n 3 such that n 1 ~ 1, n 2 ~ 1, n 3 ~ 1, n 1+n2 +n3 = n 
and for all {i,j,k} = {1,2,3} : n.+n. > nk. 
1. J 
Take the following profile r as follows 
a b c R. for ;<; i ;<; nl 1. 
b c a R. for Ill < i ;<; nl+n2 1. 
c a b R. for nl+n2 < i ;<; n +n +n = n. 1. 1 2 3 
Notice that I {i E N : <a,b> E R.} I {i E N : i ~ Ill or nl +n2 < i} 1. 
n 1+n3 > [ {i EN : <b,a> ER) 
Hence there are more individuals preferring a to b, than individuals who 
prefer b to a. Therefore <a ,b > E F (r) and < b ,a> It F (r) . Similarly it 
follows <b,c> E F(r), <c,b> It F(r), <c,a> E F(r) and <a,c> \l'. F(r). 
Thus F(r) is cyclical. 
Although F is a "nice" and often used rule for societies with a two 
alternative set, it is almost useless for societies with more than two 
alternatives. 
The profile described above is usually called Condorcet profile named 
after Condorcet, who studied the probability of the appearance of such a 
profile. (See Condorcet (1785)). The alternatives in C(r) are frequent-
ly called Condorcet-winners. 
EXAMPLE 2.3. Scoring rules. ThesA rules are characterized by Young (1975). 
Let r = <A,N> be a society, and s = <s 1 ,s2 , ... ,sp> ERP such that 
s 1 ~ s 2 ~ ... ~ sp ~ O; sis called a score vector. Let r E M(A)n be a 
profile then every individual i assigns scores to every alternative x, 
according to its preference R .. 
1. 
First we calculate the number of alterna-
tives defeated by x in R.: d- (x,R.) := \ {y EA : <x,y> 
1. 1. 
E R. } [ Then we 
1. 
calculate the number of alternatives which defeat x in R. 
\{yEA:<y,x>ER.} 
1. 
0 1. 
= d- (x 'vR.). Let d (x ,R.) = I A I 
1. 1. 
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d+ (x,R.) := 
1. 
d+ (x,R.) 
1. 
0 d (x,R.) is the number of alternatives, which are incomparable 
J._ 
to x in R .• 
J._ 
Hence if R. is a linear ordering dO(x,R.) 1. 
J._ J._ 
For 
1 
2 
Now the score of x at Ri can be computed 
score (x ,R., s) 
J._ 
instance if s 
I 
1 < t ~ (3-0) 
:= 0 d (x,R.) 
• J._ 
= < 3,2,1 > and 
1 (s2+s3) St 2 
a(b) 2 R , 
cl 
12. 
then 2 score (b,R ,s) := 
The score of x at a profile r is equal to the sum of all the indivi-
dual scores : 
score(x,r,s) := I score(x,R.,s). 
iE N i 
Now the society ranks the alternatives according to their score : 
The welfare scoring function Fs with score vector s is the welfare 
function F fromlW(A)n to IW(A) on f defined as follows 
s 
Vr E IW(A)n Va,b EA <a,b> E F (r) :++ score(a,r,s) > score(b,r,s). 
s 
Evidently Fs is well-defined. 
The choice scoring function Ks with score vector s is the choice 
function KF induced by Fs. 
s 
Hence x E Ks(r) if and only if Vy EA score(x,r,s) ~ score(y,r,s). 
There are two special applications of choice scoring functions, both 
corresponding with a special choice of s. The first one is the Borda 
rule. This rule has been introduced by Borda (1781). It is defined as 
follows 
The Borda welfare function BW is the welfare scoring function F from 
s 
IW(A)n totW(A) on r with score vectors= <p,p-l, ... ,2,1>. 
The Borda choice function BC is the choice scoring function K from 
s 
l.W(A)n tolP(A) on r with score vectors= <p,p-1, ... ,2,1>. 
We are very familiar with the second application namely 
ry voting rule (one man one vote). 
The ordina-
The voting rule Vis the choice scoring function K fromlL(A)n tolP(A) 
s 
on r, with score vector < 1,0 ,0, ... ,0 ,0 >. 
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Since only the maximal elements of an individual preference Ri of 
combination r score, it is evident that V is indeed the "one man one vote" 
rule. 
Let us illustrate these two types of applications with some examples. 
Suppose N °.• {1,2, ... ,75} and A= {a,b,c,d,e}. Obse:rve the following 
profile r E: JL (A) 75 
a b c d e R. for 1 ~ i ;:: 16 (2 .3 .1) 
l 
d b c e a R. for 17 ;:: i ;:: 31 
l 
c b e d a R. for 32 ;:: i ;:: 46 
l 
b c e d a R. for 47 ;:: i ;:: 61 
l 
e b c d a R. for 62 ;:: i ;:: 75. 
l 
Take s 1 <1,0,0,0,0>. It is easy to compute the following results: 
score (a,r,s 1) 
score (b, r, s 1 ) 
16, score (e,r,s 1 ) = 14 and score (d,r,s 1) = score (c,r,s) 
15. Hence the alternative chosen by the voting rule V is 
a. This however is not an acceptable choice for most of the voters, since 
59 (f>1 4/5 part) of the voters rank a as worst alternative, whereas b is 
ranked best or second best by all the voters. Therefore b would be a more 
acceptable choice in profile (2.3.1). It is this criticism which stimu-
lated de Borda to create the Borda rules as defined above. The result 
V(r) = {a} instead of the choice b occurs because not all the positions 
of the alternatives are taken into account in the voting rule V. If we 
take s 2 = <5,4,3,2,1> it is straightforward to prove that score(a,r,s2 ) 
139, score(b,r,s2 ) = 315, score(c,r,s2 ) = 270, score(d,r,s2 ) = 195 and 
score(e,r,s2 ) = 206. Hence b c e d a : BW(r) and {b} = BC(r). 
Although these rules give an acceptable result in profile (2.3.1), 
they do not always yield a nice result. 
Observe the following two profiles : 
r a b e c d Rl (2 .3 .2) 
a e b c d R. for 2 ;£ i ;:: 35 
l 
e a b c d R. for 36 ~ i ~ 74 and 
l 
a b e d c R75. 
r' a b c d e R' 1 (2. 3 .3) 
For all i ;;; 2 R~ R .. 
l l 
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Profile r' and r differ only in the first component. Again it is 
straightforward to calculate 
score(a,r,s2 l 
score(b,r,s2 l 
score(c,r,s 2 l 
score(d,r,s 2 l 
score(a,r',s2 ) 336, 
score(b,r' ,s 2 J 227, 
149 and score(c,r' ,s2 ) = 150 
76 and score(d,r' ,s2 J = 77 and 
score(e,r,s2 l 337 and score(e,r' ,s2 l = 335. 
Hence BC(r) = e and BC(r') =a. Looking at the two profiles we observe 
that BC(r') is individual l's best choice in R1 . Hence if R1 is his 
real preference he may take advantage of the situation at (2.3.2) by mis-
representing his real preference by Ri-
A, to the author's opinion, more illustrative defect of the Borda rule 
can be found in the following example. 
Suppose N = {1,2,3,4} and A= {a,b,c,d,e}. 
Observe the following two profiles 
2 2 (2 .3 .4) r a b c d e Rl 
a b c e d 2 R2 
e d c (a) 2 b R3 
e d c b a 2 R4 
and 
3 
a b c d e 3 (2 .3 .5) r R 
1 
b e d 3 a c R2 
d (a) 3 e c R3 b 
d b a 3 e c R4. 
3 2 R2 can be constructed by a positional switch of the pair {a,b} in R2 . 
Moreover R~ and R~ differ only on the pair {a,b}. Notice that R~ and 
3 3 2 2 3 R3 differ only on the pair {d,e} and R4 and R4 too. Hence r and r 
differ only 
Note : 
on three pairs 
2 
score (a,r ,s ) 
2 2 
score (b, r , s ) 
2 2 
score (c ,r ,s ) 
2 2 
score (d,r ,s2 ) 
of alternatives. 
12} 3 111, score(a,r ,s) 
3 2 
111 score (b , r , s ) 12! 
12 
3 2 
score (c ,r ,s ) 12 
11 
3 2 
score (d,r ,s2 ) 13 
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2 
score(e,r ,s2 l = 13 , 
2 Hence e a c b d : BW(r ) 
3 
score(e,r ,s2 ) = 11. 
d b c a e : BW(r3 ). and 
- 2 3 Hence vBW(r ) BW(r ) . BW(r3 ) is the totally opposite 
Hence BW(r3 ) and BW(r2 ) differ on every pair. Hence to 
ordering of BW(r2 ) 
construct BW(r3 ) 
from BW(r2 ) we have to p s change (2 ) = (2 ) 10 pairs, but as is shown 
3 . 2 
above we can construct r from r by only changing 3 pairs of alternatives 
in the individual orderings. Hence a "small change" in the profile may 
cause a "great change" in the corresponding Borda welfare outcomes. 
EXAMPLE 2.4. Voting by veto. We will not introduce this rule in a formal 
way but illustrate it with a few examples. 
Suppose : A 
N 
{a 1 ,a2 ,a3 ,a4 ,aS,a6 ,a7 } and 
{1,2,3}. 
Now the veto voting rule is applied as follows_. 
First individual 1 picks an alternative from the set of possible 
outcomes. This alternative will not be chosen. Then individual 2 takes 
an alternative from the remaining set of possible outcomes. Then 3 does 
the same and after 3 it is l's turn again. This procedure continues until 
there is only one alternative left. This is the choice of the veto voting 
functions. 
For example take the following profile 
r al a2 a3 a4 as a6 a7 Rl (2 .4 .1) 
a3 as a7 a4 a6 a2 al R2 
al a2 a6 a4 a7 as a3 R3. 
After 1 has removed a candidate, the set of possible outcomes is re-
duced to {a 1 ,a2 ,a3 ,a4 ,aS,a6 }. After 2's turn this set is•{a2 ,a3 ,a4 ,aS,a6 }. 
After 3's turn this set is {a2 ,a4 ,aS 1 a 6 }. Then the set is reduced to 
{a2 ,a4 ,aS} by 1, and furthermore to {a4 ,aS} by 2 and finally 3 reduces it 
to {a4 } which is the choice of the veto voting function at profile r. 
Notice that a 4 is more or less acceptable for every individual. 
Now take the following profile 
r' al a2 a3 as a4 a6 a7 R' 1 (2.4.2) 
a4 a3 as a7 a2 a3 a6 R' 2 
a4 al a2 a6 a7 as a3 R' 3 
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Applying this rule to profile r' we obtain subsequently the following 
sets of possible outcomes: {a1 ,a2 ,a3 ,a4 ,a5 ,a6}, {a1 ,a2 ,a3 ,a4 ,a5}, 
{a 1 ,a2 ,a4 ,a5}, {a1 ,a2 ,a5 }, {a1 ,a5 } and {a 1}. Hence the veto voting func-
tion gives {a1} at profile r 3 • Observing the positions of a 4 in rand r', 
we see that the position of a 4 in r' is an improvement of the position of 
a 4 in r. However at r' a 4 _is not chosen although its position there is 
better than that in r, where a is chosen. Hence the veto voting function 
4 
lacks this kind of a monotonicity property. 
These veto voting rules are discussed in literature (see, e.g. Moulin 
(1983)) in connection with a game-theoretical approach to social choice 
theory. 
EXAMPLE 2.5. Artificial decision rules. The welfare functions and choice 
functions introduced above are all used (some in a modified form) in 
practice. The rules introduced here are not used in daily life or at 
least we hope that they are not applied. These rules have an artificial 
character. They are introduced for illustration purposes. 
Suppose : N = {1,2, ... ,n} and A= {a1 ,a2 , .•. ,ap}. 
The dictatorial Welfare function D. from L(A)n to L(A) on f <A,N> 
l. 
with dictator i is defined as follows : 
Vr E:L(A)n D.(r) R .. 
l. l. 
r = <R 1 , ... ,Rn> 
h · 11 · h · · f ( )n h .th d' Mat ematica y Di is t e proJection o L A on t e i coor inate. 
Since the collective preference is completely determined by ith individual 
preference, i is decisive in every situation. Hence i is a dictator in 
rule Di. Similarly we can define a dictatorial choice function Di 
D' i 
r 
KD .• 
l. 
The antidictatorial welfare function AD. fromL(A)n toL(A) on 
l. 
<A,N> with 
V r E: L(A)n 
antidictator i is defined as follows : 
AD. (r) 
l. 
r = < R1, ... ,Rn> 
vR .. 
l. 
Again the ith component in a profile completely determines the images of 
ADi, but now these images completely conflict with the ith preference. 
Therefore i is called an antidictator. Again an antidictatorial choice 
function ADi can be defined by ADi 
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The constant welfare function CR (for some fixed R EJL(A)) from 
JL(A)n toJL(A) on f is defined as follows : 
CR(r) = R. 
The name of this rule speaks for itself. A constant choice function c~ 
can be defined as follows : C' 
R 
Of course there are many other interesting rules (see e.g. Moulin 
(1983)), which we have to omit in view of the available space. 
3. POSSIBLE CONDITIONS FOR DECISION RULES 
In the previous section several welfare functions and choice functions 
are introduced. Along with their introduction we have shown some proper-
ties of these functions. In this section these properties are formalized. 
The formalizations discussed here are frequently used as reasonable con-
ditions. 
Suppose : A= {a 1 , ... ,ap} and N = {a, ... ,n}. 
Let further F be a welfare function from ..fl to W on f < A, N > and K be a 
choice function from Vn toJP(A) on f. 
DEFINITION 3.1. Pareto-optimality. 
F is Pareto-optimal if Vr E vn[Vi,j E N R.= R. =:> F(r) Rl (= R2 ... = R ) 
]_ J n 
K is Pare to-optimal if Vr E vn[Vi,j E N R.= R. =:> K(r) Max(R 1 J. ]_ J 
First it should be noted that Pareto-optimality appears in several 
other forms in literature. Here only one form (the weakest) is discussed 
to avoid confusion. Many of the conditions introduced hereafter have 
small variations in literature. We will only discuss one form of each, 
since they all cover the same intuitive notion in which we are interested. 
A decision rule is Pareto-optimal if the whole society is decisive in 
those situations in which all individuals agree with each other. Clearly 
the antidictatorial rules and the constant rule of 2.5 are not Pareto-
optimal, but all the other rules have this property. 
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DEFINITION 3.2. Non-dictatorship. 
F is non-dictatorial if 
Yi EN 3 r E Vn aR. ~ F(r). 
l 
K is non-dictatorial if 
Yi E N 3 r E Vn Max(R.) ~ K(r). 
l 
A decision rule is non-dictatorial if for every individual i there 
d .th . f is a situation in which the rule does not a opt i strict pre erence. 
It is evident that the dictatorial rules in 2.5 do not have this non-
dictatorship property, but all the others introduced in §2 have. 
DEFINITION 3.3. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). 
F is independent of irrelevant alternatives if 
1 2 _ n 1 1 2 1 1 I 2 I Ya,b EA Yr ,r E V r {a,b} = r {a,b} ~ F(r ) {a,b} = F(r ) {a,b}' 
where for all R E lP (Ax A) , R I {a ,b} is the restriction of R to the pair 
{a,b} and for all r E Vn, r I {a,b} = <R 1 I {a,b}' ... ,Rn I {a,b}>. 
A welfare function F is independent of irrelevant alternatives if the 
collective preference F(r) between any pair of alternatives {a,b} and in 
any situation r E Vn does not depend on the position of any other (irre-
levant) alternative c( fl {a,b}) in that situation r. Hence the collective 
preference between a and b is completely determined by the individual pre-
ference between a and b. IIA guarantees that the collective preference 
is established by pairwise comparison of the alternatives. 
Note that by the definitions of the majority rule (2.2), the dictato-
rial, the antidictatorial and the constant welfare functions (2.5), all 
the functions have property IIA. The Borda welfare function (2.3) is not 
independent of irrelevant alternatives. In order to prove this, consider 
the profiles r 2 in (2 .3 .4) and r 3 in (2 .3 .5) and observe r 2 I { } = 
3 2 3 a,c 
r I{ }andBW(r)[{ }f.BW(r)[{ }· a,c a,c a,c 
In general welfare scoring functions do not have property IIA, unless 
[A I= 2 in which case there are are no irrelevant alternatives. 
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DEFINITION 3.4. Non-manipulable. 
K is 
Vi E 
[3 a 
non-manipulable if 
N vr 1 ,r2 E vn [Vj E N-{i} R. R~ ~ 
1 2 2 J 1 J 
E K(r ) - K(r ) , b E K(r) - K(r) <a,b> 
K is non-manipulable if for all individuals i it holds that for 
situations r 1 it is not completely profitable for i to change its pre-
1 2 ference from Ri to Ri, where all the others do not change their preferen-
ces. In 2.3 we showed that the Borda choice function is manipulable. 
(See profiles (2.3.2) and (2.3.3)). In general, every choice scoring 
function is manipulable whenever I A ~ 3. It is left to the reader to 
show that the antidictatorial and veto choice functions are manipulable. 
The other rules introduced in 2.2 and 2.5 are non-manipulable. The proof 
is again left to the reader. 
DEFINITION 3.5. Monotony. 
1 2 Let a,b EA, R ,R E JP(AxA) and 1 2 n r ,r E V . The preference <a ,b > does 
not decrease going from R2 to R1 if [<a,b> E R2 ~ <a,b> E R1] and 
- 2 - 1 [<a,b>EaR ~<a,b>EaR]. 
Notation 
The preference <a ,b > does not decrease going from r 2 to r 1 if 
Vi EN <R~ ,R~> E il(<a,b>). 
l l 
Notation 
<r 1 ,r2 > E ii (<a,b>). 
n 
F is monotonous if 
1 2 n Va,b E A Vr ,r E V 
K is monotonous if 
1 2 1 ' 2 
<r ,r > E ii (<a,b>) ~<F(r ),F(r )> E il(<a,b>). 
n 
Va EA vr 1 ,r2 E Vn [[Vb EA <r 1 ,r2 > E ii (<a,b>)] and 
2 n 1 [a E K(r )]] ~[a E K(r )]. 
Both these types of monotony are also called strong positive associa-
tion. Since ii (<a,b>) and il(<a,b>) are relations on Vn and W respecti-
n 
vely, a monotonous welfare function does not disturbe these relations. 
This explains the name monotony. It is easy to prove that a monotonous 
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welfare function is independent of irrelevant alternatives. The anti-
dictatorial welfare function however is not monotonic. (The proof is 
left to the reader). 
The veto voting rule (2.4) is not monotonous : this is shown in 
example 2 .4. Muller and Satterthwaite ( 1977) showed that non-manipulable 
choice functions K are monqtonous, whenever I K(r) I = 1 for all r E :n:..(A)n. 
We end this sequence of conditions with a condition introduced by 
the author (1987). 
DEFINITION 3.6. Continuity. 
1 2 1 2 n Let R ,R EJP(AxA) and r ,r E V. 
d(R 1 ,R2 ) :=I R1 /'::,. R2 I (=I (R 1-R2 ) u (R2 -R 1 ) I) 
d (r1 ,r2 ) := I U{R~ /'::,. R: : i E N} I 
n i i 
F is aontinuous if 
12 n 12 1 2 Vr ,r E V dn (r ,r ) ~ d(F(r ) ,F(r ) ) . 
It can be proved that d and dn are both distance functions. Further-
more there are topological spaces on Vn and W such that the condition : 
Ve c W c is open in W => F- 1 (c) is open in vn 
is equivalent to the condition : 
12 n 12 1 2 Vr ,r E V dn (r ,r ) ~ d(F(r ) ,F(r ) ) . 
These facts will be proved in Storcken (198 ). According to these facts 
the name continuity is sufficiently explained. In words this condition 
is as follows : 
F is continuous if a change in the profile is not smaller than a 
change in the corresponding images. 
It is shown that the Borda welfare function is not continuous. Further-
more in Storcken (198 ) it is shown that the IIA condition implies this 
continuity condition. Hence the other welfare functions introduced in 
2.2 and 2.5 are continuous. It can be shown that a welfare scoring 
function is not continuous whenever I A I ~ 3. 
Although there are many other conditions imposable on decision rules 
we will stop here, because we are sufficiently equipped to understand the 
impossibility results of the next section. 
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4. SOME IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREMS IN SOCIAL CHOICE 
In 1951 K.J. Arrow proved his famous impossibility theorem, which 
can be found in Arrow (1978). The theorem has been presented in several 
forms. Here oi;e of these· is stated. 
THEOREM 4.1. Arrow's impossibility theorem 
Let r = < A,N > be a society such that I A [ ;:; 3 and F a welfare function on 
f from!W(A)n to\W(A). Then Fis not simultaneously Pareto-optimal, in-
dependent of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorial. 
A proof of this theorem can be found in e.g. Kelly (1978). This 
theorem surprises many social choice theorists, since the three conditions 
Pareto-optimality, IIA and non-dictatorship seem at first sight reasonable 
for ordinary decision rules and yet they cannot occur in any welfare func-
tion simultaneously. This surprise is and was turned into efforts to re-
cover the cause of this impossibility. These efforts gave rise to a con-
siderable amount of articles and books, which nowadays form the theory 
of social choice. Disregarding several authors such as de Borda, Caritat 
Marquis de Condorcet, and May, one could say that Theorem 4.1 initiated 
the theory of social choice. 
The rest of this section comments on the efforts mentioned above. 
These efforts can be divided into several classes. We will only deal with 
a few of them. 
4.2 Changes of the range of decision rules 
As you can notice in Theorem 4.1 the impossibility is stated for de-
cision rules with range IW(A). Many work was done on studying the effects 
of a change of the range of the decision rule. 
First it is noticed that substituting lP (Ax A) for lW (A) yields a possi-
bility theorem, e.g. the pairwise majority rule (2.2). But this substi-
tution brings in another not yet solved problem : How to handle the cyclic 
parts of a relation ? 
A second substitution, namely A instead ofiW(A) introduces similar 
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impossibility theorems. If we substitute A forlW(A) the welfare function 
becomes a choice function, the images of which are singletons. Gibbard 
(1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) independently proved the following result. 
THEOREM 4. 2 .1. Let r = < A,N > be a society such that I A I ~ 3. Then 
there is no choice function K from\W(A) to A which is simultaneously 
Pareto-optimal, non-dictatorial and non-manipulable. 
Some years later Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) proved an other 
impossibility theorem of this kind. 
THEOREM 4 .2 .2. Let r = < A,N > be a society such that I A I ~ 3. Then 
there is no choice function K from\W{A) to A which is simultaneously 
Pareto-optimal, non-dictatorial and monotonous. 
Furthermore they showed that 4.2.2 implies both 4.2.1 and 4.1. 
In both these theorems the IIA-condition is replaced by another con-
dition. This fact is motivated by the range changement of the decision 
rule. Since Theorem 4.2.2 implies Theorem 4.1, monotony is perhaps a 
weaker condition than IIA. 
Blair and Pollack (1979) and Blau (1979) studied welfare functions of 
which the ranges were still orderings, e.g. ~(A). They found impossibili-
ty results similar to Theorem 4.1. In their theorems "non-dictatorial" 
is replaced by "non-oligarchical",which means that there is not a group 
of individuals that is dictatorial as a group. 
There are many other impossibility theorems in which the range of the 
decision rule is changed. Most of these rules are treated in Kelly (1978). 
All the ranges which are discussed lead to unsatisfactory decision rules 
or new impossibility theorems. 
4.3 Introduction of infinite societies 
Up to now the societies had finitely many alternatives and finitely 
many individuals. There are, however, models with either an infinite set 
of individuals or an infinite set of alternatives. To both types of models 
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we will devote a few words. 
Kirman and Sondermann (1972) studied societies with an infinite num-
ber of individuals. They introduced a measure on this individual set and 
translated the Arrow-conditions of Theorem 4.1 to this new model. They 
found a result which is similar to 4.1, which means that the absence of a 
dictator is replaced by the absence of a coalition with measure zero, 
which is decisive in every situation. Noting that singletons of the set 
of individuals have measure zero, their result is comparable to Arrow's 
impossibility. 
Chichilnisky and Heal (1983) studied models with infinitely many al-
ternatives. In their model IIA is replaced by a continuity property and 
non-dictatorship by anonimity. The anonimity criterion guarantees simi-
lar rights for different individuals in similar situations. It is there-
fore slightly stronger than the non-dictatorship criterion. The conti-
nuity property seems to be weaker than IIA. It is noted here that these 
comparisons are purely intuitive since a logical one is impossible, be-
cause of the differences in the models. Although they have a condition in 
a topological description : the space of preferences is contractable which 
is necessary and sufficient to guarantee the existence of a Pareto-optimal, 
anonymous and continuous welfare function, it is difficult to interprete 
their result, just because of the topological nature of that condition. 
Hence one could be doubtful about the use of such a model in order to un-
derstand Theorem 4.1. 
4.4 Changes of the conditions of a welfare function 
It is possible to argue about the conditions imposed by Arrow on the 
welfare functions. One could claim that these are too restrictive and 
that this is the reason for the occurrence of Arrow's impossibility. 
In literature this has been one of the important rejective arguments of 
those who doubt the use of social choice theory. If we think that Arrow's 
conditions might be too restrictive, then we are exposed to a new and per-
haps even more difficult problem : Is it possible to substitute other con-
ditions for these three, such that the substitutes have a meaningful in-
terpretation and are still powerfull enough to exclude several of the 
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oddities discussed in section 2. 
Many substitutes for the conditions mentioned in section 3 have been 
investigated. They all caused new impossibilities. We will not deal 
with these new conditions, for those who like to read more about these, 
will find a considerable number of these conditions in Kelly (1978), 
Moulin (1983), Sen (1970) and Pattanaik (1978). We will make one excep-
tion. In Storcken (198 ) it is proved that there is no welfare function 
on a society with at least three alternatives fromJL(A)n totw(A), which 
is simultaneously Pareto-optimal, non-dictatorial and continuous. Since 
continuity is a weaker condition than IIA, it follows that the above men-
tioned assertion is a strengthening of Theorem 4.1. Moreover, this in-
dicates that the above stated problem is a difficult one. In section 5 
we will deduce a similar result to show how the theorem in Storcken 
(198 ) is established. 
4.5 Domain restrictions 
Instead of weakening the three conditions of Theorem 4.1 one could 
implicitly weaken them by restricting the domain of the welfare function. 
In an unrestricted domain every possible combination of, say, linear or 
weak or quasi-orderings is taken into account. This can be interpreted 
as that the society does not know anything more about the orderings of an 
individual than that it is linear, weak or a quasi-ordering. Hence domain 
restrictions can be interpreted as knowledge about the individual orde-
rings. 
This type of relaxation of the conditions of Theorem 4.1 led to possi-
bility theorems. Several necessary and sufficient sets of conditions, 
which indicate special types of domain restrictions, are found in corres-
pondence with the existence of special types of welfare functions. We 
mentioned already one, namely the theorem of Chichilnisky and Heal (1983). 
Another well-known result was deduced by Pattanaik and Sen (1969), who 
characterized the domains which admit pairwise majority rules. Other re-
sults on this subject of domain restrictions can be found in Kalai and 
Muller (1977), Ritz (1985), Storcken (1985) and many, many others. 
The problem with these characterizations is that they are very techni-
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cal and therefore very hard to understand in terms of social choice theory. 
Again we do not have a clear and satisfying answer to the problem how 
Theorem 4.1 is brought about. 
We end this section by mentioning that there are more types of efforts 
to understand the cause of Theorem 4.1, e.g. a game theoretical one, see 
Moulin (1983). None of these efforts, however, gives a clear answer to 
the posed problem. 
5. AN ILLUSTRATIVE IMPOSSIBILITY 
In this section a new impossibility theorem is proved to illustrate 
some of the techniques which are frequently applied to prove an impossi-
bility theorem. 
Throughout this section we suppose 
A {a 1 ,a2 , ... ,ap} and p ~ 3, 
N {1,2}, 
{x c A X ~ 0 and x ~ A} and 
f <A,N>. 
Hence r is a society with at least three alternatives and precisely two 
individuals. A is the set of non-trivial subsets of A. A can be seen as 
the set of (real) choices which one can make from A. 
Let G be a function from A x A to A. G can be interpreted as a de-
cision rule on r, which assigns to every possible combination of (real) 
individual choices a (real) collective choice. The author was inspired 
by Brams and Fishburn (1982) to study these functions. 
DEFINITION 5.1. 
G is Pareto-optimal if 
VX E A G(X,X) = X; 
G is dictatorial if 
VX,Y E A G(X,Y) X or VX,Y E A G(X,Y) 
G is continuous if 
1 2 1 2 VX ,X ,Y ,Y EA 
where 
1 1 2 2 
d 2 « x t Y > 1< X I Y )) ~ 
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Y; 
d2 (<x 1 ,Y 1 >,<x2 ,i>J :=I <x 1llx2 J U (Y 1lli) I and 
d(x 1 ,x2 J :=I x 1llx2 I for all x 1 ,x2 ,Y 1 ,Y2 EA. 
Notice that d and d2 are distance functions. Hence Definition 5.1 is 
just a translation of equally named conditions defined in section 2. 
THEOREM 5.2. If G is Pareto-optimal and continuous, then G is dictatorial. 
This theorem is a new impossibility theorem, since the continuity con-
dition is new (as far as the author knows) . The impossibility is similar 
to Arrow's impossibility. 
We will prove this theorem in steps. 
Observe that for every x1 ,x2 EA and Y1 ,Y2 EA it holds that 
d(X 1 ,Y 1) ;;; d(X 1 ,(A-X1)) = p. 
< 1 1> < 2 2> < d2 ( x , y , x • y ) ~ p. 
For every U E A define 
Covers(d,U,p) := {y EA VX EU d(X,Y) < p}; 
diag(U) = {<x,x> : x E u}; 
Covers(d2 ,diag (U) ,p) {<x,Y>EAxA v <z,z> E diag(U) 
d 2 (<x,Y>,<z,z> < p}; 
If X,Y E A u := {z E A X,Y z n x n y f 0 or (A-Z) n (A-X) n (A-Y) f O}. 
covers(d,U,p) is the subset of A whose elements are closer than p to 
any element of U. 
LEMMA 5.3. Let X,Y EA. Then <x,Y> E Covers (d2 ,diag (UX,Y) ,p). 
PROOF OF LEMMA 5.3. Let Z E U and X,Y E A. X,Y 
d 2 «x,Y>,<z,z>) =I xllz u zi'IY I= I A-([x n Y n z] u [(A-x) n (A-Y)n (A-z)Jll 
Hence by the definition of U it follows that d 2 (<x,Y>,<z,z>J < p, X,Y 
which completes the proof. D 
The following lemma strengthens the Pareto-optimality. 
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LEMMA 5.4. lfX,Y EA X n Y c G(X,Y) c XU Y. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 5.4. Let X,Y E A. Take Z = G(X,Y) EA and T EU X,Y 
By the Pareto-optimality of G it follows that 
G(T,T) = T. 
By the continuity of G we hav_e 
d(G<T,T>, G<x,Y>) ~ d2(<T,T>,<x,Y>). 
Hence by (5.4.1) and Lemma 5.3 it follows that d(T,Z) < p. 
Hence Z E Covers(d,U ,p). X,Y 
Notice that Covers(d,U ,p) {TE U (A-T) g U}. X,Y 
Hence (A-Z) g U X,Y 
This leads to (A-Z) n X n Y = 0 and (A-(A-Z)) n (A-X) n (A-Y) 
Hence X n Y c Z = G(X,Y) c XU Y. 
The following lemma is almost the result we are aiming at. 
LEMMA 5.5. Let X,Y EA such that X-Y ~ 0 and Y-X ~ 0. 
Then G(X,Y) E {x,Y}. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 5.5. Let Z = G(X,Y), 
c2 = (X n Z)-Y, c = <x n z n Y), c4 (Y n Z) -X, 3 
cl = x - (Y U Z), CS = y - (X U Z) and c = 6 A - (X u Y). 
By lemma 5.4 we have c3 = x n Y c z c c 2 u c 3 u c4. 
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(5 .4 .1) 
D 
Case 1 Suppose c 1 ¥ 0 and Cs ¥ 0. 
Notice d 2 c<c1 ,cs>,<x,Y>J I c 2 U c 3 U c 4 I. 
Hence by the continuity of G we have 
d(G(c 1 ,csl ,z) :;; I c 2 u c 3 u c 4 j. (S. s .1) 
By Lemma S.4 it follows that G(C1,CS) c c 1 U CS. 
Hence since G(c 1 ,cs) ¥ 0 we have 
d(G(c 1,csl ,z) > I c 2 u c 3 u c 4 I . 
This contradicts (S.S.1). 
Case 2 Suppose c 2 ¥ 0 and c 4 ¥ 0. 
Similarly to case 1 we can deduce a contradiction. 
Hence (c 1 = 0 or CS 0l and (c2 = 0 or c 4 = 0l. 
Using the assumptions X-Y ¥ 0 and Y-X ¥ 0 it follows evidently that 
G(X,Y) E {x,y}. 
The following result uses the fact that I A I G 3. 
LEMMA S.6. VX E A G(X,A-X) x or 
vx EA G(X,A-X) A-X. 
D 
Since < X ,A-X > represents a maximal conflict between 1 and 2, this 
theorem shows that either in every maximal conflict 1 completely wins or 
in every maximal conflict 2 completely wins. Hence in a maximal conflict 
there is no intermediate outcome. 
PROOF OF LEMMA S.6. Suppose : Y c X EA and X-Y = {x}. By Lemma S.S we 
have G(X,A-X) E {x,A-X}. Without loss of generality suppose G(X,A-X) = X. 
It is sufficient to prove that G(Y,A-Y) Y. Again by Lemma 5.S we have 
G(Y,A-Y) E {Y,A-Y}. Since d(X,A-Y) ~ 2 and 
d(G(X,A-X),G(Y,A-Y)) the proof is finished. 
= d 2 (<X,A-X>,<Y,A-Y>) G 
D 
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.2. By Lemma S.6 we only have to distinguish the follow-
Case 1 VX E A G(X,A-X) = A-X. We will prove that in this case the follow-
ing holds : VX,Y EA G(X,Y) = Y. Take X,Y EA. It is sufficient to 
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prove that G(X,Y) = Y. We are done if X = Y. Suppose X f Y. Then we 
have : p > d2c<x,Y>,<x,A-x>J = d(Y,A-X) -- d(G(X,Y) ,A-X) 5 .2 .1 
If X-Y f 0 and Y-X f 0, it follows by 5.5, 5.2.1, and the fact 
d(X,A-X) p, that G(X,Y) = Y. 
If X c Y or Y c X, it follows by 5.4 and 5.2.1 that G(X,Y) Y. 
Case 2 lfX E A G(X,A-X) = x: 
Similarly to case 1 it follows that VX,Y EA G(X,Y) x. D 
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